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ABSTRACT 
The thesis examines the evolving role of Islamic financial instruments in the 
modernisation of Islamic financial practices. Crucial to this process of modernisation is the 
proper appreciation of the impact and importance of selective Sharia opinions termed fatwa 
shopping in this thesis. Fatwa shopping involves selecting, reviewing, and combining Islamic 
juristic rulings in the form of fatwas (the plural of fatwa in English and it is also referred to as 
fatawa in Arabic). Using this approach, medieval Islamic rules and contracts are utilised on a 
functional basis and as a means of developing modern functional equivalents.  
The thesis argues that fatwa shopping continues the classical tradition of doctrinal 
selections (talfiq) made by Muslim jurists to find an interpretation that best fits the 
circumstances. The application of this approach finds expression in the views of Muslim 
scholars and Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs) and their Sharia Supervisory Boards (SSBs) 
reviewing and selecting various Islamic juristic rulings from different schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence to certify modern Islamic financial products and services. This approach 
recognises that medieval Islamic commercial contracts have significant problems in terms of 
feasibility and practicality in modern banking transactions. The thesis takes a middle path 
between legitimacy and practicality by allowing the development of Islamic financial 
instruments that obey Islamic juristic rulings but also take into account economic and financial 
considerations.  
Since financial institutions including IFIs are crucial to economic development and 
invariably involve risks to the economy, institutions, and consumers, regulation plays an 
important role in ensuring financial stability and risk management. Thus, it is important to 
contextualise the position of Islamic finance within the global financial system. Islamic 
financial institutions cannot be separated from the general regulatory framework and the 
management of risk. A key justification for the regulation of banking and financial institutions 
is to mitigate and prevent risks that may jeopardise the industry and the whole economy. This 
is reflected in both the public interest and economic theories of regulation. The government 
has a central role in risk regulation to protect the public from adverse consequences of banking 
and financial transactions through regulations that are primarily concerned with specifics risk 
in the financial industry. In the case of IFIs, it is not only government that has a central role in 
the development of financial products and the regulation of risks in Islamic finance. SSBs, as 
non-governmental bodies, provides substantive determinations as to whether a particular 
financial activity or instrument is Sharia compliant. Unlike conventional products, the character 
of Islamic financial products relies on Sharia compliance.  
 One of the main challenges for Sharia compliance is whether fatwas can accommodate 
modern risk management instruments. Risk management instruments are pivotal to managing 
and hedging risks. These include various forms of derivatives as well as insurance and limited 
liability corporations. As modern derivatives and insurance are considered essential to deliver 
benefits to the financial industry and the economy as a whole, modern Islamic finance should 
be able to adapt to this economic and risk management environment. Despite disagreements 
xviii 
 
Muslims scholars on whether modern instruments comply with Islamic law, the method of 
selective Sharia rules or fatwa shopping provides a mechanism for deriving modern fatwas on 
which to base Sharia compliant equivalents on derivatives, insurance, and limited liability 
corporations.   
In order to assess how IFIs actually operate in a financial system, the thesis examines 
Islamic finance in two jurisdictions: Indonesia and Australia. These two jurisdictions are 
selected as providing a comparison of a system that makes little or no accommodation for a 
very small Islamic finance industry (Australia) and Indonesia where fatwas are recognised in 
the local banking system; the validity of Islamic financial instruments depends not only on 
satisfying conventional regulatory requirements but also on SSBs certification of Sharia 
compliance. The legitimacy of local Islamic financial products and services operates through a 
non-state agency, Sharia Advisory Boards – Indonesian Ulama Council.  They set their own 
juristic rules. The fatwas produced by that body play an important role in harmonizing Sharia 
opinions in the Indonesian financial system. Local banking acts direct Indonesian regulators to 
adopt fatwas as a national benchmark. In addition, fatwas of that governing body allow the 
adoption of various juristic rules from different Islamic schools in defining local fatwas on 
Islamic finance. In contrast, in Australia there is decentralised Sharia regulation so that local 
IFIs develop their own Sharia justifications for products and services offered to the markets. 
Local regulators have no concerns on Sharia compliance aspects of those local IFIs.  
The thesis concludes that that selective Sharia rules or fatwa shopping has contributed to 
the modern development of Islamic finance. The method has been successful in harmonizing 
legitimacy and practicality of Islamic financial transactions with the needs of a modern 
financial system. 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Thesis Overview 
This thesis explores the growing practice in the modern Islamic finance industry to 
review, select, and combine rulings emanating from the various interpretations of Islamic law. 
The purpose of this is to provide legitimacy for the structuring of Islamic financial instruments 
for use in the market place. This is referred to in the thesis as fatwa shopping. Islamic finance 
itself refers to the means by which financial institutions and corporations conduct financial 
transactions in accordance with the principles of Sharia, or Islamic law.1 The terms Sharia and 
Islamic law are used interchangeably. Sharia compliance is the foundation for banks providing 
Islamic products and services. Since the receipt and payment of interest is religiously 
prohibited (haram).2 Islamic banks avoid this by adopting particular forms of Islamic contracts 
and arrangements, i.e. Musharakah, Mudharabah,3 and other mechanisms. These Islamic 
contracts are structured to produce a sharing and collaborative mechanism in the provision of 
                                                          
1 This law is derived from the primary sources namely the Qur’an and the practices and saying of the Prophet Mohammad 
(Hadits) and from the secondary sources of Islamic law: Ijma (consensus among ulama or Moslem scholars) and qiyas 
(analogical reasoning). Shariah encompasses all daily activities pertaining to the relationship between man and God, man 
and man, and man with its environments including animals. The great part of Shariah is found in the corpus of fiqh which 
often referred in the Western legal tradition as the science of Islamic law or jurisprudence, see H. Patrick Glenn, Legal 
Traditions of the World, Fourth Edition (Oxford University Press, 2010) 184-236. 
2 Discussion about whether interest is prohibited and reflects riba in the Quranic text has been massively debated in the 
contemporary discussion of Islamic economic and banking system. Mahmoud El Gamal, Islamic Finance, Law, Economics, 
and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2006) observes the controversy of so called “Islamic” financial products. 
Meanwhile, Abdullah Saeed, Islamic Banking and Interest (Brill, 1999) and Abdul Kadir Thomas (eds), Interest in Islamic 
Economics: Understanding Riba (Routledge, 2006) observe the questions of riba and the challenges facing of this term in 
the contemporary Islamic Banking and Finance industry.  
3 This thesis uses Bahasa Indonesia for transliteration. Musharakah is a contract between two parties whereby both parties 
contribute agreed proportion of capital in running a business. The profit is to be distributed according to the agreement 
meanwhile the loss is to be borne in proportion to capital contribution, see Muhammad Taqi Usmani, ‘The Concept of 
Musharakah and Its Application as an Islamic Mode of Financing’ (1999) 14(3) Arab Law Quarterly, 210. Meanwhile 
Mudharabah is a contract between two parties, one is a capital owner (shahibul maal) contributes money, and the other is 
an agent-manager (mudharib) contributes times and managerial skills. These two parties agree to commence a business 
venture. The profit will be shared between the two based on the profit ratio decided at the beginning of the contract and the 
loss will be borne by the capital owner, in Zamir Iqbal and Abbas Mirakhor, An Introduction to Islamic Finance: Theory and 
Practice (John Wiley & Sons (Asia), Pte Ltd, 2007) 110.  
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finance.4 Those contracts generate distinctive financial contractual arrangements, and affect 
the nature of risks, legal, governance, capital and liquidity requirements governing Islamic 
financial services.5  
Fatwa shopping is one of the most controversial issues in modern Islamic finance but 
surprisingly has not yet attracted much attention by Islamic finance scholars.6 Research in 
Islamic finance has disproportionately focused on agency theory in the Sharia certification 
process whereby fatwa shopping involves conflict of interests between fatwa seekers including 
bankers and finance institutions and Muslim jurists who issue fatwas on a particular product 
and service.7 The thesis aims to fill this vacuum by critically appraising a classical method in 
Islamic jurisprudence that is often used to select, review, and combine various Sharia opinions 
to justify a desired outcome in a particular case called talfiq, and examining the relationship 
between this traditional methodology in Islamic law and modern practices of fatwa shopping 
in contemporary Islamic finance.  
                                                          
4 Nicholas D. Ray, Arab Islamic Banking and the Renewal of Islamic Law (Graham & Trotman, 1995) and Mervyn K. Lewis 
and Latifa M. Algoud, Islamic Banking (Edward Elgar, 2001) 29. 
5 Mervyn K. Lewis and Latifa M. Algaoud, Islamic banking (Edward Elgar, 2001) 39-60, and Habib Ahmed, Product 
Development in Islamic Banking (Edinburgh Univ. Press, 2010) observed that Islamic contracts, its development and 
application in the Islamic banking industry. The nature of Islamic banking risks and its implications of the risk assessment 
method is discussed in Simon Archer and Rifat Ahmed Abdel Karim (eds), Islamic Finance: the regulatory challenge (John 
Wiley and Son, 2007) and Hennie van Greuning and Zamir Iqbal, Risk Analysis for Islamic Banks (the World Bank, 2008). 
Meanwhile, the governance structure of Islamic banks is explored in Zulkifli Hasan, Shari’ah Governance in Islamic Banks 
(Edinburgh University Press Ltd, 2012), and Zafar Iqbal and Mervyn K. Lewis, An Islamic Perspective on Governance 
(Edward Elgar, 2009). 
6 Various sources have identified the issue of fatwa shopping under the discussion of the Islamicity issues of Islamic finance 
transactions, see, eg, Barry Rider, ‘Corporate Governance for Institutions offering Islamic Financial Services’ in Craid R. 
Nethercott, et al (eds), Islamic Finance: Law and Practice (Oxford University Press, 2012) 172; Malik, M. Shaukat, Malik Ali, 
and Mustafa Waqas, ‘Controversies that Make Islamic Banking Controversial: An Analysis of Issues and Challenges’ (2011) 
2(1) American Journal of Social and Management Sciences 41; Ahmed, above n 5; Wafik Grais and Matteo Pellegrini, 
‘Corporate Governance and Shariah Compliance in Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services’, (2006) 4045 World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper 1, 9; Volker Nienhaus, ‘Human Resources Management of Islamic Bank: Responses to 
Conceptual and Technical Challenges’ in Simon Archer and Rifat Ahmed Abdul Karim, Islamic Finance: The Regulatory 
Challenge (John Wiley and Sons, 2007) 395; Mahmoud El-Gamal, ‘Contemporary Islamic Law and Finance: the Tradeoff 
between Brand-Name Distinctiveness and Convergence’ (2008) 1(6) Berkeley Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Law 
195, 199; M. Fahim Khan, ‘Setting Standards for Shariah Application in the Islamic Financial Industry’ (2007) 49(3) 
Thunderbird International Business Review 285, 286; and Saad Azmata, Michael Skully, Kym Brown, ‘The Shariah 
compliance challenge in Islamic bond markets’ (2014) 28 Paciﬁc-Basin Finance Journal 47.  
7 For the first discussion on this issue, see Grais and Pellegrini, above n 6, 9, Nienhaus in Archer and Karim, above n 6, and 
El Gamal, above n 6, 199. 
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The practice of fatwa shopping is closely related to risk management and regulatory 
demands in modern Islamic finance. Conventional counterparts have well-developed risk 
management processes as well as instruments that identify, measure, and manage various risk 
exposures. In contrast, Islamic banking and finance struggles to reconcile risk management 
demands by business entities both nationally and globally with the seemingly rigid stances of 
some Sharia scholars in the issue of Islamic legal edicts (fatwas). These restrictive approaches 
have effectively resulted in the proscription in the usage of financial instruments designed for 
risk management purposes even if utilised for legitimate commercial reasons.  
The development of Islamic finance puts in sharp focus the elaboration and 
implementation of corporate strategies not only for the competitiveness of enterprises seeking 
to operate within the confines of the economic doctrine of the Sharia, but also for their survival 
in the international market place. It has been widely acknowledged that the Islamic finance 
may not be sustainable in the long term without a proper risk regulation and management 
framework that can effectively deal with the complex risks that exist in today’s globalised 
economy.8 A particular challenge for the Islamic financial industry is financial stability.9   
This thesis first, examines the nature, causes, and consequences of fatwa shopping in the 
fields of Islamic banking, Islamic hedging and derivatives, Islamic insurance (takaful), and in 
relation to limited liability in Islamic law. Secondly, it examines how the practice of fatwa 
shopping contributes to the modern development of medieval Islamic juristic rules and 
provides a mechanism for the development of modern Islamic products and services which 
meet the needs of modern financial industry. Through the process of selection and adaptation, 
                                                          
8 See, Muhamad Umer Chapra, and Tariqullah Khan, “Regulation and Supervision of Islamic Banks” (2000) 3 Islamic 
Development Bank Review, Islamic Research and Training Institute, and Moody's, “Derivatives in Islamic Finance: 
Examining the Role of Innovation in the Industry” (Moody's Global Corporate Finance, 2010). 
9 Habib Ahmed, Mehmet Asutay and Rodney Wilson, Islamic Banking and Financial Crisis: Reputation, Stability, and Risks 
(Edinburg University Press, 2014) 1. 
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those traditional contracts can be re-engineered to accommodate modern financial transactions. 
And thirdly, the thesis suggests regulatory mechanisms that can be employed in Islamic finance 
to deal with the issue of conflicts in Sharia interpretations that are often claimed to inhibit 
standardisation and Sharia harmonisation in the industry.  
The methodology used throughout this thesis is based on doctrinal legal research. It 
adopts a positivist perspective in evaluating relevant laws and regulations. This approach views 
law and its inherent methodology as a self-contained system not requiring a separate research 
methodology.10 Using doctrinal legal research, the thesis analyses and evaluates the meaning 
and effectiveness of legal doctrine particularly Islamic law and how it has been developed and 
applied in modern financial transactions. The next section starts by providing a background to 
Islamic finance.  
 
1.2 Development of Islamic Finance   
Modern Islamic finance grew rapidly during the second-half of the 20th century.11 In 
1956, the Tabung Haji, a state-sponsored pilgrimage fund was established providing Malaysian 
Muslims a savings scheme free from interest (riba) for pilgrims to save for the purpose of 
performing hajj (pilgrimage) to Mecca.12  This type of fund management became a popular 
method of collecting and managing the funds for depositors and investing those funds in 
                                                          
10 Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research’ (2012) 17 Deakin 
Law Review 83, see also See Richard Schwartz, ‘Internal and External Method in the Study of Law’ (1992) 11(3) Law and 
Philosophy 179, 185. 
11 Frederic L. Pryor, “The Islamic Economic System” (1985) 9 Journal of Comparative Economics 197, 197, Thomas B. 
Pepinsky, “Development, Social Change, and Islamic Finance in Contemporary Indonesia” (2013) 41 World Development 
157, 158, and Shofwan Al Banna and Bhakti Eko Nugroho, “Indonesia’s Islamic Economy Project and the Islamic Scholars” 
(2013) 17 Procedia Environmental Sciences 957, 958, Imtiaz A. Pervez, “Islamic Finance” (1990) 5(4) Arab Law Quarterly, 
259, for critical views on Islamic finance, see Muhammad Anwar, “Islamicity of Banking and Modes of Islamic Banking” 
(2003) 18(1) Arab Law Quarterly, 62. 
12 For an interesting review on Islamization of economy in Malaysia, see Patricia Sloane-White, “Working in the Islamic 
Economy: Sharia-ization and the Malaysian Workplace” (2011) 26(2) Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia 304. 
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accordance to Sharia principles.13 In the 1960s, El Naggar established the Mith Ghamr project 
in a village of Egypt. This was the first experience of Islamic banking based on the profit 
sharing model.14  In the Middle East since the 1970s with the rapid increases in oil revenue and 
wealth, there was growing interest in financial investment based on religious tenets.15 This led 
to the establishment of some banking institutions dedicated to serve the needs of Muslim 
community based on Islamic law. In 1974, the first modern Islamic bank, the Dubai Islamic 
Bank, was established in the United Arab Emirates. This was followed by the establishment of 
the Islamic Development Bank in 1975.16 In the 1980s and 1990s, Islamic finance continued 
to grow in its traditional markets in the Middle East and South East Asia. This stage witnessed 
the involvement of Western banks to establish Islamic windows, branches, subsidiaries, and 
joint ventures to access lower cost Islamic finance. In the late 1990s, there was also growing 
number of Arab-based Islamic banks opening branches, subsidiaries, and joint ventures 
overseas in Malaysia, London, and some European countries. In the 2000s, there were two 
significant Islamic finance developments. The first was the expansion of Islamic finance in 
European countries, Africa, East Asia, and Americas.17 Second was the introduction of 
financial and governance infrastructure for Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs). These included 
the establishment of Accounting Auditing Organization for Islamic financial institutions 
(AAOIFI), the Islamic Financial Services Boards (IFSB), and International Islamic Financial 
Markets (IIFM). In the area of risk management, there were also a growing number of over-
the-counter (OTC) Islamic derivatives to mitigate the risks of IFIs with the involvement of 
                                                          
13 Ibid. 
14 Lena Rethel, “Whose Legitimacy? Islamic Finance and the Global Financial Order” (2011) 18(1) Review of International 
Political Economy 75. 
15 Ibrahim Warde, Islamic Finance in the Global Economy (Edinburgh University Press, 2001). 
16 Rethel, above n 13, 82. 
17 Alfred Kammer, et al, “Islamic Finance: Opportunities, Challenges, and Policy Options” (2017) 15(5) IMF Staff Discussion 
Note, 11. 
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International Swaps and Derivatives Associations (ISDA). These are discussed in chapters 2, 
5, and 6.  
Today, Islamic finance continues to grow with opportunities of becoming a player in 
international finance. It has been described as the industry that is “too big to be ignored”.18 At 
the end of 2017, Islamic financial assets globally were worth at US $2.44 trillion.19 These assets 
are predicted to continue to grow to US$3.4 trillion by the end of 2018 and available in 76 
different countries.20 This rapid growth has raised concerns by international financial 
authorities and organizations such as International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), and International Swap and Derivatives 
Associations (ISDA). Their concern is to ensure that Islamic financial institutions are 
financially stable, have sound products and have an effective service base providing a level 
playing field for the Islamic banking industry regionally and globally.21 The thesis addresses 
these concerns particularly in relation to the needs for derivatives instruments in the Islamic 
financial industry. This is discussed in chapters 5 and 6. Central to the thesis is the importance 
of fatwas in establishing standard requirements for modern Islamic financial transactions which 
is examined in the next section.  
 
 
                                                          
18 Maher Hassan and Jemma Dridi, ‘the effects of the Global Crisis on Islamic and Conventional Banks: A comparative 
Study’ (2010) 10 (201) International Monetary Fund Working Paper. 
19 Thomson Reuters, “Islamic Finance Development Report 2018: Building Momentum” [20/01/2019] 
https://repository.salaamgateway.com/images/iep/galleries/documents/20181125124744259232831.pdf. 
20 Ernst and Young, World Islamic Banking Competitiveness Report 2013-2014 (Report, Ernst and Young, 2014). 
21 Archer and Karim, n 6, 2. 
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1.3 Fatwa as a Driving Force of the Development of Islamic Law  
The development of Islamic law is greatly influenced by the roles of Muslim jurists 
(mufti) in  fatwa (fatawa is a plural form of fatwa)22 issuance for the changing needs of Muslim 
societies. A fatwa is an Islamic legal verdict issued by a qualified Shariah jurist or a mufti. A 
fatwa consists of a question (su’al, istifta) addressed to a mufti, together with an answer (jawab) 
provided by that mufti.23 The fatwa was instrumental in bringing legal change and the 
development of Islamic law.24 According to Schacht, the founders of Islamic legal schools 
(madhahib) in Sunni tradition were actively engaged in ifta, an activity of giving fatwa.25 
Islamic law reflects social and economic conditions and has grown with developments of state 
and society,26 where fatwas played its role as a social and legal instrument.27   
From the beginning, a fatwa was essentially private with no official sanction for those 
who abandoned it. The authority of a fatwa was based on the reputation of a Muslim legal 
scholar whose opinions  were voluntarily followed by a laymen with no official sanction.28 
Following the final establishment of major Islamic legal schools (madhahib) in Sunni 
traditions, Islamic governments started to appoint prominent Muslim scholars as official muftis 
to provide general public opinions on religious issues.29 Howeer, these official muftis had no 
monopoly of giving fatwas, and the private practice of ifta (a giving fatwa) by un-official 
scholars has never stopped.30   
                                                          
22 Fatawa is a plural form of fatwa. see Wael B. Hallaq, ‘From Fatwa to Furu: Growth and Change in Islamic Substantive 
Law’ (1994) 1(1) Islamic Law and Society 29, 31. 
23 Hallaq, above n.22.  
24 Joseph Schacht, Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964) 75.  
25 Ibid.  
26 Ibid.   
27 Hallaq, above n. 22, 31. 
28 Schacht, above n.24, 74.  
29 Ibid.  
30 Ibid.  
8 
 
In modern Islamic legal tradition, fatwa has become an accelerating factor in the growth 
and change in modern Islamic financial law. Hallaq suggested that any inquiry into the 
historical evolution and later development of Islamic legal doctrine must take account of the 
mufti(s) and their fatwas.31 As will be discussed thoroughly in this thesis, modern Islamic 
financial transactions are derived from various fatwas either from individual mufti or 
organisations such as the International Islamic Fiqh Academy of the Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC) and Sharia Advisory Boards of Indonesian Ulama Council.  
 
1.4 Fatwa as the Source of Islamic Legitimacy  
Modern Islamic finance institutions derive their Islamic legitimacy from various 
fatwa(s)32 issued by Muslim jurists or scholars.33 In issuing those fatwas, these scholars seek 
various juristic opinions from similar or different Islamic legal schools (madhahib) to structure 
Islamic financial transactions for use in the market place. These scholars may operate as 
members of a Sharia Board or Sharia Committee in Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs). At the 
macro level, scholars are employed by government bodies such as Central banks (as the peak 
regulator) to issue a fatwa for Shariah standards in Islamic products and services in a particular 
jurisdiction.34 At the micro level, scholars are hired by individual banks but may have different 
                                                          
31 Ibid, 65.  
32 Fatawa is a plural form of fatwa. A fatwa declaration is an Islamic legal verdict issued by a qualified Shariah scholars or 
mufti. A fatwa consists of a question (su’al, istifta) addressed to a mufti, together with an answer (jawab) provided by that 
mufti, see Wael B. Hallaq, ‘From Fatwa to Furu: Growth and Change in Islamic Substantive Law’ (1994) 1(1) Islamic Law 
and Society 29, 31. 
33 These scholars are assumed to have hybrid knowledge in Islamic law and a more technical knowledge of finance and 
economics. The main role of these scholars is to apply ijtihad that is interpretations of the Qur’an and the prophetic traditions 
of Muhammad (hadits) as the main sources of Islamic law. To a larger extent, these scholars rely on the interpretations and 
legal traditions of the four schools of law namely Maliki, Hanbali, Hanafi, and Shafii school of law (madhahib). 
34 In Indonesia, Undang-Undang Nomor 21 Tahun 2008 Tentang Perbankan Syariah [Law No 21 of 2008 on Islamic 
banking] [author’s trans] requires the central bank to adopt the fatwa of the National Shariah Council (DSN) – the Ulama 
Council of Indonesia (MUI), see Tim Lindsey, ‘Monopolising Islam: The Indonesian Ulama Council and State Regulation of 
the Islamic Economy (2012) 48(2) Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 253. Meanwhile in Malaysia, the Islamic Banking 
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functions. In Indonesia and Malaysia, the main function of these scholars is to harmonize the 
banking products with the centralized fatwas in their respective countries as well as to supervise 
the implementation of those fatwas in financial products and services. In other countries such 
as in Singapore, United Kingdom, and Kuwait, these scholars have authority or independent 
decisions to issue a fatwa on Islamic products and services.35  
Choosing and selecting Sharia opinions as a system of governance for Muslims activities 
including economic and financial matters has existed since the classical era of Islamic history, 
“in many times and places, merchants could choose the madhab [Islamic legal school] they 
wished to govern their transactions”.36 The process of choosing and changing religious 
guidance through fatwas is a result of rational debate and critical analysis within Islamic law 
resulting from changes to the business and social environment. Thus, a fatwa can be seen as a 
bridge to fill the gap between the ideal and the real.37 However, the character of a fatwa largely 
depends on particular juristic opinions adopted by Muslim jurists in creating that fatwa. Thus, 
character of fatwa may vary from static and restrictive to flexible and practical. This is 
discussed further in various themes related to the thesis particularly in chapter 2, 5, 7, and 8.   
Islamic legal tradition has provided legal diversity as a source of richness rather than 
difficulty.38 This diversity can occur in the absence of a dominant Islamic law authority or 
institutional hierarchy.39 As a result, the different interpretations among diverse Islamic schools 
                                                          
Act 1983 and the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009 established the Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) as the highest 
authority for reference in Islamic banking and finance matters.  
35 See, Rusni Hasan, et al., ‘A Comparative Analysis of Shari’ah Governance in Islamic Banking Institutions Across 
Jurisdictions’ (Research Paper No 50, International Shari’ah Research Academy for Islamic Finance (ISRA), 2013). 
36 Nicholas H.D. Foster, ‘Islamic Perspectives on the Law of Business Organisations I: An Overview of the Classical Shariah 
and a Brief Comparison of the Shariah Regimes with Western-Style Law’ (2010) 11 European Business Organization Law 
Review 3, 27.  
37 See Bryan S. Turner and Berna Zengin Arshan, ‘Sharia and Legal Pluralism in the West’ (2011) 14(2) European Journal 
of Social Theory 139. 
38 Ihsan Yilmaz, ‘Inter-Madhab Surfing, Neo-Ijtihad, and Faith-based Movement Leaders’ in Peri Bearman, Rudolph Peters 
and Frank E. Vogel (ed), The Islamic School of Law: Evolution, Devolution, and Progress (Harvard University Press, 2005) 
195.  
39 Adam Possamai, Bryan S Turner, Joshua Roose, Selda Dagistanli and Malcolm Voyce, ‘Defining the conversation about 
Shari'a: Representations in Australian newspapers’, (2013) 61 Current Sociology 626.  
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of thought (madhahib) are inevitable. This situation has prompted the practice of “picking up” 
the most favourable Islamic legal verdicts (fatwas). Since, there is no requirement that a 
restrictive single fatwa to be followed. This leaves the individual free to seek guidance from 
various fatwas from different madhahib. From this perspective, a growing practice of what the 
thesis calls fatwa shopping can be seen as an expression of legal pluralism whereby a party 
openly searches for a particular religious opinion that will satisfy the unique requirements of 
that individual.40  
Fatwa shopping is seen as a major issue by Islamic finance scholars. In the absence of 
the centralised fatwa institution that harmonises doctrinal views on Islamic products and 
services, financial institutions might seek a series of opinions to gain Sharia compliance.41 
Financial institutions may approach a number of Muslim jurists or scholars (simultaneously or 
consecutively) within the same or from different Islamic legal schools (madhahib) to provide 
religious opinions on financial contracts, products, and services.42 This procedure enables these 
institutions to receive a preferred fatwa based on their financial objectives.43 Furthermore, the 
thesis argues that the practice occurs due to the weak governance arrangements of the Shariah 
Supervisory Board (SSB) at the institutional level. As argued by Wafiq and Pellegrini, the 
practice is a result of conflict of interests in the process of Sharia supervision due to a dual 
relationship of the Sharia Supervisory Board’s (SSB) position as the employee and as the 
supervisor or assessor.44 Nienhaus45 and El-Gamal46 agree adding that its implications may 
weaken the process of supervision and undermine a sound Sharia pronouncement on Islamic 
                                                          
40 Bryan S. Turner, ‘Legal Pluralism, State Sovereignty, and Citizenship’, (2011) 7(4) Democracy and Security 317, 324. 
41 Rider, ‘Corporate Governance for Institutions offering Islamic Financial Services’ in Nethercott, et al (eds), above n 6, 172. 
42 See Shaukat, Ali, and Waqas, above n 6. 
43 The product proposal usually comes after banking practitioners, who have conventional financial training and 
expectations, build a product structure which tends to mimic a conventional financial product or a traditional practice that has 
been engineered by bankers and lawyers to fit into the conventional banking model. see Habib Ahmed, above n 5. 
44 Grais and Matteo Pellegrini, above n 6, 9. 
45 Nienhaus in Archer and Karim, above n 6, 395. 
46 El Gamal, above n 6, 199. 
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products and services. It has also been argued that fatwa shopping works against Sharia 
harmonisation in the industry.47 Differences in Sharia rules result in differences in reporting 
standards, financial auditing, and accounting treatment.48 This situation may jeopardize market 
discipline, as the market is unable to judge efficient players based on transparent and standard 
disclosures.49 Furthermore, this practice may increase Shariah risk and reputational risk that 
may reduce market trust.50 It has also been seen as creating moral hazard between the bank and 
its Sharia Board since they are involved in a transactional relationship in issuing Shariah 
certification.51  
In contrast to the existing literature that views fatwa shopping as a major problem in 
Islamic finance, the thesis argues that such a practice is part of the evolutionary process for the 
modernisation of Islamic finance. It provides a mechanism for reviewing and modernising 
traditional Islamic commercial contracts to accommodate the needs of modern banking and 
financial transactions.52 Fatwa shopping reflects legal diversity in Islamic legal tradition which 
promotes the development of modern Islamic finance enabling Islamic banks and financial 
institutions to remain competitive with products that meet the needs of consumers, business 
and global finance. It is one of the common methods used by modern scholars in deriving a 
Sharia compliant product.53  
                                                          
47 See Malik, Shaukat, Ali, and Waqas, above n 6, 14. 
48 Hennie Van Greuning and Z. Iqbal, Risk Analysis for Islamic Banks (2008, the World Bank) 176. 
49 Khan and Fahim, above n 6, 286. 
50 When the external stakeholders such as the investors or customers loss their confidence in Islamic banks due to the 
inconsistency in the work of Shariah supervisory boards when their decisions contradict each other. Shaukat, et al, above n 
6, p.14. See also, Abdul Karim Aldohni, the Legal and Regulatory Aspects of Islamic Banking: A Comparative Look at the 
United Kingdom and Malaysia, (Routledge, 2011) 107. 
51 Azmata, Skully, and Brown, above n 6.  
52 Razeen Sappideen, ‘The modernisation of Islamic Finance’, forthcoming. 
53 See, Frank E. Vogel and Samuel L. Hayes, III, Islamic Law and Finance: Religion, Risk, and Return (Kluwer Law 
International, 1998) 36, Walid Hegazy, “Fatwas and the Fate of Islamic Finance: A Critique of the Practice of Fatwa in 
Contemporary Islamic Financial Markets” in S. Nazim Ali (ed), Islamic Finance: Current Legal and Regulatory Issues 
(Islamic Finance Project, Islamic Legal Studies Program, Harvard Law School, 2005) 133-152, Habib Ahmed, above n 5, 47, 
and Barry Rider, ‘Corporate Governance for Institutions offering Islamic Financial Services’ in Craid R. Nethercott, et al 
(eds), above n 6, 172. 
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1.5 Scope of Research  
The primary focus of this thesis is fatwa shopping in modern Islamic financial 
transactions, and how this can successfully balance orthodoxy and efficiency. The efficiency 
and the need to accommodate modern financial instruments has led to the development of 
financial instruments bear little resemblance to classical Islamic contracts. The discussion of 
this thesis is limited to the discourse of Sunni Islamic schools of thought, namely the Hanafi, 
Maliki, Shafii, and Hanbali schools. Some cases in this thesis have been derived from the case 
of Indonesia and Malaysia. This research is relevant to jurisdictions offering Islamic finance 
and services.  
 
1.6 Structure  
The thesis consists of ten substantive chapters and a concluding chapter. A summary of 
each of the chapters follows.    
 
1.6.1 Modernisation of Islamic Financial Transactions  
Chapter 2 examines the nature and development of fatwa shopping as a method of 
modernising Islamic finance. This chapter views fatwa shopping as an inevitable and legitimate 
method of developing modern versions of medieval Islamic contractual forms. Fatwa shopping 
is viewed as a source of richness rather than difficulties and a continuation of the classical 
method of selective Sharia rules known as talfiq. This method allows the adoption of a 
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particular interpretation that best fits the circumstances, regardless of whether or not this 
interpretation come from the scholar’s own legal school.   
 
1.6.2 Regulatory Theory  
Chapter 3 explains how banking and finance regulation exists for preventing and 
mitigating financial risks. It discusses banking and finance regulations particularly in relation 
to risk management. Three different theories of regulation are elaborated to show that banking 
and finance including Islamic finance and banking is subject to regulatory concerns. One of 
the justifications for regulation of banking and finance is to mitigate and prevent risks that may 
jeopardise the industry and the whole economy. As part of the global financial regulatory 
regime, Islamic financial industry needs to harmonise between Sharia compliant and risk 
management aspects preventing risks in the industry.  
 
1.6.3 Hedging and Derivatives 
Chapter 4 examines the nature, types, and functions of risks and risk taking in the 
financial industry and discusses contractual agreements to manage and control risk exposures 
including derivatives instruments such as options, forwards, futures, and swaps contracts.  
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1.6.4 Derivatives and Islamic Law 
Chapter 5 discusses the need for derivatives in Islamic finance. It also examines key 
objections to derivatives in Islamic finance. Although derivatives instruments are new to 
Islamic financial law, the thesis examines the possibilities for Sharia compliant derivatives 
such as the development of so-called Islamic hedging through derivatives-like instruments. It 
also discusses Sharia compliant derivatives such as Islamic profit rate swaps. These contracts 
perform a similar economic function to that of conventional interest rate swaps. Interest rate 
swaps are the basic form of swaps in conventional derivatives that are widely used in 
derivatives markets. In a modern global regulatory regime, Sharia compliant derivatives need 
to be consistent with mainstream derivative instruments. This is discussed in chapter 6.  
 
1.6.5 Legal Frameworks for Sharia Compliant Hedging Derivatives 
Chapter 6 examines Islamic derivatives particularly the documentation of Sharia 
compliant hedging transactions called the ISDA/IIFM Tahawwut (Hedging) Master 
Agreement. The discussion focuses on the type of derivatives and hedging transactions that are 
accommodated in the Master Agreement as well as how it operates. The development of these 
instruments illustrates how different Islamic juristic rules can be used to develop effective 
Islamic derivative products which meet the needs of the economy and the financial market as 
well as Sharia compliance.  
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1.6.6 Islamic Insurance (Takaful)  
 Chapter 7 discusses how selective Sharia rules (Chapter 2) have been applied in creating 
Islamic insurance (known as takaful in Islamic finance terminology). Takaful is imperative as 
another risk management vehicle in Islamic finance along with derivatives. This chapter 
reviews and evaluates the Islamic juristic rules that have been utilised to form an Islamic 
insurance scheme for protection against risks. This scheme has distinctive characteristics 
compared to its conventional counterparts combining elements of a cooperative and 
commercial-based insurance with some modifications to conform to Islamic principles.    
 
1.6.7 Limited Liability in Islamic Law  
Chapter 8 deals with another pivotal concept in the area of risk management namely 
the limited liability corporation which is accepted by most of Islamic financial institutions 
(IFIs). Medieval Islamic juristic rules do not recognise a corporation as a legal entity, ‘artificial 
person’. A modern financial industry is virtually impossible without the corporation as a juristic 
entity. This chapter critically analyses various Islamic juristic rules on the legitimacy of the 
corporation. The limited liability corporation is central to development of modern contracts 
which enable expansion of business and industry as the risks to the capital owners are limited 
to their capital contribution to the corporation.  
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1.6.8 Islamic Finance in Indonesia 
The focus of Chapter 9 is the regulation of Islamic finance in Indonesia. It is an 
important illustration of how the regulatory framework has been adapted to formally 
recognised the important of the Sharia Advisory Boards – Indonesian Ulama Council (DSN-
MUI). These bodies, through fatwas, play an important role in harmonizing Sharia opinions for 
local financial institutions. Indonesia regulators are required to adopt their fatwas as national 
benchmarks.  
This chapter argues that the fatwas of the DSN-MUI are consistent with the global trend 
of financial fatwas allowing the adoption of various juristic rules in defining local Islamic 
financial forms.  
 
1.6.9 Islamic Finance in Australia  
In contrast to the position in Indonesia, in Australia there is no recognition in the 
regulatory framework of special needs for Islamic compliant products. Chapter 10 provides a 
general discussion of the regulation of IFIs in Australia. It examines the decentralised Sharia 
approach where local IFIs develop their own Sharia justifications for products and services 
offered to the markets. Unlike Indonesia, local regulators in Australia are not concerned with 
Sharia compliance aspects of those institutions. This creates issues for the industry which will 
be addressed in this chapter. The chapter also examines how local IFIs adopt the most common 
Islamic products such as murabahah-based financing (the term is referred differently in some 
jurisdictions). This product is considered as a product of the legalistic approach in Islamic 
finance (chapter 2).  
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1.6.10 Conclusion 
Chapter 11 concludes that selective Sharia rules or fatwa shopping has contributed to 
the modern development of Islamic finance. The method has been successful in harmonizing 
legitimacy and practicality of Islamic financial transactions with the needs of a modern 
financial system and discusses the way forward for future developments in Islamic finance.  
The chapter following, chapter 2, examines the nature and development of fatwa 
shopping as a method of modernising Islamic finance. 
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CHAPTER 2: MODERNISATION OF ISLAMIC FINANCIAL 
TRANSACTIONS 
2.1 Introduction 
A key issue for Islamic finance is how to modernise disparate sets of Islamic contracts 
created by medieval Muslim scholars. This is not a simple task considering that these contracts 
have fallen into disuse in most Muslim countries,1 where Islamic rules on financial transactions 
have been mostly displaced by European law.2 Modern financial instruments and concepts such 
as risk management techniques including derivatives, legal personality and corporate limited 
liability, and insurance, bear no resemblance to medieval Islamic financial transactions.3 The 
reason for the focus on modernising medieval financial transactions is because there were 
accepted as the embodiment of financial transactions which complied with the fundamental 
principles and precepts of Islamic law.    
With this in mind, the pivotal question is how an emerging “Islamic” methodology can 
adapt Islamic financial instruments to meet modern expectations. The three basic options are: 
first, one could adopt juristic rules of one particular school of Islamic legal thought (madhab). 
This approach limits the acceptable rules that might be derived from a single school and is 
restrictive in nature. Second, some fusion of the jurisprudence from the four schools could be 
undertaken. This provides a solution where there are no criteria on how different juristic rules 
can be stitched together pragmatically and when the legitimacy of combining juristic rules of 
the four schools is a matter for debate. This chapter argues that this approach could be 
                                                          
1 Haider Ala Hamoudi, ‘Present at the Resurrection: Islamic Finance and Islamic Law’ (2011) Legal Studies Research Paper 
Series, 1109.  
2 Ibid 1109.  
3 These modern concepts have been a focus of this thesis where Islamic finance replicate existing those concepts as closely 
as possible in legal and economic substance through adjustments of various Islamic medieval juristic rules so as to enable 
them to comply with Islamic prohibitions in a formal manner.  
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defensible as a means of meeting the modern needs of Islamic finance. The third possible 
approach is to adopt a new methodology so that the original sacred texts can be reinterpreted 
in a way that provides scope for modernising financial instruments – a process referred to as 
the reopening the gates of ijtihad (individual intellectual effort and wider independent 
reasoning).4    
It is argued that the most appropriate methodology is the second option. That is, current 
Islamic financial rules are selected from all four schools on a functional basis, that is, favouring 
rules that operate best under modern circumstances. This model is often called the pragmatic 
approach. It utilises a legalistic tool in Islamic jurisprudence termed as talfiq (amalgamation of 
various Sharia rules). It provides a mechanism for reviewing and modernising traditional 
Islamic commercial contracts to accommodate the need for modern banking and financial 
transactions.5  
This chapter proceeds as follows. It begins by examining the source of Islamic rules for 
Islamic finance particularly the importance of fatwas (Islamic legal verdicts) in legitimizing 
Islamic financial products and services. It then highlights the approaches to modernising 
Islamic finance to determine the most appropriate method for the development of modern 
financial contracts and instruments. This is followed by a discussion of the legitimacy of 
legalistic and selective juristic rules and how this would apply in practice.  
 
                                                          
4 Hamoudi, above n 1, 1114-1115.  
5 Razeen Sappideen, ‘The modernisation of Islamic Finance’, forthcoming.  
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2.2 Sources of Islamic Finance Law 
In theory, the term Islamic finance refers to financial products or services which are based 
on, or comply with, either the primary or secondary sources of Islamic law. The primary 
sources are often called revealed sources of Islamic law derived from the Qur’an (the Holy 
Book) and the Sunnah (traditions based on the hadith, sayings and actions of the Prophet 
Muhammad, peace be upon him). The secondary sources are the non-revealed sources 
developed by Muslim jurists after the revelation of the primary ones including ijma (consensus 
on a point of law), qiyas (a sub-ijtihad species of strict analogical reasoning), and other 
authoritative sources.6 In supporting a legal proposition in Islamic law, Muslim jurists in Sunni 
traditions should be based on either a verse of the primary sources or an interpretation by 
Muslim jurists on those primary sources.  
The Qur’an provides general principles, the Sunnah then operates in a similar fashion to 
case law, consistent with the Quranic principles. In other words, the Sunna embodies the 
application of the Qur’an to concrete disputes and hypothetical questions that arose during the 
prophet’s life.  If the resolution of a new case cannot be found in the Qur’an and the Sunnah, 
then scholars will endeasvour to find a Sharia rule by interpreting those primary sources.7 For 
instance, in the case of the prohibition of riba which is found literally in the Qur’an,8 there is 
no dispute on this prohibition among the four major Islamic legal schools (madhahib). 
However, the Qur’an does not clearly define what is riba. Classical Muslim jurists then turned 
to the Sunnah to understand what riba was. Although the translation of riba in the modern 
                                                          
6 These sources have been developed by Muslim scholars through a certain methodology called Ijtihad as the “maximum 
effort expended by the jurist to master and apply the principles and rules of usul al-fiqh (legal theories) for the purpose of 
discovering God’s law”, see Wael B. Hallaq, ‘Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?’ (1984) 16(1) International Journal of Middle 
East Studies.  
7 See David M. Eisenberg, “Sources and Principles of Islamic Law” in Craig R. Nethercott and David M. Eisenberg, Islamic 
Finance: law and Practice (Oxford University Press, 2012) 15-53. 
8 Qur’an, 2: 272-80. 
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Quranic translation is often referred to as “interest”, classical jurist did not draw on such a 
conclusion.9 As will be seen below there are various opinions on what qualifies as ‘interest’. 
In modern terminology, interest has many forms ranging from simple interest to compound 
interest. It is the percentage that a borrower of money must pay to the lender in return for the 
use of money. In its simplest form, interest is paid on the principal only and for compound 
interest, it is paid on both the principal and the previously accumulated interest.10 One of the 
leading Sunna texts reported in various compilations including Bukhari, Muslim, Tirmidhi, and 
Ibn Maja is as follows:  
“Gold for gold, silver for silver, wheat for wheat, barley for barley, dates for dates, salt 
for salt, like for like, hand to hand, and whoever increases it or demands more is engaged 
in riba, both the one who takes it, and the one gives it”.11  
This hadith deals with the prohibition of trade in classical currencies. The application to 
modern interest-based banking requires an interpretative process as money today is no longer 
based on any sort of gold standard and in the case of digital currency not based on physical 
notes and coins.   
There are different views on whether the modern banking interest is part of the riba. 
Some argue that interest is not inherently evil and that the term riba does not include modern 
bank interest.12 For example, Sheikh-al-Azhar Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi issued a fatwa 
when he was the Mufti (an official expounder of Islamic law) of Egypt that permits Muslim to 
access interest-based banks.13 Mohammad Hatta, one of the founding fathers of Indonesia and 
                                                          
9 Haider Ala Hamoudi and Mark Cammack, Islamic Law in Modern Courts (Wolters Kluwer, 2018) 480. 
10 Black’s Law Dictionary, (9th Edition, West, 2009) 886. 
11 Hamoudi and Cammack, above n 9, 480. 
12 Alexandre Ceiro, “The Social Construction of Sharia: Bank Interest, Home Purchase, and Islamic Norms in the West” 
(2004) 44(3) Die Welt des Islams 351, 352.  
13 The essence of his fatwa is that the bank’s depositors should be viewed as passive investors and banks should be viewed 
as their investment agents. Focusing on the liabilities side of the bank’s interest, he viewed that bank’s depositors are 
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a leading economist, argued that bank interest was not identical with riba as long as it is used 
for productivity not for consumptive purposes.14 The predominant opinion is that banking 
interest is part of the riba. The divergence of opinion does not occur in the fundamental 
principles of Sharia,15 but rather in its application to individual cases.16 This is why some 
commentators argue that Islamic law has not been received as ready-made rules for 
implementation.17 The interpretation of its sources can take the form of a fatwa and is in essence 
an interpretative process.18 This can lead to different opinions among Sharia scholars.19  
Since modern financial transactions such as payment of interest do not resemble any 
classical Islamic contracts, prohibition would not be found in the primary or secondary sources 
of Islamic law.20 It is the role of contemporary Muslim jurists and scholars to determine the 
permissibility of these transactions and any alternatives. The mechanism for Islamic 
certification of Sharia compliance is through fatwas (Islamic legal verdicts). These fatwas are 
developed through a process of selection, interpretation, adaptation, and modification of 
various Sharia opinions developed by the four prominent Islamic jurisprudence schools 
(madhahib) in Sunni traditions (Hanafi, Maliki, Shaffi, and Hanbali).  
                                                          
entitled to receive a profit as a percentage of their capital, see Mahmoud A. El-Gamal, ‘Interest and the Paradox of 
Contemporary Islamic Law and Finance’ (2003) 27(1) (6) Fordham International Law Journal 108, 109-110. 
14 See, eg, Muhammad Hatta, Beberapa Fasal Ekonomi, Djalan ke Ekonomi dan Bank (Dinas Penerbitan Balai Pustaka, 
1958), 170-187; and Dawam Rahardjo, ‘Questions of Islamic Banking in Indonesia’ in Mohamed Ariff (eds), Islam and the 
Economic Development of Southeast Asia. Islamic Banking in Southeast Asia (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 137, 
138. 
15 For example, there is no dispute on faith issues, i.e. the unity of Allah, the prophecy of Muhammad, and the authenticity of 
the Qur’an. There is also no major divergence on how the five pillars of Islam, such as the five daily prayers, fasting, and 
pilgrimage, are performed. 
16 Ahmed Alkhamees, A Critique of Creative Sharia Compliance in the Islamic Finance Industry (Brill, 2017), 96. 
17 Bernard Weiss, ‘Interpretation in Islamic Law: The Theory of Ijtihad’ (1978) 26(2) The American Journal of Comparative 
Law 199.  
18 Mohd. Daud Bakar, ‘The Sharia Supervisory Board and Issues of Sharia rulings and Their Harmonization in Islamic 
Banking and Finance’ in Simon Archer and Rifaat Ahmed Abdel Karim (ed), Islamic Finance: Innovation and Growth 
(Euromoney Books and AAOIFI, 2002) 83. 
19 Ibid. 
20 For instance, a murabaha (cost plus profit) financing in Islamic bank does not reflect an original murabahah found in 
classical Islamic commercial law (fiqh muamalat). This product is structured by combining several arrangements such as 
waa’d (promise) and wakalah (agency contract). This will be further discussed somewhere in this chapter.  
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The next section illustrates the application of the prohibition of riba from an ideal into 
the current Islamic financial industry.  
 
2.3 From Ideal to Pragmatic: The Road to a Modern Financial System  
2.3.1 The Ideal  
Modern Islamic finance is more than just a rule that bank interest is unlawful in Islamic 
law. In the period from the 1950s to the 1960s, Islamic finance was envisaged as part of an 
ideological project referred to as “Islamic economics”. This was meant to be distinct from the 
dominant paradigms of Marxism and Capitalism.21 During this period, Islamic finance was 
directed to securing social justice and economic opportunity for those in need, while 
simultaneously adhering to Islamic legal and moral principles.22 Islamic finance was then 
designed to alleviate the economic hardship of Muslims.23 It was believed that Islam 
encompasses not only religious ritual, but also social and economic aspects. Thus, Islam was 
seen as having its own economic system whilst rejecting Western economic systems notably 
interest-based financial institutions in Muslim countries.24  
This view was adopted by Mit Ghamr in Egypt. This local rural saving bank was 
established in the 1960s creating a profit and loss sharing mechanism to replace interest-based 
banking system.25 The institution provided financing to the poorest of potential borrowers not 
                                                          
21 Hamoudi and Cammack, above n 9, 478. 
22 See, eg, Walid S. Hegazy, ‘Contemporary Islamic Finance: From Socioeconomic Idealism to Pure Legalism’ (2007) 7(2) 
Chicago Journal of International Law 581, 583; Abdullah Saeed, ‘Islamic Banking and Finance in Search of a Pragmatic 
Model’ in Victoria Hooker and A. Saikal, Islamic Perspectives on the New Millennium (Singapore: ISEAS, 2004) 113-129. 
23 The Muslim Brotherhood Movements and Ahmad Al-Najjar in Egypt are a starting point to discuss this model, see Hegazy, 
above n 64, 583, see also Delwin A. Roy, “Islamic Banking” (1991) 27(3) Middle Eastern Studies 427. 
24 Hegazy, above n 22, 583.  
25 Ann Elizabeth Mayer, ‘Islamic Banking and Credit Policies in the Sadat Era: The Social Origins of Islamic Banking in 
Egypt’ (1985) 1(1) Arab Law Quarterly 32. 
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served by existing institutions.26 This local savings bank utilised non-usurious financial 
products, and implemented profit and loss sharing arrangements in its intermediary role.27 The 
founder believed that these equity based partnerships could help to rebuild Muslim societies, 
not only by financing large projects, but also by promoting entrepreneurship and strengthening 
small businesses.28 Thus, it could promote social justice, alleviate poverty, develop the local 
economy, and provide equal access to credit.29   
This earliest model relied on Islamic finance to alleviate poverty in Muslim societies. 
This is contrary to the current practice where the legitimacy of Islamic finance is derived among 
others from the fatwa certification of an authority employed to determine what is prohibited 
and what is permissible. This is argued in later sections of this chapter and subject to analysis 
in Chapters 10 and 11. For the idealist, the legitimacy relies on the ability of Islamic finance to 
protect the broader Muslim polity or the Muslim poor, rather than maximising profits of the 
investors and shareholders.30  
In this period, Islamic finance was imagined as a riba free (an interest free) model which 
relied on the mechanism of profit and loss sharing. This mechanism was built on a type of  
Islamic-based partnership contracts known as Musharakah and Mudharabah.31 These contracts 
create a sharing and collaborative mechanism between what Western financial systems would 
                                                          
26 Mayer, above n 25, 38. 
27 Rania Kamla and Rana Alsoufi, “Critical Muslim Intellectuals’ Discourse and the Issue of Interest (riba): Implications for 
Islamic Accounting and Banking” (2015) 39 Accounting Forum 140, 141. 
28 See for instance, Hegazy, above n 22, 585. 
29 M. N. Siddiqui, ‘Islamic Banking: True Modes of Financing’ (2001) New Horizon 15.  
30 He further argues that Sharia compliant commutative structures and mutual cooperatives might support economic 
development within Muslim communities, see Hamoudi, above n 1, 1120.  
31 Musharakah is a contract between two parties whereby both parties contribute agreed proportion of capital in running a 
business. The profit is to be distributed according to the agreement meanwhile the loss is to be borne in proportion to capital 
contribution, see Muhammad Taqi Usmani, ‘The Concept of Musharakah and Its Application as an Islamic Mode of 
Financing’ (1999) 14(3) Arab Law Quarterly, 210. Meanwhile Mudharabah is a contract between two parties, one is a capital 
owner (shahibul maal) contributes money, and the other is an agent-manager (mudharib) contributes times and managerial 
skills. These two parties agree to commence a business venture. The profit will be shared between the two based on the 
profit ratio decided at the beginning of the contract and the loss will be borne by the capital owner, in Zamir Iqbal and Abbas 
Mirakhor, An Introduction to Islamic Finance: Theory and Practice (John Wiley and Sons (Asia) Pty Ltd, 2007) 110.  
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regards as borrowers and lenders.32 Under a mudharabah for instance, a bank is composed of 
two silent partnerships, first, the bank is financier vis-à-vis those who need capital, who are the 
working partners. Second, the depositors are the financiers vis-à-vis the bank, which is the 
working partner. As such, profits flow from the borrowers to the bank, and then to the 
depositors.33  
According to the advocates of the idealist approach, the profit sharing mechanism 
promotes brotherhood whereby a financial institution and its clients share profits or losses in 
some form of solidarity.34 This contrasted with the ordinary interest-based finance, where, the 
capital owners or shareholders earn their money at the expense of labour, irrespective of the 
amount of money actually earned by labour in its productive activities.35 A well-known 
advocate of the idealist approach is Iraqi Shi’i Scholar Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. He argued 
that interest taking is not efficient because the financier has no interest in whether or not the 
venture in which they invest is in fact profitable. The financier is guaranteed a profit either 
way. The same is not true in a two tiered silent partnership, where the financier only makes a 
profit if the venture is profitable.36  
Nowadays Islamic finance has moved away from the ideal of sharing, solidarity, and 
partnership because of its impracticality and inefficiency. The problems include the issue of 
higher risk and transactional costs, moral hazards, incentive issues,37 and the difficulty of 
                                                          
32 Nicholas D. Ray, Arab Islamic Banking and the Renewal of Islamic Law (Graham & Trotman, 1995) and Mervyn K. Lewis 
and Latifa M. Algoud, Islamic Banking (Edward Elgar, 2001) 29. 
33 Hamoudi and Cammack, above n 9, 484.  
34 These advocates include Egyptian Islamist Sayyid Qutb and Pakistani Abul A’la al-Maududi, see Hamoudi and Cammack, 
above 9, 484. 
35 The influence of Marxist thought on Islamic economics in its origin is perhaps obvious given that given these references to 
owners of capital and providers of labor and the exploitation of the latter by the former, see Hamoudi and Cammack, above 
9, 484. 
36 This idea has dominated literatures of Islamic finance where profit and loss sharing has been perceived as the ideal 
model of Islamic finance, see Hamoudi and Cammack, above n 9, 484, see also Ibrahim Warde, Islamic Finance in the 
Global Economy (Edinburg University Press, 2nd edition, 2014) 146. 
37 More discussion on this issue, see Mervyn K Lewis, Mohamed Ariff, and Shamsher Mohamad (ed), Risk and Regulation 
of Islamic Banking (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014) 28.  
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competing with conventional financial institutions. In this environment, Islamic financial 
institutions (IFIs) strive to maintain a level of confidence in its operation. Additional issues 
arise such as the use of a profit benchmark to interest-based system (this will be discussed in 
paragraph 5.4.2 of Chapter 5), and displaced commercial risk where Islamic banks are under 
pressure to pay its investors-depositors a rate of return higher than what should be payable 
under the “actual” terms of the investment contract. This can occur when a bank underperforms 
and is unable to generate adequate profits for distribution to the account holders.38 Nowadays, 
the profit sharing mechanism is only a minor part of Islamic financial industry.39 
As Islamic finance has not been successful in operating on the basis of profit and loss 
sharing principles as advocated by the idealist approach, Islamic finance has been then 
dominated by the pragmatist as explained below.    
 
2.3.2 Pragmatism in Islamic Finance  
Islamic finance has been under pressure to develop equivalents to modern financial 
instruments. This pragmatic approach not only purifies, but also replicates existing 
conventional financial practices through adjustments to various medieval Islamic juristic 
rules.40 This approach considers the various ways of creating modern Islamic products and 
services in sometimes unorthodox and liberal ways.41 This approach recognises problems of 
                                                          
38 Hennie van Greuning and Zamir Iqbal, Risk Analysis for Islamic Banks (World Bank Publications, 2008) 176 
39 Warde, above n 36. 
40 Hegazy, above n 22, 602. 
41 Alexandre Ceiro, ‘The Social Construction of Sharia: Bank Interest, Home Purchase, and Islamic Norms in the West’ 
(2004) 44(3) Die Welt des Islams 351-375, 352. 
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feasibility and practicality in the reliance on profit and loss sharing arrangements and seeks to 
balance practicalities with traditional Islamic principles.42 
The pragmatic approach has been successful in recasting the conventional financial 
transactions into Islamic forms through various legalistic tools derived from Islamic 
jurisprudence.43 It mimics and replicates most conventional financial products and services. 
This trend was inevitable because in most jurisdictions Islamic finance co-exists with its 
conventional counterparts. It also reflects the change in focus for Islamic financial institutions 
from poverty reduction to investor and bank profits.44 In such an environment, efficiency, 
competitiveness, and profitability emerge as main contributing factors for the advance of 
Islamic financial institutions. This approach is a choice for economic and financial efficiency 
rather than social benefits of Islamic financial transactions.45  
The next section discusses the application of the pragmatic approach through the 
selection of various Sharia rules in structuring and developing modern Islamic finance 
transactions. Under this method, various Sharia opinions in the form of fatwas have been a rich 
source to structure Sharia compliant financial products and services.  
 
2.4 The Role of Selective Sharia Rules in Modern Islamic Finance  
The pragmatic approach utilises various Sharia opinions in fatwas as a basis for 
structuring Islamic banking and finance products. These opinions are derived from four Islamic 
                                                          
42 Abdullah Saeed, ‘Islamic Banking and Finance in Search of a Pragmatic Model’ in Victoria Hooker and A. Saikal, Islamic 
Perspectives on the New Millennium (Singapore: ISEAS, 2004) 113-129.  
43 Hegazy, above n 22. 
44 Abdul Rahim Abdul Rahman, ‘Islamic Banking and Finance: Between Ideals and Realities’ (2007) 15(2) International 
Islamic University Malaysia Journal of Economics and Management 123, 127.  
45 Mahmoud El Gamal, Islamic Finance, Law, Economics, and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2006).  
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legal schools (madhahib) in Sunni traditions. Thus, the vast compendia of norms and rules 
developed by medieval Muslim jurists are reviewed, selected, modified, and structured to 
enable modern financial transactions.  
 
2.4.1 Talfiq (Selection of Sharia Opinions) and its Legitimacy  
In Sunni traditions, selection and combination of various Sharia opinions is referred to 
as talfiq.46 Where there is a conflict of opinions in deriving Sharia rules or conflicting fatwas 
given to a lay person (a muqallid). It is the absence of strong evidence favouring one over 
another, the jurists and the layperson can choose between legal opinions,47 both inside and 
outside the particular school (madhab), that best fits their circumstances.48 This method is 
viewed as a “pragmatic eclecticism”.49 This may also involve the adoption of “weak” and 
discredited opinions from the school, as well as opinions held by other schools enabling the 
harvesting of opinions from various schools.50 This method could also lift seemingly “out of 
date” restrictions, 51 and create a new positive law from the “the virtual dispersal-cum-
                                                          
46 See Ahmed Fekry Ibrahim, “Talfiq/Takhayyur” in the [Oxford] Encyclopedia of Islam and Law, Oxford Islamic Studies 
Online, [18/03/2018], <http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t349/e0082>. Some also refer to the term takhayyur 
as a moderate form of talfiq. According to Coulson, “The review of the mass of variant views which the method of takhayyur 
entailed had brought about a growing consciousness of the human and therefore fallible nature of the bulk of traditional 
Sharia doctrine; and the validity of the thesis that the juristic speculations of medieval scholars were binding upon modern 
generations naturally began to be questioned. Traditional principles now appeared in relation to certain problems as a 
formidable barrier to the further progress that modernism desired”, see N. J. Coulson, History of Islamic Law (Edinburgh 
University Press, 2011) 201.    
47 Ibrahim, above n 46.   
48 See Albert Hourani, Arabic Thoughts in the Liberal Age 1798-1939 (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 152-153. 
49 Ahmed Fekry Ibrahim, Pragmatism in Islamic Law: A Social and Intellectual History (Syracuse University Press, 2015). 
50 Wael B. Hallaq, an Introduction to Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 117. 
51 Birgit Krawietz, ‘Cut and Paste in Legal Rules: Designing Islamic Norms with Talfiq’ (2002) 42(1) Die Welt des Islams, 
New Series 3. 
29 
 
restructuring of Sharia law”.52 This alleviates the hardship suffered by a particular doctrine in 
a particular circumstance,53 and provides a methodology as the basis for reform.54  
Talfiq has been commonly utilised by four legal actors: consumers of the law, judges, 
juris-consultants and author jurists. Consumers of the law include subjects of the law, laypeople 
and jurists in their capacity as consumers of the law such as litigants and fatwa-seekers not 
only on ritual and moral matters but also for financial and economic matters.  The other 
categories are judges (qadis), Muslim jurists (mufti), and author jurists (jurists who compile 
law books, creating, justifying, modifying, and codifying legal doctrine).55 One would assume 
that, given the choice, rational legal authorities and subjects would attempt to engage in forum 
and doctrinal shopping to facilitate their transactions.56 Some also argue that talfiq can be 
utilised by legislators to write codes that are more compatible with modernity.57 According to 
Schacht, it was only the Modernists who abandoned the principle of abiding by the rules of one 
school when temporarily changing one’s madhab (an Islamic legal school).58 In the case of 
Islamic finance, talfiq might be used by Muslim scholars who are working closely with bankers 
and financial consultants in confirming the legitimacy of a particular modern financial product.   
Although some classical Muslim scholars rejected talfiq in deriving Sharia rules,59 other 
scholars supported it as legitimate.60 There are some seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
fatwas concerning its validity.61  The 17th century Mufti known as Mar’i, he is said to have 
                                                          
52 See Hallaq, above n 50, 117. 
53 Coulson prefers to use the term takhayyur rather than talfiq, see Coulson, above n 46, 192.  
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibrahim, above n 46, 4.  
56 Ibid.  
57 Norman Anderson, Law Reform in the Muslim World (Athlone Press, 1976) 34-80. 
58 Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Clarendon Press, 1964) 68.  
59 Those who rejected including Ibn Khaldun arguing that criticized that some mufti satisfying the whims of their fatwa 
seekers (mustaftis), issued fatwas using the different schools for their arbitrary practice, which lacked any normative 
guidelines, see Lutz Wiederhold, ‘Legal Doctrines in Conflict: The Relevance of Madhhab Boundaries to Legal Reasoning in 
the Light of an Unpublished Treatise on Taqlid and Ijtihad’ (1996) 3 Islamic Law and Society 234, 252. 
60 See, eg, Ibid; Ibrahim, above n 49, 83; and Wiederhold, above n 59, 247.  
61 See for more discussion on this issue in Krawietz, above n 51, 13-15. 
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been one of the greatest Hanbali scholars in Egypt, issued a fatwa declaring “the permissibility 
of talfiq within taqlid” although not with the deliberate intention to look around for easy 
solutions which is sinful.62 There is support for approaching a jurist from a different school for 
the purpose of obtaining a more advantageous view which is legitimize by consensus among 
Muslim scholars.63 Promotion of common or public interest (maslaha) is also relevant in 
choosing the easier of two things.64  
In recent times, Talfiq was also made permissible when state officials such as judges and 
legislators, used it to write modern codes.65 It is also supported by the paradigm of ikhtilaf 
(different opinions among Muslim scholars).66 Historically, the status of talfiq changed once 
the Mufti Mar’i issued a fatwa on the permissibility of the practice of talfiq.67 This fatwa 
recognises that this method is easier and it is normal for people to follow what is easier for 
them as a practical social need,68 and in the case of muamalat (commercial transactions) is 
necessary for the interest of people and their well-being.69 More so where there are no clear 
texts in the Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad disapproving talfiq.70 Changing 
madhab in contemporary Muslim society is seen as inevitable especially for a layperson not 
strictly adhering to a particular school of Islamic law.71  
                                                          
62 Ibid 16. 
63 Wiederhold, above n 59, 253.  
64 Krawietz, above n 51, 19.  
65 Anderson, above n 57.  
66 Following this complaint, it is found in history that a decree was issued ordering muftis to be confirmed by the chief of 
judges of their madhab. Before this decree, a mufti only after having received formal permission to deliver a legal opinion 
from a senior representative of his own madhab, see for more discussion on this issue in Wiederhold, above n 59, 252.  
67 Ibrahim, above n 49, 86. 
68 Ibid 92.  
69 Muhammad Tahir Mansoori, ‘Is “Islamic Banking” Islamic? Analysis of Current Debate on Sharia Legitimacy of Islamic 
Banking and Finance’ (2011) 50 (3-4) Islamic Studies 383, 406.  
70 Ibid 407.  
71 Nadirsyah Hosen, Dari Hukum Makanan tanpa Label Halal Hingga Memilih Mazhab yang Cocok (Noura Books, 2015) 47. 
While following a madhab is required, following a single madhab on every issue is not according to many scholars. The 
obligation of taqlid is to follow a school or an authority on a given issue or set of issues. Thus, for example, an individual is 
permitted to follow the Hanafi school in prayer and the Maliki school in rulings related to zakah (an obligatory almsgiving). 
This is not interdicted so long as one: (i) actually knows the rulings of the other school on the issue; (ii) does not 
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2.4.2 Legitimacy of Modern Islamic Finance  
One of the pivotal questions for the method of selective Sharia rules in modern Islamic 
finance is the Islamicity or legitimacy. Some argue that modern Islamic finance has no 
legitimacy considering that its practice purports to justify modern financial products that bear 
no resemblance to what which existed at the time the Sharia rules were developed.72 Some 
contemporary scholars argue that the raw materials of talfiq are the old Sharia rules that have 
limited use in the modern world.73 It has been argued that talfiq is methodologically wrong 
because opinions and dicta of individual jurists are taken out of context and recombined 
according to the user’s personal preferences so that an authority is sometimes used to support 
a conclusion unwarranted by the original author’s position.74 This is further supported by other 
scholars who argue that there is no legitimacy in modern financial institutions offering Sharia 
compliant products and services and no validity in the methodology deriving medieval Sharia 
rules,75 the mechanism of selective Sharia opinions or “Sharia Arbitrage” makes the Islamic 
financial industry vulnerable to abuse by elite financiers to increase profit under Islamic 
brands.76   
However, it can be argued that the legitimacy and authority in question in is in fact 
private. Most of the Islamic financial industry adopts privatization of Sharia, through “Sharia 
Supervisory Boards”, or “Sharia Boards,” whose review and approval must be obtained for any 
transaction. This is the case for Indonesia and Australia, see chapter 10 and 11. This private 
                                                          
systematically seek out dispensations (i.e. the easiest position), see Ibn `Abidin, Radd al-Muhtar (1:33) and Nabulsi, 
Khulasa al-Tahqiq (56). 
72 Haider Ala Hamoudi, ‘Jurisprudential Schizophrenia: On Form and Function in Islamic Finance’ (2007) 7 Chicago Journal 
of International Law 605, 610.  
73 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Toward Islamic Reformation: Civil, Liberties, Human Rights, and International Law (Syracuse 
University Press, 1996) 33.  
74 Ibid.  
75 El-Gamal elaborated extensively on the issue of legitimacy in Islamic finance, see El Gamal, above n 45.  
76 Ibid 190. 
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law model relies on non-state mechanisms and institutions. Thus, the legitimacy of Islamic 
finance in in fact private and more intimately tied to the logic of modern finance and 
international financial transactions. Chapter 5 will argue that Islamic finance, for instance, 
relies on risk management techniques developed by its Western counterparts. The so-called 
Sharia compliant derivatives are then developed to meet the modern needs of Islamic financial 
transactions.  
As indicated above, Islamic finance has benefited from the application of conventional 
theories of economics and finance to Islamic finance such as risk management theories as will 
be discussed in Chapter 4. Although some argue that the application of these theories also 
create the trade-off between efficiency and legitimacy,77 there are other normative 
considerations in Islamic law that might support forgoing efficiency gains for the sake of 
legitimacy. In some case that will be discussed in the following section, the current method of 
selective Sharia rules may balance legitimacy and efficiency concerns and ultimately lead 
Islamic finance from not only an ideological discipline but also a rational discipline influenced 
by the concept of economic efficiency. 
 
2.5 The Legalistic Approach  
 The application of selective Sharia opinions in the financial and banking industry is 
described as follows. If there are two opposite views on a particular contract say scholar A’s 
permissibility in one case and scholar B’s prohibition on the same case, the A’s view would be 
chosen.78 This method enables institutions to combine various Sharia rules in structuring 
                                                          
77 See El Gamal, above n 45, that extensively discusses this issue.  
78 Habib Ahmed, Product Development in Islamic Banking (Edinburgh Univ. Press, 2010), 48-49.  
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modern Islamic financial products, but also to alter medieval Islamic commercial contracts  to 
meet modern needs.79 Some commentators note that the method should be at the final stage of 
the intellectual effort whereby the solution in a particular madhab (school) is not able to provide 
the best possible solution in particular circumstances.80 This is viewed as a legitimate practice 
as long as it is exercised through reputable Muslim jurists.81  
One of the pivotal arrangements utilised in modern Islamic finance for credit facilities is 
murabahah (a cost plus profit sale). In its original version, murabahah is a sale contract where 
a seller discloses all information concerning the object of sale including its original cost, and 
both parties freely agree on a fixed profit to be added to that cost.82 In Islamic banking practices, 
this original form of murabahah was an ineffective mechanism for the provision of credit 
facilities. Islamic bankers needed to combine this contract with other Sharia rules taken from 
different Islamic schools that bore no relation to the original rules of the murabahah itself. The 
adoption of different rules for the sake of the murabahah’s implementation in the banking 
practices has created different and opposing Sharia opinions. Ultimately, the banking industry 
has adopted Sharia opinions that support the modified version. The modified version is 
discussed in the following section.  
The resurrection of the murabahah contract in modern Islamic finance has emerged as a 
result of the expansion of Islamic finance post profit and loss sharing to create a credit facility 
without violating the Islamic prohibition of interest.83 During the 1970s, Islamic banking 
                                                          
79 Ghazala Ghalib, “An Analysis of Application of Talfiq in Modern Islamic Commercial Contracts” (2013) 10(2) Policy 
Perspectives 133.  
80 Mohd Hafiz Jamaludin and Ahmad Hidayat Buang, “An Analysis of the Views of the Supporters and Opponents in the 
Usage of Talfiq in Islamic Law” (2017) 25(3) Jurnal Syariah 363-394.  
81 Ghalib, above n 79.  
82 See, eg, Nicholas Dylan Ray, Arab Islamic Banking and the Renewal of Islamic Law (Graham and Trotman, 1995) 41; and 
Necmeddin Guney, “Murabahah financing revisited: The Contemporary Debate on its Use in Islamic Banks” (2015) 23 
Intellectual Discourse 495-506, 497.  
83 Walid Hegazy, “Fatwas and the Fate of Islamic Finance: A Critique of the Practice of Fatwa in Contemporary Islamic 
Financial Markets” in S. Nazim Ali (ed), Islamic Finance: Current Legal and Regulatory Issues (Islamic Finance Project, 
Islamic Legal Studies Program, Harvard Law School, 2005), 147. 
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advocates searched for an appropriate medieval Islamic contract that may overcome the 
inefficiencies of profit and loss sharing mechanism as envisaged by the idealist.84 They found 
murabahah could achieve its objective. Its permissibility has been confirmed by a fatwa of Al-
Sanhuri, an Egyptian legal scholar who drafted the Egyptian Civil Code.85  Furthermore, the 
introduction of murabahah may replicate and mimic conventional debt-based products. Debt-
based products itself (asset-backed financing) are considered low risk and resemble familiar 
conventional fixed-interest rate products in their risk-return profile.86 
In order to be applied in modern Islamic finance, the original murabahah contract needs 
adjustments. Islamic bankers through the approval of their Sharia Advisory introduce 
additional Sharia rules including a wakalah contract (agency) and wa’ad (a unilateral promise). 
The following diagrams explain these modifications.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
84 Ibid.  
85 Hegazy in Ali (ed), above n 83, 147-148. 
86 Ibid 168.  
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Figure 2.1. Original Murabahah.  
 
Source: Author  
Two parties namely Islamic Bank A (Bank A) and a borrower enter into a contract 
wherein one of them, defined as the “Seller” (Bank A) in the above case, agrees to purchase an 
asset from a third party, defined as “Suppliers” in the above case, at a cost of $1000. The Seller 
(Bank A) then sells that asset to its borrower, referred to as “Purchaser” above, at a mark-up 
$100 agreed between them, presumably to compensate the Seller for the effort and risk 
involved in obtaining the asset from the Supplier. In other words, there are two purchase and 
sale agreements entered into as part of a murabahah. The first is sale from the Supplier to the 
Seller, and the second is a sale from the Seller to the Purchaser. The second sale is at the same 
price as the first, plus a mark-up in the Seller favor. In the above case, the second sale can take 
the form of a credit sale, wherein the Purchaser (the Borrower) agrees to pay the Seller (Bank 
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A) in future installments. Using this way, murabahah can be used to replicate an interest rate 
in all material legal and economic respects.87  
The above example on the application of original murabahah involves some risks for 
Bank A. First, the bank would incur loss if the potential borrower (the Purchaser) does not 
honor the promise to purchase the asset from the bank. Second, the bank would add additional 
costs considering that the bank is obliged to find the requested asset before reselling it to the 
borrower (the Purchaser). Third, the bank would also incur loss if the asset was damaged before 
re-selling to the borrower. Hence, the original murabahah creates significant risks if it used as 
a method for modern Islamic financing.  
To address the difficulties encountered by the original murabahah in practice, Islamic 
bankers started combining other Sharia rules. This is illustrated in the following diagram.   
Figure 2.2. Modified Murabahah in Credit Facilities   
 
Source: Author  
                                                          
87 An extensive discussion on murabahah including its surrounding legal and Shariah issues, see Hamoudi and Cammack, 
above n 9, 485-511.  
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In the above example, this modified structure shifts the potential risks from Bank A to 
its borrowers. In the above example, a borrower (the Purchaser) desiring to buy an asset, 
approaches Bank A (the Seller), and promises (wa’ad) to buy the requested asset from Bank 
A. The bank then appoints the borrower to search for the required asset and appoints the 
borrower as the bank’s agent through the application of wakalah (agency) contract. In these 
two arrangements (wa’ad and wakalah), Bank A shifts its transaction costs to the buyer. Bank 
A does not need to employ staff to locate the asset and buy it for the borrower. Furthermore, 
through the application of the wa’ad rule, the borrower is obliged to fulfil the promise (wa’ad) 
to buy the requested asset. Although there are some objections to this modified murabahah 
particularly on the arrangement that makes a promise (wa’ad) legally binding, Islamic banks 
have adopted the fatwa which treats the promise (wa’ad) as legally binding. This fatwa is 
pivotal because it will block the revocation of the potential buyer (the borrower) of their 
promise at any time before concluding the murabaha contract. This modified murabahah is 
used to replicate the mechanism of interest-based credit facilities, and transform the activities 
of Islamic banks to acting as an intermediary institution rather than as a seller of the asset. 
The legitimacy of the modified murabahah depends upon whether the potential 
purchaser’s promise is legally binding. The fatwa issued by Al-Zarqa declared that a promise 
(wa’ad) may be legally binding based on a popular view of the Maliki school. Other Muslim 
scholars reviewed the Islamic jurisprudence literature (fiqh) looking for a basis for the fatwa.88 
Support for the fatwa came from the first conference on Islamic banks held in Dubai in 1978 
where a fatwa was issued allowing the use of the promise in the murabahah-based credit 
facilities and recognizing the promise as legally binding. In 1988, the OIC (Organisation of 
Islamic Cooperation) the International Fiqh Academy declared that the promise, though 
                                                          
88 Hegazy in Ali (ed), above n 83, 147-148.   
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ethically binding on the promisor, is not legally binding on such promisor unless the promisee 
has incurred expenses (reliance) on the basis of such a promise resulting in the obligation of 
the promisor to fulfil the promise.89  
Thus, the modified murabahah used for credit facilities was derived from two most 
important fatwas, one fatwa is on the permissibility of murabahah, while the other fatwa is on 
a binding nature of wa’ad (promise). The first fatwa which was based on a minority view in 
the Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), allowed the murabaha contract, but placed restrictions on its 
practice. The second fatwa removed all such restrictions.90 The third fatwa concened the 
application of wakalah (an agency contract) in the murabahah-financing. The combination of 
these instruments (wa’ad, wakalah, and murabahah) is common in jurisdictions offering 
Islamic financial products and services. For instance, the National Sharia Advisory Council of 
the Indonesian Ulama Council issued fatwas on the permissibility of murabahah and the 
binding nature of wa’ad to give a Sharia foundation of the practice of murabahah in Indonesia’s 
Islamic banking industry.91  
In modern Islamic finance, murabahah has been a mainstream product leading to the 
resurrection of another pivotal arrangement in modern Islamic finance, tawarruq (reverse or 
commodity murabahah). Tawarruq is examined extensively in Chapter 5. Briefly, a tawarruq 
contract is a continuation of the murabahah.92 Traditionally, tawarruq refers a series of sale 
contracts whereby a purchaser buys an asset from a seller for a deferred payment and 
subsequently sells it to a third party for cash at a lower price for the purpose of obtaining cash.93 
                                                          
89 Ibid.  
90 Ibid.  
91 See Indonesian Ulama Council, Himpunan Fatwa Keuangan Syariah Dewan Syariah Nasional MUI (The Fatwa Collection 
on Sharia Finance) (Penerbit Erlangga, 2014).  
92 Craig R. Nethercott, ‘Murabaha and Tawarruq’ in Craid R. Nethercott and Eisenberg (eds), Islamic Finance: Law and 
Practice (Oxford University Press, 2012), 200.  
93 Ahmad A. Alkhamees, A Critique of Creative Sharia Compliance in the Islamic Finance (Brill, 2017) 69.  
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This practice has been widely adopted in South East Asian countries as a means of cash 
liquidity where a person buys a commodity, i.e. wheat on a deferred basis and then sells it on 
the spot market for a lower price to obtain cash. However, it should be clearly noted that such 
a practice occurs outside modern financial markets so that the seller has no role in the second 
sale.94 Medieval Muslim scholars had different views on the legitimacy of such a trading.95 
However, in recent times, the traditional tawarruq is regarded as permissible by the majority 
of individual fatwa as well as collective fatwas such as those issued by fatwa bodies or Sharia 
Supervisory Boards (SSBs) of financial institutions in Middle Eastern Countries. The most 
referred fatwa on the permissibility of tawarruq comes from Saudi scholars.96 The International 
Fiqh Academy based in Jeddah also issued a fatwa that the application of traditional tawarruq 
is not against the Sharia principles as long as there is no other solution and due to necessity 
(dharurah).97  
The original tawarruq causes practical difficulties in financial markets. Bankers and 
Sharia scholars modify this contract creating what has been called the organized tawarruq.98 
Under this modified mechanism, the purchasing and selling of a particular asset has been 
organized previously by an arranger (commonly a financial institution such as bank) to 
facilitate cash payment to the client. This mechanism is contrasted with its traditional version 
where the seller has no role in the second sale. Under the modified version, the bank organizes 
the purchase of the asset on a deferred payment basis and sale by the purchaser for cash. The 
                                                          
94 Ibid.  
95 For more discussion on these debates, see Habib Ahmed and Nourah Mohammad Aleshaikh, ‘Debate on Tawarruq: 
Historical Discourse and Current Rulings’ (2014) 28 Arab Law Quarterly 278. 
96 For instance, in 1966, the early grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Shaikh Muhammad ibn Ibrahim issued a fatwa on the 
permissibility of classical tawarruq following the view of the Hanbali School. Later on in 1977, during the advent of the 
Islamic banking, the Saudi Arabia Council of Senior Scholars issued a fatwa that tawarruq trading of a commodity is lawful 
as long as it does not involve two sales in a sale (bay innah). This bay al-innah is considered a double sale whose ultimate 
and sole objective is to circumvent the prohibition of usury and achieve an interest-based loan, see Hegazy, above n, 596.  
97 Ibid.  
98 Zamir Iqbal and Abbas Mirakhor, An Introduction to Islamic Finance: Theory and Practice (Wiley, 2nd Edition, 2011) 86.  
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arranger, usually the bank, manages the sale agreement.99 Although this mechanism deviated 
from its original form, there are some fatwas declaring the permissibility of such an organized 
tawarruq.100 It indicates the need for modern Islamic finance to provide alternative financial 
instruments. This argument has also been extended to derivative markets. This will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 5.  
The above illustrations of how murabahah and tawarruq have been adapted by 
combining the rulings from various Sharia interpretations to structure Islamic financial 
instruments for use in the market place. This demonstrates that the modern method of Islamic 
finance that this chapter refers to as fatwa shopping in Chapter 1 is a prevailing practice in the 
industry. 
  
2.6 Summary  
Selective Sharia rules allow modernisation of Islamic finance. Under this approach, 
medieval Islamic contracts are utilised on a functional basis. This leads to the reinvigoration of 
fresh ideas to decide which of medieval juristic rules can be adapted for use in modern financial 
transactions. This chapter argues that this pluralist approach which allows the combination of 
Sharia rules in the form of fatwas is a legitimate method of adapting medieval Islamic 
                                                          
99 The definition of the organized tawarruq is taken from the International Fiqh Academy of the Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC) based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, as follows: “[An arrangement] when a person (mustawriq) buys 
merchandise from a local or international market on a deferred price basis. The financier arranges the sale agreement either 
himself or through his agent. Simultaneously, the mustawriq and the financier execute the transactions, usually at a lower 
spot price. Reverse tawarruq: it is similar to organized tawarruq, but in this case, the mustawriq is the financial institution, 
and it acts as a client”, see Ahmed and Aleshaikh, above n 93, 292. 
100 Asyraf Wajdi Dusuki, Mohammad Mahbubi Ali, and Yulizar D. Sanrego, ‘The Application of Commodity Murabahah in 
Bursa Suq Al-Sila’ Malaysia vis-à-vis Jakarta Future Exchange Sharia Indonesia: A Comparative Analysis’ (2013) 49 ISRA 
Research Paper, 6. 
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contractual arrangements so as to meet the requirements of a modern financial industry. The 
various Sharia opinions need to be viewed as a source of richness rather than difficulties.  
The legalistic approach reflects a continuation of the classical method called talfiq. This 
method is a form of doctrinal selections made by a Muslim jurist toward a particular 
interpretation that best fits the circumstances, regardless of whether or not this interpretation 
came from the scholar’s own legal school. The application of the legalistic approach involves 
two steps. First, Sharia scholars review and select various opinions from different schools to 
derive a single conclusion that legitimates a particular financial product. Then, Islamic banks 
review and select a fatwa that would legitimise their financial products and services. Thus, the 
users of this method are Muslim jurists who may be members of Sharia Supervisory Boards as 
well as the subjects of the law itself namely Bankers, financial firms and consultants.   
As shown in this chapter, medieval Islamic commercial contracts have significant 
problems in terms of feasibility and practicality. This method is an attempt to find a middle 
path between adaptation and rejection. By this approach, it is possible to have Islamic financial 
instruments that obey religious precepts and also meet economic and financial considerations 
to face modern challenges of the financial industry.  
The disputes on the legitimacy of selective Sharia rules have been addressed in this 
chapter. This chapter locates legitimacy of modern Islamic finance in the private actors known 
as Sharia Supervisory Boards (SSB) that control Islamic finance. These actors provide 
substantive determinations as to whether a particular financial activity or instrument is Sharia 
complaint. They are thus responsible for determining Sharia compliance with regards to 
different types of financial instruments offered by various market participants.  
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Moreover, the legitimacy of modern Islamic finance could be also placed within the logic 
of modern financial theory particularly efficiency and practicality. Although Islamic finance 
can adapt to modern financial requirements, there are still normative considerations in Islamic 
jurisprudence that might support forgoing efficiency gains for the sake of legitimacy. This 
would mean that current Islamic finance remains an ideological discipline rather than a purely 
rational discipline dominated by concepts of conventional economic theories such as efficiency 
and risk management. The risk regulation and risk management theory particularly derivatives 
from a conventional perspective will be discussed in the next two chapters.  
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CHAPTER 3: THEORIES OF REGULATION 
 
3.1 Introduction  
Financial and banking regulations exist to protect the industry, customers, and the 
economy from risks or adverse consequences arising from the financial and banking activities. 
Regulation is directed towards managing and mitigating those risks. These risks include 
market, credit, operational, liquidity, and systemic risks.1 This chapter discusses risks in the 
financial and banking industry. It then discusses the main theories on regulation including 
financial regulation.2 Based on this section, this chapter argues that the combination of public 
interest and the economic theory of regulation is imperative in the current global financial 
industry to prevent those risks.  
  
3.2 Risks in the Financial Industry  
Risk, broadly defined, refers to uncertainty of future outcomes, positive or negative.3 
There are known and unknown risks as Rumsfeld observed.4 In relation to known risks not all 
are easily capable of being measured. Some risks can be managed within the organization 
                                                          
1 Razeen Sappideen, “The Regulation of Credit, Market and Operational Risk Management under the Basel Accords” (2004) 
Journal of Business Law 59. 
2 Based on the Lecture notes distributed by Razeen Sappideen in his seminars on International banking and Finance Law, 
School of Law, Western Sydney University. 
3 See for instance Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (New York, 1921).  
4 He stated that “Reports that say that something has not happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, 
there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we 
know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns – the ones we don't know we don't 
know. And if one looks throughout the history of our country and other free countries, it is the latter category that tend to be 
the difficult ones”, see "Defense.gov News Transcript: DoD News Briefing – Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers, United 
States Department of Defense (defense.gov)", [2/05/2018], 
http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2636. 
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others could be transferred to other parties. Most of these risks cannot be easily quantified using 
quantitative models.5  
Financial sectors pool and allocate various risks using a variety of instruments to reduce 
risks such as derivatives, hedging, diversification, and insurance. In order to be successful, 
firms must mitigate and manage risks and simultaneously take advantages of such risk 
exposures. Risk exposure is the extent to which a bank could be affected by certain factors that 
may have a negative impact on returns and the stability of that institution.6  
One of the justifications for regulation of banking and finance institutions is to mitigate 
and prevent risks that may jeopardise the industry and the whole economy. The government 
has a central role in the risk regulation to protect the public and the economy from adverse 
consequences of banking and financial transactions. The Global Financial Crisis 2008 (the 
GFC) highlighted the importance of managing the financial risks. The global 
interconnectedness of financial institutions exposed financial institutions and economies to 
systemic risk (see paragraph 3.2.5 below).  
 
3.2.1 Market Risks 
Market risk is a risk of loss resulting from volatility of income or changes to market 
value resulting from movements in underlying market factors such as interest rates, foreign 
                                                          
5 See John Evans and Amandha Ganegoda, “Measuring Operational Risk in Financial Institutions” (2008) 4 The Finsia 
Journal of Applied Finance 9. 
6 Joel Bessis, Risk Management in Banking (Wiley, 4th Edition, 2015) 2.  
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exchange rates, equity and commodity prices, or credit spreads.7 Market risk consists of several 
risks including interest rate risks, commodity risks, foreign exchange risks, and equity risks.  
Interest rate risk is the potential for losses due to movements in interest rates. This risk 
arises because bank assets (loans and bonds) usually have a significantly longer maturity than 
bank liabilities (deposits). If interest rates rise, the value of the longer-term assets will tend to 
fall more than the value of the shorter-term liabilities, reducing the bank’s equity. In addition, 
if interest rates rise, the bank will be forced to pay higher interest rates on its deposits well 
before its longer-term loans mature and it is able to replace those loans with loans that earn 
higher interest rates.8 Meanwhile, equity risk is the potential loss due to an adverse change in 
the price of stock. Stock, also referred to as shares or equity, represent an ownership interest in 
a company. Banks can purchase ownership stakes in other companies, exposing them to the 
risk of the changing value of these shares.9  
Foreign exchange risk is the risk that the value of the bank’s assets or liabilities changes 
due to currency exchange rate fluctuations. Banks buy and sell foreign exchange on behalf of 
their customers (who need foreign currency to pay for their international transactions or receive 
foreign currency and want to exchange it to their own currency) or for the banks’ own accounts. 
In addition, commodity risk is the potential loss due to an adverse change in commodity prices. 
Commodities include agricultural commodities (e.g., wheat, corn, soybeans), industrial 
commodities (e.g., metals), and energy commodities (e.g., natural gas, crude oil). The value of 
these commodities may fluctuate significantly due to changes in demand and supply.10  
                                                          
7 Hennie Van Greuning and Sonja Brajovic Bratanovic, Analyzing Banking Risk: A Framework for Assessing Corporate 
Governance and Risk Management (World Bank, 3rd Edition, 2009) 223. This definition is in line with the definition given by 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Minimum Capital Requirements for Market Risk (BCBS, 2016) (10/04/2017) 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d352.pdf, 5.  
8 Greuning and Bratanovic, above n 7.  
9 Ibid.  
10 Ibid.  
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3.2.2 Credit Risk 
Credit risk is the potential loss to a bank where the bank’s borrower or counterparty 
fails to repay (on time or not at all) its obligations, i.e. principal, interest, or other investment-
related cash flows.11 This risk adversely affects the bank’s cash flow and liquidity.12 Credit risk 
is also associated with counterparty risk13, or default risk.14 Credit risk is one of the chief risks 
in the banking system that can lead bank failures. It adversely affects cash flow and bank’s 
liquidity. More than 70 percent of a banking balance sheet generally relates to this aspect of 
risk management.15  
 
3.2.3 Operational Risks  
Operational risks are concerned with the potential loss resulting from inadequate or 
failed internal processes, people, and systems or from external events.16 For instance, in the 
GFC operational risk occurred in the form of a failure of due diligence in the process of issuing 
loans to the subprime borrowers.17 Although operational risk is difficult to measure accurately, 
regulations require banks to take measures to deal with this type of risk.18  
 
                                                          
11 See, eg, Greuning and Bratanovic, above n 7, 161-162; and Richard Apostolik, Christopher Donohue, and Peter Went, 
Foundations of Banking Risk: An Overview of Banking, Banking Risks and Risk-Based Banking Regulation (John Wiley & 
Sons, 2009) 18. 
12 Greuning and Bratanovic, above n 7, 161-162. 
13 Ibid.  
14 Apostolik, Donohue, and Went, above n 11, 18. 
15 Greuning and Bratanovic, above n 7, 161-162.  
16 Rupak Chatterjee, Practical Methods of Financial Engineering and Risk Management (Springer, 2014), 295. 
17 See John A. Allison, Financial Crisis and the Free Market Cure: Why Pure Capitalism is the World Economy’s Only Hope 
(McGraw Hill, 2013) 37 on discussion on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as one of the contributors of the 
financial crisis in the US.   
18 Chatterjee, above n 16, 295.  
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3.2.4 Liquidity Risks 
Liquidity risks occur where the bank may be unable to meet its obligations in a timely 
fashion. This may occur, for instance, when depositors deciding to withdraw their deposits. 
There is an inverse relationship between liquidity and liquidity risk, given that the higher the 
liquidity risk, the higher the probability of becoming illiquid, and therefore, the lower the 
liquidity.19 This liquidity risk is related to Basel Accords that will be discussed in depth in 
Chapter 9.  
 
3.2.5 Systemic Risks 
Systemic risk is defined as “the probability that cumulative losses will occur from an 
event that ignites a series of successive losses along a chain of institutions or markets 
comprising a system”.20  According to Scott, systemic risks are related to connectedness of 
financial institutions, contagion, and correlation. Connectedness is that the failure of one bank 
will cause the failure of others through either on assets or liabilities side.21 Contagion is an 
indiscriminate run by creditors of financial institutions that can render otherwise solvent 
institutions insolvent due to fire sale of assets that are necessary to fund withdrawals and the 
resulting decline in asset prices triggered by such sales. And correlation is the failure of 
multiple institutions resulting from the collapse of asset prices due to an exogenous event.22 
Systemic failure decreases capital availability, increases its cost, and may trigger “bank runs” 
                                                          
19 Kleopatra Nikolaou, “Liquidity (Risk) Concepts: Definitions and Interactions” (2009) European Central Bank Working 
Paper Series No. 1008, [04/07/2017] 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1008.pdf?e87aba3a52137adea91048bf54801968, 15-16.   
20 George G. Kaufman, ‘Bank Failures, Systemic Risk, and Bank Regulation’ (1996) 16(1) Cato Journal 17, 20. 
21 Hal S. Scott, Connectedness and Contagion: Protecting the Financial System from Panics (The MIT Press, 2016) 1.  
22 Ibid. 
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in which the inability of one bank to meet depositors’ withdrawal demands in turn causes other 
banks to fail.23 
 
3.3 Regulation 
There are various definitions on regulation.24 Some scholars define regulation as an 
activity whereby the actions of individual or institutions are limited by the imposition of rules.25 
Others argues that it is implementation of legal instruments to achieve a broader policy 
objective including social and economics.26 Viscusi, Harrington, and Vernon argue that 
regulation is “a state imposed limitation on the discretion that may be exercised by individuals 
or organizations, which is supported by threat of sanction”.27 From these definitions, it might 
be concluded that regulation contains some basic elements including rules, restrictions and 
guidance, legal instruments, the regulated and regulators, and objectives. However, the theory 
of regulation is not monolithic considering that there are three mainstream theories that define 
what is regulation below.   
 
                                                          
23 Ibid.  
24 See, eg, Barry M. Mitnic, The Political Economy of Regulation (University of Columbia Press, 1980) discussing and 
reviewing competing definition of regulation from theoretical perspectives; and Johan Den Hertog, “General Theories of 
Regulation”, in B. Bouckaert and G. De Geest, Encyclopaedia of Law and Economics (Volume I: The History and 
Methodology of Law and Economics), (Edward Elgar, 2000).  
25 M. Moran, M ‘Theories of Regulation and Changes in Regulation: The Case of Financial Markets’, (1986) 34 Political 
Studies 185–201. 
26 Hertog, above n 24, 63. 
27 W. Kip Viscusi, Joseph E. Harrington, and John M. Vernon, Economics of Regulation and Antitrust (MIT Press, 20005). 
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3.4 Public Interest Theory    
 The public interest theory of regulation views that regulation as guided and created to 
satisfy the public interest.28 There are two dimensions to this theory. First, regulation seeks the 
protection and benefit of the public at large. Second, regulation is a system of ideas, which 
seeks to remedy if not prevent market failure, with a view to maximizing social welfare.29  
The second dimension of the public interest theory arises from the view that the 
regulation is designed to avoid market failures that could jeopardize public interests at large. 
This assumption may overcome the weaknesses of the first approach by defining what are the 
public interests. Pigou argues that the underlying proposition for regulation is based on a public 
demand for the correction of market inefficiencies and failures which affect the society at large 
rather than a particular interest group.30 Den Hertog argues that the public interest theory leads 
to the best possible use of the scarce resource available for the public only when there is 
sufficient information and enforcement power to promote public interests.31  Regulation could 
be designed to correct inefficient or inequitable market practices leading to economic and social 
problems. Consequently, regulations could be designed to require minimum wages and 
maximum rents accessibility to health care, guaranteeing income in the event of sickness, 
unemployment, disablement, old-age and so on.32 This suggests that public interest theory is a 
subdivision of the economic theory of welfare.33  
                                                          
28 See Arthur Cecil Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (Macmillan, 1932).  
29 This if often called a welfare economic rationale for regulation, see Sophie Harnay and Laurence Scialom, ‘The Influence 
of the Economic Approaches to Regulation on Banking Regulations: A Short History of Banking Regulation’ (2016) 40 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 401, 402.  
30 Pigou, above n 28. 
31 Hertog, above n 24, 225. 
32 Richard A. Posner, “Theories of Economic Regulation’, (1974) 5 (2) Bell Journal of Economics 335.  
33 P. Aranson, ‘Theories of Economic Regulation: From Clarity to Confusion’ (1990) 6 Journal of Law & Politics 247, 249. 
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There is, however, the fundamental problem whether regulation genuinely reflects 
public interests at large. It has been pointed out  that there are always private interests involved 
in regulation besides economic objectives particularly where political actors act on behalf of 
lobby groups, and political institutions.34 It has also been observed  that public interest often 
represents a compromise in achieving a balance between the conflicting interests of diverse 
groups in a society.35  As economic agents, regulators may pursue their own interests, which 
may or may not be consistent with public interest. As a result, regulation is often designed to 
safeguard private interests, for instance, a paradigmatic change in the conception of the 
regulation instruments of the banking authorities.36 Consequently, regulation often reflects a 
bias either for protection of the public interest or diverse groups within a society. There is 
always a risk of regulatory capture by privative interests. This is discussed in the following 
paragraph.  
 
3.5 Captive Theory (Private Interest Theory) 
Captive theory views regulation as a reflection of private interests. Regulation, although 
on the face of it designed to protect the public interest, may promote commercial interests.37 
Moreover, captive regulation is shaped by diverse private interests in a society such as political 
actors, private entities, or government or regulators. The regulatory process is depicted as a 
competitive process amongst pressure groups investing resources in political lobbying to obtain 
                                                          
34 Paul Joskow and Rodger Noll “Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview.” In G. Fromm (ed.), Studies in Public 
Regulation, (MIT Press Series on the Regulation of Economic Activity, Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press, 1981).  
35 A. J. Boudreau, ‘Public Administration and the Public Interest’ (1950) 16(3) The Canadian Journal of Economics and 
Political Science 371. 
36 For more discussions see, Harnay and Scialom, above n 29, 401.  
37 See Imad A. Moosa, Good Regulation, Bad Regulation: The Anatomy of Financial Regulation (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) 
9-13.  
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favorable action from the regulatory authorities.38 Through regulation, politicians or political 
parties make their own demands to which private industries must respond.39 This interest 
groups may be a key factor in determining regulatory outcomes.40 Political interests pursue 
their own preferences rather than the public good.41 Thus, small, well-organized groups are 
seen as more able to obtain rents through favorable regulation, as they can organize themselves 
less expensively than larger groups.42 In this theory, the government controls representing 
public interests are more vulnerable to the demands of powerful political pressure groups than 
in capitalist economies.43 
Private firms are also concerned with regulation. Thus, regulation may be influenced 
and designed for the purpose of safeguarding the benefit of those firms.44 These firms seek 
regulations that can enhance their profitability and returns. For instance, regulation in the 
banking industry may serve the private interests of banks and to organize the distribution of 
rents between them. As the financial sector is especially well funded and organized, it is 
powerful enough to influence regulation.45 In this context, a banking regulation may serve self-
interest of the regulated banking entities rather than social welfare in general.46  
Governments may also enact regulation to serve their interests. This especially occurs 
in banking and finance regulation. Historically, banking and finance institutions are engine of 
                                                          
38 Gary Becker, ‘A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence’ (1983) 98(3) The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 394. 
39 Fred S. Mcchesney, ‘Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation’ (1987) 16 Journal of Legal 
Study 102. 
40 Randall Kroszner and Philip Strahan, ‘Obstacles to Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping 
Banking Supervision and Regulation Reforms’ (2000) University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business, 34. 
41 Ibid.  
42 See Harnay and Scialom, above n 171, 407. 
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the economy. Through the regulations a state entity or the government may influence the 
national credit supply that matters for the stability of an economy. Regulations may facilitate 
government expenditures, channeling credit to politically attractive ends, maximizing welfare, 
and influencing the political actors and bureaucrats.47 Banks may facilitate the government 
needs. For instance, the governments often use the bank to facilitate their programs and 
initiatives neglecting other sources of funding such as raising taxes and issuing sovereign 
bonds.48 Governments then may regulate to benefit constituencies such a group of government 
supporters including political parties.  
The captive theory of regulation suggests that economic and commercial purposes of 
diverse groups are protected or promoted through particular regulation. Commercial entities 
have an incentive to exercise control over institutions which affect their profitability. This 
could include the media, academia, and popular culture. For instance, it has been said that the 
finance industry has been captured by academia, since academic researchers have been 
providing the intellectual justification for giving this industry an incentive to pursue their 
financial objectives.49 Some argue that there is a symbiotic relationship between finance 
professors and the financial industry. Based on empirical research, the industry may pursue 
their financial interest including lobbying government for regulations that produce avoid sub-
optimal outcomes.50 
There are fundamental criticisms of the capture theory of regulation. Posner argues that 
this theory does not tell why some interests are effectively represented in the political process 
and others not, or under what conditions interest groups succeed or fail in obtaining favourable 
                                                          
47 Ibid.  
48 See Xavier Freixas and Anthony M. Santomero, ‘An Overall Perspective on Banking Regulation’ (2002) Working Papers, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 8. 
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legislation. No reason is suggested as to why the regulated industry should be the only interest 
group able to influence an agency. Customers of the regulated firm have an obvious interest in 
the outcome of the regulatory process – why may they not be able to ‘capture’ the agency as 
effectively as the regulated firms. Posner thus argues that the capture theory of regulation is 
unsatisfactory.51 It could be argued that this theory fails to acknowledge the similarity in 
interest between the public the regulated firms. For instance, the banks’ interests in operating 
in a safe and sound-banking environment overlap with the public interests in achieving the 
same objective. The success of the banking system to mitigate their inherent risks, for instance, 
would also deliver the public interest in the whole economy. This weakness is further 
elaborated in the economic theory of regulation. 
 
3.6 Economic Theory of Regulation  
The economic theory of regulation argues that regulation is primarily for safeguarding 
and protection of the public at large or some large subclass of the public.52  Stigler, for instance, 
challenged the idea that regulation is designed and operated primarily for the benefit of 
business, rather than solely to advance the overall public interest by correcting market 
failures.53 Stigler argues that is instituted primarily for the protection and benefit of the public 
at large or some large subclass of the public. He observes that the political process sometimes 
defies rational explanation but comprehending acts of great moral virtue.54 Even if the industry 
                                                          
51 For more discussion on the weaknesses of the capture theory of regulation, see Posner, above n 50, 342. 
52 Stigler, above n 44, 3. 
53 Ibid.  
54 Ibid. 
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achieves some benefits from regulation, these benefits are obtained in a pure profit-maximizing 
form.55  
Garry Becker focuses on competition between interest groups. Interest groups invest in 
influencing the political process to gain favorable legislation. The key to Becker’s model is the 
relative pressure exerted by a group since the investment made by opposing groups will tend 
to have a counteracting effect on the effectiveness of resources devoted to gaining influence. 
This means that excessive resources will often be used to influence the political process, and 
the outcome will generally be inefficient.56   
Posner argues that the Economic Theory of Regulation admits the possibility of 
‘capture’ by interest groups other than the regulated firms; and it replaces the ‘capture’ 
metaphor, by the more neutral terminology of supply and demand. Posner accepts the economic 
regulation serves the private interests of politically effective groups. This is reasonable on the 
basis that the theory is committed to the strong assumptions of economic theory generally, 
notably that people seek to advance their self-interest and do so rationally. Economic theory 
insists that regulation can be explained as the outcome of the forces of demand and supply. 
Posner says that the theory rests on two assumptions. First, the coercive power of government 
can be used to give valuable benefits to a particular individual or groups, economic regulation 
– the expression of that power in the economic sphere – can be viewed as a product whose 
allocation is governed by laws of supply and demand. Second, the theory of cartels may help 
locate the demand and supply curves. The theory of cartels illuminates both the benefit and the 
cost side. This theory is based on the view the value of cartelization is greater, the less elastic 
the demand for the industry’s product and the more-costly, or the slower, new entry into the 
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industry. According to Posner, economic theory of regulation may be empirically analyzed 
using a body of data.57 
  
3.7 Categories of Regulation 
3.7.1 Social Regulation  
Regulation may take several forms or categories including economic, social, and 
financial regulation.58 Social regulation refers to social objectives that are embedded in a 
regulation, for examples, environmental protection, consumer protection, financial inclusion, 
redistribution of incomes, and prevention of crimes.59 Based on the perspective of the private 
theory of regulation, social regulation confers general benefits to a large group at the expense 
of small and powerful groups.60 Although social regulation produces few direct benefits but 
significant costs, private parties are beneficiaries of indirect effects of such regulation.61 For 
example, indirect effects of social regulation, such as a competitive advantage gained, can be 
sufficiently large for private parties.62 
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3.7.2 Economic Regulation 
Economic regulation is divided into structural regulation and conduct regulation.63 The 
former refers to market structure including rules and restrictions pertaining to conduct of the 
market. The latter refers to the behavior of economic actors particularly producers and 
consumers.64 Economic regulation is designed to prevent a market imperfection resulting from 
an abuse of monopoly power, externalities, and exploitation of information asymmetry. 
Monopoly power restricts the number of firms that can operate in the market and hence 
determines prices and outputs.65 Externalities are situations where there is a divergence 
between private and social cost or, in other words, where the prices used in exchange by 
individuals do not reflect general social costs or benefits.66 Information asymmetry occurs 
where consumers and producers lack information about each other. Under such asymmetry, 
resources are misdirected from their most highly valued uses. 
 
3.7.3 Financial and Banking Regulation  
Financial regulation may be directed to safety-and-soundness (or solvency) regulation 
and/or compliance regulation. The former is designed to protect depositors  from the losses 
arising from the insolvency of financial institutions while ensuring financial stability.67 The 
predominant form of solvency regulation is capital regulation, whereby financial institutions 
must comply with liquidity and capital adequacy rules as required under the  Basel Accords.68 
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64 Ibid.  
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Regulation may require periodic reporting by banks and financial institutions, and the fair and 
non-discriminatory treatment of the customers  and  promoting competition within the 
market.69 Compliance regulation refers to a firm’s adherence to laws, regulations, guidelines 
and specifications relevant to its business. Violations of regulatory compliance often result in 
legal penalties, including fines.70 
The justifications for banking regulation are predominantly similar to economic 
regulation.  One dimension of the public interest theory of regulation is that markets for goods 
and services are imperfect. Thus, government intervention is needed to allocate resources 
efficiently. As argued in economic regulation, unregulated markets tend to create abuse of 
monopoly power, externalities, and exploitation of information asymmetry.71 Regulation seeks 
to avoid or at least to mitigate the adverse outcomes of market imperfection.  
In the context of banking regulation, there are, at least, four rationales for government 
intervention. First, regulation is needed to ensure fair and open competition. To achieve this 
objective, the regulator needs to maintain a level playing field among market participants.  This 
includes applying uniform rules relating to capital adequacy and liquidity to financial 
institutions in line with the Basel Accords (see paragraph 3.8.1).72   
Regulation is also needed to protect the interests of individual depositors in the banking 
industry.  Information asymmetry may lead to a situation where banks are more knowledgeable 
about business risks than their depositors, who neither have access to relevant information 
about the operations of banks, nor, very often, the insight to understand the significance of any 
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such information.73 It has been long argued that this information asymmetry leads to adverse 
selection, where banks may choose and apply opportunistic information about loan customers 
and moral hazard, and where bank managers may engage in actions to divert economic 
resources for personal gain.74 Thus, small and uninformed retail depositors may be incapable 
of looking after their own interests.75 This lack of information among common depositors 
creates disadvantages and exposes their vulnerability. Retail customers do not make frequent 
repeat orders of contracts and do not have the capacity to acquire information, and the failure 
of contracts is costly to them.76As a result, information asymmetry is traditionally perceived as 
being more pervasive in retail than in wholesale markets.77 Wholesale customers, including 
sovereign customers, corporate customers, and financial institutions, on the other hand, are 
normally sophisticated and professional.78  
However, the global financial crisis 2008-2009 (GFC) showed that even sophisticated 
wholesale investors, perceived to be skilful and knowledgeable, also became vulnerable.79 The 
complicated nature of new financial derivatives and products made it difficult for even 
sophisticated investors to assess financial information. These customers’ exposure to adverse 
consequences of financial transactions was not covered by an effective deposit insurance 
scheme.80  For this reason, the regulation is designed to protect not only individual depositors, 
but also wholesale customers.  
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Third, regulation is needed to ensure the smooth functioning of the credit supply. Most 
commonly, bank deposits constitute a primary source for credit. Any breakdown of the banking 
system will affect credit supply.81 The provision of a payment system and effective credit 
circulation are essential to the functioning of a productive economy.82 The role of banks is thus 
central to the functioning of a nation’s monetary policy, and to assure a smooth-functioning 
payment system.83  
Banks are highly leveraged institutions using debt to run their business and generate 
profits. Consequently, these debts are subject to strict regulations protecting the owner of these 
monies from loss.84 These regulations are also directed to managing the adverse effects of 
banking risk exposures that may impact not only other banks, but also the broader economic 
sector and community generally.85 In a globally connected banking and financial services 
market linked to international payments systems, losses can rapidly spread across countries 
resulting in what is known as systemic risk flowing from the contagion effect. Given the 
exposure of national economies and the international financial system generally, banks are 
treated as being “special” and as requiring more strategically tailored regulation compared to 
other types of businesses.86 It is systemic risk associated with banking institutions that makes 
them special.87 
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One essential goal of banking regulation is to prevent or mitigate crises that might cause 
the systemic collapse of banks, and even of the economy. Banks are interrelated through 
interbank markets where liquidity is transferred from banks with a surplus to banks with a 
deficit, and by payment systems, a system for clearing cheques and transmitting electronic 
payments.88 Bank interaction through interbank markets and their dominance of payment 
systems creates the potential for widespread bank failure to cause severe economic disruption 
and even a banking panic.89 Further, there is a fear of financial contagion spreading from one 
bank to another leading to the eventual collapse of the entire financial system.90 Therefore, 
distress at some banks triggered by an initial default can potentially spread and force other 
events of default in other banks. Contagion due to interbank claims and obligations may also 
be reinforced by indirect contagion on the asset side of the balance sheet where banks are forced 
to write down the value of their assets.91  
 Financial risks have become increasingly complex and difficult to understand.92 
Preceding the GFC, hard-to-quantify dimensions of risk were largely neglected.93 Banks did 
not appreciate their own levels of risk and counterparty risk. Those investing in complex 
products provided by banks also failed to understand their levels of risk.  
In the event of a crisis, it is also in the public interest that banking regulatory measures 
restore market stability and market confidence. While the government may be prepared to act 
as lender of last resort in bad times, it is also important to implement applicable rules and 
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standards concerning bank exit policies. A robust exit policy could avoid credit and liquidity 
losses to depositors, avoid full insolvency triggers, and avoid contagion.94 Rigorous bank exit 
measures provide certainty in the event of financial turmoil.95  
The social objectives of banking regulation appear to be less obvious but are just as 
important. Social regulatory objectives include objectives such as increasing home ownership 
or channelling resources to particular sectors of the economy or population.96 Bank credit can 
be directed, for example, to target disadvantaged sections of society or the economy.97 Boosting 
economic development is an objective  for banking regulation.98 Other regulatory objectives 
include making funds available for small businesses, and for students to finance education-
related spending.99 These regulatory measures seek to redistribute income and stabilize the 
macro-economy. Particularly in developing economies, regulation plays a pivotal role in 
achieving developmental and social goals. Banks are regulated in a way designed to achieve 
those social objectives.100 Finally, banking regulation also aims to combat financial crime 
including fraud and money laundering.101 In summary, the public interest theory of regulation 
has two origins: economic and social. In this light, regulation is established largely in response 
to economic concerns and is created to solve economic problems. 
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3.8 Risk Regulation Schemes  
There are various types of regulations that are primarily concerned with a specific risk 
in the financial industry including among others systemic regulation and prudential regulation. 
The former is primarily concerned with the systemic risks. Meanwhile, the latter aims at 
providing a market confidence and level playing field for market participants. There are some 
important regulatory schemes directed to mitigate those risks including capital adequacy; 
deposit guarantee; and bailouts.  
 
3.8.1 Capital Adequacy  
Capital adequacy is one of the most important to any regulatory model. This is designed 
to mitigate credit risks, market risks, operational risks, liquidity risks, and systemic risks. This 
is based on the idea that risky assets require more capital while less risky assets require less. 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) of the Bank of International Settlement 
(BIS) introduced the capital adequacy standards regulation known as the Basel Accords in the 
1980s. The Accords have been modified following financial failures and crises. Recently, the 
banking authorities around the world are implementing the changes to the Basel Accords III 
(known as a Basel IV) that is expected to be fully implemented in 2019. However, the 
discussions and debates on the new Basel Accords are ongoing.  
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3.8.2 Deposit Guarantee  
Another important prudential regulation is deposit guarantee. The main objective of 
this scheme is to protect depositors’ money and to reduce the fragility of the financial sector.102 
The principal objective is to contribute to the stability of the financial system and to protect 
less financially sophisticated depositors. Deposit insurance represents a financial safety net 
commonly used by governments to maintain depositors’ confidence in the event of financial 
instability and thus to avoid bank runs. Although the issue arises as to whether government or 
private insurance mechanisms should be employed, most deposit insurance schemes around 
the world are government administered.103 Historically, this regulation was firstly introduced 
in the United States following the Great Depression. In this era, thousands of banks were failing 
each year causing customers loss of their deposits. Thus, the US Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) was introduce in 1934. Accordingly, this deposit guarantee institution was 
perceived as the most important structural change in the banking history.104 Currently, this type 
of scheme has been adopted by many countries. Diamond and Dybvig argue that this scheme 
is the only known effective measure to prevent bank runs.105 They argue that with deposit 
guarantee, the banks no longer bear the downside risk of their positions since the deposit insurer 
bears that risk.106 However, some argue that the existence of deposit guarantee creates an 
environment which provides incentive for banks to take on high risk/high return portfolios of 
assets. This is closely related to moral hazard problems.107 In addition, the deposit insurance 
scheme is often directed towards systemic risks where the probability that the failure of a single 
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bank will trigger a systemic collapse of the economy. This scheme may deter bank runs by 
alleviating the fear that banks will default on deposit accounts. This scheme can only be 
activated once a bank has declared defaults on its deposit payments.  
 
3.8.3 Bailouts  
The most controversial is government bailouts. Casey and Posner define a bailout as 
occurring:  
“When the government makes payments (including loans, loan guarantee, cash, and 
other types of consideration) to a liquidity-constrained private agent in order to enable 
that agent to pay its creditors and counterparties, when the agent is not entitled to those 
payments under a statutory scheme”.108  
The major rationale is the macroeconomic impact of failure and the systemic risk flowing from 
failure or large interconnected financial institutions. Private firms that utilised bailout are often 
perceived as being the ‘too-big-to-fails”, the failure of which would harm the whole 
economy.109 There are objections to this policy on the grounds that it allows bailout of 
recipients that have no entitlement to a bailout, bailout encourages firms to engage in risky 
behaviour,110  and that bailout transfers public money for the sake of private interests.  
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3.9 Summary   
This chapter argues that the best approach is a combination of economic theory and 
public interest theories of regulation. It is the economic theory of regulation particularly 
banking and finance regulations that seek to balance diverse interests of regulated firms and 
entities, the regulators, and the public in general. In addition, from the viewpoint of economic 
rationale for banking regulation under public interest theory, there is a convergence of the 
interest of the public and some interests of the regulated banks. It is in the interest of banks to 
maintain a safe and stable banking regime that also confers benefits on the general public. On 
this view, banking regulation is not only captured under the private interest theory but also 
serves the economic objective stipulated by the public interest theory. However, it should be 
recognized that, regardless of the special attributes of banks, banks are exist to make profits 
and maximize returns for their investors. The corporate nature of banks in pursuing profit 
prevails over potential catastrophic consequences and regulatory penalties as a result of risk-
taking. In part, it also justifies incumbent regulatory power to rein in banks and banking 
activities. 
 One of the justifications for regulation of banking and finance institutions is to mitigate 
and prevent risks that may jeopardise the industry and the whole economy. This is also related 
to public interest theory and economic theory of regulation. It is the government that has a 
central role in that risk regulation to protect the public from adverse consequences of banking 
and finance transactions through various types of regulations that are primarily concerned with 
a specific risk in the financial industry including among others capital adequacy policy. The 
next chapter begins the examination of how risk is managed through particular financial 
instruments, particularly hedging derivatives. It discusses how risk can be managed through a 
set of financial techniques designed to transfer risks.     
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CHAPTER 4: HEDGING AND DERIVATIVES  
 
4.1 Introduction  
 In modern finance, derivatives are one of the pivotal hedging techniques to manage risks. 
They reduce potential risks that may occur in business activities of financial institutions. This 
discussion is important to the key arguments of the thesis since one of the key issues of Islamic 
finance is the lack of risk mitigation tools including hedging instruments that make Islamic 
finance more efficient to serve modern financial transactions.   
 This chapter discusses hedging and derivatives instruments from the perspective of 
conventional finance.  It begins by exploring the nature of hedging including its purposes.  It 
then moves to an examination of basic derivatives instruments such as options, forwards, 
futures, and swaps. This is followed by discussion of the trading system of derivatives 
including exchange traded, over-the-counter (OTC), and OTC cleared derivatives. It also 
considers some regulatory issues concerning derivatives.  
 
4.2 Hedging and Its Economic Benefits 
Hedging in its essence can be defined a method or means to manage risks in a business 
transaction. It is defined as a means of protecting against financial loss or other adverse 
circumstances .1 It is also related to an investment activity that reduces the risk of adverse price 
                                                          
1 Online Oxford Dictionary, ‘Hedge’ [06/12/2017] https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/hedge. 
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movements in an asset2 or a class of assets. Hedging is also used for some types of high risk 
activities to reduce risks that may impact on capital gains.3  
Hedging performs a range of functions including risk mitigation, profit maximising, 
and arbitrage.4 The focus of this section is the risk mitigation function of derivatives. Hedging 
is a risk management tool to avoid adverse movements of market prices in financial markets. 
Through hedging risks in financial markets can be distributed across a variety of innovative 
financial instruments such as derivatives. By mitigating those risks, financial markets may 
provide benefits through lowering the costs shouldered by other sectors on the economy.  
Hedging provides portfolio managers with a great deal of flexibility in investment choices.5 
Other forms of hedging activities including arbitrage enable hedgers or arbitrageurs not only 
to avoid risk but also to make a profit.6  They act much like speculators.7 There is also the 
advantage that hedgers may be able to avoid regulations and so maximise their profits.8 This is 
because they function in private markets, are unregistered, and exempt from existing 
regulations.9 Because of this hedging transactions are subject to surveillance and greater 
regulatory concerns due to its high risks in nature and potential negative impacts on financial 
industry.10  
                                                          
2 Investodia, ‘Hedge’ [06/12/2017] https://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hedge.asp. 
3 The American Heritage Dictionary, ‘Hedge Fund’ (3rd Edition, 2011).  
4 Razeen Sappideen, ‘The Regulation of Hedge Funds’ (2016) 7 Journal of Business Law 3. 
5 Mark J. Powers et al, Inside the Financial Futures Markets (John Wiley and Sons, 1991).  
6 Ibid.  
7 Ibid.  
8 Henry Ordower, ‘Demystifying Hedge Funds: A Design Primer’ (2007) 7 University of California Davis Business Law 
Journal 323, 327.  
9 Particularly in securities, currencies, and derivatives markets, see W ulf A. Kaal and Dale A. Oesterle, ‘The History of 
Hedge Fund Regulation in the United States’ in Handbook on Hedge Funds (Oxford University Press, 2016).  
10 John Horsfield-Bradbury, ‘Hedge Fund Self-Regulation in the US and the UK’ (2008) Victor Brudney Prize in Corporate 
Governance 2008, [21/12/2017] http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/corp_gov/papers/Brudney2008_Horsfield-
Bradbury.pdf. 
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In contrast, the lack of hedging facilities or instruments for risk mitigation restricts 
opportunities for risk management and can lead to higher capital costs.11 This is important in 
the later consideration of Islamic banks and opportunities for risk reduction, see chapter 5.  This 
can result in financial markets becoming less efficient and jeopardising market participants in 
sustaining their business activities.   
There are various instruments available for hedging activities in financial markets; the 
most important instruments are derivatives which are discussed in the following section.  
 
4.3 Derivatives: Definition, Function, and Benefits   
 Derivatives are defined as contracts whose value is derived from the performance of 
underlying secondary sources or values.12 These value of these financial instruments depends 
on financial assets that attached to it, such as bonds, equities, fixed-income instruments, shares, 
foreign currencies, commodities, etc.13 Derivatives allow traders in the financial markets to 
purchase and sell a particular asset without the necessity of owing and trading in that asset.  It 
also allow derivatives’ participants to manage and hedge risks against adverse movements in 
the underlying asset’s price.14 
 Legally, derivatives contain some basic features. First, it is the agreement or contract 
between two counterparties conferring rights and obligations on the parties.15 Second, the 
                                                          
11 Securities and Exchange Commission, ‘Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds’ (2003) [8/12/2017] 
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf. 
12 The definition of derivatives is varied across jurisdictions, see Timothy E. Lynch, ‘Derivatives: A Twenty-First Century 
Understanding’ (2011) 43 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal, 5.  
13 Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Edition, 2004) 475, some argue that this definition may include nearly all financial instruments 
are derivatives such stocks and bonds, see Fischer Black and Myron Scholes, ‘the Pricing of Options and Corporate 
Liabilities’ (1973) 81(3) The Journal of Political Economy 637, 637.  
14 Satyajit Das, Derivatives Products and Pricing (John Wiley and Sons, 3rd Edition, 2006) 4.  
15 Lynch, above n, 12.  
69 
 
payment of derivatives relies on some unknown future events such that contracting parties have 
limited control over the outcome of the events.16 Third, counterparties to these contracts take 
the opposite positions in relation to the underlying values. It means that one party expects the 
price of the underlying value to increase, while the other party expects a decrease.17  Fourth, it 
is a form of zero-sum game, meaning that one trader’s gain is another trader’s loss. 18 Each type 
of derivatives functions  in a particular way to mitigate a particular risk, as will be discussed 
below.  
 
4.3.1 Options  
  Options give the contracting parties rights, but not obligations, to buy (call option) or 
sell (put option) a specified underlying asset at a predetermined price within a specified period 
of time.19 To create options, a buyer pays a small payment (premium) in advance by way of a 
fee to a seller.20 The amount of this premium depends on the level of risk for that option.21 The 
premium is much smaller than the profit expected by the buyer.22  
  There are two methods of exercising an options, namely the American and European 
models. The former allows the timing of the exercising or execution before or on the expiration 
date of the option. The latter only permits exercise of the option on the expiration date.23 The 
                                                          
16 For further a limited control over the contingency in derivatives, See Lynch, above n 12, 18. 
17 Ibid.  
18 See, eg, Lynn A. Stout, ‘Insurance or Gambling? Derivatives Trading in a World of Risk and Uncertainty’ (1996) 14(1) The 
Brookings Review 38-41, 40; Timothy E. Lynch, ‘Gambling by Another Name; the Challenge of Purely Speculative 
Derivatives’ (2012) 17(1) Stanford Journal of Law, Business, and Finance 67.  
19 Alastair Hudson, The Law on Financial Derivatives (Sweet and Maxwell, 5th Edition, 2012) 1-56.  
20 Hudson, above n 19, 1-56.  
21 The Black-Scholes model is a common method to determine the price of options. This model enables transacting parties 
to quantify risk in determining the value of an option, for more discussion on this model, see Alan N. Rechtschaffen, Capital 
Markets, Derivatives and the Law: Evolution after Crisis (Oxford University Press, 2nd Edition, 2014) 204.  
22 Hudson, above n 19, 1-56. 
23 Most options being traded on exchanges are based on the American model, Hal S. Scott and Annan Gelpern, 
International Finance: Transactions, Policy, and Regulation (Foundation Press, 20th Edition, 2014) 922.  
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opportunity for early exercise of the option make the American option are more valuable than 
its European counterpart. While the American options can be treated similarly to the European 
ones just by deciding not to exercise until the expire date, the American model gives greater 
flexibility to respond to market movements prior to the expiration date. Consequently, 
American options are preferred.24   
  In terms of settlement mechanisms, both call options (rights to buy) and put options 
(rights to sell) can operate either physically settled options or as cash-settled options.25 The 
former allows the buyer to call for delivery of the physical asset. While the latter allows the 
buyer of the option to receive a cash payment equivalent to the profit that would be made on 
the sale of those values.26  In relation to trading options investors may take long or short 
positions. An investor (the buyer) has a long position where the investor has bought and owns 
those values. An investor (seller) has a short position where the investor owes those values, but 
does not actually own them yet.27 
  Options deliver economic benefits in the financial markets. Most importantly options 
increase liquidity. They provide investment opportunities in stock markets while financing long 
term projects. Investors can choose either to invest on a long-term or short term basis. The 
negotiable nature of options may attract more investments for projects. Investing in stock 
markets involves a high level of risk due to price fluctuations and the other influencing factors. 
Consequently, options give investors a method to mitigate the risk that the value of their 
investments may diminish.  Options also give investors the opportunity to structure investment 
portfolios by choosing the most appropriate position of their portfolios.28 Chapter 5 discusses 
                                                          
24 Muhammad al-Bashir Muhammad Al-Amine, Risk Management in Islamic Finance: An Analysis of Derivatives Instruments 
in Commodity Markets (Brill, 2008) 204. 
25 Hudson, above n 19, Ibid 1-58. 
26 Ibid 1-98.  
27 Rechtschaffen, above n 21, 198.  
28 See El-Gari, ‘Towards an Islamic Stock Market’ (1993) 1(1) Islamic Economic Studies, 12. 
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how far there are Islamic alternatives to options. Generally, options may provide efficiency in 
financial markets by allowing the parties to allocate risks. The next section will discuss 
forwards and futures.   
 
4.3.2 Forwards and Futures  
  In forward contracts, both contracting parties agree to undertake a complete transaction 
at a future date for a specified price.29 The main objective of this contract is to facilitate the 
sale and delivery of a commodity and to ensure that the commodity is available at the specified 
date in the future when it is needed by the purchaser of the forward.30 In forwards, the price of 
the underlying asset or commodity may be subject to market fluctuations. The forwards 
contract can be sold to other parties at a lower or higher price than the original purchase price 
if buyer can find a counterparty willing to buy it.31 An investor that agrees to buy an underlying 
value (such as bonds) has a long position, while the investor that agrees to sell that value has a 
short position.32 The investor holding a long position will take the delivery of the asset and pay 
the seller of the asset the contract value, while the seller is obligated to deliver the asset.33  
  Forwards contracts are privately negotiated and arranged off-the exchanges.34 Trading 
activities for these contracts operate outside formal exchanges and, in contrast to futures, 
without standard terms. Forwards’ contracting parties privately negotiate the terms of the 
contracts such as duration, price, size, quality, and delivery location and time.35 In forwards, a 
                                                          
29 Hudson, above n 19, 1-92.  
30 Rechtschaffen, above n 21, 156.  
31 Ibid.  
32 Scott and Gelpern, above n 23. 
33 Ibid  
34 Rechtschaffen, above n 21, 156.  
35 J. Hull, Options, Futures and other Derivatives (Prentice Hall, 7th Edition, 2009). 
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seller must find the counterparty willing to enter into the contract for a similar asset or 
commodity.36 This has been one of its major disadvantages because forwards may not be the 
most reliable and efficient instruments for hedging risks.37 The reasons for this are explained 
below. 
  In contrast to forwards contracts, futures are essentially forwards contracts traded in an 
exchange with standardised terms.38 Since futures are traded in an exchange, the trading system 
may remove disadvantages of forwards contracts.  Since forwards contracts cannot be readily 
traded on a formal market platform this restricts ready conversion into cash (illiquidity). In 
forwards, there must simultaneously be a party who wants to sell a commodity on a forward 
basis and a party who wants to buy that commodity for future delivery, (double coincidence of 
wants). These limitations are mitigated by the trading system on organized exchanges.39  
  The problems arising out of counterparty risks, where a contracting party fails to 
conclude the forward contract, are removed by the margin system and the clearing-house acting 
as the counterparty in each transaction.40 The margin system and clearing house will be 
discussed in next sections. There are additional measures to mitigate counterparty risks in 
futures markets. These are: the requirement that  the investor provide a performance bond 
reflecting a “good faith” of margin deposit as collateral for the transaction; Futures are marked-
to-market on a daily basis with an exchange of cash flow between member firms reflecting the 
net market movements of aggregated positions; futures exchanges recognise only exchange 
                                                          
36 Rechtschaffen, above n 21, 156.  
37 Ibid.  
38 Ibid 157.  
39 This will be discussed in detail in the following section of this chapter.  
40 Sanjay Kevin, Security Analysis and Portfolio Management (Prentice-Hall, 2007) 240.  
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members as counterparties to individual transactions.41 This would also be used to ensure 
solvency of the futures market members in trading activities of these futures.  
  Although futures address some of the deficiencies of forwards, not all problems have 
been resolved. For instance, the contracts are not sufficiently flexible to benefit from 
subsequent favourable price movements. In this situation, for instance, the price of the 
underlying asset in the market may decrease before the exercise date. Thus, market participants 
of futures markets may use put and call options or rights to buy and sell the underlying asset 
under the futures contracts within a defined period of time. If in a particular period the price of 
the asset is less than the exercise price of those futures contract, the buyer will purchase the 
underlying asset at the current price and sell it at the stipulated price in the option through 
exercising the put option. However, if at a particular time the price of the asset is greater than 
the exercise price of those futures, the buyer of the options will not exercise the option to buy 
the asset and let the options expire.42 
 
4.3.3 Economic Benefits of Futures Markets  
  Risk shifting is the main reason for the development of futures markets.  Hedgers use 
futures to mitigate risk exposures particularly price fluctuation in a commodity market. Futures 
contracts enable producers, processors, traders, and end users to look a price for their products. 
A processor, for instance, may opt to reduce the price risk involved in buying, storing and 
eventually using their raw materials. In a market economy, manufacturers run the risk of large 
                                                          
41 Rechtschaffen, above n 21, 159.  
42 Anthony Saunders and Marcia Millon Cornett, Financial Institutions Management:  A Risk Management Approach 
(McGraw Hill, 6th Edition, 2007) 308.  
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changes in the prices of the raw material or the final products between the time they buy their 
raw material and the time they sell their final products.  
  When the risk is transferred efficiently, futures market may enhance liquidity in a 
particular commodity market as a large group of traders ready to buy and sell that commodity. 
When a seller wants to sell futures contracts to protect the business, the seller need not wait for 
a long period of time for a buyer because futures markets enable a large number of traders and 
hedgers to transact quickly favouring their respective positions.   
  The other advantage is that the markets decide the appropriate price at a particular 
period of time. Futures contracts work in contrast to the fixed price system that often results in 
resource misallocation and high costs. Futures markets thus represent an equilibrium between 
the supply and the demand in a free market economy. Futures exchanges have been established 
to avoid losses due to price fluctuations. Moreover, commodities in futures markets need to be 
standardised and graded following market requirements. The quality of the commodities must 
also be standardised. This mechanism encourages producers to upgrade their production 
techniques.  
  Muslim economies, particularly in Middle Eastern countries, largely depend on oil 
production. It is clear that futures in crude oil may deliver advantages to mitigate the fluctuation 
of the oil price in global markets. Most Muslim countries have not taken advantage of futures 
to reduce the negative effect of oil price fluctuations and to profit from it. In these markets, as 
will be discussed in Chapter 5, derivatives instruments are considered as contrary to the spirit 
of Islamic finance. Chapter 5 argues that there are alternative positions possible for Islamic 
finance in delivering the economic effects of conventional derivatives.  
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4.3.4 Swaps  
 Another important derivatives product is swaps. Swaps are an agreement where buyer 
and seller exchange future cash flows for a period of time. One of the basic swaps is interest 
rate swaps also called “plain vanilla” swaps.43 Under this contract, two parties are trading a 
fixed and variable interest rate. For instance, one company may have a bond that pays the 
London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) which is a variable rate, while the other party holds 
a bond that provides a fixed payment of interest say 10 per cent. If the LIBOR rate over the 
period of the swap is higher than the 10 per cent, then the party agreeing to receive interest in 
accordance with LIBOR will receive more than the party entitled to receive the 10 per cent. 
Normally neither party will in fact pay the sums which it has agreed to pay over the period of 
the swap but instead will make a settlement on a net payment basis under which the party owing 
the greater amount on any day simply pays the difference between the two amounts due to the 
other.44 
  Swaps enable financial institutions or users to hedge against particular risks. For 
instance, an issuer (a bank) of a particular fixed-rate bond may reduce the risk of interest rate 
volatility by entering into the interest rate swap contract. The bank uses this bond to make 
floating rate loans to its customers. If rates decrease, the bank is at risk. By swapping its 
variable revenues for fixed rates, the bank hedges its exposure on its bonds.45  
  Similar to other derivatives instruments, swaps enable risks to be transferred to those 
who take on the risk. The following section will discuss general objectives of derivatives.   
                                                          
43 Frank Partnoy, ‘Financial Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage’ (1997) 22 Journal of Corporation Law 211, 
219.  
44 Hudson, above n 19, 1-96.  
45 Scott and Gelpern, above n 23, 962.  
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4.3.5 Objectives of Derivatives  
1. Transferring Risks  
  Derivatives allow contracting parties to transfer specific risks that may occur in their 
business transactions. These risks include interest rate risks, currency risks, equity and 
commodity price risks, and credit risks. A party transfers these risks to other parties who are 
more willing or better suited to take or manage those risks. This mechanism frequently takes 
place without trading in the underlying asset or commodity that derivatives are based on.46  
 
2. Managing and Hedging Risks  
  Derivatives are also designed to manage risk. Derivatives are commonly used to lock 
in uncertain future prices of an underlying asset without the need to purchase that asset.  
Contracting parties can invest in an underlying asset with a small upfront monetary 
commitment using borrowed funds enabling a party future control over an asset that has not 
yet been purchased.47 In derivatives, a contracting party is not required to transfer funds until 
a contemplated performance or maturity date.48  
  Hedging is also one of the most common strategies of using derivatives. The unwanted 
risks of a particular transaction may be reduced or mitigated by entering into an offsetting 
derivatives transaction.  Hedging contracts allow risks to be hedged one by one rather than 
                                                          
46 This will be discussed in the following section of this chapter of this thesis.  
47 Rechtschaffen, above n 21, 153.  
48 Ibid.   
77 
 
relying solely on risk diversification allowing the banks to buy protection against the overall 
level of defaults.49  
   
3. Maximising Profits and Zero Sum Game 
  The most controversial function of derivatives is speculation.50 Speculators use 
derivatives to generate profits in financial markets.51 In addition, derivatives also represent a 
zero-sum game.52 It means that in derivatives contracts, such as futures and options, there are 
two contracting parties at opposing ends of the contract. If one party wins, the other will lose.53 
In addition, in exchange traded derivatives (discussed in the following section), there are a 
common rules namely margin trading that facilitates this speculation.54  
 
                                                          
49 The models used for this approach are, for instance, Value at Risk (VaR), Market Risk VaR. It is said that this collective 
hedging strategy is to be less costly than numerous individual hedging strategies, because it will capture economies of scale 
and diversification benefits, and avoid duplicative hedging costs that individual entities may incur, e.g. a mutual fund may 
own two stocks that have offsetting exposure to some risk, see John C. Hull, Risk Mangement and Financial Institutions 
(Wiley, 3rd Edition, 2012) 16. 
50 See Timothy E. Lynch, ‘Gambling by Another Name; the Challenge of Purely Speculative Derivatives’ (2012) 17(1) 
Stanford Journal of Law, Business, and Finance 67, 71. 
51 See Tony Norfield, ‘Derivatives and Capitalist Markets: The Speculative Heart of Capital’ (2012) 20(1) Historical 
Materialism 103-132, 103. 
52 See, eg, Lynn A. Stout, ‘Insurance or Gambling? Derivatives Trading in a World of Risk and Uncertainty’ (1996) 14(1) The 
Brookings Review 38-41, 40; Timothy E. Lynch, ‘Gambling by Another Name; the Challenge of Purely Speculative 
Derivatives’ (2012) 17(1) Stanford Journal of Law, Business, and Finance 67; and Thomas Lee Hazen, ‘Rational 
Investments, Speculation, or Gambling: Derivatives Securities and Financial Futures and Their Effect on the Underlying 
Capital Markets’ (1992) 86 Northwestern University Law Review 987, 1006.  
53 Ibid.  
54 See, eg, Daniel Ladley, Guanqing Liu, and James Rockey, ‘Margin Trading: Hedonic Returns and Real Losses’ (2016) 
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2762219; and Anne Jones Dorn, Daniel Dorn, and Paul Sengmueller, ‘Trading 
as Gambling’ (2015) 61(10) Management Science 2376-2393. 
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4. Arbitrage  
  Derivatives can also be used for arbitrage activities. There is on the one hand regulatory 
arbitrate, where derivatives are used to circumvent regulatory regimes (regulatory arbitrage) so 
the practice of using derivatives allows a position where a more favourable regulatory regime 
applies.55 In its usual sense arbitrage refers to trading in derivatives which allows contracting 
parties to generate profit by exploiting the differences in identical or similar financial 
instruments in different markets. Some derivatives such as swaps trading allows contracting 
parties to take advantage of arbitrage opportunities among different financial markets. This 
arbitrage is based on the difference between swap spreads and interest rates available in other 
markets.56  
 
4.4 Trading in Derivatives: Exchange Traded, OTC (Over-the-Counter), 
and OTC Cleared Derivatives  
  Derivatives are traded either in an exchange or over-the-counter (OTC).57 Exchange 
traded derivatives are conducted in an exchange; contracting parties must be members of that 
exchange in order to trade in derivatives. This reduces counterparty risks where a party fails to 
conclude the derivative contract.58 This type of trading requires standardised futures contracts. 
The exchange provides mechanisms to guarantee the interests of both parties where the contract 
                                                          
55 Hudson, above n 19, 1-39.  
56  See, eg, Frank Partnoy, ‘Financial Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage’ (1997) 22 Journal of Corporation 
Law 211, 210 discussing on how the market manipulates the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) as a benchmark rate 
in the global interest rate swap market to take regulatory opportunities; and Philip Ashton and Brett Christophers, ‘On 
Arbitration, Arbitrage and Arbitrariness in Financial Markets and their Governance: Unpacking LIBOR and the LIBOR 
Scandal’ (2015) 44(2) Economy and Society Volume 188-217.  
57 However, some classify derivatives into three groups: OTC derivatives; exchange traded derivatives; and debt obligations 
(hybrid securities or securitised derivatives), see Schuyler K. Henderson, Henderson on Derivatives (LexisNexis, 2nd Edition, 
2010).   
58 Rechtschaffen, above n 21, 152.  
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is dishonoured. First, the clearing-house is established and serves as its own counterparty to 
every trade. This house guarantees each contract. In other words, an individual trader does not 
need to evaluate the profile and integrity of their counterparty.59 Those exchanges are, for 
instance, the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) 
in United States, the Sydney Futures Exchange (SFE) in Australia, and Indonesian Futures 
Exchange in Jakarta.  
  In contrast, OTC derivatives are designed and negotiated individually between 
contracting parties.60 This type of trading does not need an exchange. Some of basic derivatives 
instruments are in this category. These include swaps, options, and forwards. Swaps can be 
regarded as the first modern example of OTC financial derivatives.61 These derivatives allow 
counterparties to negotiate specific contract terms and the parties to tailor contracts to 
individual needs.   
  A growing number of regulations directed to derivatives markets obscure the line 
between OTC and exchange-traded derivatives. These regulations force many standard forms 
of swaps to be cleared through the mechanism of an exchange called central counterparties 
(CCPs) akin to clearing-houses in exchange traded derivatives.62 In addition, the use of 
standard documentation in the global swap transactions such as ISDA Documentation makes 
OTC derivatives contracts more standardised than customised.63 In Chapter 6, the 
standardisation of OTC derivatives particularly one that was set up by ISDA will be examined 
along with its Sharia compliant alternatives.    
                                                          
59 Ibid.  
60 Ibid.  
61 Christopher L. Culp, ‘OTC-Cleared Derivatives: Benefits, Costs, and Implications of the “Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act’ (2010) 2 Journal of Applied Finance 103-129, 106.  
62 Rechtschaffen, above n 21, 152.   
63 ISDA Documentation will be discussed in Chapter 6 of this thesis.  
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4.4.1 The Trading System in Exchange-Traded Derivatives  
  In an exchange, a clearing house plays the role of an intermediary between the buyers 
and the sellers in derivative transactions. It simultaneously becomes the seller to the original 
buyer and the buyer to the original seller.64 To allow this mechanism, the exchange requires its 
members to obtain margin rules, i.e. initial margin, maintenance margin or margin variation, 
and margin calls on every single derivatives transaction,65 discussed in the next section.  
   
4.4.2 Margin Rules in Derivatives Transactions  
Exchange traded derivatives rely on margin rules in smoothing transactions. To 
illustrate this mechanism, assume that a trader wants to enter into a futures contract in an 
exchange market. After becoming a member of that exchange, the trader must maintain a 
certain amount of cash or collateral in the trader’s account to guarantee performance of the 
trader’s trading activities. The trader then deposits this amount with the clearing-house.66 This 
amount (called the initial margin) is a small percentage of the current price of the futures 
contract, say 5 per cent.67  
After the trader has signed into a trading platform, the trader holds a variation margin 
account. This margin is adjusted on a daily basis based on price movements in the underlying 
asset (this daily adjustment is called a “mark-to-market”) traded by the trader.  This margin 
ensures that the trader’s account (variation margin) follows market movements. For instance, 
                                                          
64 Rechtschaffen, above n 21, 188.  
65 For more discussion on the evolution of margin rules, see William G. Tomek, ‘Margins on Futures Contracts: Their 
Economic Roles and Regulation’ (1985) American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy, [21/07/2017] 
http://www.farmdoc.illinois.edu/irwin/archive/books/Futures-Regulatory/Futures-Regulatory_chapter3.pdf. 
66 Ibid 648. 
67 Scott and Anna Gelpern, above n 23, 930.  
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if the trader suffers a loss, this will be directly reflected in the trader’s variation margin account; 
on the other hand, if the trader gains, the account will increase.  
Lastly, the trader is also subject to a maintenance margin. This margin is required when 
the variation margin account falls below a specified level, the trader must inject more money 
into the account; otherwise the trader’s position will be liquidated.68 Thus, the trader has to 
maintain the minimum level of the maintenance margin. If this minimum margin call is 
insufficient to offset the decline in the contract’s value, the broker or the dealer is obliged to 
pay the exchange any shortfall that must be paid by the trader.69 The way that the dealer pays 
the shortfall is subject to regulations in respective jurisdictions.  
  From the perspective of risk management, the margin system allows exchanged-traded 
derivatives to protect their contracting parties. The risks of adverse movements of an 
underlying asset under the contract are adjusted directly in the parties’ margin accounts. In 
addition, the margin system also signifies that futures contracts are highly leveraged financial 
instruments. This means that a trader is only required to provide at least 5 per cent of the 
contract’s notional value to enter into in these derivatives transactions.  
  The above mechanisms allow huge profits or losses on a relatively minimal initial 
investment  which encourages speculation.70 It is less likely to be  a problem if futures are used 
for hedging purposes. Losses on a position will be offset by gains on the underlying cash 
position being hedged, and vice versa. The amount of gains or losses are then taken from the 
clearing house and the winners receive the profits and losers have the amount of the equivalent 
loss debited from their margin account by the clearing house.71 The combination of initial 
                                                          
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Sheila C. Bair, ‘Lessons from the Barings Collapse’ (1995) 64(1) Fordham Law Review, 1-10.  
71 Robert Tompkins, Options Explained2 (Springer, 2016) 535. 
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margins and variation margins ensures that players in the market have sufficient funds to meet 
their obligations.72 
  The relevance of these derivatives to Islamic finance will be discussed in chapter 5. 
These types of trading mechanisms have not yet attracted major discussion by Muslim scholars.  
The discussion principally focuses on contractual functions of medieval Islamic contracts that 
may replicate the economic effects of conventional derivatives.  
 
4.4.3 Trading System in OTC Derivatives: From Bilaterally Negotiated to 
Centralised Clearing  
  Financial crises in the last two decades has prompted OTC derivatives, particularly 
derivatives transactions that occur in banking and financial markets, to be shifted into central 
counterparties known as CCPs. This trend followed the G-20 summit in September 2009. There 
leaders made the commitment that all standardised OTC derivatives contracts, such as swaps, 
should be traded on exchanges or electronic platforms. These transactions should also be 
cleared through CCPs and reported to trade repositories in their respective jurisdictions. OTC 
derivatives that are not centrally cleared should be subject to higher capital requirements.73  
Jurisdictions that hosts OTC derivatives transactions should also establish rules of the game 
for trading mechanisms through CCPs.  
                                                          
72 Lynn A. Stout, ‘How Deregulating Derivatives Led to Disaster, and Why Regulating Them Can Prevent Another’ (2009) 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1432654>.  
73 See Point 13 of the G-20 Leaders Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit, (September, 2009) [21/10/2017] 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique0925.html. In addition, capital requirement method developed by Basel 
highlighted in Chapter 3 and will be thoroughly discussed in Chapter 9. The principle of Basel capital requirement is that 
risky assets require more capital, while less risky assets require less capital.   
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  CCPs are organised in a similar fashion to futures exchanges. CCPs simultaneously act 
as a buyer to original sellers, and a seller to original buyers. To protect this trading mechanism, 
CCPs may require its members to submit to margin rules and default fund contributions (a fund 
to cover the losses of a clearing member in case that the initial margin is not enough to cover 
the losses).74  
  CCPs employ risk sharing arrangements in its trading activities. As shown in the 
following figure 3, each CCP member has responsibility to cover the risks that may occur in 
the OTC derivatives activities of other members. CCPs create three levels of defence against 
defaulting members. First, margin rules posted by clearing members provide risk protection 
against their positions. This margin rule is similar to the margin rule in futures exchanges. 
Second, defaults funds contributed by clearing members provide a second buffer after the 
margin is fully used. According to Basel, default funds also known as clearing deposits or 
guarantee fund contributions are clearing member’s funded or unfunded contributions towards 
a CCP’s mutualized loss sharing arrangements.75 And third, the last level of defence is the 
CCP’s own capital in a case that the defaults funds are not sufficient to cover the losses called 
“Skin-in-the game”. If the final level of the CCP’s capital proves to be insufficient, the CCP 
would default and the clearing members would need to mutualize the losses.76  It means that 
all CCP members are responsible to cover losses resulting from derivatives transactions under 
the supervision of that particular CCP.  
                                                          
74 Svetlana Borovkova, and HIcham Lalaoui El Mouttalibi ‘Systemic Risk and Centralized Clearing of OTC Derivatives: A 
Network Approach’ (2013), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2334251, 9. 
75 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Capital Requirements for Bank Exposures to Central Counterparties’ (July 
2012) Bank for International Settlements, 8.  
76 Cristiano Zazzara, “OTC Derivatives Clearing: Central Counterparties (CCPs) and Capital Requirements” (Harvard 
Symposium, Harvard University, 2016) 6.  
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  The following figure shows the shift from non-centralised to a centralised trading 
system.  
Figure 4.1. The Shift from Non-Centralised to a Centralised Trading System 
 
Source: Bank for International Settlements.77  
 
4.4.4 CCPs as Insurance for OTC Derivatives?  
It is interesting to see how the global financial regulation is directed towards risk and 
loss sharing arrangements. As explained above, in the CCP’s system, the clearing house acts 
as an insurance entity for OTC derivatives markets by controlling risks. As the members of the 
CCP are required to deposit a percentage of their notional amount, these default funds may 
cover their future losses. These funds are akin to a price or premium for protection against 
unknown risks in their future transactions.  
                                                          
77 Dietrich Domanski, et al, ‘Central Clearing: Trends and Current Issues’ (December 2015) BIS Quarterly Review, 61.  
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Although the CCP is viewed as providing a self-controlled mechanism over systemic 
risk in the financial markets, a risk that may spread to the whole economy, it still raises some 
issues for concern.  The first concern is whether the CCPs belong to a group of shareholders or 
its members. I If the CCP belongs to the members of CCP, then the members have a right to 
any benefits derived from the funds collected by the CCPs. In the case of default by any 
member, it is unclear whether the collected funds will be used to cover the default. If the losses 
are not covered by the collected funds, whether all members are responsible for the loss. This 
remains a question for the CCP system.  
This last concern is also related to the possible risk transfer from the OTC derivatives 
members to the CCPs signifying collective coverage of a defaulting party creating the 
probability of individual risk taking of OTC derivatives participants.78 The shift from bilateral 
OTC to central clearing may provide a protective mechanism where risks are pooled. However, 
this risk sharing mechanism may create costs in the form of distorted incentives. In other words, 
moral hazards may arise at various levels of the clearing either by the CCP itself or its members, 
i.e. CCP may engage in riskier investments if a bailout is assured, or members may become 
involved in riskier trade profiles and adverse selection.79  
 The July 2017 report by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and International 
Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO) stated as follows: 
CCPs are expected to cover fully their current and potential future exposures to each participant 
with a high degree of confidence. All CCPs are also expected to maintain additional prefunded 
financial resources in an amount sufficient to cover a wide range of potential stress scenarios that 
should include, but not be limited to, the default of the one or two participants and their affiliates 
                                                          
78 Ibid.  
79 Svetlana Borovkova, and HIcham Lalaoui El Mouttalibi “Systemic Risk and Centralized Clearing of OTC Derivatives: A 
Network Approach” (December 11, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2334251, 9.  
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that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure to the CCP in extreme but 
plausible market conditions.80 
Thus, the CCPs are responsible to cover the future losses of its members. This means that 
CCPs become systemically important where their failure may create systemic effects in the 
financial industry making them as “too-big-to-fail” entities that may look to government for 
bailouts.81 As a consequence, it has been argued  that these entities should be not formed 
privately;82 there should be a government role through a public-private partnership that may 
provide an incentive to discourage excessive risk taking in the OTC markets through various 
regulatory frameworks.83  
Regulatory frameworks are imperative to guide CCPs in serving the public interest as 
part of economic regulation as stated in Chapter 3. Thus, several jurisdictions have established 
specific regulations for the central clearing mechanism. For instance, the first central clearing 
obligation in the EU came into effect on 21st June 2016.84 Most countries have opted for 
mandatory clearing of interest rate derivatives, which makeup a large portion of the total 
outstanding derivatives transactions.85 For instance, the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) requires that certain OTC interest rate derivatives between larger financial 
institutions in major currencies are cleared through a CCP. However, Australian banks do not 
have to clear all their single-currency swaps.86 In Indonesia, at the time of writing, has not yet 
                                                          
80 Bank for International Settlements and International Organization of Securities Commissions, ‘Resilience of Central 
Counterparties (CCPs): Further Guidance on the PFMI’ (July 2017) [15/10/2017] http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d163.pdf, 24 
81 Manmohan Singh, ‘Making OTC Derivatives Safe - A Fresh Look’ (March 2011) 11 (66) IMF Working Papers 1-22.   
82 See Gordon C. Rausser, William Balson, and Reid B. Stevens, “Centralized Clearing for Over-the-Counter Derivatives” 
(September 18, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1475351. 
83 Ibid.   
84 Lucia Orszaghova, ‘Central Counterparties: Recent Trends and Regulatory Responses’ (2018) 1 Financial Market 
Regulation 26, 30.  
85 Ibid 30.  
86 Duke Cole and Daniel Ji, ‘The Australian OTC Derivatives Market: Insight from New Trade Repository Data’ (2018) 
Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin, 13.  
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established any regulation of CCP. Bank Indonesia planned to establish this CCP for OTC 
derivatives transactions by the end of 2018.87  
The growing number of OTC derivatives transactions has resulted in increasing 
regulation to govern these transactions including the establishment of CCPs. Most Muslim 
countries have no regulations on this.  This is because derivatives transactions are almost absent 
in those countries due to the prohibition of most conventional derivatives under Islamic law. 
This interpretation has been refuted by modern Muslim scholars who argue that some types of 
derivatives-like features derived from medieval Islamic rules can be applied in Muslim 
economies.  This is discussed in detail in Chapter 5. This means that most Muslim nations are 
left behind in developing regulatory frameworks for CCPs. Based on the author’s review, up 
to 2018, Islamic perspective on CCPs has not been considered by the International Islamic 
Financial Services Board (IFSB), a non-government regulatory body for governance, 
supervision, and regulatory aspects of Islamic finance based in Kuala Lumpur or International 
Islamic Financial Markets (IIFM), a non-government regulatory specialising in creating 
standard documentation for Sharia compliant derivatives based in Bahrain. The CCP might 
attract interesting debates in Islamic finance discourses. On the one hand, CCPs might be 
regarded as gambling activities as this concept employs a margin system. On the other hand, 
this concept also involves risk sharing arrangements promoted by Islamic advocates as the true 
basis of Islamic finance as discussed in Chapter 2.  
 
                                                          
87 Ayomi Amindoni, ‘Indonesia to Establish Clearing House for Derivatives in 2018’ (2016) the Jakarta Post, July 22.  
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4.5 Summary  
 This chapter has examined derivatives in financial markets. Derivatives contracts are 
contracts that derive its value from underlying assets. These instruments are inevitable in 
managing and hedging risks in a modern business economy. The basic features of derivatives 
such as options, forwards, futures, and swaps respectively deliver economic benefits if they are 
applied to mitigate the unknown future events.    
  The key distinctions of importance in this chapter are between options, forwards, 
futures, and swaps. As will be seen in chapters 5, 7, and 8, these distinctions are important in 
assessing financial instruments from the point of view of Sharia compliance transactions. As 
derivatives can deliver economic benefits for the economy, it is important to develop these 
types of contracts in modern Islamic finance. Amid the disagreements of derivatives 
instruments among Muslim scholars particularly on the view that derivatives involving a 
prohibited element particularly gharar (uncertainty) such as selling something that is not 
owned by the seller, modern Islamic finance reconstructs medieval Islamic rules arguing that 
derivatives may have its equivalent in the Sharia compliant industry. This will be examined in 
the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 5: DERIVATIVES IN ISLAMIC LAW 
 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter elaborates the argument in Chapter 2 that modern Islamic finance can find 
an appropriate balance between orthodoxy and efficiency. The logic of modern finance 
particularly risk management must be considered in structuring Islamic financial products and 
services.  
This chapter examines seemingly rigid stances of some Sharia opinions that prohibit 
nearly all types of derivatives. Using the methodology described in chapter 2, this chapter 
provides alternative interpretations which would legitimise modern risk management 
instruments with derivatives-like features to be incorporated into Islamic finance.1 First, this 
chapter discusses the importance of derivatives for a modern Islamic financial industry. 
Second, it provides an alternative Sharia view in response to some objections to derivative 
instruments by Islamic finance academics. Third, it examines the definition, scope, 
characteristics, and practices of Sharia compliant derivatives. Fourth, it discusses Sharia 
compliant derivatives-like features. This examination corresponds sequentially to the most 
common types of swaps namely interest rate swaps in conventional derivatives. This is 
followed by the summary.  
  
                                                          
1 Well-known commentators in Islamic finance suggest that the current development of Islamic finance needs risk 
management tool such as derivatives, see, eg, M. Umer Chapra, and T. Khan, “Regulation and Supervision of Islamic 
Banks” (Policy Paper No 3, IRTI Islamic Development Bank, 2000); and Moody's, ‘Derivatives in Islamic Finance: Examining 
the Role of Innovation in the Industry’ (Report, Moody's, 2010).  
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5.2 The Need for Derivatives in Islamic Finance  
Derivatives are a key part of modern financial risk management (Chapter 4). 
Derivatives allow financial institutions to mitigate and hedge various risks which occur in their 
business transactions.  In order to develop Islamically acceptable derivatives, it is necessary to 
ensure that these instruments do not contravene Islamic juristic rules.2  
Despite the need for modern risk management instruments particularly derivatives in 
the Islamic finance industry, the industry has been slow to develop Sharia compliant 
derivatives.3  The reasons for this include the  lack of research on efficient alternatives to 
Islamic alternatives on derivatives. It is complicated by the number of fatwas that prohibit 
conventional derivatives affecting risk management processes in Islamic finance and the lack 
of standardisation of Islamic contracts on derivatives.4 The standardisation issue is not 
addressed in this chapter but is examined in chapter 6. The development of modern derivative 
instruments would permit IFIs to reduce and manage their risk exposures, improve their overall 
creditworthiness5 make them more competitive as well as satisfying the needs of a modern 
economy, business, and customers. 6  
Another issue in developing Sharia complaint derivatives is whether these Islamic 
versions should simply duplicate existing non-Islamic derivatives instruments. Of course, there 
is diversity of scholarly opinions on those matters. They range from a total rejection of 
                                                          
2 See, eg, Muhammad Al-Bashir Muhammad Al-Amine, ‘Risk and Derivatives in Islamic Finance: A Sharia Analysis’ in K. 
Hunt-Ahmed, et al, Contemporary Islamic Finance (John Wiley and Sons, 2013) 331-352, 332; and Bashar H. Malkawi, 
‘Financial Derivatives Between Western Legal Tradition and Islamic Finance: A Comparative Approach’ (2014) 15(1) Journal 
of Banking Regulation, 41-55.  
3 T. Khan and Habib Ahmed, Risk Management: An Analysis of Issues in Islamic Financial Industry, (Islamic Development 
Bank, Islamic Research and Training Institute, 2001) 164.  
4 Ibid, 164.  
5 Anouar Hassoune, ‘Derivatives in Islamic Finance: Examining the Role of Innovation in the Industry’ (Report, Moody’s, 
April 2010).  
6 Ibid.   
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derivatives in some countries and limited implementation in others.7 This has resulted in a 
cautious approach by the Islamic finance industry towards derivatives. However, contemporary 
Sharia rules provide an alternative interpretation to some seemingly rigid fatwas or Sharia 
opinions on derivatives. The following section examines those objections and alternative 
interpretations derived from various Islamic juristic rules that may bring alternative permissible 
derivatives under Islamic finance.   
 
5.3 Gharar (Uncertainty) and Derivatives  
The main objection to derivatives is that it may involve prohibited gharar, often 
translated as uncertainty.  A fatwa prohibiting derivatives provides: 
“where the contract provides for the delivery of described and secured merchandise at some 
future date, and payment of its price on delivery. It also stipulates that it shall end with the 
actual delivery and receipt of the merchandise. This contract is not permissible because the 
deferment of the two elements of the exchange [delivery and payment]”.8 
This fatwa refers to futures contracts as one of the derivatives described in 4.3.2 of chapter 4. 
In futures, both the delivery of commodities and payment of money are postponed to a future 
date. The fatwa states that a sale can only be valid if either the money or the delivery is 
postponed but not both. For a sale to be valid, there must also be a transfer of ownership of the 
commodity sold. If the seller does not own the commodity, the seller cannot transfer ownership. 
It is argued that almost all Islamic legal schools (madhahib) in Sunni traditions agree that the 
                                                          
7 Al-Amine in Hunt-Ahmed, et al, above n 2, 332.   
8 Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC), ‘Resolution No 63/1/7’ (2000).  
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sale of non-existent commodities or objects, and objects that may cease to exist, is not in 
conformity with Islamic law.9  
But this is not a universal view as there are Islamic juristic rules indicating that the non-
existence of subject matter does not necessarily invalidate the sale contract.10 The rationale 
behind the prohibition of selling non-existent subject matter is the uncertainty regarding the 
qualitative and quantitative elements of the subject matter. If these uncertainties could be 
removed by a certain agreed mechanism, then it is possible to create such futures contracts 
under Islamic law.11 Thus, the deferment of the two counter values (money and subject matter) 
should be allowed.12 Some scholars argue that the opinion based on scholars unanimous 
agreement (ijma) on the prohibition of the sale of non-existent subject matter, is very weak.13  
This should not prevent Islamic futures contracts. Muslim scholars require that the deferment 
of counter values in sales contract be directed towards a real exchange not for speculative 
purposes.14 Those scholars do not further elaborate on how the speculative nature of futures 
could be removed. There is the further difficulty to be considered, that is whether the margin 
system in futures exchanges may lead to speculative activities through the leverage system, 
whereby only a small percentage of cost for the notional transaction enables a participant to 
trade in that transaction to earn profit (paragraph 4.3.10 of chapter 4).  
The thesis argues that futures contracts should not be categorised as a gharar 
(uncertainty) sale because the uncertainty has been removed by the trading and guarantee 
                                                          
9 Wahbah Al-Zuhayli, Financial Transactions in Islamic Jurisprudence. Vol.1 (translated by Mahmoud A. El-Gamal, and 
revised by Muhammad S. Eissa) (Dar Al-Fikr, 2001), 75.  
10 M. Zahra and SM. Mahmor, ‘The Validity of Contracts when the Goods are not Yet in Existence in Islamic La of Sale 
Goods’ (2002) 17(4) Arab Law Quarterly 379-97, 397.  
11 Ibid.  
12 Monzer Kahf, ‘Islam’s Stance on Commodities and Futures Markets’ [25/03/2017] 
http://www.Islamonline.net/servlet/satellite?cid=1119503544954&pagename=IslamOnline_English-
Ask_Scholar52FFatwaE%2FPrintFatwaE.  
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
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mechanism of a standardised exchange market, i.e. through a clearing-house.15 The clearing 
house mechanism has been extensively discussed in paragraph 4.4 of Chapter 4. This approach 
is based on public interest considerations (maslahah) in allowing futures transactions.16 The 
public interest considerations have been discussed at paragraph 3.4 of chapter 3. Muslim 
scholars, in reviewing various fatwas that prohibit futures derivatives17 found weaknesses in 
the evidential bases for these fatwas. This primarily because these Islamic legal verdicts fail to 
recognise the actual mechanics of derivatives trading and apply the rules of conventional sale 
to derivatives trading.18 In other words, most fatwas fail to recognise the trading mechanism 
under exchange-traded derivatives whereby derivatives transactions are cleared by a particular 
clearing house. According to this view, the existence of clearing houses reduces significantly 
the failure to deliver the commodity under futures contracts. This supports the argument that 
futures should be allowed in Islamic finance as long as the underlying asset of these futures do 
not contradict Islamic principles. These principles will be separately discussed 5.3 of this 
chapter.  
Moreover, futures contracts should not be classified under the hadith prohibiting sale 
of non-existent goods (la tabi’ ma laysa ‘indak). According to modern hadith commentators, 
the text of the hadith refers to a traditional sale whereby the existence of the good is essential.  
Where the goods are not in existence at the time of the transaction, the sale is invalid.19 This 
hadith also refers to a sale of particular objects especially an object of sale that is difficult to 
find in a common market. However, if that object of sale is easily replaceable in the market, 
                                                          
15 See, eg, Mohammad Hashim Kamali, “Prospects for an Islamic Derivatives Market in Malaysia” (1999) 41(4/5) 
Thunderbird International Business Review 523-540, 532.   
16 Ibid.  
17 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, ‘Islamic Commercial Law: An Analysis of Futures’ (1996) 13 the American Journal of Islamic 
Social Sciences 197-225. 
18 Ibid, see also the article on options, and the prospect of derivatives in Islamic finance Mohammad Hashim Kamali, 
“Islamic Commercial Law: An Analysis of Options” (1997) 14 the American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 17-39. 
19 Kamali, above n 15, 536.  
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then the seller can sell that object even if the seller does not possess the object of sale at the 
time of signing the sale contract.20 It is argued that this hadith is not relevant to futures 
derivatives.  
In futures contracts, sales and purchases of a commodity have been measured and 
standardised in its quality and quantity. The reason of the prohibition of sale of non-existence 
object is uncertainty of time of delivery, quality, and quantity of the object of sale. This reason 
is absent in futures contracts because in these contracts such requirements (time of delivery, 
quality and quantity) have been guaranteed by an exchange rule. Thus, this guarantee 
mechanism removes uncertainties leading to the absence of uncertainty in delivering the object 
of sale in futures-exchange traded derivatives.21    
The common rationale that is often used in forbidding derivatives is that these 
transactions contain uncertainty (gharar) because of the absence of money and traded goods at 
the time of contract. This logic has been disputed by some scholars on the grounds that the 
mechanisms of modern derivatives are completely different from those traditional sale 
contracts. Thus, an analogy between traditional sales as equivalent to derivatives is invalid. 
The element of uncertainty (gharar) in derivatives transactions has been reduced by the 
mechanism of the clearing house, an intermediary institution between the seller and the buyer. 
This alternative interpretation supports the future development of Islamic derivatives. The next 
section addresses a further objection to derivatives, that is, it amounts to the sale of one debt 
for another debt.  
 
                                                          
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid 536-537.  
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5.4 Derivatives: Sale of One Debt for Another Debt  
Another objection to futures derivatives is that they may involve a sale of one debt for 
another debt (bai al kali bi al kali) which is unlawful. For instance, party A signs a futures 
contract with party B to purchase a commodity from party B to be delivered in two months’ 
time at an agreed price. As this is a futures contract, both the commodity and the price are to 
be delivered and paid for within two months. After one month, party A sells the commodity to 
Party C at a higher price with the commodity and the price to be paid and delivered in a month. 
In this transaction, party A has not yet received the commodity and it is indebted to party A. 
This example is often used to describe a sale of a debt for debt. The prohibition of such a sale 
comes from a hadith prohibiting sale of one debt for another debt.22 
It can be argued that a sale of a debt for another debt is lawful provided that the sale is 
clear of riba, and there is not clear texts in the primary sources of Islamic law (the Qur’an and 
the Hadith) prohibiting it.23 A further suggested condition is that such a future sale for a fixed 
period could be conducted with proper documentation as recorded in a Quranic verse that 
indicates a transaction involving future obligations for a fixed period of time needs to be in 
writing.24 The verse could be applied to all types of transactions involving debts (dayn) as long 
as these sales are accurately recorded and documented.25 Moreover, some scholars take the 
view that to facilitate the development of futures contracts under Islamic finance, the delay in 
payment is allowed until the subject matter is delivered,26 as long as the subject matter is 
                                                          
22 The hadith reported by Musa bin ‘Ubayah bin Nashit al-Rabdhi reported from ‘Abd Allah Ibn ‘Umar, simply that “Prophet 
(peace be upon him) prohibited bay’ al-kali bi al-kali” (sale one debt for another debt), see Mohammad Hashim Kamali, ‘the 
Permissibility and Potential of Developing Islamic Derivatives as Financial Instruments’ (1999) 2 IIUM Journal of Economics 
and Management 73-86, 83.  
23 Kamali, above n 22.  
24 “O you who believe! When you deal with each other in a transaction involving future obligations for a fixed period (idha 
tadayantum bi-daynin ila ajalin musamman) reduce it into writing. Let the scribe write faithfully as between the parties…” 
(Qur’an 2:282)”, see Kamali, above n 22, 83.  
25 Ibid.  
26 Frank E. Vogel and Samuel L. Hayes, III, Islamic Law and Finance: Religion, Risk, and Return (Kluwer Law International, 
1998) 114.   
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concrete goods (ayn) such as palm oil, a watch, horse, or house, and continuously available in 
the market.27 These scholars are derived this opinion from the view that hadith preventing a 
sale of debt for another debt is weak (dhaif),28 a type of hadith in which in its transmission has 
been found a defect such as in the credibility of its narrators.   
Thus, the above alternative Sharia opinions support a transaction involving the sale of 
a debt for another debt. This may legitimise most important features of futures transactions 
whereby most traders in futures contracts exit the contracts before the expiry date. A further 
aspect of futures which have been argued to be Islamically objectionable is a sale before the 
seller takes possession.  
 
5.5 Derivatives: Sale before Possession (Qabd) 
Another objection to derivatives transactions is that they permit the sale of the subject 
matter before the seller takes possession. In futures contracts, transacting parties are allowed 
to re-sell the subject matter to third parties before they take possession. Almost all futures and 
options contracts are settled before maturity and physical delivery.29 There is a fatwa that cited 
below prohibits such a transaction.  
The contract provides for the delivery of described and secured merchandise at some future 
date, and payment of its price on delivery. The contract, however, does not stipulate that it shall 
end with the actual delivery and receipt of the merchandise, and thus it may be terminated by 
                                                          
27 Kamali, above n 22, 87. 
28 see also Muhammad al-Bashir Muhammad al-Amine, Risk Management in Islamic Finance: an Analysis of Derivatives 
Instruments in Commodity Markets (Brill, 2008), 21.  
29 See, eg, A. Khan, ‘Commodity Exchange and Stock Exchange in Islamic Economy’ (1988) 5(1) the American Journal of 
Islamic Social Science 91-114, 98; and Sami Al-Suwailem, ‘Hedging in Islamic Finance’ (Occasional Paper No 10, Islamic 
Research and Training Institute Islamic Development Bank, 2006) 43.  
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an opposite contract. This type of contract is the most prevalent in the commodity markets. It 
is not at all permissible, moreover, it is not permissible to sell a merchandise purchased under 
salam [deferred sale] (…) terms with advance payment unless the mechanise has already (been) 
received.30  
This is supported by a hadith “He who buys foodstuff should not sell it until he has received 
it” which is also cited a prohibition of sale prior to taking possession.31  
The fatwa and hadith referred to above have been disputed by some scholars. The hadith 
was linked to foodstuff, especially perishable goods, because of uncertainty over the delivery 
to the buyer of food that is not in the seller’s possession. When there is no such uncertainty, 
such as in the sale of real property, the qabd (possession) is not a requirement.32 In addition, it 
has been argued that the concept of possession (qabd) is a juristic concept that has various 
meanings such as “holding, retention, taking into custody, evacuation, measuring, separating, 
and even viewing”.33 Thus, the concept of possession should be viewed on the basis of 
prevailing practice.34 Consequently, modern commercial transactions involving computerized 
and documented transactions should be considered as part of a current trading custom. Hence, 
the possession also occurs when a sale or an offsetting transaction is verified by the exchange 
and the contracting parties’ accounts are properly documented.35  
It is arguable that futures contracts can be categorised as a sale by description (bay al-
sifah) which is permissible under Islamic law. Futures are similar to a sale by description on 
the basis that the sale of the asset (although not in possession at the time of signing contract) 
                                                          
30 Organization of Islamic Countries Fiqh Academy, ‘Resolution 63/1/7’ (OIC Fiqh Academy, 2000).  
31 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, ‘Prospects for an Islamic Derivatives Market in Malaysia’ (1999) 41(4/5) Thunderbird 
International Business Review 523-540, 538.  
32 Ibid 358.  
33 Ibid 359. 
34 Ibid.  
35 Ibid.  
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has detailed documentation relating to specification and time of delivery.36 Consequently, the 
sale by description may validate certain aspects of futures contracts as Sharia compliant 
futures.37 This view has been supported by fatwas in jurisdictions offering Islamic finance. For 
instance, the National Shariah Board of Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) indicates that Islamic 
law recognises two distinct types of qabd (possession) namely qabd haqiqi (physical 
possession) and qabd hukmi (legal possession).38 The former relates to a physical possession 
of a subject matter after a sale transaction takes place. The latter refers to a legal possession of 
a subject matter even though the subject matter is not physically held.39 Both types of 
possession are allowed under Islamic law in a trading transaction.40 This alternative view 
indicates a level of support for the sale of subject matter before the seller takes possession. A 
further objection to derivatives relates to the sale of rights discussed next.  
 
5.6 Options and Selling of Rights  
Another objection to derivatives, particularly options contracts, is that Islamic law does 
not permit the sale of rights. The Islamic Fiqh Academy of OIC, for instance, issued a fatwa 
stating that options contracts are illegal and their trading is prohibited. This is based on the 
view that options are new financial instruments that do not fall under the purview of any one 
of the nominated contracts in Islamic commercial law. Furthermore, the subject of matter of 
                                                          
36 According to Al-Amine, Hanafi, Maliki, and Hanbali scholars accept this type of contract, Muhammad Al-Amine, 
‘Commodity Derivatives: An Islamic Analysis’ In Muhammad Iqbal, & Tariqullah Khan (Ed.), Financial Engineering and 
Islamic Contracts (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) 58-98.  
37 Bashar H. Malkawi, ‘Financial Derivatives Between Western Legal Tradition and Islamic Finance: A Comparative 
Approach’ (2014) 15(1) Journal of Banking Regulation, 41-55.  
38 Sharia Advisory Council (Dewan Syariah Nasional, DSN) – Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI), “Fatwa Nomor 82/DSN-
MUI/VIII/2011 on Perdagangan Komoditi berdasarkan Prinsip Syariah di Bursa Commodity (Fatwa No.82/DSN-
MUI/VIII/2011 on Commodity Exchanges based in Sharia Principles in Commodity Markets) (DSN MUI, 2011). 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
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the options contracts are not subject matter that can be legally exchanged under Islamic law 
such as mal (wealth), manfa’ah (usufruct), and haq mali (right related to property).41 Another 
objection is that options contracts may involve gambling (maysir). Gambling occurs when one 
party in an options contract, at the time of exercising the contract, gains from the contract, 
whilst the other must lose. This probability of gain or loss depends on an unknown future 
market price. In addition, in most options contracts, contracting parties have no intention of 
taking delivery, but use the contract to profit from price differentials.42  
Conversely there is support for the view that options contracts may have their own 
Islamic version. It is argued that the concept of down payment (bay al-urbun) and a stipulated 
option (khiyar al-shart) may become Islamic alternatives to options contracts.43 In these 
contracts, contracting parties are free to insert stipulations in contracts and to ask for a fee such 
as monetary compensation by one who grants an option to the other.44 It is also argued that the 
concept of a stipulated option (khiyar al-shart) closely resembles options. This contract refers 
to an option in which a condition stipulated in the contract, whether to confirm the contract or 
to cancel it in a specified period.45 There is support for this view as an Islamic alternative.46 It 
also has the advantage that  the stipulated option (khiyar al-shart) could be used as a tool of 
risk management in its own right meaning that the contract provides a right for either party, or 
both, or even to a third party, to confirm or to cancel the contract within a stipulated time 
period.47  
                                                          
41 Al-Amine, above n 28, 36.  
42 Vogel and Hayes, above n 26, 164.  
43 Kamali, above n 15.    
44 Ibid 356-357.  
45 Al-Amine in Hunt-Ahmed, et al, above n 2, 339.  
46 Kamali, above n 15, 369-370.  
47 Al-Amine in Hunt-Ahmed, et al, above n 2, 339.  
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Other scholars argue that a down payment contract, (bay al-urbun) is the most relevant 
arrangement for options.48  This contract allows one party to buy the right to purchase from the 
other party specified goods for a specified price on [or in some versions by] a certain date.49 In 
this transaction, the buyer pays only a small part of the price of a commodity, on the 
understanding that the seller will retain this amount if the sale is not finally concluded due to 
withdrawal of the buyer.50  
Although the alternative view has supported Sharia complaint instruments that 
resemble options, some disputes remain. The inherent leverage in options and their detachment 
from the reference asset(s) remains controversial.51 Nonetheless, there is sufficient support for 
the argument that selling rights is not inconsistent with Islamic law.  
 
5.7 Regulating Speculation in Hedging Activities  
The previous discussion has been directed to the alternative Sharia opinions on 
derivatives, which leave open opportunities for structuring derivatives under Islamic finance.  
It has not, however addressed the issue of speculation as an inseparable part of derivatives 
transactions. This makes derivatives instruments completely different to traditional sales. In 
derivatives markets, a speculator does not intend to hold an asset other than for profit.52 This 
has created adverse impacts for financial markets and separated the financial sector with real 
                                                          
48 Vogel and Hayes, above n 26, 156.  
49 Ibid.  
50 Al-Amine in Hunt-Ahmed, et al, above n 2, 341.  
51 Juan Sole and Andreas Jobst, ‘Operative Principles of Islamic Derivatives: Towards a Coherent Theory’ (Working Paper, 
International Monetary Fund Working Paper, 2012) 14.  
52 Joel Bessis, Risk Management in Banking (Wiley, 4th Edition, 2015), 73.  
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economic production.53 Derivatives have been criticised as potentially corrupting,54 and too 
remote from the underlying assets that are required in Islamic transactions.55 Speculation is an 
inherent part of derivatives transactions.56  
A distinction can be drawn between speculation and hedging. Most scholars consider 
that hedging for the purpose of risk mitigation is a valid in Islamic law.57 But the issue is how 
to deal with speculative aspects of hedging. A limited level of speculation is not only needed 
but is necessary for the smooth functioning of any exchange.58 Consequently, it may not be 
possible to eliminate speculation altogether in ordinary sales or in derivatives. However, if a 
limited level of speculation is necessary, the question then becomes how to draw the line 
between this limited scale of speculation and that which is excessive.59  
One view is that speculation would be acceptable when it is part of some real activity 
and helps to shift risks from the vulnerable producers, who cannot afford to bear all the risk, to 
those who can afford to bear it.60 A properly organized or regulated market may reduce 
speculation to an acceptable level. The existence of a clearing-house, for instance, may prevent 
market abuse and promote financial stability in derivatives markets.61 In addition, the capital 
requirement for derivatives transactions is also another aspect that could be considered in 
derivatives markets. The International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) also 
                                                          
53 Edward LiPuma and Benjamin Lee, ‘Financial Derivatives and the Rise of Circulation’ (2005) 34(3) Economy and Society 
404-427.  
54 Rodney Wilson, ‘Islamic Financial Instruments’ (1991) 6 Arab Law Quarterly 205-214, 209. 
55 Rodney Wilson, ‘Global Islamic Capital Markets’ (2007) Islamic Finance News 13-20, 14. 
56 Ibid. These opinions have been shared among advocates of Islamic finance, see Muhammad Akram Khan, ‘Commodity 
Exchange and Stock Exchange in Islamic Economy’ (1988) 5(1) American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 92-114.  
57 Al-Fatawah al-Iqtisadiyyah al-Sadirah an Nadwat al-Barakahli al-Iqtisad al-Islami by Abd al-Sattar Abu Ghuddah in Al-
Amine in Hunt-Ahmed, above n 2, 344.  
58 Ahmadal-Ashkar, ‘Toward anI slamic Exchange in Transitional Stage’ (1995) 3(1) Islamic Economic Studies 82–83.  
59 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, ‘The Permissibility and Potential of Developing Islamic Derivatives as Financial Instruments’ 
(1999) 7(2) IIUM Journal of Economics & Management, 77.  
60 Fahim Khan, ‘Islamic Futures and Their Markets’ (Research Paper No 32, Islamic Research and Training Institute, Islamic 
Development Bank, 1996) 46.  
61 Australian Securities and Investment Commission, “Background to the OTC Derivatives Reform” [25/04/2017] 
http://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/markets/otc-derivatives-reform/background-to-the-otc-derivatives-reform/ 
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launched its master agreements to ensure that OTC (over-the-counter) derivatives are 
documented properly. The discussion of this will be provided in Chapter 6. Standard 
documentation may increase market confidence and liquidity, since quotes can be made on 
standardised contractual assumptions.62   
The next section discusses the meaning of Islamic derivatives, its characters, and 
restrictions in Islamic finance.  
 
5.8  “Islamic” or “Sharia Compliant” Derivatives  
Alternative Sharia views discussed in the previous sections provided a foundation for 
creating derivative-like features in Islamic finance. This section examines these “Islamic” or 
“Sharia compliant” derivatives, that is, instruments that are based on, or comply with, either 
the primary or secondary sources of Islamic law. As derivatives are modern transactions which 
bear little resemblance to any medieval Islamic juristic rules, their validity depends on fatwas 
issued by modern Muslim jurists or Sharia Supervisory Boards of respective IFIs who advocate 
Sharia compliant derivatives. These scholars whose opinions have also been relied on as 
foundations for Islamic derivatives have based their opinions on Islamic juristic rules 
particularly from Sunni traditions to legitimize Sharia compliant derivatives.  
One of the important points in discussing derivatives in Islamic finance is that most 
scholars relate derivative activities to the Arabic term namely tahawwut (hedging). 63 This word 
literally means, among other things, ‘care’, ‘precaution’, or ‘prudence’.64 Tahawwut is thus 
                                                          
62 Li Lin and Jay Surti, ‘Capital Requirements for Over-the-Counter Derivatives Central Counterparties’ (2013) IMF Working 
Paper WP/13/3. 
63 See Mohd Razif, N.F., et.al. ‘Permissibility of Hedging in Islamic Finance’ (2012) 12(2) Middle-East Journal of Scientific 
Research, 155-159. 
64 Craig R. Nethercott and David M. Eisenberg, Islamic Finance: law and Practice (Oxford University Press, 2012), 209-232.  
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related to hedging activities in Islamic finance which should not contravene prohibited Islamic 
law principles. One of the prohibited elements that has been addressed in the previous sections 
is gharar (uncertainty). It has been argued that gharar can be avoided under modern derivatives 
particularly in exchange-traded derivatives. Another prohibition that needs to be avoided in 
Islamic hedging activities is interest. Sharia compliant derivatives should not use interest as its 
underlying value. This will be discussed next.  
In designing Sharia compliant derivatives, the underlying value or asset must be Sharia 
compliant. 65 Interest would not be allowed as an underlying value in this type of transaction 
due to the prohibition of riba (interest). Sharia compliant derivatives need to utilise 
commodities or assets that are classified as Sharia compliant such as oil, agricultural products, 
i.e. crude palm oil, or precious metals such as gold, and copper, etc.  
The principle that the underlying economic activities of assets or values must be Sharia 
compliant is used in shares or stocks, which are commonly used as the underlying values of 
derivatives. Qualitative and quantitative Sharia screening is used to ensure Sharia compliance. 
Qualitative screening assesses whether the main business activities not contrary to Sharia 
principles. Some business activities are considered impermissible (haram). There are variations 
of these prohibited activities ranging from alcohol, tobacco, pork related products, financial 
services including interest-based conventional banks and insurance practices, gambling, 
casinos, music, hotels, cinemas, and adult entertainment, arms manufacturing, pornography, 
and so on.66 It should be carefully noted that each jurisdiction has its own classification either 
                                                          
65 Jan Smolarski, Michael Schapek, and Mohammad Iqbal Tahir, ‘Permissibility and use of options for hedging purposes in 
Islamic Finance’ (2016) 48 Thunderbird International Business Review 425–443.  
66 Each industry sets its own Sharia screening resulting the type of industry that is considered prohibited would vary. For 
detailed explanation on Sharia screening, see, eg, Ulrich Derigs and Shehab Marzban, ‘Review and Analysis of Current 
Sharia Compliant Equity Screening Process’ (2008) 1(4) International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and 
Management 285-303, 287; and Dawood Ashraf and Mohsin Khawaja, ‘Does the Sharia Screening Process Matter? 
Evidence from Sharia Compliant Portfolios’ (2016) 132 Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization 77-92, 79. 
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to include all or some of those activities. A further screening is quantitative one that assesses 
whether sources of business income are permissible (halal).67 Muslims jurists that sit on boards 
of Islamic financial institutions stated that as long as the non-halal income is less than one third 
or 33 per cent of the overall income, then the income could be categorized as Sharia compliant. 
This figure is common in Islamic finance markets. The figure 33 per cent referred to above is 
derived from the hadith: “the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) advised Abu Bakr not 
to donate more than one-third of his wealth, and commented that one third is too much”.68 
Although this hadith is not related to a financial screening of a business activity,69  some 
scholars argue that since two thirds of sources of funds come from permissible sources, the 
one-third from impermissible sources is ignored.70  
If after applying these two layers of Sharia screening, theoretically, Sharia compliant 
derivatives cannot be used by a company whose primary business activity is not permissible 
(haram). Although Islamic derivatives are derived from medieval Islamic commercial law 
contracts and thus deemed Sharia compliant, it does not necessarily mean that the hedging 
based on these contracts is Sharia compliant if  the underlying assets of that hedging are 
considered non-halal.71 In other words,  the use of traditional Islamic commercial contracts to 
deliver returns from non-compliant investments are prohibited. The example of this principle 
will be separately discussed in the following sections particularly on Islamic profit rate swaps.  
Another consideration relevant to Sharia compliance derivatives is where hedging is 
used exclusively for risk management purposes. This purpose is legitimate in Islamic law as it 
                                                          
67 Derigs and Marzban, above n 68.  
68 Ibid 292.  
69 Ibid. 
70 Mohamed Ali Elgari, ‘Purification of Islamic Equity Funds: Methodology and Sharia Foundation’ (Proceedings of the Fourth 
Harvard University Forum on Islamic Finance, Harvard University, 2000) 77-80.   
71 Yusuf Talal Delorenzo, ‘The Total Returns Swap and the "Shariah Conversion Technology" Stratagem’ [21/12/2017] 
https://uaelaws.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/delorenzo-copy.pdf.  
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provides an instrument to mitigate risks and harm based on modern financial needs and 
activities 72 and Islamic economic objectives.73 There is support for this approach in some 
verses in the Qur’an74 which promote the preventive steps in managing commercial 
transactions from unwanted risks.75 This is also supported by a hadith saying that “In Islam, 
harm should neither be initiated nor reciprocated”.76 Muslim scholars derive from this hadith 
some principles related to managing future uncertainties. These include that harm must be 
eliminated or  as much as possible and preventing harm takes priority over seeking benefit.77 
These principles provide a legal basis for hedging transactions in Islamic finance based on the 
public interest (mashalah).78 Some jurists do not reject the concept of hedging but differ as to 
what Sharia compliant hedging mechanisms can be developed.79 Generally, Muslim scholars 
agree on the permissibility of hedging activities as long as they are designed for risk 
management purposes and do not contravene Sharia principles.80 
Some fatwas (Islamic legal verdicts) also support the permissibility of hedging for risk 
management purposes. Dallah Barakah Resolution No.2/28 in 2007 issued resolutions 
permitting managing risk through hedging (tahawwut) as long as it is in line with Sharia 
mechanisms, contract and instruments and as long as they do not involve matters that 
contravene Sharia principles.81 The Accounting Auditing Organization of Islamic Finance 
                                                          
72 Wan Zil Farlihah Wan Ibrahim, ‘Hedging in Islamic Finance’ (2016) 1(3) Islamic Corporations for the Development of 
Private Sector Bulletin, 13. 
73 Sami Al-Suwailem, ‘Hedging in Islamic Finance’ (Occasional Paper No 10, Islamic Research and Training Institute Islamic 
Development Bank, 2006), 57.  
74 Qur’an 2:195, 2:283-283, 12:47-49, see Noor Fahimah Mohd Razif, et al, ‘Permissibility of Hedging in Islamic Finance’ 
(2012) 12(2) Middle-East Journal of Scientific Research 155-159. 
75 Ibid 156.  
76 Asyraf Wadji Dusuki, ‘Principle and Application of Risk Management and Hedging Instruments in Islamic Finance’ 
[06/10/2017] http://www.iefpedia.com/english/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Asyraf.pdf. 
77 Ibid.  
78 Derigs and Marzban, above n 68, 292.  
79 Dusuki, above n 78. 
80 Al-Amine in Hunt-Ahmed, et al, above n 2.  
81 Mohamad Akram Laldin, ‘Islamic Hedging Standards’ (2017) IIFM Workshop on Islamic Hedging Standards 10th April, 
http://www.iifm.net/sites/default/files/Islamic%20Hedging%20Standards%20by%20Prof.%20Dr.%20Mohamad%20Akram%2
0Laldin.pdf. 
106 
 
Institutions (AAOIFI) in its Sharia Standard declares that hedging is permissible for institutions 
to hedge against the future devaluation of the currency with some Sharia requirements. In 
Malaysia, Sharia Advisory Councils of the Malaysian Securities Commission and the Central 
Bank of Malaysia issued a number of Sharia resolutions supporting hedging activities in 
Islamic finance. The Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) issued a fatwa in 2015 on the 
permissibility of tahawwut (hedging).82  
Furthermore, Sharia compliant derivatives restrict the use of derivatives for speculation 
and gambling.83 As discussed in the previous section, the avoidance of speculation in hedging 
markets creates a dilemma because it is difficult to distinguish between hedging for prudent 
financial management and speculation. One way of avoiding speculation is through a well-
regulated market that may reduce speculation to an acceptable level. As will be discussed in 
chapter 6, a standard documentation for a type of Islamic derivatives has been developed by 
the International Islamic Financial Markets (IIFM) and International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA) providing a procedure for derivatives transactions within the spirit of 
Islamic principles.  
This section sets out what can be considered the basic characteristics and scope of 
Sharia compliant derivatives. 
 
 
 
                                                          
82 Yudi Ahmad Faisal, ‘Islamic Derivatives in Indonesia: A Study on Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI)’s Fatwa on Tahawwut 
(Hedging)’ (2016) 2(1) İslam Ekonomisi ve Finansı Dergisi 35-61. 
83 Al-Amine in Hunt-Ahmed, et al, above n 2, 344.  
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Table 5.1. Sharia Restrictions for Derivatives Transactions  
No Sharia Restrictions for Hedging  
1 Sharia compliant derivatives contracts are derived from various medieval 
Islamic juristic rules. These rules are selected, modified, and combined creating 
mechanisms, returns, and protection that are comparable to modern derivatives. 
In addition, Sharia compliant derivatives follow particular Sharia requirements 
and provisions developed by Muslim scholars who advocate the development of 
derivatives-like features in Islamic finance.  
2 Sharia compliant derivatives use permissible underlying values or assets. Thus 
some types of assets or values cannot be used as their underlying values such as 
banking interest.  
3 Underlying assets or values used for Sharia compliant derivatives must be 
evaluated using qualitative and quantitative screening.  
4 Sharia compliant derivatives should be used only for risk management purposes  
5 Sharia compliant derivatives should limit the use of speculation and gambling in 
its transactions 
Source: Author 
 
5.9 Time Value of Money in Sharia Compliant Derivatives Transactions 
One of the rationales behind derivatives transactions is time value of money. It means 
the value of $1 today is greater than the value of $1 in the future because $1 can be put to 
productive use to generate profit over time. The value of $1 invested appreciates through the 
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payment of interest,84 and productive use to generate profits. The interest rate determines the 
cost of funds in the banking and non-banking sectors. The future value of money is adjusted 
for inflation as the value of money decreases due to increases in the prices of goods and services 
in the economy. The time value of money is central to hedging activities. Various hedging 
activities such as options, futures, and swaps are designed for the purpose of managing and 
mitigating unpredicted and adverse movements of the future value of money or underlying 
assets.  
Sharia compliant derivatives can be designed to anticipate changes in the time value of 
money following Sharia rules. Islamic finance does not completely reject the time value, but 
modifies and imposes conditions as to comply with Islamic law. This is discussed in the next 
section.   
 
5.9.1 Time Value of Money in Islamic Finance  
There are two Sharia opinions concerning the time value of money. One view rejects 
the whole concept of the time value of money due to the prohibition of interest, riba. This 
prohibition includes the time value in interest-based loans as well as in a sale-based financing 
involving credit sale prices.85 This view further argues that Islamic banks can also breach 
Sharia law in undertaking financing transactions notably sale-based financing such as 
murabahah (a cost plus sale on a deferred payment basis) (see paragraph 2.5 in Chapter 2). 
                                                          
84 Interest is a premium of using money and computed by multiplying capital value by the interest rate. Interest rate itself is a 
percent of premium paid on money at one date in terms of money to be in hand in a predetermined future time, in Irving 
Fisher, the Theory of Interest: As Determined by Impatience to Spend Income and Opportunity to Invest it (Augustus M. 
Kelley Publishers, Clifton, 1974) 13.  
85 Feisal Khan, Islamic Banking in Pakistan: Sharia Compliant Finance and the Quest to Make Pakistan More Islamic 
(Routledge, 2015) 74, another well-known Muslim jurist M. Taqi Usmani views “in Sharia there is no concept of time value of 
money”, see M. Taqi Usmani, An Introduction to Islamic Finance (Brill, 2002) xvi. 
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Under murabahah, the spot price is lower than the forward price meaning that time has 
monetary effects that make the difference between spot and forward price. On the first view 
this is regarded as representing a rental for the use of money for a certain period and thus a 
form of  interest, riba.86 A different view is taken by other Muslim scholars that the profit under 
deferred payment sales in medieval Islamic juristic rules such as murabahah cannot be 
considered as time value of money. For them, the price difference between the present and the 
future value of that contract does not represent the pure time element (time value of money), 
but rather a recognition of changing forces of supply and demand.87  
If time value of money is rejected, this has adverse consequences for Islamic finance. 
The absence of time value of money makes it difficult for Islamic banks to determine their 
margin rates particularly on its sale-based financing products. It is normal in Islamic banking 
practice for the spot price of a commodity to be less than the deferred credit price.88 The 
difference between the spot price and the future price of a commodity is due to the logic that 
money has monetary effects.89 Moreover, the absence of the time value of money on foreign 
exchange markets would also collapse forward exchange markets.90 This creates an assumption 
that foreign exchange transactions should be carried out at spot market prices. A prohibition 
will eliminate speculative activity in the foreign exchange market and limit trading to the spot 
market to take advantage of differentials in bilateral or cross currency rates. 
A further problem is that the absence of the time value of money on foreign exchange 
markets would also eliminate hedging markets. Hedging involves activities designed to protect 
                                                          
86 See, eg, Muhammad Anwar, ‘Islamicity of Banking and Modes of Islamic Banking’ (2003) 18(1) Arab Law Quarterly 62-80, 
66; Mohammad Omar Farooq, ‘Stipulation of Excess in Understanding and Misunderstanding Riba: The Al-Jassas Link’ 
(2007) 21(4) Arab Law Quarterly 285-316, 314.  
87 Fahim Khan, ‘Time Value of Money and Discounting in Islamic Perspective’ (1991) 1(2) Review of Islamic Economics 35-
45.  
88 Mahmoud El Gamal, Islamic Finance, Law, Economics, and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 12.  
89 Ibid.   
90 There is a strong argument in Islamic finance that money exchanges should be carried out on a spot cash basis.  
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against risks from receipts or payments in foreign currency and in the holding of assets in 
foreign currency whenever the devaluations or revaluations take place. The absence of hedging 
will transfer the risks from commodity trading and foreign investment directly to the groups 
involved in these activities. It then would limit activity in these areas since traders and investors 
will generally minimize risks and accordingly reduce the volume of their activities.91 To avoid 
this, investors may resort to the conventional banking system.  
The absence of the time value of money in commodity markets would also cause a 
collapse of Islamic hedging that relies heavily on commodity prices for its income stream. As 
discussed previously, most of the underlying assets of Islamic hedging (derivatives) are 
commodities such as oil, agricultural products, i.e. crude palm oil, or precious metals such as 
gold, copper, etc. Most Islamic derivatives instruments employ mechanisms that includes a 
series of sales and purchases of certain commodities based on the spot as well as credit price. 
This will be discussed separately in the following sections. If the price difference between the 
credit and spot price is considered as the prohibited time value of money, one should consider 
that there would be no Islamic hedging. This would place Islamic finance institutions at a 
serious disadvantage compared to its conventional counterparts.  
The consequence is that the time value of money concept, is an inevitable aspect of 
Islamic finance but subject to certain conditions.  Time value of money should be allowed as 
long as the money acts as capital combined with other resources to undertake a productive 
activity.92 In other words, Islamic finance allows for $1 today to be worth more than $1 
tomorrow as long this is the result of investing/bearing risk rather than lending. The key point 
of differentiation is that time by itself cannot create value, but investing and therefore bearing 
                                                          
91 M. Siddieq Noorzoy, ‘Islamic Laws and Riba (Interest) and Their Economic Implications’ (1982) 14(1) International Journal 
of Middle East Studies 3-17, 15.  
92 Zamir Iqbal and Abbas Mirakhor, Introduction to Islamic Finance: Theory and Practice (John Wiley and Sons, 2nd Edition, 
2011) 10.  
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risk with associated profits (and losses) can create value.  Furthermore, the Islamic conception 
on the time value of money has been derived from a long-standing conception of money as 
capital not as a commodity.93  This means that money should not be recognised as an objective, 
but as a means to achieve or increase human welfare, if it is utilised in a legitimate manner.94 
It is also permissible to compensate the time value in sales contracts. The time value 
applies only to tangible items which is why the spot (cash) price for a commodity is allowed to 
be lower than the future (deferred payment); these practices are referred to among others as a 
cost plus sale on deferred payment basis (murabahah),95 see paragraph 2.5. This view is 
supported by the Hanafi school.96 According to Said, the practice of murabahah in Islamic 
banks has clearly shown that “there is a value of time in murabahah based finance, which leads, 
albeit indirectly, to the acceptance of the time value of money”.97 
The acceptance of modified time value of money in Islamic finance does not necessarily 
allow its application to loan contracts. In the case of lending, increases (by way of interest) are 
prohibited as a means of providing material compensation for time.98 If money is viewed solely 
as a medium of exchange, charging interest would distort this function since more would be 
returned in the future than was borrowed – i.e. the standard used in exchange would be violated. 
Thus, a shirt may cost you $10 if paid for on the spot or $11 if paid for next month but I may 
                                                          
93 Abdul Azim Islahi, Contributions of Muslim Scholars to Economic Thought and Analysis: (11-905 A.H.-632-1500 A.D.) 
(Scientific Publishing Centre - King Abdulaziz University, 2005) 47.   
94 This conception is closely related to a long-standing business vehicle in Muslim traditions particularly Islamic profit sharing 
contracts such as mudharabah and musharakah, see Chapter Islamic Partnership for further discussion on this issue 
95 Muhammad Ayub, Understanding Islamic Finance (John Wiley and Sons, 2007) 404.  
96 For instance, a great scholar of Hanafi namely Al-Sarakhsi (died 1090 CE.) stating unequivocally that “a thing is sold on 
credit for a larger sum than it would be sold for in cash”, see Abraham L. Udovitch, Partnership and Profit in Medieval Islam 
(Princeton University Press, 1970) 78.  
97 Abdullah Saeed, Islamic banking and Interest: A Study of the Prohibition of Riba and Its Contemporary Interpretation (Brill, 
1996) 95.  
98 Zamir Iqbal, and Abbas Mirakhor, Introduction to Islamic Finance: Theory and Practice (John Wiley and Sons, 2nd Edition, 
2011), 10.  
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not lend you $10 to buy the shirt now on the condition that you pay me $11 next month.99 The 
former is permitted but not the latter. Explanations vary from, it is knowable only to God100 or 
that riba used to occur (riba jahiliyyah) at the time of the Prophet not because of its 
excessiveness (the interest rate is excessive), but a lack of stipulation and disclosure of a 
predetermined excess in the contract that might be the source of exploitation and vulnerability 
of the borrower.101 This would mean that there would be no breach of Sharia principles where 
the banks state the rate of interest at the signing of the contract. This argument would also 
clarify the differences between trade and riba because in trade, it is clear that at the beginning 
of the contract, the profit rate is determined.    
Based on the above explanations, the Islamic notion of the time value of money can be 
clearly understood by reviewing the distinction between loans, investment, and trading. In the 
case of loans, money cannot create money because it is an act of charity where the surplus 
funds are effectively being utilized to promote economic development and social wellbeing.102 
In relation to investment, the investor will be compensated for any profit and loss earned during 
that time and Islam fully recognizes this return on the investment as a result of an economic 
activity. In the case of trading, the difference between the cash price and credit price in sale 
transactions is acknowledged in Islamic law and thus permissible. In short, Islamic law 
recognizes time value of money considering that money is a medium of exchange, time 
facilitates completion of economic activity, and the owner of capital is to be compensated for 
                                                          
99 Feisal Khan, Islamic Banking in Pakistan: Sharia Compliant Finance and the Quest to Make Pakistan More Islamic 
(Routledge, 2015) 75.  
100 Ibid.  
101 Mohammad Omar Farooq, ‘Stipulation of Excess in Understanding and Misunderstanding Riba: The Al-Jassas Link’ (2007) 
21(4) Arab Law Quarterly 285-316, 314.  
102 Iqbal and Mirakhor above 100, 63. 
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any return resulting from economic activity. Lending should be a charitable act without any 
expectation of monetary benefit.103 
 
5.10 Interest Rate Benchmarking  
It is inevitable that Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) refer to an interest rate as a 
benchmark in determining prices (profit and margins) in IFIs’ financial products and services. 
This is because IFIs have not yet provided a full-scale system for replacing an interest-based 
system in the financial markets.104 An interest rate is an inseparable part of hedging activities 
in conventional markets. Consequently, Islamic finance cannot ignore this in managing their 
rate of returns to depositors and customers. This makes hedging an inseparable part Islamic 
financial activities. Some Muslim scholars take the view that benchmarking Islamic finance’s 
rates of return to conventional interest rates is legitimate.105 It is argued that the benchmark is 
just a number to determine a permissible market rate of return in Islamic products.106 In 
practice, Islamic products are closely pegged to conventional interest rates. For instance, 
Islamic investments rates are attached to the conventional deposit rates.107 Islamic asset based 
financing (murabahah)’s rate benchmarks interest rates as a determining factor to adjust with 
                                                          
103 Ibid.  
104 Noorzoy, above n 93, 15. 
105 El-Gamal, above n 90, 78.  
106 Mohamed Ariff and Shamsher Mohamad, Islamic Wealth Management: Theory and Practice (Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2017) 160.  
107 Beng Soon Chong and Ming-Hua Liu, ‘Islamic Banking: Interest Free or Interest Based?’ (2009) 17(1) Pacific-Basin 
Finance Journal, 125-144. There is recent empirical study showed that not all Islamic banks rigidly peg their investment 
rates to interest rates, see Raditya Sukmana and Mansor H. Ibrahim, “How Islamic Are Islamic Banks? A Non-Linear 
Assessment of Islamic Rate – Conventional Rate Relations” (2017) 64 Economic Modelling 443-448.   
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inflation, and to satisfy both depositors and the shareholders.108 This is subject to compliance 
with Sharia requirements for a particular product.109    
Benchmarking against the interest rate in Islamic finance has been the subject of debate 
and controversy and has led to the call for the creation of an “Islamic benchmark”. In Pakistan, 
for instance, the majority of local Muslim scholars issued fatwas (Islamic legal verdicts) to 
prohibit the use of interest rates as a standard to determine prices in Islamic finance.110 For 
some, an interest rate benchmark “allows usury (riba) through the back door”.111 It is seen as 
not advancing the “philosophy of Islamic economy having no impact on the system of 
distribution”.112 Other organizations such as the Fiqh Academy of the Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC) and Accounting Auditing Organization of Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI) approve the creation of an Islamic benchmark as an alternative to the interest based 
rates to determine profit margins.113 
The attempt to develop Islamic benchmarks may be misguided considering that Islamic 
finance recognizes the time value of money. This juristic position has several consequences:  
One must note that the juristic argument that “time value is recognized in sales but not in debts 
or loans” is at best insufficient, and at worst disingenuous. If the claim is based on the need for 
pricing time value for each transaction separately (based on credit rating, quality of collateral, 
etc.), then there is a valid argument to be made (in conventional as well as Islamic finance). 
                                                          
108 Saeed, above n 99, 84.   
109 Taqi Usmani argues that “If a murabahahh transaction fulfills all the conditions … merely using the interest rate as a 
benchmark for determining the profit of murabahahh does not render the transaction as invalid, haram or prohibited, 
because the deal itself does not contain interest. The rate of interest has been used only as an indicator or as a benchmark”, 
see Usmani, above n 87, 82.  
110 Shoaib A. Ghias, ‘Juristic Disagreement: The Collective Fatwa Against Islamic Banking in Pakistan’ in Karen Hunt-
Ahmed (ed), Contemporary Islamic Finance: Innovations, Applications, and Best Practices (John Wiley and Sons, 2013) 
103-120, 110.  
111 Ariff and Mohamad, above n 108, 160.  
112 Usmani, above n 87, 82.  
113 Majallah Fiqh Academy, IRTI, IDB, IDB OIC, Jeddah 18-19 Shawwal, 10-11 April 1993 Conference on Curriencies 
Issues, 8th Conference, Vol. 3, p.780 in Ariff and Mohamad, above 113.  
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However, the mere claim is insufficient in this case, since the manner in which appropriate 
interest rates are determined in sales, leases, and the like remains unspecified. On the other 
hand, if interest rates in Islamic finance (including the pure time-value components thereof) are 
benchmarked to conventional interest rates, it would appear that the general claim is vacuous 
and disingenuous, since it serves only to create arbitrage opportunities, from which jurists stand 
to be primary beneficiaries.114 
Benchmarking based on interest rates has consequences for Islamic finance. The 
interest rate risk has been inevitably attached to Islamic products and services. This is the risk 
that the value of underlying assets will change when the interest rate changes. To manage these 
risks, Islamic banks and other Islamic financial institutions along with their Sharia scholars, 
must develop instruments to hedge against those risks as will be discussed below.  
 
5.11 Islamic Profit Rate Swaps  
5.11.1 Murabahah, Tawarruq, and Wa’ad  
Murabahah (cost plus profit sale contract) and tawarruq (reverse or commodity 
murabahah) are common contracts in modern Islamic banking and finance utilised as 
underlying contracts in derivative-like features.115 Murabahah is a cost plus profit sale contract 
(paragraph 2.5 of Chapter 2). Under this contract, a seller purchases an asset from a supplier 
and resells it to the buyer at cost plus profit. Meanwhile, tawarruq involves a series of 
murabahah contracts involving a third party. Under this contract, a series of sale contracts are 
entered into whereby a buyer buys an asset from a seller for a deferred payment and 
                                                          
114 El-Gamal, above n 90, 8.  
115 Ibrahim Warde, Islamic Finance in the Global Economy (Edinburgh University Press, 2000) 133.   
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subsequently sells it to a third party for cash at a lower price for the purpose of obtaining 
cash.116  
Another important arrangement in structuring Islamic derivatives is promise (wa’ad). 
Under Islamic law, a mere promise (wa’ad), whether bilateral or unilateral, is legally 
unenforceable. This concept is the opposite of a contract (aqd) and is not a legally binding 
obligation that is generally understood to arise from the formal acts of offer (ijab) and 
acceptance (qabul).117 In other words, a promise is simply a statement that one will do or refrain 
from something in the future. There is no expiration due for breaking it, although it is sinful to 
make a promise with the intentions of breaking it. Thus, wa’ad is substantively different from 
an oath (yamin).118 All major schools in Sunni traditions argue that a promise made by a person 
to the other is religiously binding but not legally binding. This is because wa’ad is part of a 
voluntary contract (aqd tabarru’).119 Since the wa’ad is a mere promise, it does not have to 
satisfy the requirements of binding contracts (aq’d) under Islamic law.120  
In order to be used in Islamic derivatives, the interpretation of wa’ad (promise) needs 
to be modernised allowing it to be enforceable before the courts. Although there are two 
different views on the enforceability of wa’ad,121 the current practice takes the view that a 
promise is enforceable in the courts. This view has been strengthened by a fatwa in jurisdictions 
offering Islamic finance. For instance, the  Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI), states that wa’ad 
is morally and legally binding.122 The council argues that a promissory arrangement is 
                                                          
116 Paragraph 2.5 of Chapter 2.   
117 Nethercott and Eisenberg, above n 66, 226.  
118 Some argue that wa’ad is similar with a yamin, see Ibid 226.  
119 International Shariah Research Academy for Islamic Finance (ISRA), Islamic Financial System: Principles and 
Operations (ISRA, 2012) 288.  
120 The requirements of aqd under Shariah include possession or ownership of subject matter of the contract, contracting 
parties, ijab and qabul, Al-Amine, above n 28.  
121 Debates on this, see Islamic Banker, ‘Islamic Contract Law’ [30/04/2017] http://www.Islamicbanker.com/Islamic-contract-
law.html. 
122 Fatwa Number 85/DSN-MUI/XII/2012 of Shariah Advisory Council (DSN) - Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI).  
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enforceable where the promisee suffers a cost for the promise. This is called mulzim 
(enforceable promise) whereby the promisee can be forced to honour promises. As part of the 
punishment for not honouring the promise, the Council allows the bank to execute 
compensation (ta’widh) on a defaulted promise. This opinion has been adopted by the local 
regulator (Bank of Indonesia) in the Islamic banking industry. This has legal consequence that 
an Islamic bank can require payment of compensation for failure to honour the promise in case 
of murabahah financing based on wa’ad (promise to buy the asset acquired by an Islamic 
bank).123 The Council’s view is similar to the International Fiqh Academy of Saudi Arabia’s 
view that wa’ad is legally in a court of law.124  
The view that wa’ad can be enforceable before the courts provides flexibility in 
structuring various Islamic products to accommodate modern derivatives. For instance, it is a 
common rule in the market that Islamic finance prohibits a forward contract for a currency 
transaction due to the issue of riba. To be Sharia compliant, a foreign exchange needs to be 
arranged on the spot basis. However, by using the concept of wa’ad, it is possible to create a 
currency transaction that mimics a foreign exchange forward whereby the parties mutually 
promise (wa’ad) to buy different currencies from each other at the exchange rate prevailing on 
such date with simultaneous delivery to occur sometime in the future.125 This transaction is 
Islamically permissible since this arrangement is not legally binding and is not equivalent to 
enforcing a bilateral promise as a matter of law.126 The Accounting Auditing Organisation for 
Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) takes this view stating that: 
                                                          
123 Bank Indonesia Regulation No 18/2/PBI of 2016 Article 5(2).  
124 International Shariah Research Academy for Islamic Finance (ISRA), above n 468, 290.  
125 Al-Amine, above n 28, 103-109. 
126 Nethercott and Eisenberg, above n 66, 227.  
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A bilateral promise to purchase and sell currencies is forbidden if the promise is binding, even 
for the purpose of hedging against currency devaluation risk. However, a promise from one 
party is permissible if the promise is binding.127 
The prohibition continues in effect despite an acknowledgement that, in practice, Islamic 
financial institutions treat a bilateral promise as binding even if formally it is not. 
The flexibility of wa’ad in structuring modern Islamic products has led to its adoption 
in the financial industry. Most Sharia compliant derivatives and ISDA and IIFM agreements 
employ wa’ad to structure Sharia compliant derivatives. This is further discussed in Chapter 6. 
In 2015, the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) issued a fatwa on tahawwut (hedging). All types 
of derivative-like features under the fatwa use the concept of wa’ad.128 In addition, the 
adaptation of wa’ad as a primary component of the new standardised Islamic hedging 
documentation developed by ISDA and IIFM may create a global standard with wa’ad as the 
main component in structuring Sharia compliant derivatives.129  
Three mainstream arrangements in modern Islamic finance namely murabahah (cost 
plus profit sale), tawarruq (reverse murabahah) and wa’ad (promise) have been pivotal in 
developing Sharia compliant hedging products including Islamic profit rate swaps.   
 
                                                          
127 Accounting Auditing Organization of Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), ‘Sharia Standard No 1 on Trading in 
Currencies (AAOIFI, 2000).  
128 Currency Exchange based on bay al sarf has been approved by the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) on a fatwa number 
28/DSN-MUI/III/2002 on bay al-sharf. The fatwa states that currency exchange is allowed on the spot basis in which the deal 
settlement is expected to be completed within 2 days after contract has been concluded. This fatwa also prohibits currency 
forward transactions, currency swap transactions, and currency option transaction. Later on the fatwa allows currency 
forward contracts. However, it needs to be preceded by wa’ad (unilateral promise) as will be discussed in detail in this 
chapter.     
129 Nethercott and Eisenberg, above n 66, 229.  
119 
 
5.11.2 Islamic Profit Rate Swaps  
The combination of the above murabahah (cost plus profit sale), wa’ad (promise), and 
tawarruq (reverse murabahah) can mimic swaps derivatives particularly interest rate swaps. 
This is done through a series of trades using the combination of these arrangements. Under the 
conventional interest rate swaps, the counterparties agree to exchange fixed and floating 
interest rates for a period of time by reference to a predetermined notional amount (see 
paragraph 4.3.4 of Chapter 4). Since, the interest is prohibited in Islamic finance and cannot 
use as the underlying value in Islamic derivatives (see paragraph 5.3), in Islamic swaps, the 
counterparties thus exchange profit rates derived from a series of trades in a Sharia compliant 
commodity such as crude palm oil. Thus, this transaction involves not only counterparties in 
the swap agreement, but also suppliers and traders in a commodity exchange where 
counterparties, for instance, Islamic Bank A and B can easily purchase and sell a preferred 
commodity.    
Those three distinctive Islamic medieval arrangements (wa’ad, murabahah, and 
tawarruq) are used simultaneously in each period of trading. The murabahah is used to 
generate fixed profit payments from a series of trades between the banks, while a series of 
corresponding reverse murabahah (tawarruq) are used to generate floating profit payments.130 
The floating profit rate is commonly referred to London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), as a 
global benchmark for interest rate (see paragraph 5.10). Similar to its conventional counterpart, 
the parties in Islamic profit rate swaps agree on the terms of the transactions (i.e. the trade 
dates, the fixed profit rate, the floating profit rate, the assets to be traded, and the notional cost 
price of the whole series of trading).  
                                                          
130 See Kazi Hussain and Fahad Mehboob, ‘Hedging Market Risk in Islamic Finance’ (no date) [20/01/2018] available at 
http://www.worldcommercereview.com/publications/article_pdf/105, 22-24.  
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For example, Bank A has a fixed rate investment profile from its purchase of Islamic 
assets maturing in five years and paying quarterly. The management decides that it can get a 
better cash flow from a floating rate profit. In this case, the bank enters into an Islamic profit 
rate swaps agreement with Bank B in which Bank A receives a fixed profit rate and pays a 
floating profit rate. The Islamic swap is structured to match the maturity and cash flow of the 
fixed rate investment profile, and the two fixed-rate streams are netted. Bank A and Bank B 
then choose the preferred floating profit rate index which is usually benchmarked to LIBOR. 
Meanwhile, Bank B receives commodity market price plus floating profit rate over LIBOR. 
This floating profit rate is repeated quarterly until maturity. There is no actual payment is made, 
as the principal amount upon which total payments are based are merely notional.131 
On each trade date, Bank A and Bank B undertake promises (wa’ad) to enter into two 
trading agreements based on murabahah with different profit rate types; the first has a fixed 
profit rate while the second has a floating profit rate. The first mechanism (fixed rate leg) 
includes the following steps:  
(i) Bank B gives a wa’ad (promise) to purchase an amount of crude palm oil from 
Bank A;  
(ii) Bank A sells the commodity to Bank B on murabahah basis at cost plus profit to 
be paid upon completion of subsequent transaction (floating rate portion). 
Thus, the commodity murabahah transaction is executed. In this first mechanism, Bank 
B is considered as a fixed rate payer.  
Simultaneously, the second mechanism (floating rate leg) is executed as follows:  
                                                          
131 Ibid.  
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(i) Bank A gives a wa’ad (promise) to purchase the commodities from Bank B;  
(ii) Bank B will sell the commodities to Bank A at cost plus profit based on the 
prevailing profit rate (agreed market price plus floating profit portion based on 
LIBOR).  
Under this mechanism, Bank A is considered as a floating rate payer. In addition, it is 
important to note that in the above series of trades, both banks do not hold the commodities, 
since both of them utilise economic effects of the transactions not for holding the commodities. 
As a result, in each trade, each bank will purchase the commodities from suppliers and resells 
it to the traders or brokers at the same time. Thus, the commodities go back to the exchange in 
each transaction. Moreover, the whole series of trades will not go beyond the determined 
notional amount of the agreement.  
The net result of these series of trades is that on each trade date the amount of 
commodities sold under each murabahah will be the same and the cost price will the same, and 
these will effectively be netted off by way of sales to a third party broker; only the profit 
element will differ, and, as in a conventional interest rate swap, the net beneficiary (of the 
difference between the fixed and floating rate) is dependent on whether the fixed or floating 
rate was higher.132 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
132 See Hussain and Mehboob, above n 132, 22-24.  
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Figure 5.1. Islamic Profit Rate Swaps 
 
Source: Jobs.133  
Islamic profit rate swaps are part of the Sharia compliant OTC derivatives. The 
agreements between contracting parties are commonly drafted under a master agreement that 
records all transactions or trades. This master agreement as well the netting mechanism of 
Islamic profit rate swaps are discussed in chapter 6.  
This preceding discussion indicates that in Islamic finance, as with Islamic law generally, 
there is a great deal of debate, respecting the permissible and the prohibited. As this chapter 
argues there is growing support for the legitimacy of derivatives in Islamic finance among 
contemporary Muslim scholars and market participants.  
 
                                                          
133 Andreas Jobst, ‘Monetary Policy and Liquidity Management’ (Seminar on Islamic Finance, Rome Italy November 11, 
2009). 
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5.12 Summary  
This chapter discussed the need of derivatives in Islamic finance and the use of these 
instruments for risk management purposes. This chapter has demonstrated that a total rejection 
of derivatives without genuine investigation is unwarranted. Despite the fact that almost all 
derivatives instruments are totally new to Islamic financial law, the possibility of admitting 
some of these instruments, or finding the suitable alternative for others, is feasible. Through 
selective juristic rules method, some Islamic juristic rules could be used to develop so-called 
Islamic hedging derivatives.  
This chapter defined Islamic hedging derivatives as a type of hedging transaction 
following requirements of Islamic law. These requirements include: (i) that Sharia compliant 
derivatives shall be derived from Islamic contracts; (ii) Sharia compliant derivatives must 
utilise underlying asset that are classified as Sharia compliant; (iii) economic activities of those 
values or assets must be religiously permissible (halal). These assets are then evaluated through 
qualitative and quantitative screening. Based on these principles, for instance, it is prohibited 
to apply Islamic profit rate swaps to income or companies that are not deemed Sharia 
compliant; and (iv) Sharia compliant derivatives must be used for risk management purposes 
only so as to limit speculation and gambling. The chapter also discussed Islamic profit rate 
swaps through the combination of Islamic contracts creating an economic effect of 
conventional profit rate swaps. To be applied in practice, these Islamic profit rate swaps need 
to be drafted under a mainstream standardisation benchmark, a theme that will be discussed in 
the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 6: LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR SHARIA COMPLIANT 
HEDGING DERIVATIVES 
 
6.1 Introduction   
Over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives have shifted to a standardised contract rather than a 
customised one (paragraph 4.4 of Chapter 4). At the global level, it is the International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association (ISDA) providing a master agreement for those types of 
derivatives. The ISDA version has become a benchmark for the documentation of Islamic OTC 
derivatives. International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM) based in Bahrain works with ISDA 
creating the ISDA/IIFM Tahawwut (Hedging) Master Agreement. This document provides 
legal frameworks for over-the-counter (OTC) Sharia compliant derivatives.1 particularly 
Islamic profit rate swaps (paragraph 5.11.2 of Chapter 5). The Tahawwut agreement satisfies 
the need for standard documentation, the absence of which was one of the major issues behind 
the low demand for Islamic hedging.2 
This chapter argues that a standard documentation for Islamic OTC derivatives is 
imperative for the global financial industry in order to tackle uncertainties in modern Islamic 
financial transactions as indicated in the previous chapter. This chapter begins with an 
examination of the ISDA/IIFM Tahawwut (Hedging) Master Agreement along with its close 
                                                          
1 Jonathan Lawrence, Anthony R.G. Nolan, Paul de Cordova, ‘Sharia Compliant Master Agreement Introduced for Hedging 
Islamic Finance Transactions’ (K&L Gates, 2010). In addition, the IIFM and ISDA recently introduced Credit Support Deed in 
March of 2017 to accommodate recent global initiatives on non-cleared derivatives particularly on collaterals and margin 
requirements as proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO). 
2 See, eg, ISDA, ‘IIFM and ISDA Launch Tahawwut (Hedging) Master Agreement’ (1 March 2010), available at 
http://www.isda.org/media/press/2010/press030110.html; and Saadiah Mohamad, Jaizah Othman, Rosmimah Roslin & 
Othmar M. Lehner, ‘The use of Islamic hedging instruments as non-speculative risk management tools’ (2014) 16(3) Venture 
Capital, 207-226, 222.  
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out netting system and its adoption for Islamic profit rate swaps. It then suggests the way 
forward for legal frameworks for Islamic derivatives.  It then provides a concluding summary. 
 
6.2 ISDA Master Agreement: A Global Market Benchmark   
 The 2002 ISDA Master Agreement was developed by the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA) – a non-government organization consisting of the largest 
derivatives dealers and professional advisors. This standard documentation has been a global 
benchmark for non-cleared OTC derivatives, and used in more than 90 per cent of the global 
financial derivatives markets.3 ISDA documentation typically consists of three layers. These 
include:  
(i) The master agreement that sets general rules applying to all derivative transactions 
agreed to by the counterparties;  
(ii) The “confirmation” which documents each individual transaction; and  
(iii) The “credit support” which provides for the collateralisation or the guarantee of 
payments to be made under specified transactions.4  
The ISDA combines into a single contract all the multiple transactions under derivatives 
contracts between the counterparties. This enables various individual and unconnected 
transactions to be set off5 one against one another.6  
                                                          
3 Hudson, Alastair, The Law on Financial Derivatives (Sweet and Maxwell, 5th Edition, 2012), 2-08.   
4 Ibid 2-01.  
5 The definition is explained in paragraph 6.3 of this chapter.  
6 Hudson, above n 3, 2-94.  
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 The focus of this chapter is on two important features of the document. The first is that 
it provides the counterparties a termination mechanism in the event of defaults on one of the 
counterparties. This mechanism is closely related to insolvency law issues of derivative 
transactions. One of the important aspects of this mechanism is netting and close out netting, 
explained below. The second important feature is that the agreement organises the way in 
which the parties will govern their derivative transactions.7 Most elements of netting and close 
out netting under the document are based on the law applying in the UK and New York.8 
Outside these jurisdictions, derivatives participants need to adjust to a specific governing laws 
set up in their dealings.  
 The reasons for the wider application of the ISDA documentation are that ISDA 
documentation may improve efficiency, reduce transaction costs especially in relation to 
termination mechanisms for a derivatives contract,9 and diminish settlement risk.10 It may also 
increase economic certainty particularly for close out netting in the event of defaults. This 
mechanism may provide protection for non-defaulting party.11 It also provides greater certainty 
and market confidence that the terms and conditions of the document have been thoroughly 
tested and experienced in the global OTC derivative markets. For some commentators, the 
2002 ISDA Master Agreement is the most remarkable standard form ever designed, covering 
an immense range of transactions; its terms and conditions handle huge transactional amounts 
traded on the global market.12  But it is not without its critics who point to some deficiencies 
in ISDA documentation particularly in the master agreement itself and the Credit Support 
                                                          
7 Ibid 2-94. 
8 “The legal enforceability of the close-out netting provisions of the ISDA Master Agreement and their consequences for 
netting on financial statements”, see ISDA, ‘Effectiveness of Netting’ [21/12/2017] http://www.isda.org/c_and_a/pdf/The-
effectiveness-of-netting.pdf. 
9 Frank Artnoy and David Skeel, ‘The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives’ (Law School Paper No 125, University of 
Pennsylvania, 2006) 8.  
10 Alan N. Rechtschaffen, Capital Markets, Derivatives and the Law: Evolution after Crisis (Oxford University Press, 2nd 
Edition, 2014), 164.  
11 Ibid.  
12 Philip Wood, Set-off and Netting, Derivatives, Clearing Systems (Sweet&Maxwell, 2007) 217.  
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Annex.13 ISDA has now proposed some amendments to address these issues.14 In addition, the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has also launched margin requirements to 
support the credit support annex, a type of collateral in derivatives transactions, of the 2002 
ISDA Master Agreement.15 This latest initiative is also included in the Credit Support of the 
ISDA (this credit support is beyond the scope of this chapter).  
 
6.3 Netting and Close Out Netting under the ISDA Master Agreement  
Close out netting is a particular important aspect of ISDA Master Agreement. It 
provides a credit enhancement to reduce counterparty risk, credit risk, or even systemic risks.16 
Netting is often referred to as the consolidation of multiple payments, transactions, or positions 
with the primary objective of creating a single value.17 This process would determine the final 
amount owed by the party and amount based on that consolidation process. Netting may 
involve two parties and hence called a bilateral netting, or multi-parties called a multilateral 
netting. In the first scenario, all transactions between two parties in one currency are netted and 
only the net balance is transferred. Under the second scenario, all payments in one currency 
are netted and the payments from all companies taking part in the multilateral netting system 
are taken into account. The second type of netting often involves a third party commonly as a 
                                                          
13 This is a mechanism to regulate collateral between contracting parties in derivative master agreement. Edmund Parker 
and Aaron McGarry, ‘the ISDA Master Agreement and CSA: Close Out Weaknesses Exposed in the Banking Crisis and 
Suggestions for Change’ (January 2009) Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 16-19, 16.  
14 See Marcus Jamson, ‘Optional Amendment to ISDA Master Agreement’ (24 October 2014) Mondaq Business Briefing, 
Business Collection [02/10/2017], see also comments on recent amendments on Guy Usher and Edward Miller, “Put Your 
Money Where your Mouth Is” – ISDA Publishes Long-Waited Amendments to Section 2(a)(iii)” [02/10/2017] 
http://www.mondaq.com/uk/x/334244/Commodities+Derivatives+Stock+Exchanges/Put+Your+Money+Where+Your+Mouth+
Is+ISDA+Publishes+LongAwaited+Amendments+To+Section+2AIii. 
15 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), ‘Margin Requirements for Non-Centrally Cleared Derivatives’ 
(Standard Documentation, Bank of International Settlements, March 2015).  
16 Thomas F. Huertas, ‘Negating Risk Through Netting’ (1994) 4 International Financial Law Review, 3-4. 
17 Investodia, ‘Netting’ [12/01/2018] https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/062515/what-difference-between-payment-
netting-and-closeout-netting.asp?ad=dirN&qo=investopediaSiteSearch&qsrc=0&o=40186. 
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clearing house. This house handles all payments from multi-parties and calculates the netting 
amounts of those transactions. In addition, this type may also involve credit support annexes 
(CSA) as a mutual collateral against the default of a particular party in that multilateral 
transactions.18   
Close out netting is often defined as a process involving termination of obligations 
under a contract whereby one of the contracting parties defaults in meeting their obligations.19 
This default triggers the termination of the contract and activates the immediate calculation of 
all transactions into a single value. Similar to the netting, this process determines the final 
amounts owed and the amount based on the consolidation process of multiple transactions and 
payments. This mechanism is an important process in the global financial markets notably OTC 
derivatives.20 Under close out netting, the non-defaulting party has the ability to close-out or 
terminate all open financial positions in a contract upon the occurrence of specified events, 
including the commencement of insolvency proceedings. This is often tantamount to an early 
termination since it occurs prematurely to the scheduled termination dates of the relevant 
transactions. In addition, the parties then have the right to net all reciprocal obligations 
following from the close-out process on an aggregate basis. This involves combining the 
relevant positive and negative replacement values into a single net payable or receivable.21 
Thus, the close out netting commonly involves three steps: termination; valuation; and 
determination of the net balance.22  
                                                          
18 Jon Gregory, Counterparty Credit Risk: The New Challenge for Global Financial Markets (Wiley, 2011) 46.  
19 David Mengle, ‘The Importance of Close Out Netting’ (2010) 1 ISDA Research Notes, [22/02/2018] 
https://www.isda.org/a/LPDDE/netting-isdaresearchnotes-1-2010.pdf. 
20 Ibid.  Jeffrey Wern Loong Yow, ‘The Enforceability of close out netting: A Malaysian Perspective’ (2012) 6(6) Law and 
Financial Markets Review 399-409. 
21 Ibid.   
22 See, eg,David Mengle, above n. 19, 3; and Akhmad Affandi Mahfudz, ‘Tahawwut Master Agreement: Pertinent Issues and 
Legal Practices in Malaysia’ (Conference Paper, International Islamic Financial Markets (IIFM) Specialized Sessions on 
Islamic Finance, 2007). 
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After the process of close-out netting, two possible scenarios may occur. If the single 
net amount is owed by the defaulting party, the collateral posted by the defaulting party can be 
applied to that single net amount. The remaining collateral must be returned to the insolvency 
administrator and the residual claims by the non-defaulting party are treated as unsecured 
claims. However, if the single net amount is owed by the non-defaulting party, the non-
defaulting party may further set-off such amount with any amounts owed to it by the defaulting 
party under other financial contracts via cross-product netting arrangements if applicable under 
the relevant insolvency regime. The final amount arrived at will be paid by the non-defaulting 
party to the insolvency administrator.23 
The fundamental premise of the 2002 ISDA Master Agreement in relation to close out 
netting is that all transactions entered into under such contract forms a single agreement 
between the contracting parties. This single agreement enables contracting parties to monitor 
and manage risk exposure based on the overall assessment of the transactions entered between 
the parties, considering the volume and frequency of derivatives transactions.24 The “single 
agreement” concept under the ISDA enforces close out netting calculation. Close out netting 
enables for all transactions under the master agreement to be terminated on the occurrence of 
specific events stated in the agreement.25  
As indicated previously, two possible scenarios may occur after the process of close 
out netting whether the net balance creates an asset or liabilities for contracting parties. A 
derivative contract may be either "in the money," that is, representing a present or future right 
to receive payment from the other counterparty (i.e., an asset), or "out of the money," that is, 
representing a present or future obligation to make payment to the other counterparty (i.e., a 
                                                          
23 See Yow, above n 19, 400.  
24 Ibid.  
25 Ibid.  
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liability). With certain derivative structures, it is also possible that at any given time neither 
party owes any payment to the other. Thus, the credit risk faced by a derivative counterparty is 
one that requires the simultaneous existence of two conditions in order for a loss to occur. 
These are that counterparty must be "in the money" when the derivatives are terminated; and 
that the other counterparty must be unable to satisfy the resulting payment obligation.26 This is 
illustrated in the netting mechanism under the 2002 ISDA Master Agreement. 
Figure 6.1. Close Out Netting Under Sec 6 of 2002 ISDA Master Agreement 
 
Source: ISDA.27 
 The above figure shows that two parties, party A as a non-defaulting and party B as 
defaulting party, are engaged into two swaps transactions. For party A, transaction 1 has a 
negative replacement cost of US $1 million, while transaction 2 has a positive replacement cost 
                                                          
26 Mark A. Guinn and William L. Harvey, ‘Taking OTC Derivative Contracts as Collateral’ (2002) 57(3) the Business Lawyer 
1127-1156, 1138.  
27 International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), ‘Netting and Offsetting: Reporting Derivatives under U.S. GAAP 
and Under IFRS’ (2012), available at https://www.isda.org/a/veiDE/offsetting-under-us-gaap-and-ifrs-may-2012.pdf, 12. 
Net Payment = $ 200.000 
Transactions No.2 = $ 800.000 
Transactions No.1 = $ 1.000.000 
Non-defaulting 
party (Party A) 
Defaulting Party 
(Party B) 
If close-out netting is not enforceable, the above transaction is as follows:  
Recovery ≤ $ 800.000 
Pay = $ 1.000.000 
Non-defaulting 
party (Party A)  
Defaulting Party 
(Party B) 
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of US$ 800 thousand. The figure shows that if the close out netting is enforceable, the party A 
is obliged to pay the net difference of US$ 200 thousand to party B. In other words, this 
transaction creates a liability of party A, and asset for party B. However, if the close out netting 
is not enforceable, the party A needs to pay US $ 1 million to party B, and also needs to wait 
the payment from the party B, possibly months or years, for whatever fraction of the US$ 800 
thousand gross amount it bankrupts.28 This unenforceable netting creates liability as well as an 
asset for party A and party B. However, there is uncertainty concerning on the ability of party 
B to recover debts from party A. 
 The mechanism of the Master Agreement could be adopted as a benchmark in developing 
standard documentation for the Sharia compliant derivatives. It provides most recognizable 
practices on how derivatives documentation should be drafted in modern derivatives markets. 
This will be a stepping stone for Sharia compliant documentation that is still in its infancy. The 
Islamic version which has adopted that documentation is discussed in the following section. 
 
6.4 ISDA/IIFM Tahawwut (Hedging) Master Agreement 
The IIFM and the ISDA introduced “the ISDA/IIFM Tahawwut Master Agreement” as 
an alternative for documenting Islamic derivatives particularly swaps transactions. It was the 
result of 24 drafts and a consultation process started from 2006.29 It was completed in 2010.30 
The delays had been caused by differing views on Islamic aspects of the document including 
                                                          
28 See ISDA, above n 26, 11. 
29 Joel Clark, “Islamic tahawwut master agreement arrives at last” (01 Mar 2010) risk.net, available at 
https://www.risk.net/derivatives/structured-products/1593967/islamic-tahawwut-master-agreement-arrives-last. According to 
Irfan, the draft itself had been circulated to more than 100 Islamic finance institutions and conventional finance that has 
Islamic subsidiaries and windows, but only twenty-five took an active interest, the majority of these being conventional 
financial institutions, see Harris Irfan, Heaven’s Bankers: Inside the Hidden World of Islamic Finance (London: Constable, 
2014) 174.  
30 Clark, above n 28.  
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the use of Islamic contracts, settlement mechanism particularly netting and close out netting. 
Later on, major critics of the document mostly relate to these aspects. These will be discussed 
in the following section.31  
Although the Tahawwut benchmarking the 2002 ISDA Master Agreement, the initiators 
stated that the document is different in substance to the ISDA version. The Tahawwut is to be 
strictly used for hedging actual risks, with no speculation (actual settlement of assets and 
payments). It is available only for permissible (halal) assets; and the charging of interest is 
prohibited. These restrictions reflect the limitations on Islamic hedging referred to in paragraph 
5.3 of Chapter 5. In this way, the agreement provides a further stepping stone in product 
development and in allowing parties to financial transactions to protect themselves against 
market uncertainties and ensuring compliance with Sharia law.  
 
6.5 The Structure of the Tahawwut  
The Tahawwut agreement has special features compared to the 2002 ISDA Master 
Agreement. First, the Tahawwut divides transactions into “Transactions” and “Designated 
Future Transactions (DFT)”.32 The “Transactions” applies to any concluded transactions under 
the document based on murabahah (cost plus profit sale) contracts referring to actual or binding 
contracts that sets out the relevant terms and condition, referred to as the “Confirmation”. As a 
binding contract, “Transactions” must state exact date of delivery of at least a portion of the 
agreed-upon subject of sale such as crude palm oil.33 This commodity is an underlying asset 
                                                          
31 Noor Suhaida Kasri and Siti Syafira Zainalabiddin, ‘Breach of Wa’d and Its Compensation Payment: A Critical Analysis of 
Islamic Profit Rate Swap’ (2016) 8(1) ISRA International Journal of Islamic Finance 191-195.  
32 Section 1 of the ISDA-IIFM Tahawwut Master Agreement. 
33 see J.T. McMillen, et al, ‘The 2010 Tahawwut Master Agreement: Paving the Way for Shariah Compliant Hedging 
Products’ (2010) [20/02/2017] http://ssrn.com/abstract=1670118, 10.  
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for implementation of the intended sale and purchase and creation of the payment obligation 
between contracting parties.  
Meanwhile, “Designated Future Transactions” shorted as DFT refers to non-binding 
agreements or non-concluded transactions in the form of promise (wa’ad) to enter into a sale 
and purchase agreement to an uncertain future date subsequent to signing the agreement of 
murabahah (cost plus profit sale) contracts between contracting parties. Under DFT, the 
amount, time of delivery, and pricing of future sales and purchases of an underlying asset or 
commodity remain undecided. Unlike the “Transactions”, in DFT each party can cancel the 
agreement (promise) prior to become a binding contract. However, the DFT becomes binding 
when each party decides to execute it.34   
The differentiation between two types of transactions under the Tahawwut affects the 
treatment of early termination under the document. The Tahawwut permits parties to enter into 
transactions that may be documented immediately (“Transactions”) as well as transactions due 
to occur in the future (“Designated Future Transactions”) so that parties are able to create cash 
flows similar to the cash flows created in conventional derivatives products.35 Unlike the 2002 
ISDA Master Agreement’s netting system allowing parties to aggregate the exposures between 
them and reduce them to a single payment, the Tahawwut, separates the netting mechanism 
into two types as will be discussed in paragraph 6.6.1 and 6.6.2 below.36 Hence, there is no 
single net sum payable under the agreement. 37  
                                                          
34 Ibid 9-10.  
35 Juan Sole and Andreas Jobst, ‘Operative Principles of Islamic Derivatives: Towards a Coherent Theory’ (Working Paper 
No 12(63), International Monetary Fund, 2012) 26.  
36 For detail explanation of these modifications, see Lynn Aziz, ‘ISDA/IIFM Launch Tahawwut Master Agreement’ (2010) 
[14/03/2018] https://islamicbanker.com/publications/islamic-hedging-agreement. 
37 Jonathan Lawrence, et al, ‘The New Islamic OTC Derivatives Contract’ (2010) 5 Journal of International Banking and 
Financial Law 305.  
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Second, the Tahawwut modifies some key provisions of the 2002 ISDA Master 
Agreement. It deletes several provisions related to receipt and payment of interest due to the 
issue of prohibited interest-based transactions. These include the provisions on the delay of 
payment due to illegality or force majeure event,38 on the default of any payment or delivery 
obligation39, and on the delay of payment of any unpaid amount or early termination amount.40 
There is disagreement in relation to these provisions and whether these amendments reflect 
Sharia principles.41  
Third, all involved transactions either completed transactions or uncompleted 
transactions attached to the tahawwut need further Sharia approval from respective Sharia 
Supervisory Boards (SSBs). The tahawwut is the only agreement that is considered Sharia 
compliant. However, if there is any amendment or addition to the Tahawwut master agreement, 
contracting parties must first take all action required to satisfy themselves as to Sharia 
compliance. 42 The intention is that contracting parties are to ensure Sharia compliance for each 
transaction which precedes the agreement. The parties may make available approvals from 
their SSBs (e.g., based on a copy of the relevant fatwa or documentation of their own internal 
consideration) before entering into the agreement. Section 3(h) of the Tahawwut states: 
“insofar as [a party] wishes or is required for any reason to enter into transactions which are 
Shariah compliant it has made its own investigation into and satisfied itself as to the Sharia 
compliance of this Agreement (including the obtaining of a declaration, pronouncement, 
                                                          
38 Section 6(e)(iv) of the ISDA-IIFM Tahawwut Master Agreement. 
39 Section 9(h)(i) of the ISDA-IIFM Tahawwut Master Agreement. 
40 Section 9(h)(ii) of the ISDA-IIFM Tahawwut Master Agreement. 
41 For instance, under Islamic law, the non-defaulting party is permitted to recover actual damages resulting from the default, 
including all fees, costs and expenses (other than interest and consequential damages) incurred as a result of such default. 
Frequently, cost recovery provisions (often capped at an amount determined on the basis of a default rate) are included in 
the documentation. However, this was not the approach applied in this master agreement. In Shari`ah-compliant murabahah 
and musawama transactions, obligations to pay interest are sometimes permitted in the documentation as an inducement to 
timely performance (although the non-defaulting party must donate the interest to charity, rather than retaining any interest 
amount). That also was not the approach taken in the Tahawwut Master Agreement”, see McMillen, et al, above n 32.  
42 Ibid.  
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opinion or other attestation of the Sharia adviser, board or panel relevant to it where 
required)”. 
Section 3(h) of the Tahawwwut is realistic enough that there would be different Sharia 
interpretations toward a particular transaction attached in the documentation. Strictly following 
a particular Islamic juristic view would not be feasible considering that the Tahawwut is 
intended to be applied in various jurisdictions with different Islamic juristic views. Moreover, 
the Tahawwut strictly places the legitimacy of Sharia into respective SSBs. This is clear when 
the section 1 (d) stating that the document is not intended to be governed by Islamic law before 
the courts, but rather by New York and English law as the governing law for the agreement. 
This means that determinations of unlawfulness or illegality are made without reference to 
Islamic law.    
 
6.6 Terminated Transactions under the Tahawwut 
In contrast to the 2002 ISDA Master Agreement’s netting and close out netting 
calculation that consolidates all transactions into a single value (see above figure 6.1), the 
Tahawwut splits the calculation of terminated transactions into two separate methods as a 
reflection of two types of transactions under the document (paragraph 6.3). These include the 
calculation of terminated transactions under “Transactions” (concluded transactions) and 
“Designated Future Transactions” (non-concluded transactions).  
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6.6.1 Termination of “Transactions” 
In the termination of “Transactions” (concluded transactions), the originally agreed 
payment price under murabahah contracts is accelerated and becomes payable immediately. 
All payments due from one counterparty to the other under concluded transactions are 
accelerated and set off against each other to determine a single close out amount. The economic 
effects of this calculation are similar to the 2002 ISDA Master Agreement’s close out netting 
mechanism.43  
 
6.6.2 Termination under “Designated Future Transactions” (DFT)  
In non-concluded transactions, the calculation of terminated transactions refers to 
market quotations as in the 1992 ISDA Master Agreement.44 Before explaining the termination 
method in DFT, the termination of the 1992 ISDA version is firstly explained. In the 1992 
ISDA Master Agreement, the contracting parties must decide between “Market Quotation” or 
“Loss Method” as a method of calculating or measuring the value of the terminated transactions 
at the early termination date. In “Market Quotation”, the value of terminated transactions would 
be set by obtaining the price quotations from market makers or leading dealers in the relevant 
derivatives. This quotation would be for the replacement cost of the particular terminated 
transactions. This is not available if fewer than three quotations are obtained, due to some 
reasons for instance because of unstable market conditions as in the case of global financial 
crisis, or because there were fewer dealers who deal in particular types of illiquid transactions, 
or if a market quotation would not (for some reasons) produce a commercially reasonable 
                                                          
43 Sole and Jobst, above n 34, 26.  
44 Ibid.   
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result. In these situations, the “Loss Method” applies with respect to those terminated 
transactions. Under the Loss Method, the payment is measured by reference to what can be 
reasonably determined in good faith as the party’s total losses and gains in connection with the 
terminated transactions.45 In practice, it may be difficult to find market advisors willing to price 
complex transactions realistically following a major default. As a result, the parties may opt 
for the “loss method” which gives a large amount of discretion to the determining party and 
introduces major subjectivity into the process.46  
The difficulty to define the close out amount of the market quotation especially during 
the global financial crisis and the subjectivity of the loss method attracted the ISDA 2002 
Master Agreement to change those methods with close out netting (see paragraph 6.3). This 
latest version has been introduced into the market place and gaining its recognition and 
popularity amongst market participants.47   
While the 2002 ISDA Master Agreement has moving forward by introducing the “close 
out netting”, the tahawwut is moving backward by adopting the “Market Quotation” and “Loss 
Method” in the termination of non-concluded transactions (DFT). To apply these methods, 
there are three steps to be followed by market participants in terminating their DFTs. First, 
market reference is established on the basis of a replacement transaction. Thus, an index is 
calculated based on the Market Quotation or Loss Framework determining a replacement cost 
for the terminated transactions. This quotation may be referred to market dealers.48 The index 
called “Relevant Index Amount” (RIA) is measured and calculated to determine the final price 
                                                          
45 College of Law (England and Wales), Commercial Contracts: Restrain of Trade [no date]. 
46 John Gregory, The xVA Challenge: Counterparty and Credit Risk, Funding, Collateral, and Capital (John Wiley and Sons, 
3rd Edition, 2015) 54.  
47 Ibid.  
48 There is no explanation on this type of dealer in the case of Islamic hedging transactions whether it is referred to 
conventional derivative dealers or is there any dealer for Islamic hedging transactions called “Islamic dealers”, this for sure 
needs an additional research.  
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of assets for those transactions. Second and third are that the parties exercise wa’ad (promise), 
and enter into a musawamah sale contract using the index as a price reference of those assets. 
Unlike murabahah whereby the seller must disclose all relevant costs related to the price of a 
subject matter, the musawamah does not require such disclosure. Consequently, the use of 
musawamah is preferable in this model because the non-defaulting party has complete 
discretion in determining the loss. This consideration is similar under the conventional system 
as discussed previously.  
  
6.6.3 Early Termination of DFTs  
In the event of early termination date due to event of default, non-defaulting party 
makes the following calculation: 
(i) Early termination amount = [close out amount + Unpaid amount owing to Non-
Defaulting Party] + Unpaid amount owing to defaulting party 
(ii) Relevant Index Amount = Aggregate of the Market Quotation (or Loss) for non-
concluded transactions and concluded transactions    
The close amount reflects netted accelerated payments of completed transactions (under 
murabahah contracts). Both amount either early termination and relevant index may be positive 
or negative. In a case that the index is positive, non-defaulting party is considered as “in the 
money” meaning that it can exercise promise (wa’ad) requiring defaulting party to enter into a 
sale-based musawamah and to purchase designated assets from non-defaulting party for the 
positive indexed value (market value of the assets plus relevant index value plus sale tax, etc.). 
However, if the relevant index value is negative, defaulting party is “in the money” meaning 
that it can exercise promise (wa’ad) requiring non-defaulting party to enter into a sale-based 
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musawamah and to purchase designated assets from defaulting party for the positive indexed 
value (market value of the assets plus absolute value of relevant index value plus sales tax, 
etc.).49     
The value of the Relevant Index is an amount determined by the relevant determining 
party (in the above case, the determining party may be non-defaulting or defaulting party) equal 
to the sum of either: the termination currency equivalent of the market quotations for each 
terminated non-concluded transaction for which a market quotation is determined; and 
secondly such determining party's Loss for each terminated non-concluded transaction for 
which a market quotation cannot be determined or would not provide a commercially 
reasonable result. This is a departure from the preference in the market for using the concept 
of close-out amount contained in the 2002 Agreement as market quotation with a fall-back to 
Loss was seen to be a more acceptable method of calculation to some Sharia scholars in the 
IIFM.50 In addition, Loss is the determining party’s losses and costs (or gain) in relation to the 
terminated non-concluded transactions. In contrast to the 1992 ISDA Master Agreement, due 
to Sharia requirements, Loss does not specifically refer to loss of bargain, cost of funding or 
losses or costs incurred as a result of terminating, liquidating, obtaining or re-establishing any 
hedge or related trading position. 51  
It is important to note that where the defaulting party fails to comply with its promise 
after a notice has been given (for instance, if it were insolvent). This party is discharged from 
its obligation to deliver the assets and is entitled, by way of liquidated damages, to payment of 
an amount equal to the value of the relevant index.52 However, this last mechanism is not clear 
                                                          
49 Tariq Zafar Rasheed, ‘Introduction to the ISDA/IIFM Tahawwut Master Agreement’ (Presentation, Berwin Leighton 
Paisner, 2015) 15, http://www.blplaw.com/media/download/Introduction_to_the_ISDA-IIFM_Master_Agreement.pdf. 
50 Allen and Overy, ‘ISDA/IIFM Tahawwut Master Agreement’ (2010), available at 
http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/Pages/ISDA-IIFM-Tahawwut-Master-Agreement.aspx. 
51 McMillen, et al, above n 32.  
52 Section 6(h)(ii) of the ISDA/IIFM Tahawwut Master Agreement. 
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particularly on how the penalty of failing to abide the non-binding wa’ad (promise) could be 
enforced, given that the obligation set forth in the undertaking is merely a non-binding promise 
rather than an enforceable agreement. It might be also difficult to enforce the liquidated 
damages right each party has for the other’s refusal to comply with its wa’ad (promise).53 
However, in a summary, this mechanism crystallises an amount equal to the mark-to-market 
value of the concluded transactions in respect of which assets have not been fully delivered 
(DFT), giving the relevant party a liquidated damages claim for such amount. The end result 
therefore economically achieves a similar result to that which would apply under a 
conventional ISDA Master Agreement. The table below is summarised the differences between 
the 2002 ISDA Master Agreement and the ISDA/IIFM Tahawwut Master Agreement.  
Table 6.1. Differences Between the 2002 Master Agreement and the ISDA/IIFM Tahawwut 
 The 2002 ISDA Master Agreement The ISDA/IIFM Tahawwut  
 
Purpose 1. Hedging and Swaps Derivatives 
2. No limitation on type of assets  
3. Interest is permissible  
1. Hedging Actual Risks 
2. Settlement of Actual Assets and Payments 
3. Involving Halal Assets 
4. Interest is Prohibited  
 
Scope  Single Agreement Concept Two types of agreements:  
1. “Transactions” based on murabahah (cost plus 
profit sale)  
2. “Designated Future Transactions” (DFT) based 
on wa’ad (promise) 
 
Binding 
Nature  
All transactions under the document are 
legally banding  
All transaction under the “Transactions” are 
legally binding, whilst all transactions under the 
DFT are not legally binding. DFTs are promises 
to enter into future binding transactions. This 
means that each party can cancel prior to binding 
murabahah contracts.  
 
Delivery of 
Goods and 
Assets 
 
Uncertain date for delivery  Two types of delivery: 
1. Under the concluded transactions 
(murabahah contract) = amount, timing, 
pricing and delivery are exact  
2. Under the non-concluded transactions 
(promise or wa’ad) = amount, timing, 
pricing and delivery are deferred to 
uncertain future date  
 
                                                          
53 McMillen, et al, above n 32.  
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Early 
Termination 
All remaining transactions are accelerated 
into one single amount  
Two types of early termination: 
1. Under “Transactions” = all remaining 
payments are accelerated following early 
termination  
2. Under “DFTs”, the early termination is 
determined by Relevant Index Amount which 
is Aggregate of the Market Quotation (or 
Loss)   
  
Bilateral 
Netting (2 
parties)  
Single payment netted, net balance paid 
 
No single payment considering two types of 
transactions: concluded (“Transactions”) and 
non-concluded transactions (“DFT”) 
 
Multiparty 
netting  
Usually clearing house calculates the net 
amount.  
 
NA. Since the Tahawwut seems designed for 
bilateral agreements 
Terminated 
Transactions 
 
All transactions under the 2002 ISDA 
Master Agreement  
All transactions including concluded and non-
concluded transactions under the IIFM/ISDA 
Tahawwut Master Agreement  
 
Default Availability of Collateral under Credit 
Support Annex 
 
The ISDA/IIFM Wathiqah Hamish al Rahn al 
Naqdi (Credit Support Deed for Cash Collateral 
(VM)).54 
 
Non 
Defaulting 
Party  
Option to close out or terminate. Steps to 
follow are: termination, valuation, and net 
balance 
 
Option to close out or terminate. Steps to follow 
are: termination, valuation, and net balance 
 
Governing 
Law 
 
English and New York Law English and New York Law excluded Sharia Law  
Sharia 
Compliance  
NA.  The ISDA/IIFM Tahawwut Master Agreement is 
considered Sharia compliant. However, the 
document of the transactions attached to the 
Tahawwut is subject to the approval of respective 
Sharia scholars  
 
 
6.6.4 Issues of the Tahawwut  
The first issue with the Tahawwut is the mechanism of close out netting particularly 
under the DFTs. One view is that close out netting under the Designated Future Transactions 
(DFT) breaches the principles of wa’ad (promise), particularly where there is a failure to 
perform the promise.55 On this approach DFTs are not concluded transactions where 
                                                          
54 International Islamic Financial Markets (IIFM), “IIFM And ISDA Publish Islamic Credit Support Deed For Variation Margin” 
[1/12/2018] http://www.iifm.net/news-updates/iifm-and-isda-2. 
55 Kasri, above n 30, 191-195.  
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counterparties have expressed an intention to enter into binding contracts (musawama sale 
contracts) because their terms are not yet fully determined and on their own, are not legally 
binding contracts. As the parties would not be legally bound to enter into the remaining asset 
trades, there would be no legal basis for close out for the party which is “in-the-money” to 
demand compensation for the replacement value of the swap transactions. However, the 
Tahawwut states that where a party fails or is unwilling to comply with its obligation to 
purchase the designated assets, the party who exercised the wa’ad is charged from its obligation 
to deliver the assets and is entitled, by way of liquidated damages, to payment of an amount 
equal to the value of the Relevant Index Amount (RIA) (Above), thus crystalizing an amount 
equal to the mark to market value of non-concluded transactions (DFT).56 However, in Sharia, 
this mechanism modifies Islamic traditional contracts which are adapted for modern hedging 
transactions. Disagreements among Muslim jurists and scholars (ikhtilaf) are inevitable as part 
of any modernisation of financial instruments.  
For some commentators, the concept of netting is more consistent with the muqasah 
rather than the musawamah (a cost plus sale without disclosure of its original price and 
acquisition costs) that has been utilised by the Tahawwut. Muqasah is defined as a form of 
clearance of obligation and setting off debts of the debtor and creditor when the debts are 
identical in all aspects or when the debt is of different value, the smaller debt is deducted from 
the larger debt. Both debtor and creditor are indebted toward each other where the debts are of 
the same amount and value, and both parties have agreed to set off their debts and terminate 
their obligations accordingly.57 According to the Sharia Advisory Council – Central Bank of 
Malaysia, muqasah is a common practice and acceptable even where two parties are indebted 
                                                          
56 Although note the discussion of basic risk under the heading Early Termination of Non-Fully Delivered Terminated 
Transactions and DFT above.  
57 Ahcene Lahsasna, Sharia Non-Compliance Risk Management and Legal Documentations in Islamic in Islamic Finance 
(John Wiley and Sons, 2014).  
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to each other and the debts are settled based on the payment of the difference between the 
amount of the two debts.58 Muqasah allows the settlement of debts in different currencies 
between two parties as in the case of sarf (currency exchange).59 This contract has been 
regarded as the Islamic version of netting. Even if netting is similar to muqasah, its effect in 
relation to insolvency in unclear in Islamic jurisprudence.60 Moreover, the Islamic equivalent 
of netting does not address issues of multi-party netting or netting involving multiple 
transactions between parties. The Sharia-based netting is focused on the transactions between 
two parties.  
Another important issue is the lack of market adoption on the Tahawwut.  Prior to the 
creation the Tahawwut, Islamic banks developed their own Shariah-compliant hedging 
documentation at significant cost to the industry.61 Since 2003, the industry has designed OTC 
Islamic derivatives, i.e. Islamic profit rate swaps, and cross currency swaps.62 The markets 
have developed their own internally approved and agreed template Shariah compliant hedging 
documentation, so there is less incentive to use the Tahawwut. If these markets adopt this mater 
agreement, they will have to re-negotiate and revisit their existing documents, which is 
undesirable given the time and costs that may be required to amend the existing documents.  
 
                                                          
58 Central Bank of Malaysia, Sharia Resolutions in Islamic Finance (BNM, 2nd Edition, 2010) 142.   
59 Sole and Jobst, above n 34.  
60 Philip R. Wood, Set-Off and Netting, Derivatives, Clearing Systems, Volume 4 (Sweet & Maxwell, 2007) 
61 See from the report of Norton Rose Fulbright, ‘A Year in the Life of ISDA/IIFM Master Agreement’ [21/03/2017]  
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/60521/a-year-in-the-life-of-the-isdaiifm-tahawwut-master-
agreement. 
62 Ibid. 
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6.6.5 Multiple Interpretations of “Market Quotation” 
The adoption of “Market Quotation” and “Loss Method” in the tahawwut may create 
issues in interpreting market quotation itself. Several cases show that there were some 
difficulties in defining market quotation in financial crises.63 This method was found in the 
1992 ISDA version and then changed in the 2002 ISDA Master Agreement due to its inherent 
weaknesses as noted in paragraph 6.4.2. The fall back is the ‘Loss’ method with the determining 
party calculating what their loss is using reasonableness and doing so in good faith, discussed 
above at 6.4.2. The problems with this approach have been also discussed at the same section.  
 
6.6.6 Lack of Netting Legislation in Muslim Countries 
Another major issue of the Tahawwut is that the lack of netting legislation in Muslim 
majority countries where Islamic finance has flourished. Most Middle Eastern countries (i.e. 
Bahrain, UAE, and Qatar) do have some rudimentary, but insufficient provisions.64 In Central 
Asia in countries with Muslim majorities (such as Kazakhstan) there is no netting legislation 
nor is it being considered.65 In countries where close out netting is unenforceable, this creates 
legal uncertainties for Tahawwut’s users. Netting may effectively work as long as there is 
certainty that this arrangement is enforceable in each of the relevant jurisdictions, in particular 
in the event of insolvency of one of the parties.66 For this reason, Malaysia, one of the market 
                                                          
63 “Valuing Close Out Payments in the OTC Global Derivatives Markets” [21/09/2018] 
https://www.allens.com.au/pubs/baf/fobafoct02.htm, see also Edmund Parker and Aaron McGarry, ‘The ISDA Master 
Agreement and CSA: Close Out Weaknesses Exposed in the Banking Crisis and Suggestions for Change’ (2009) 
Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 16-19, 18.  
64 Peter M Werner, ‘Update on Netting in Asia’ (2011) Conference on Cross-Jurisdictional Netting and Global Solutions, 
available at https://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/projects/lfm/P%20Werner,%20Netting%20in%20Asia.pdf. 
65 Ibid.   
66 Philipp Peach, ‘Netting and Resolution Powers – Global Problems, Local Solutions?’ (Conference Paper, London School 
of Economics, 2011).  
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leaders in Islamic hedging, in 2005 stated that the methodology in determining the close out 
amount under the conventional interest rate swap could also be applied onto Islamic profit rate 
swaps.67 This may not work effectively if the insolvency law in that country is not completely 
consistent with close out netting. 68 This thesis argues that Islamic countries should adopt 
legislative solutions which balance the enforceability of close-out netting with national policy 
and regulatory considerations.69 As close out netting is the primary means of mitigating credit 
risk associated with OTC derivatives,70 the lack of netting legislation in the most of Muslim 
countries may create legal risks concerning the enforceability of netting provisions under the 
Tahawwut. 
Indonesia as another important market in the global Islamic finance does not have 
netting legislation. Enforceability of the netting rule of the 2002 ISDA Master Agreement 
refers to general principles of law based on the Indonesian Civil Code which recognises a 
limited form of set-off (perjumpaan hutang), such as in Articles 1425 to 1434. This concept is 
also explained in Indonesian Bankruptcy Law.71 But this appears only to apply to bilateral 
netting. The Indonesian Civil Code ICC recognizes that the set-off is one of the reasons to 
nullify a contract.72 There is disagreement on the issue of whether those articles of the  
Indonesian Civil Code  can be directly applied because the termination of the contract needs to 
be requested by a receiver.73 In the Indonesian Bankruptcy Law, only the receiver can request 
termination of a preferential transfer transaction entered into by the debtor before its 
                                                          
67 Mahfudz, above n 21.   
68 Yow, above n 19. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Mengle, above n 21. 
71 Law Number 37 of 2004 on Indonesian Bankruptcy and Suspension of Payments.  
72 Article 1381 of the Indonesian Civil Code.  
73 Amy Rachmi Budiati, et al, ‘Standarisasi Perjanjian Transaksi Derivatif OTC Domestik Berdasarkan Prinsip Dalam ISDA 
Master Agreement Dihubungkan dengan Ketentuan Kepailitan di Indonesia’ (2016) 13(2) Bulleting Hukum Kebanksentralan, 
23.  
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bankruptcy, if such transaction is considered detrimental to the creditors.74 Article 1266 of the 
Indonesian Civil Code also states that judicial intervention is required to terminate the 
obligations of the counterparties under the agreement. This rule should be waived to make the 
set-off system in Indonesia comparable to close out netting system under the ISDA Master 
Agreement. Hence, in the event of early termination, contracting parties can directly off against 
each other to determine a single close out amount without the judicial decision of the courts.  
 
6.6.7 Advantages of the Tahawwut  
The Tahawwut could be a benchmark for Islamic derivatives documentation. This 
includes the adoption of global standard documentation in OTC Islamic derivatives markets. 
This documentation may also benefit both the issuers and Islamic investors since they have a 
template for their derivatives agreements.75 From Islamic point of view, the Tahawwut is 
viewed as a pan-madhab (across all schools agreement) that spans major schools in the Sunni 
traditions.76 Although, the Tahawwut does not establish universally binding market rules, its 
adoption in the ISDA documentation has led market players developing Sharia compliant 
versions adapted from the document. In 2004, for instance, the market mirrored the ISDA 2002 
Master Agreement when the Malaysian CIMB Bank created Islamic Profit Rate Swaps by 
                                                          
74 These include: (1) the preferential transfer was performed by the debtor before it was declared bankrupt; (2) the debtor 
was not obligated by contract (existing obligation) or by law to perform the preferential transfer; (3) the preferential transfer 
was prejudiced the creditors’ interests; and (4) the debtor and such third party had or should have had knowledge that the 
preferential transfer would prejudice the creditors’ interests.  
 
75 Saadiah, et al, above n 2, 222. 
76 Sole and Jobst, above n 34, 25. 
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replicating conventional interest-rate swaps through the Islamic Swap Master Agreement 
adopted from the ISDA version for interest rate swaps. 77  
The adoption of the Tahawwut could deliver economic efficiencies in Sharia compliant 
hedging markets. It may reduce the time committed to the negotiations process and 
consequently, has an impact on reducing legal expenses. Prior to this document, participants in 
the Islamic markets might be developing their own in-house documents, which were different 
from dealer to dealer based on specific negotiations and customizations for contractual parties. 
This lack of uniformity in legal terms and definitions made negotiations difficult and time 
consuming, especially for novice investors with little experience in this new market. Hence, 
this standard may reduce legal costs in respect to negotiating the Islamic law requirements of 
each derivative transaction. Moreover, the less transaction costs in drafting the OTC Islamic 
derivatives may also lead to a competitive pricing of these derivatives. This might attract 
market participants to use the Tahawwut.  
Tahawwut may also enhance transparency. All of the materials economic and legal 
terms must be defined in the agreement. Therefore, an uninitiated investor in the Islamic 
derivatives market will be prompted to consider all of the key issues associated with Islamic 
derivatives transactions. In effect, even if the parties to the agreement are experienced dealers 
and a beginner investor, the document will put them on equal footing.  
Tahawwut may also enhance liquidity. Standard terms consistently applied across 
Islamic derivatives transactions provide a common reference point, a contractual benchmark 
for all participants. If all participants use the same document, then the sale and assignment of 
Islamic derivatives is more easily facilitated. Without a standard form the market can become 
                                                          
77 Michael Mahlknecht, “Islamic Capital Market: A Growing Area for Investments” in Angelo M. Venardos, Current Issues in 
Islamic Banking and Finance: Resilience and Stability in the Present System (World Scientific Publishing, 2010) 255. 
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fragmented, as investors search not only for the most favourable pricing, but also for the most 
favourable contract form. A standard contract form for Islamic derivatives is analogous to 
standardised future contracts traded on a future exchange; it provides a common denominator 
upon which all parties can transact.78 Based on a survey, most Islamic hedging documentation 
is hard to understand. The terminologies mostly used are Arabic terms and concepts.79 
Documentation often requires additional documentations and procedures, which can be 
cumbersome. For instance, an investor needs to sign multiple contracts before and after the 
transaction. In addition, they also need to read and understand the whole document that is more 
rigid than conventional hedging documentation, and for some clients, they may not understand 
the Islamic terms used in the contracts. As the industry is relatively new and Sharia resolutions 
vary across jurisdictions, it is important that global harmonization especially with regard to 
documentation is established as many of businesses involved in hedging activities are those 
with cross-border transactions.  
 
6.7 A Way Forward  
Islamic financial institutions have developed Islamic alternatives to hedging 
transactions, and the collaboration between IIFM and ISDA has resulted in developing standard 
documentation for Islamic hedging transactions. What needs to be done is that the International 
Financial Supervisory Boards (IFSB) review the market practices on hedging transactions 
particularly on its risk legal frameworks. Moreover, Islamic derivatives are extending to new 
                                                          
78 Hal S. Scott and Annan Gelpern, International Finance: Transactions, Policy, and Regulation (Foundation Press, 20th 
Edition, 2014), 975, for the same logic as in the case of the ISDA 2002 Master Agreement. 
79 Saadiah, et al, above n 2, 222.  
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jurisdictions and territories leading to a pressing demand for Sharia complaint standard 
products, as well as collateral documentation in order to manage credit risk.80  
The Accounting Auditing Organization of Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) 
should also review on the product templates of the Tahawwut. This may create a broader 
acceptance within the Islamic hedging markets. Currently, the markets have been developing 
their own Sharia version that differs from one jurisdiction to another. The Sharia parameters 
on hedging transactions of the Tahawwut would be beneficial for the market as their 
benchmark. Without positive responses of those Islamic standard setting bodies, the Tahawwut 
would be left behind in the market place.  
 
6.8 Summary   
This chapter finalises the previous discussions starting with the arguments on how 
Islamic finance adopts risk management up to creating Sharia compliant-profit rate swaps 
through a method of selective Sharia rules (Chapter 2). This chapter continues the argument of 
the previous chapter that to avoid uncertainties (gharar) in Islamic derivatives transactions, it 
is imperative to develop a standardised rule that may reduce those uncertainties.    
The introduction of the ISDA/IIFM Tahawwut Master Agreement does not only 
provide such standardization, but also open the door to largely untapped markets and 
opportunities. Though it may take some time until Islamic banks are able to integrate the ISDA 
framework into their own agreements and structures, the long-term advantages of 
standardization will provide banks with incentives to make the transition. However, there are 
                                                          
80 ‘Bahrain's IIFM and ISDA publish Islamic credit support deed for variation margin’, 
http://businesspulse.qa/en/eqstory/ZAWYA20170330081404/. 
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some continuing issues. These difficulties relate to close out netting mechanism for non-
concluded transactions, whether use the use of market quotations and loss method reduces the 
ability of the Tahawwut to reduce counterparty risks in the event of market distress. The most 
important deficit is the lack of netting system in the insolvency laws of Muslim jurisdictions. 
Until these difficulties are resolved, Islamic hedging (particularly derivatives) will struggle to 
compete with the current global regulatory model. Furthermore, other difficulties relate to the 
credit support for OTC Islamic derivatives; this needs to be reviewed by the IFSB as part of its 
role in harmonising Basel Accords in Islamic markets. The AAOIFI has an important role in 
reviewing the practice of Islamic hedging from Sharia and accounting perspectives. This is an 
urgent task considering that Islamic derivatives use different types of contacts and 
arrangements that completely different with their conventional peers.  
The next chapter will discuss another pivotal issue that goes beyond derivatives but 
relates to another risk management instrument in Islamic finance namely insurance. The 
creation of Islamic version of insurance is imperative since modern Islamic financial markets 
cannot be separated from the insurance system. Through a method of selective Sharia rules 
(Chapter 2), the-so-called takaful was introduced to create economic effects of insurance 
system under Islamic finance.  
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CHAPTER 7: ISLAMIC INSURANCE (TAKAFUL) 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 Modern Islamic insurance is a reflection of selective Islamic Juristic choices. It provides 
a rich source to analyse on how the approach developed in Chapter 2 operates in practice. 
Insurance, including Islamic insurance, is one of the most important risk management vehicles 
in a modern financial economy. Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) provide such a mechanism 
allowing mutual risk protection for Islamic financial markets. Since some elements of 
conventional insurance are not allowed under Islamic law, Muslim scholars have used 
techniques referred to in chapter 2 to select various medieval Islamic juristic rules to be used 
in developing Islamic insurance (also known as takaful in Arabic terminology). The selective 
Sharia rules allow companies or operators to choose which Islamic rulings best fit with their 
business strategies and interests.   
 This chapter commences by discussing the definition and types of conventional 
insurances and the Sharia objections to these arrangements. It then discusses various 
operational models of Islamic insurance derived from different Sharia justifications. This is 
followed by an examination of common issues and challenges in the industry and concludes 
with a summary.  
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7.2 Conventional Insurance 
7.2.1 Risk Sharing vs. Risk Transfer
  Conventional insurance typically involves risk transfer although some types of 
insurance, such as mutual insurance, involves risk sharing.1 Risk transfer involves the 
individual risk being transferred to the insurer. In contrast, in risk sharing, the risk is shared 
within the group of policyholders. The insurer is the collective of policy holders that commit 
to share the risks with each other, so that all policy holders are both insurers and insured. Thus, 
each policyholder is liable to cover the risk of the other policyholder in the same group.  
 There are two common models of insurance namely joint-stock company insurance and 
mutual insurance (cooperative)2 as follows.    
 
7.2.2 Joint Stock Insurance  
  A Joint-stock insurance company is established and organised as a profit-oriented 
vehicle.3 It is owned by its shareholders. Insurance companies sell a financial service namely 
risk protection. The company’s profit will be based on the actuarial predictions of risk 
occurrence as well as investments profits. If these predictions are accurate, the premiums 
collected will be sufficient to cover payout of claims and operating expenses and return a profit 
to shareholders. As will be seen in the discussion below, in this type of insurance, unlike mutual 
insurance, a single premium is charged for insurance cover; this premium is final. Policyholders 
are not obliged to contribute further or additional premiums if the collected premium is not 
                                                          
1 See from a broader perspective on the definition of insurance in Herbert S. Denenberg, ‘The Legal Definition of Insurance: 
Insurance Principles in Practice’ (1963) 30 (3) Journal of Risk and Insurance 319, 327-328.  
2 Ibid.  
3 Emmet J. Vaughan and Therese Vaughan, Fundamentals of Risk and Insurance (Wiley, 10th Edition, 2008) 75-77, 77.  
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sufficient to cover claims. In addition, the profits earnings both from the investment and surplus 
of the risk fund are available for distribution to shareholders as dividends.4 
  Joint-stock insurance is based on a risk transfer model.5 The insured (an individual) 
transfers specified risks to the insurer (insurance company). Thus, the insurer indemnifies the 
insured up to a certain limit for the specified risks that may or may not occur.6 This model 
utilizes an exchange contract whereby the premium is a price paid by the insured to the insurer 
for protection against a specified risk. The actual value of that protection depends on the actual 
loss that may be more or less than the paid premiums. The delivery of the protection also 
depends on whether the risk that occurs is covered by the insurance policy. As will be seen 
from the discussion below, it is an issue for takaful scholars whether the uncertainty whether 
compensation will ever be payable means that conventional insurance can never be Sharia 
compliant.  
 
7.2.3 Mutual Insurance 
  Mutual insurance is typically considered to be a risk sharing arrangement between 
policyholders against specified risks. More conservative views argue that it also involves risk 
transfer as its mechanism transfers risk from one individual to a group. Unlike joint stock 
insurance company, it also includes sharing losses, on some equitable basis, by all members of 
the group. Policyholders own the underwriting pool of fund. 7 Consequently, profits and losses 
of the insurance fund belong to the policyholders.8 Mutual insurers commonly have no paid-in 
                                                          
4 Ibid.  
5 Zainal Abidin Mohd Kassim, ‘The Primary Insurance Models’ in Serap O. Gonulal (ed), Takaful and Mutual Insurance: 
Alternative Approaches to Managing Risks (World Bank, 2013) 21-30, 23.  
6 Vaughan and Vaughan, above n 3, 20.  
7 Ibid 77.  
8 Kassim, above n 5, 23.  
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capital as a guarantee of solvency in the event of deficiencies of the underwriting fund. As a 
consequence, a mutual insurer needs to set aside reserves or contingency funds sufficient to 
protect such adverse contingencies as unexpected claims, very large claims or decline in 
investment returns. Any surplus can be returned to policy holders or used to reduce future 
premiums.9 
  Unlike a joint-stock insurance company, the premium paid by the insured to the mutual 
insurance is not final. The insured has a contingent liability to pay additional premiums if losses 
exceed advance premiums. The advance premium that is collected is intended to be sufficient 
to cover all losses and expenses. If it is not, the additional costs are paid out of the accumulated 
surplus,10 or by additional premium payments. As will be seen from the discussion below, 
mutual insurance has some similarities with Islamic takaful models.  
 
7.3 Mutual Insurance in Islamic Law  
  Mutual insurance that contains a risk sharing mechanism, mutual assistance, and 
cooperation is considered consistent with Islamic principles.11 This is because that insurance is 
based on a gratuitous act (donation), free from gharar (uncertainty), and riba (interest).12 Based 
on this, the various conferences in the Muslim world that were held during the 1960s and 1970s 
mostly argued that mutual insurance run by benevolent societies and groups for the purpose of 
social and financial services for their members was not against Islamic principles and thus 
                                                          
9 Vaughan and Vaughan, above n 3, 77 
10 Ibid 78.  
11 Zamir Iqbal and Abbas Mirakhor, An Introduction to Islamic Finance: Theory and Practice (John Wiley and Sons (Asia) Pty 
Ltd, 2007) 122-123.  
12 In 1960s, the Second Conference for Islamic Research Assembly was held in Al-Azhar University, Cairo, issued a Sharia 
resolution on the permissibility of mutual insurance, referred as cooperative insurance in their fatwa, see Aly Khorshid, 
Islamic Insurance: A Modern Approach to Islamic Banking (Routledge, 2004) 73.  
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lawful.13 This view has been endorsed in Saudi Arabia,14 as well as in Indonesia.15 The mutual 
group operates the fund to protect business interests,16 and not intended to generate profits.17  
  The special features of mutual or co-operative-based insurance are that each member 
acts both as the insured and simultaneously the insurer. The participants enjoy benefits of 
security as well as bear the costs of indemnifying the other participants. The principle of 
solidarity means that policy holder insures others against their risks. As with all forms of 
insurance, it provides an indemnity against actual losses. The contribution (premium) of each 
member varies depending upon the number of occurrences of the insured risks and the 
indemnities that have been paid. If the fund is in deficit, the members are responsible for 
covering that deficit. If the fund is in surplus, the members have a right to claim back such 
surplus or have it reduce premiums in successive insurance premiums according to their 
contributions.18  
  One of the important features of mutual insurance and Islamic insurance is that its 
purpose is not to create profits but to benefit its policy holders (members).19 Permissible 
insurance based on Islamic principles could not be based on a profit oriented organisation such 
as a joint stock company. This view has not been popular in jurisdictions offering Islamic 
insurance, such as Saudi Arabia where a joint stock company is a pre-requisite to offering 
insurance products. Scholars argue that an Islamic-based cooperative insurance needs 
                                                          
13 Ibid 72.  
14 See W. Jean Kwon, ‘Islamic Principles and Takaful Insurance: Re-evaluation’ (2007) 26(1) Journal of Insurance Regulation 
53, 60.  
15 Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah as the largest Muslim organisations in Indonesia opined that mutual 
insurance in the form of a cooperative is permissible as long as it uses a gratuitous contract (tabarru or ta’awuniy) not an 
exchange contract (aqd mu’awadah), and avoids maysir (speculation), gharar (uncertainty), and riba (interest). Furthermore, 
the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) in 2001 also issued a fatwa on the permissibility of ‘asuransi ta’awuniy’ (cooperative 
insurance), see Husni Mubarrak, ‘Kontroversi Asuransi di Indonesia: Telaah Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) tentang 
Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial (BPJS)’ (2016) 12(1) Jurnal Tsaqafah 105-130, 116-117.  
16 Al-Ghamdi, above n 11, 216-117.  
17 Ibid 201.  
18 Ibid 206.  
19 Ibid 201.  
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modification to allow the pooling (underwriting) fund to be invested in profitable investments. 
The purpose is not to generate profit but to act as a buffer against an unforeseeable quantity 
and value of claims.20 This view is prevalent in practice. The restrictions imposed by Sharia 
law are discussed in the next section.  
 
7.4 Prohibited Elements in Commercial Insurance  
 Commercial insurance has some elements which are considered not to be Sharia 
compliant.21 These include excessive uncertainty (gharar), speculative and gambling elements 
(maysir), and interest and exchange money for money without equal countervalues (riba).22 
These prohibited elements are examined below.  
  
7.4.1 Gharar (Uncertainty)  
  The concept of gharar (uncertainty) is relevant to modern insurance.23 The contractual 
agreement between insurance companies and their policyholders to exchange a particular risk 
                                                          
20 Ibid 202.  
21 For instance, in 1926 the Supreme Islamic Family Court in Egypt viewed the contract of life insurance as contrary to 
Islamic law. In 1972, a seminar held in Morocco recommended several points in which one of them is the prohibition of life 
insurances, in Samir Mankabady, ‘Insurance and Islamic Law: The Islamic Insurance Company’ (1989) 4(3) Arab Law 
Quarterly 199-205, 201.In 1972, The National Fatwa Committee (Malaysia) also issued a resolution that life insurance 
practiced by insurance companies is a void (fasid) transaction and thus prohibited (haram), Renat I. Bekkin ‘Islamic 
Insurance: National Features and Legal Regulation’ (2007) 21(1) Arab Law Quarterly 3-34, 20. In 1985, the Majma al-Fiqh 
(Grand Council of Islamic Scholars) in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, argued that commercial insurance including life insurance is 
against Islamic principles, see Aly Khorshid, Islamic Insurance: A Modern Approach to Islamic Banking (Routledge, 2004), 
73. 
22 Bekkin above n 21, 20.  
23 Sharia scholars characterise four common features of gharar. These include: (1) uncertainty of the existence of the 
subject matter; (2) uncertainty of the availability of the subject matter; (3) uncertainty of the quality of the subject matter; and 
(4) uncertainty of the quantity and timing of completion and delivery. The existence of these uncertainties at the inception of 
the contract creates uncertainty and ambiguity of the contract and thus prohibited in Islamic law, see Mohammad Hashim 
Kamali, ‘Uncertainty and Risk-Taking (Gharar) in Islamic Law’ (1999) 7(2) IIUM Law Journal 199-216, 210.  
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protection product does not meet the standard exchange contract requirements (al-bay) under 
Islamic law.24 In the Islamic standard exchange, there should be certainty on the existence and 
the availability of the product, the quality and quantity of the product,  and the time of delivery. 
Thus, the exchange contract under conventional commercial insurance involves uncertainties 
(gharar) because those elements are not present. In commercial insurance, the companies and 
the policyholders do not exactly know whether the insured risk will occur and whether 
compensation will be paid. Moreover, the policyholders do not know the exact value of actual 
compensation. This is because the compensation depends on the policyholders’ actual loss. 
Thus, the value, quality, and quantity of the protection product at the inception of the contract 
is uncertain. There is a further difficulty that the time of delivery is uncertain because it depends 
on the occurrence of the specified risks. These arguments have been widely accepted in 
scholarly works of Islamic finance in which the contractual agreement of commercial insurance 
does not meet a legally valid exchange contract under Islamic law due to the elements of 
uncertainty (gharar).25  
 However, this is not a unanimous view. The insurance system operates to pool risk 
creating security and protection for modern society. This has been viewed as involving no 
unfairness, gambling, excess risk, or contention and economically beneficial to society and to 
individuals.26 Although at the individual level there may be some uncertainty, in aggregate, 
risks can be quantified and valued through various modern mathematical and statistical 
                                                          
24 See Tom Baker and Jonathan Simon (ed), Embracing Risk: The Changing Culture of Insurance and Responsibility 
(University of Chicago Press, 2002) 36. They describe how a Western perspective of insurance could appear in conflict with 
Islamic law. 
25 For instance, the Fiqh Academy of Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) based in Jeddah, in 1985 issued a fatwa on 
insurance as follows: “the commercial insurance contract, which earns fixed premiums as practiced by commercial insurance 
companies, involves significant gharar that makes contract null and void. This form of transaction is prohibited by the standard 
rules of Shariah”, Resolution No. 9, see Omar Clark Fisher, a Takaful Primer: Basics of Islamic Insurance (Thomson Reuters, 
2013) 16.   
26 Frank E. Vogel, and Samuel Hayes, III, Islamic Law and Finance: Religion, Risk, and Return (Kluwer Law International, 
1998) 151.  
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models.27 Pooling or aggregating risk has the effect that when these risks occur, the insured 
effectively shares the costs of those risks. Thus, in essence, an insurance company is an 
intermediary which aggregates, quantifies, and shares risk on sound technical principles.28 
Hence, the insurance system cannot be merely seen at the micro level of the contractual 
agreement between a company and its policyholders but it should also be viewed at the macro 
level where the company quantifies and managed the pooling risks based on sound modern 
techniques.  
  
7.4.2 Maysir (Gambling)  
 It is often claimed that commercial insurance involves gambling (maysir). Commercial 
insurance operates as a zero sum game whereby one party may win or lose at the expense of 
the other party. That is, a policyholder pays periodical premiums and either wins by receiving 
compensation, by way of the indemnity if the risk occurs or losses if the insured event does not 
occur. Similarly, the insurer wins if it receives premiums and there is no occurrence of a 
covered event or loses if compensation is payable when an insured event occurs. Therefore, the 
payment of the sum insured as an exchange for the premium paid depends upon chance; this 
implies gambling (maysir) that is prohibited in Islamic law.29  
 This view is also not unanimous. Gambling is motivated by profit.30 In insurance, policy 
holders take out insurance to provide protection and security against specified risks that may 
                                                          
27 See Mohd. Masum Billah, ‘Islamic Insurance: Its Origins and Development’ (1998) 13(4) Arab Law Quarterly 386-422,410 
28 Samir Mankabady, ‘Insurance and Islamic Law: The Islamic Insurance Company’ (1989) 4(3) Arab Law Quarterly 199-205, 
201.  
29 For this argument, see also Mehmet Asutai and Abdurrahman Khalil Tolefat (ed), Takaful Investment Portfolios (Wiley, 
2013) 21.  
30 Ibid.  
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happen in the future and cause severe harm to themselves and their beneficiaries.31 The gambler 
hopes to win with no element of co-operation. In contrast, the parties in mutual insurance, for 
instance, are bound together in a spirit of mutual co-operation and goodwill in providing 
material security for others.32 In the insurance system, the policyholders may not increase their 
wealth if the specified events happen while with gambling the gamblers’ wealth increases if 
they win.33 With insurance, the chance of loss (risk) exists whether or not there is an insurance 
contract in effect. Thus, gambling creates a risk, while insurance provides an instrument to 
transfer an existing risk.34  
 
7.4.3 Riba (Interest) 
  Riba has also been seen as a problem for conventional commercial insurance. Muslim 
jurists and scholars compare insurance contracts, such as an exchange contract, with a number 
of contracts sanctioned by Islamic law. One such example is the analogy made between 
insurance and exchange of currencies (sarf).35 Islamic law applies sarf on the basis of equality 
and on the spot transactions.36 The advocates of this view argue that commercial insurance is 
similar to an exchange of money for money. Both premium and protection or compensation 
are considered a kind of money leading the prohibition of insurance.37 Moreover, in 
commercial insurance, the money exchange is conducted on unequal basis which is prohibited 
                                                          
31 Ibid.  
32 Billah, above n 27, 414.  
33 Ibid.  
34 Vaughan and Vaughan, above n 3, 42.  
35 Khorshid, above n 21, 64.  
36 The main hadith that is always related to the discussion of riba is one which was reported by ‘Ubadah bin Samit that the 
Prophet (peace be upon him) said: “Gold for gold, silver for silver, wheat for wheat, barley for barley, dates for dates and salt 
for salt, like for like, equal for equal and hand to hand, if the commodities differ, then you may sell as you wish provided that 
the exchange is hand to hand” (Sahih al-Muslim), see ISRA, Islamic Financial System: Principles and Operations (ISRA, 
2012)178 
37 Khorshid, above n 21, 63.   
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under sharf principles. In other words, the compensation received by policyholders is normally 
higher than the premiums paid in any given year.38 Thus, they may consequently obtain a sum 
much higher than what has been paid so that this is an unjustified increase in capital, and thus 
prohibited.39 In addition, riba would also occur when the compensation is not simultaneous 
with payment; any delay in delivering the counter-value in a money exchange is also 
considered as riba. This principle is derived from the currency exchange principles (sharf) 
under Islamic law.   
 There is another objection that investment activities in commercial and mutual insurance 
may involve interest-based instruments or portfolios such as bonds, deposits, and equities that 
contravene Sharia principles. This leads to non-halal income that is also used for compensation 
of the insured. The intermingling of the non-halal revenues with the risk fund of the insured 
may result the money used for compensation becoming haram (impermissible).40 This issue 
would be simply addressed considering that current Islamic financial industry has provided a 
Sharia screening mechanism to provide permissible assets to be invested in (paragraph 5.3 of 
Chapter 5). 
 
7.4.4 Risk Transfer  
 The transfer of risk from the policyholders to the insurer is also considered unacceptable 
under Islamic law. This is based on an analogy (qiyas) that such risk transfer transactions are 
                                                          
38 Ibid.  
39 ibid.  
40 For instance, the Fatwa Committee of the National Council for Islamic Religious Affairs in Malaysia issued a fatwa 
concerning a life insurance in 1972 states that “the life insurance as provided by present day insurance companies is a 
business transaction which is void because it contradicts the Islamic principles as it contains the elements of gharar 
(uncertainty), riba (interest/usury) and maysir (gambling)”. See Omar Clark Fisher, a Takaful Primer: Basics of Islamic 
Insurance (Thomson Reuters, 2013) 16.  
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similar to gharar  (uncertainty) contracts and thus prohibited.41 The majority of scholars have 
not allowed this arrangement.42 Islamic law only allows the contract of guarantee (kafalah) in 
the form of a gratuitous contract (tabarru’).43 As we will be seen in the discussion below, the 
above issues have been overcome by modifying the commercial and mutual-based insurance 
through the utilisation of medieval Islamic juristic rules particularly the exposition of the 
concept of donation (tabarru) and social responsibilities (takaful).   
 
7.5 The Islamic Insurance System: Definition of Takaful 
 Islamic insurance is also called takaful which literally means “mutual or joint 
responsibility” or “solidarity”.44 This Arabic word comes from the word kafala meaning “to 
support”, “to guarantee each other”, “to bail”, and “be responsible”.45 This word is also 
connected to another words such as aman and ta’min meaning “security”, “peace”, “safety”, 
“protection”, “re-assure”, “guarantee”, and “safeguard”.46 As a result, takaful has various 
meanings representing joint responsibility and solidarity to protect and guarantee each other.   
  In modern Islamic finance, the word takaful refers to an insurance system based on 
Islamic juristic rulings derived from various medieval Islamic contracts and concepts.47 
Technically, in this insurance system,  participants separately contribute or donate to a pooling 
fund that is used to pay claims for losses suffered by the participants  or policy holders.48 Some 
                                                          
41 See Vogel and Hayes, above n 26, 154.  
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid.  
44 Hans Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic Third Edition (Edited by J Milton Coman) (Spoken Language Service, 
1976) 834.  
45 Ibid 833.  
46 Khorshid, above n 21, 11.  
47 See Simon Archer, Rifaat Ahmed Abdel Karim, and Volker Nienhaus (ed), Takaful Islamic Insurance: Concepts and 
Regulatory Issues (Wiley, 2011). 
48 Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), Financial Accounting Standards No. 12 
(2004/2005) AAOIFI. 
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portion of the total contribution of the participants is directed towards donation or tabarru 
denoting a premium made by participants or policyholders to assist those of them who need 
financial security.49 Another portion of the total contribution goes to the investment account of 
the policyholders (this will be further illuminated in the following sections). By this 
mechanism, the risks of each participant are shared with other participants as a result of a 
mutual guarantee against defined risks,50 reflecting a socially organised vehicle to practice the 
principles of cooperation and mutual assistance.51  
  Risk sharing is the underpinning concept for the establishment of modern takaful in 
which risks of the participants are shared among participants through the system of donation 
(tabarru). Modern takaful modifies contractual exchange-based contracts used by commercial 
insurance by using contractual mechanisms derived from medieval Islamic juristic rulings 
based on the concept of donation.52 In practice, this model is governed by a hybrid structure 
consisting of a commercial management company (the shareholders’ fund) and a separate risk 
fund or underwriting pool (the participants’ takaful fund).53  
   
7.6 Takaful Operational Models  
 Similar to the conventional insurance industry, takaful-based insurance also divides its 
business into general (non-life insurance) and family insurance (life insurance). For general 
                                                          
49 Ibid 406. AAOIFI’s new definition of takaful in its Sharia Standards 26 (2) 2007 defines takaful as “an agreement between 
persons who are exposed to risks to protect themselves against harms arising from the risks by paying contributions on the 
basis of commitments to donate (iltizam bi al-tabarru)”. 
50 Bank Negara Malaysia, ‘Takaful’ [30/09/2016] http://www.bnm.gov.my/index.php?ch=174&pg=500&ac=428. See also 
Malaysia Takaful Association that defines it as a mechanism in which at least two parties agreeing to jointly guarantee one 
another in the event of a loss, as a consequence of being afflicted by a calamity. [30/09/2016], 
http://www.malaysiantakaful.com.my/About-MTA/Takaful-Definitions.aspx.  
51 Billah, above n 27, 405.  
52 Bekkin, above n 21, 3-34.  
53 Archer, et al, above n 47, 11.  
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insurance, all contributions or premiums paid by participants is regarded as a donation and is 
attributed to the takaful fund (risk fund). For life insurance, the premium is divided into 
donation to the risk fund and the investment fund.54 The allocation of surplus of these funds 
depends on a particular model chosen by Islamic insurance companies (discussed in the 
following section). The general takaful is commonly designed for a short-term usually annual 
basis. Life insurance is intended to provide long-term risk protection for policyholders and their 
families.55 
 There are variable contractual models for Islamic insurance across jurisdictions.56 At 
least four operating models exist in practice:  
(i) The agency-based operating model (wakalah);  
(ii) The profit and loss sharing-based model (mudharabah);  
(iii) The hybrid model as the combination between model (i) and (ii); and  
(iv) The agency-profit sharing combined with Islamic endowment (wakalah-
mudharabah waqf).  
 
7.6.1 Agency (Wakalah) Model  
  The wakalah model is based on an agency agreement between the insurance company 
and its policyholders. The insurance company acts as an agent on behalf of the policyholders 
in managing the risk fund and the policyholders’ investment fund. Under this model, the risk 
fund (also known as the underwriting fund) as well as the investment fund exclusively belongs 
                                                          
54 Bekkin, above n 21, 12.  
55 Archer, et al, above n 47, 12.  
56 Safder Jaffer, et al, ‘Takaful (Islamic Insurance): Concept, Challenges, and Opportunities’ (Research Report, Milliman, 2000) 
14.  
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to policy holders. Consequently, the company has no right to any share in the surplus of these 
funds.  
 In practice, virtually all takaful-based insurance operates as limited liability corporations 
(this corporation model will be further discussed in Chapter 8). Shareholders of takaful-
companies are required to provide a reserve fund (known as qard al hasan acting as interest-
free loan) to cover any deficit in the policy holder risk fund. The loan is refundable in various 
schemes depending on the law of jurisdiction where the Islamic insurance companies operate. 
For instance, some jurisdictions requires the loan to be refunded when the risk fund is in 
surplus57 or by requiring policyholders to pay increased premiums in the following year. 
 The agency agreement in Islamic insurance is not practical in the modern insurance 
industry. Islamic insurance companies are commonly based on joint-stock companies with 
shareholders whose demand dividends. The agency-based model creates little incentives for 
the shareholders since they do not share any surplus from the risk fund or any profits from the 
investment fund. Consequently, the companies have less incentive to increase earnings from 
the investment fund.58 In practice, the companies may charge excessively high agency fees to 
compensate for reduced opportunities for dividends. These fees are commonly included in the 
insurance’s premium paid by policy holders. Moreover, the premium often includes 
performance fees that are quantified in relation to the performance of the underwriting surplus 
or the investment profits. These fees are not ideal for the wakalah-model and may create Sharia 
issues because the fees change the nature of the wakalah (agency) becoming more closely 
                                                          
57 Abdul Rahim Abdul Wahab, Mervyn K. Lewis, and M. Kabir Hassan, ‘Islamic Takaful: Business Models, Shariah Concerns, 
and Proposed Solutions’ (2007) 49(3) Thunderbird International Business Review 371-396, 383.  
58 Zaharudin Abd. Rahman, Contemporary Islamic Finance Architecture (IBFIM, 2014) 292. 
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aligned with the mudharabah (profit sharing). 59 To address this issue, Islamic insurance has 
moved to the mudharabah model.   
 
7.6.2 Profit Sharing (Mudharabah) Model 
 This model is based on a risk-sharing agreement derived from mudharabah contract. 
Under this agreement, the policyholders and the companies enter into a profit sharing contract 
(mudharabah) to manage the risk fund or underwriting fund. The policyholders provide capital 
in the form of premiums to pay out claims by policyholders, whilst the companies provide 
entrepreneurial skills in managing that capital. Thus, the companies will invest the risk fund in 
Sharia compliant investment schemes for profit. Any profits accrues from investments are 
shared between the policyholders and the companies in a predetermined ratio. It should be 
noted that the profit is not the same as surplus (excess of premiums over claims). This profit is 
earned from the investment activities of the risk fund not from the balance between the 
remaining risk fund and actual losses covered by that fund. In practice, the companies are also 
entitled to share in the surplus of the risk fund (underwriting surplus). This is inevitable since 
the companies operating takaful are based on a joint stock company with shareholders whose 
demand dividends. However, this creates Sharia issue because the risk fund (takaful fund) is 
theoretically designed for social and not for profit-oriented motives as will be discussed in the 
following section.  
 Similar to the wakalah (agency) model, the companies in this mudhararabah model are 
required to provide an interest free loan (qard al hasan) to maintain solvency of the risk fund. 
                                                          
59 Muhammed Altuntas, Thomas Berry-Stolzle, and Anje Erlbeck, ‘Takaful Charity or Business? Field Study Evidence from 
Micro Insurance Providers’ (2011) 30 Journal of Insurance Regulation. 
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The loan is refundable when the fund is in surplus.60 However, in practice, the repayment of 
this interest-free loan is highly unlikely in a competitive market. The operator prefers to 
maintain the contribution level as competitive as possible to attract customers into their 
products. This may imply an unrecoverable loan and reflect the factual transfer of the 
underwriting risk from the policyholders to the takaful-companies’ shareholders.61  
 The mudharabah-based model raises not only practical issues but also Sharia issues. 
First, the treatment of the surplus (or deficit) as a mudharabah profit and the premiums or 
contributions as capital is controversial. This practice puts in jeopardy the concept of donation 
(tabarru) as the form of the contribution to the risk fund. For the advocates of Islamic 
insurance, the tabarru cannot be designed for profit motives and should not converted into a 
commercial-based contract (known as tijari contract in Islamic law).62  
 Second, the profit sharing model raises the issue of the liability of the risk fund 
particularly responsibility in covering any deficit in the risk fund. If the contributions or 
premiums paid by policyholders are treated as capital, it is the capital owners (the 
policyholders) that bear the losses. However, in practice, it is the shareholders that need to 
cover the loss by providing a repayable interest-free loan (qard al hasan) to cover the deficit 
of the risk fund.63 This practice is problematic for Muslim scholars. This is because the main 
principle in a mudharabah contract is that if the two contracting parties agree to enter into a 
loan contract, each of them is obliged to share the repayment of that loan (see paragraph 8.6.6 
of following Chapter 8). In the mudharabah-based insurance, it is only one party that is liable 
                                                          
60 International Shariah Research Academy for Islamic Finance (ISRA), Islamic Financial System: Principles and Operations 
(ISRA, 2012), 517.  
61 Volker Ninhaus, ‘Solidarity, Cooperation, and Mutuality in Takaful’ in S. Nazim Ali and Shariq Nisar, Takaful and Islamic 
Cooperative Finance: Challenges and Opportunity (Edward Elgar, 2016) 22-47.  
62 Adiwarman A. Karim, Islamic Bank: An Analysis of Fiqh and Finance (RajaGrafindo Persada, 2008).  
63 Abdul Rahim Abdul Wahab, Mervyn K. Lewis, and M. Kabir Hassan, ‘Islamic Takaful: Business Models, Shariah Concerns, 
and Proposed Solutions’ (2007) 49(3) Thunderbird International Business Review 371-396, 377-381.  
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for that loan which is practically subject to the responsibility of shareholders. If the deficit 
occurs for more than one financial year, the companies may face serious financial difficulties.64 
Companies charge the direct costs of claims handling and all management expenses to the risk 
fund before the underwriting surplus or deficit is calculated.65 This modification may serve the 
need of the companies to handle the deficit of the risk fund. Malaysia allows the mudharabah-
based model, but it is seriously challenged in many other countries.66  
 Third, the companies must maintain shareholders’ funds which requires suitable 
investment strategies.67 The companies tend to increase risk funds either by increasing 
premiums for existing policyholders or attracting new policyholders or to increase its portion 
of profits. An aggressive investment policy increases the risks to the risk fund itself, and may 
lead to undesirable speculative activities with the companies acting as a risk taker. The choices 
are undesirable for the takaful industry. Raising premiums could make the companies 
uncompetitive compared to conventional commercial insurance. There must also be a 
sufficiently large number of policyholders to get the benefit of economies of scale. Payment to 
the companies can be adversely affected mainly by investment performance. Falling profits 
may lead the operator to increase its share of the profit and lower the share of the participants.68  
This model is preferred by takaful-companies because it provides significant incentives for 
companies,69 but it creates Sharia issues that may jeopardise its legitimacy among Sharia 
scholars or those clients who are concerned on Sharia principles.   
                                                          
64 Archer, et al, above n 47, 14.  
64 Ibid.  
65 Ibid.  
66 Ibid.  
67 W. Jean Kwon, ‘Islamic Principle and Takaful Insurance: Re-evaluation’ (2007) 26(1) Journal of Insurance Regulation 53, 
65. 
68 Ibid 65.  
69 See, eg, Hayat Khan, ‘Gift Exchange Anomaly: Evidence from Incentive vis-à-vis Performance of Islamic Insurance 
Operators’ (2015) 22(14) Applied Economic Letters 1175-1178; and Hayat Khan, ‘Optimal Incentives for Takaful (Islamic 
Insurance) Operators’ (2015) 109 Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 135-144. 
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 To address the deficiencies of this model, Sharia scholars searched for alternatives that 
may satisfy not only Sharia requirements, but also efficiency and business practicalities. As a 
result, the third model namely the combination of the agency (wakalah) and the profit sharing 
model (mudharabah) were designed for these purposes as discussed below.   
 
7.6.3 Hybrid Model: Combination of Wakalah and Mudharabah 
 Under the hybrid model, the companies and their policyholders enter into two separate 
contractual agreements. The first step is for both parties to enter into an agency agreement 
(wakalah) to manage the risk fund. The parties then enter into a profit sharing agreement 
(mudharabah) to manage the investment fund.70 Under the first agreement, the policyholders 
have a right to receive surplus of the risk or underwriting fund, takaful fund, whilst the 
companies receive upfront agency fees in managing that risk fund. In relation to the second 
agreement, the companies share a portion of profits from investment funds.71 Under this model, 
companies receive incentives from managing the risk fund as well as the investment fund.72 
This hybrid model reduces Sharia issues of the previous models (the wakalah and the 
mudharabah model). Deriving benefits from the risk fund (through agency fees) and the 
investment fund (through sharing profits) are legitimate under Islamic law. Moreover, this 
model is preferable for companies since their incentives are derived from the risk funds 
(through agency fees) and the investment funds (through sharing on profits). In sum, this hybrid 
model is more feasible for the industry compared to the previous models.   
                                                          
70 Zaharudin Abd. Rahman, Contemporary Islamic Finance Architecture (IBFIM, 2014) 293.  
71 Ibid.  
72 See Hayat Khan, above n 69.  
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 Similar to the previous models, this model utilizes an interest free loan to cover any 
deficit of the risk fund. The loan is repayable when the fund is in surplus. However, due to 
Sharia requirements, the operator cannot borrow money from the participants’ investment fund 
to cover that deficit.73  
 The next Islamic insurance model utilize the concept of waqf.   
 
7.6.4 Endowment (Waqf) Model 
  This model uses a waqf (endowment) concept for establishing takaful. The risk fund is 
solely designed as a waqf fund to pay out policyholders insured claims. Unlike the previous 
models, in this model, the shareholders of the company establish the waqf fund. Subsequently, 
this waqf fund is contributed to by regular payments by policyholders. The waqf fund  acts as 
the risk fund used as a donation (tabarru) under the waqf system.74 This waqf fund consists of 
contributions both from shareholders and policyholders. However, under the waqf system, the 
shareholders as well as the policyholders have no rights over the fund. The fund now becomes 
the property of the waqf which can be used for the benefit of all policyholders as well as 
shareholders.75  Waqf-based insurance is illustrated in the following figure.  
 
 
                                                          
73 Archer, et al, above n 47. 
74 Ibid 294.  
75 Ibid.  
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Figure 7.1. Takaful-based Waqf Model.76     
 
 The waqf-based agreement cannot be used as the sole operating principle in this model. 
In practice, the companies also employ the contract of agency (wakalah) and profit sharing 
(mudharabah). The agency contract is used in managing the waqf fund. Profit sharing is used 
in managing the investment fund. The operator receives incentives from both funds in the form 
of agency fee and profit sharing respectively. In theory, any deficits in the fund are not recouped 
from shareholders or policyholders. However, in practice, it is inevitable that the shareholders 
of the companies need to provide a reserve fund which is refundable when the fund is in surplus. 
Having discussed various operational models of takaful, the table below summarizes the 
differences between the previous discussed models. 
 
                                                          
76 Mohd Fadzli Yusof, Fundamentals of Takaful (Kuala Lumpur, IBFIM, 2011) 29-44.  
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Table 7.1. Features of Takaful Models 
Item Wakalah Mudharabah Hybrid (wakalah & 
mudharabah)  
Waqf   
Contractual 
Agreement  
Agency 
(wakalah) 
Profit Sharing 
Contract (policy 
holders act as a 
capital 
contributor, and 
the takaful 
operator act as an 
entrepreneur) 
 
Agency for the 
underwriting fund, 
and profit sharing 
for investment fund  
 
Waqf (waqf 
contribution acting as 
a donation), Agency, 
and Profit Sharing  
Incentive 
System 
Agency fee and 
or performance 
fee  
Profits from 
investment funds, 
and sharing 
surplus of the 
underwriting 
funds  
Agency fee and or 
performance fee, 
and profit from 
investment 
activities 
 
Agency fee and or 
performance fee, and 
profit from investment 
activities 
Share of 
investment 
fund 
 
None Pre-agreed 
percentage 
Pre-agreed 
percentage 
Pre-agreed percentage  
Share of 
Surplus of 
underwriting 
fund  
None Pre-agreed 
percentage of 
surplus 
 
None None 
Loss of 
Investment  
Borne solely by 
policy holders  
 
Ibid   Ibid   Ibid  
Operating 
Expenses 
Borne solely by 
shareholders’ 
fund except for 
direct expenses of 
the Takaful fund 
 
Borne solely by 
shareholders’ 
fund except for 
direct expenses of 
the Takaful fund  
Borne solely by 
shareholders’ fund 
except for direct 
expenses of the 
Takaful fund 
Borne solely by 
shareholders’ fund 
except for direct 
expenses of the 
Takaful fund 
Deficit in 
Takaful fund  
Qard al Hasan 
(non-interest 
loan) from 
shareholders’ 
fund  
 
Ibid  Ibid Ibid  
Creating of 
the Takaful 
fund  
Policy holders’  
contributions 
Ibid Ibid  Initial waqf fund from 
shareholders’ fund 
and policy holders’ 
fund 
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Liquidation 
of Takaful 
fund77  
Accrue to policy 
holders’ only 
Ibid  Ibid  Waqf amount must go 
to another existing 
waqf fund and cannot 
be disbursed among 
policy holders  
 
 
7.7 Islamic Insurance (Takaful): Risk Sharing or Risk Transfer? 
 Risk allocation mechanisms in takaful insurance companies have features of both risk 
transfer and risk sharing. First, under the models referred to in the previous sections, takaful 
involves a risk transfer from an individual to a group. At an initial stage when an individual 
takes out a policy under a takaful scheme, the policyholder transfers risks to the other 
policyholders in the same group. Risks of all policyholders of the takaful are collectively shared 
and indemnified by all members of the group. Second, it involves risk sharing. In theory, if the 
risk fund is not sufficient to cover the underwriting risks, the deficit will be covered by an 
interest-free loan (qard) provided by the insurer company, this fund is refundable once the risk 
fund is in surplus or through the increased premiums for the existing shareholders. Third, it 
also involves risk transfer from policyholders to the takaful company. This occurs if the risk 
fund is in deficit. The companies commonly need more capital to cover the deficit. If other 
measures do not cover the deficit in the fund, such as using contingency reserves, then an 
outright transfer would be the final resort.78 At this point, the risk is transferred to the company 
and its shareholders.   
 Additionally, takaful also involves risk sharing particularly in Islamic limited liability 
stock Islamic insurance companies. The mandatory qard (loan) facility requires sufficient 
                                                          
77 Sheila Nu NuHtay, Mustapha Hamat, Wan Zamri Wan Ismail and Syed Ahmed Salman, ‘Takaful (Islamic Insurance): 
Historical, Shariah, and Operational Perspectives’ (2015) 9(1) International Business Management 65-69.  
78 Ahcene Lahsasna, Shariah Issues and Resolutions in Contemporary Islamic Banking and Finance (IBFIM, 2014) 407.  
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shareholders’ fund to cover the deficit in the risk fund. If the shareholders’ funds are 
insufficient to cover the deficit, the company may borrow funds from third parties to cover the 
deficit. If the company fails, the third parties who have debt claims over the company will lose 
their funds as the liability of shareholders is limited to their invested capital. This mechanism 
enables the policyholders of the companies as well as their shareholders to shift or transfer the 
risks of the risk fund to a third party.   
 
7.8 A Hybrid Model: A Trade-off between Social and Profit Motives  
 The hybrid model of Islamic insurance enables the pooling funds which are managed on 
a mutual basis by a company. But there are competing interests of policy holders and company 
shareholders seeking a profitable investment through dividend payments. A critical question is 
what legal form (mutual or a joint stock company) best accommodates Islamic insurance 
requirements. There have been three common Islamic insurance standards related to this 
question. Saudi Arabia practices a cooperative-based Islamic insurance but requires all insurers 
to be joint stock companies. Malaysia adopts a joint-stock company with a limited liability 
entity based Islamic insurance. Indonesia gives an option to Islamic insurance to choose 
between a joint stock company and cooperative; most of the operators have chosen the first 
one. Pakistan has developed a waqf-based insurance. Each of these models has their own 
complexities and challenges.  
 Under the traditional Islamic insurance model which is based on mutual insurance, all 
underwriting surpluses (the risk fund surplus after costs and reserves) are allocated to the 
policyholders. But where the insurer is a joint stock company this rule has been modified. In 
Malaysia, the Islamic insurance companies share the underwriting surplus as in the various 
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cases above. Some Middle East Islamic insurance companies share surplus in the form of 
wakalah (agency) performance fee. 79 In Indonesia, the fatwa of Indonesian Ulama Council 
(MUI) allows a portion of the underwriting surplus to be shared with the shareholders on the 
basis of the agreement between the participants and the takaful companies.80 This is almost 
invariably the cease with joint stock company insurers. Where the structure is a hybrid takaful 
this effectively incorporates aspects of both mutual and commercial insurance. This leads to a 
‘rainbow of practices with mutual at one end and stock insurers at the other’.81 Even if a strict 
model is used which allocates all underwriting surpluses to policyholders, takaful companies 
may increase fees beyond the actual cost of managing the fund. In this situation, the operator 
may indirectly share in the underwriting surplus form the operation of the risk fund.82 What is 
missing from the regulators is any provision requiring disclosure of costs of administering the 
risk fund and any sums paid to the operator in excess of those costs.   
  It is clear that takaful companies must make profits from their operations in order to 
provide incentives for shareholders to invest in the company. In Malaysia, a mudharabah 
(profit sharing) model was firstly introduced to the market. This model enabled the takaful 
companies to share profits from the risk pooling fund either from the investment of premiums 
or from the surplus of the underwriting funds. Malaysia modified the mudharabah model by 
creating the hybrid model (combination of mudharabah and wakalah). This new model enables 
the companies to share the profits from the investment fund as well as to obtain a performance 
fee (wakalah fee) from the underwriting fund. The objective of this new model remains the 
same that is providing financial incentives to the company and its shareholders.  
                                                          
79 Kassim, above n 5, 90.   
80 Sharia Advisory Boards (DSN) – Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI), ‘Fatwa No. 53/DSN-MUI/III of 2006 on Islamic 
Insurance’. 
81 Ibid.  
82 Ibid.  
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  A co-operative-based takaful (as a reflection of a social insurance) may face two 
institutional obstacles. This is because the legal system of many countries do not accept mutual 
or co-operative forms of company without share capital. Even if mutual or co-operative are 
accepted as insurance undertakings, they need to be able to raise enough capital from policy 
holders to meet regulatory capital adequacy and solvency requirements. These two obstacles 
are temporarily resolved by the application of the hybrid structure whereby the pooling funds 
are managed on a mutual basis but are managed by a takaful operator, which is a company with 
shareholders.83  
 
7.9 The Treatment of Takaful Fund’s Liability   
 The consequence of a hybrid structure is that the takaful or risk fund must be separated 
from the shareholders’ fund. Accounting Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI) states that the risk fund is “a separate legal entity (shakhsiyyah 
i’tibariyyah) which has an independent financial liability”. 84 This means that the fund will 
cover specified risks of each of its contributors with the terms of the policy. One argues that 
this status only occurs in the internal setting (relevant for the relations between the takaful 
operator and the participants) but not with third parties.85  
 The status of the risk fund as defined by the AAOIFI implies that it is the risk fund that 
is responsible when the fund is in deficit. This is because the participants own the fund and are 
also liable to cover its loss. As a matter of practicality the fund cannot by itself provide 
additional capital in the case of deficit. As a result, in most jurisdictions, the takaful company 
                                                          
83 Archer, et al, above n 47, 2.   
84 Ibid.  
85 Ibid 12.  
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is forced by law to provide an interest-free loan (qard hasan) to recover the loss, which is 
refunded when the fund is in surplus.86 The status of the risk fund as having a separate legal 
personality needs to be developed to solve this practical issue. For the discussion of the legal 
personality in Islamic law is provided in Chapter 8.    
 Takaful operators are invariably incorporated as limited liability entities. This creates 
complexities whereas the fund is in deficit and the operator decides to raise funds to cover the 
deficit from the third parties. In such case, when the operator becomes insolvent, the third 
parties who have claims over the company’s debts have no rights to claim more than the asset 
of the company. It means that the operator may shift the risk of loss to the third parties. In 
theory, takaful reflects the risk sharing mechanism among participants whereby the liability of 
each participant towards risks of other participants might be assumed as unlimited. However, 
the status of a limited liability of the takaful operator may imply such mechanism impractical.  
 
7.10 Takaful Solvency Requirements 
 All takaful models share a similar mechanism to address the insolvency of the risk fund 
through the application of interest free loan (qard) provided by the takaful operators. The qard 
facility may not be supported by legal requirements depending on the jurisdiction either 
because it has been declared not to apply (such as a Saudi Arabia) or it is in a jurisdiction with 
no specific regulations for Islamic insurance. This gives rise to problems in deciding what 
amounts are required to maintain the solvency of the fund and on the winding up of fund that 
had a large qard injection.  
                                                          
86 Ibid 11.  
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 The qard is required in practice but not compulsory from an Islamic point of view. If the 
fund is in deficit, the operators may face difficulties in raising funds. Thus, the operators need 
an immediate method providing the risk fund with additional capital resources for solvency 
purposes. The Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) suggests that the qard facility must be 
ready and sufficient in the shareholders’ fund. 87 From a regulatory perspective, this means that 
the takaful companies must maintain sufficient capital for the purpose of providing a qard 
facility for the risk fund.  
 The obligation to provide a qard facility may contain a revenue transfer or an 
appropriation of profits from the operators to the risk fund. This facility may reduce the 
shareholder’s equity and be taken as capital transfer to the fund.88 In Indonesia, for instance, 
local regulators particularly the Indonesian Financial and Services Authorities (OJK) prohibits 
takaful companies from distributing profits to shareholders if there is insufficient qard reserve 
in the shareholder’s fund.89 Some commentators suggest that if the risk fund is continuously 
insolvent after the application of several qard facilities, the qards should be donated to the fund 
especially in otherwise the takaful companies cannot continue its business.90 Elgari argues that 
the donation of a qard facility to the risk fund by the shareholders demonstrates takaful’s 
cooperative nature that is the core of takaful undertaking. Islamic law does not restrict such an 
application.91 He suggests that that the operators remain responsible for qard facility and must 
                                                          
87 Islamic Financial Services Board, Standard on Solvency Requirements for Takaful (Islamic Insurance) Undertakings (IFSB, 
2010) 3. 
88 Ajmal Bhatty, ‘The Growing Importance of Takaful Insurance’ [2/01/2017] 
http://www.oecd.org/finance/insurance/46116115.pdf. 
89 Regulation of Indonesian Financial Services Authority No 72 /POJK.05/2016 on Financial Health of Sharia Insurance and 
Re-Insurance Companies, article 6 s 8.   
90 Islamic Financial Services Board, Standard on Solvency Requirements for Takaful (Islamic Insurance) Undertakings (IFSB, 
2010) 14-15. 
91 In Abdusalam Ismail Onagun, ‘Solvency of Takaful Fund: A Case of Subordinated Qard’ (2011) 18(1) Islamic Economic 
Studies 1-16, 16. 
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be ready if the qard cannot be restored.92 However, in practice, this means that the risk is 
transferred to the shareholders.  
 The qard facility is related to the issue of capital adequacy. In takaful practices, the 
shareholder’s fund is not the only equity attributable to the shareholders; it also includes a qard 
facility for the risk fund. Qard is a kind of capital in the pooling fund and refunded if the fund 
is in surplus, when the qard has been paid out to cover the deficit, the pooling fund owes the 
qard to the takaful company. The qard may thus represent an asset of the shareholders’ fund 
and a liability of the takaful fund.93  
 The application of qard facility also reflects the difficulties of the companies in dealing 
with the deficit. In theory, the participants may be called upon additional contributions to pay 
the deficit after utilisation of the qard. The deficit of the takaful fund might also be shared with 
the future participants through future pricing increases. However, in practice, it is difficult to 
apply this mechanism given that participants would presumably be at liberty not to renew their 
policies, and to take new and cheaper insurance with another takaful provider that did not carry 
a burden of deficits to be recouped. 94  
 
7.11 Regulatory Concerns on Solvency of the Risk Fund  
There are some regulatory consequences of this qard facility. First, the shareholders 
should maintain sufficient qard reserve in the shareholders’ fund. For instance, Indonesian 
Sharia insurance regulation obligates the takaful companies to maintain sufficient qard reserve 
                                                          
92 Ibid. 
93 Archer, et al, above n 47, 193-216.  
94 Archer, et al, above n 47, 205. 
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in the shareholders’ fund. The regulation also does not allow the companies to distribute the 
surplus of the risk (underwriting) fund if there are remaining unsettled qard.95 Second, the 
repayment of that loan must take into account the ability of the risk fund to meet future 
liabilities and takaful participants’ reasonable expectations. Third, can there be a surplus in the 
risk fund during the period where qard has not been fully repaid from the risk fund. Sharia 
insurance regulation in Indonesia, for instance, prefers to reduce the surplus until the qard is 
fully recovered. Fourth, jurisdictions offering Sharia insurance should state clearly the time 
period of the qard repayment by the risk fund. And fifth, jurisdictions offering Sharia insurance 
should also provide exit strategies if the qard cannot be fully recovered after exceeding a 
specified time period. In this case, whether the liability to provide loans to the risk fund can be 
extended to the investment accounts of policyholders. These five points shall important to the 
development of solvency requirements of risk (underwriting) funds of takaful companies.   
  
7.12 Challenges to Modern Takaful Insurance  
 In Muslim societies, family is the principal source of support and security.96 But where 
this is not available, support and assistance tend to be based on community-level welfare and 
food security. For instance, in Indonesia support for the needy and indigent is based on the 
Islamic precept of zakat (an earmarked levy on wealth, sometimes provided to the mosque). 
Moreover, local organised-zakat institutions that established in many parts of the country, i.e. 
Dompet Dhuafa, Lazismu, and Lazisnu, and Zakat House, provide a very effective social 
                                                          
95 Indonesian Services Authority Regulation No 72/POJK.05/2015 on Financial Health of Sharia Insurance and Re-
Insurance Companies. 
96 Ahmad Ehtisham, ‘Social Security and the Poor: Choices for Developing Countries’ (1991) 6(1) the World Bank Research 
Observer 105-127, 111.  
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security system in identifying and assisting the indigent in local communities.97 Since resources 
are generally locally provided, events that affect the whole community make this community 
support unreliable. If there is a breakdown in these traditional forms of support and assistance, 
some form of risk pooling is desirable. Third, there may be little community awareness of the 
differences between takaful insurance and conventional insurance which is prohibited.98  
 Developing countries, including Muslim nations, have relatively sophisticated social 
security mechanisms that incorporate aspects of redistribution of wealth to those in need. But 
the reseources for such schemes are locally based, and the practices cannot withstand sustained 
shocks. Moreover, the social cohesion that underlines these arrangements is increasingly 
susceptible to the challenge of contemporary Muslim societies. There is a role for the state as 
well private business actors to provide formal insurance system by pooling risk across 
localities. The takaful insurance system is new to Muslim markets. Takaful insurance can be 
seen as a complement to the traditional social security system. These traditional system of 
social security are unsuitable mechanisms to protect commercial interests and businesses 
involving high volume trading and valuable infrastructure and equipment.  
 
7.13 Summary  
 This chapter shows the development of takaful insurance as a modern development from 
Islamic principles based on shared risk. As with other modernising approaches, various juristic 
opinions have been utilised to legitimise a particular form of Islamic insurance. The Islamic 
                                                          
97 Hilman Latief, ‘Islamic Philanthropy and the Private Sector in Indonesia’ (2013) 3(2) Indonesian Journal of Islam and 
Muslim Societies 175-201. 
98 A personal experience of the writer showed that some of the Muslims are reluctant to access takaful 
insurance because of their doubts over Sharia legitimacy.  
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insurance system has modified the mutual and commercial-based conventional insurance to fit 
the juristic rulings particularly prohibition of riba, gharar (uncertainty), and maysir 
(speculation and gambling). The Islamic insurance has created a hybrid arrangement between 
a proprietary and mutual insurance, and generates distinctive characteristics compared to its 
conventional counterparts.  
 The practice of Islamic insurance still raises some issues particularly with regard to the 
relationship between the company, its shareholders, and policyholders. The differing 
approaches in the various jurisdictions have resulted in market fragmentation and divergence 
on regulatory and Sharia standards. Effectively takaful insurance operations are undertaken by 
joint stock companies (limited liability entities) rather than by cooperatives. This practice is 
inevitable due to some institutional obstacles in the adoption of a cooperative based takaful. A 
joint stock takaful has elements of risk sharing and risk transfer in relation to which there is 
continuing debate. The problem for the takaful industry is how to remain competitive whilst 
remaining Sharia compliant.   
  The next chapter will discuss another pivotal concept to the financial industry, the 
limited liability corporation. The difficulty is that Islamic finance struggles with the concept of 
a limited liability corporation due to the fact that medieval Islamic juristic rules do not 
recognise the-so-called ‘artificial person’. The limited liability corporation has been a major 
development in modern contracts that enable the expansion of industrialisation because the 
risks of the capital owners are limited to their capital contribution. The existence of the limited 
liability corporation is integral to risk management that is central to this thesis.  
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CHAPTER 8: LIMITED LIABILITY IN ISLAMIC LAW  
 
8.1 Introduction 
As discussed in chapters 2 and 7, Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) largely operate 
under as limited liability corporation. Islamic scholars continue to debate the legitimacy in 
Islamic law of a limited liability corporation. There are serious reputational risks for limited 
liability corporation if they are deemed not to be Sharia compliant. The limited liability 
corporation is closely related to risk management techniques where the investor risks only their 
capital contributions. The limited liability corporation is crucial to capital markets.1 Its absence 
from Islamic markets would effectively shut out most Muslim countries from financial 
markets.2  
This chapter argues that the concept of a limited liability corporation can be 
accommodated within Islamic principles. The chapter begins with a discussion of the nature of 
a corporation and its legal personality and limited liability. It then examines liability of Islamic 
business ventures partnership models, shirkah and mudharabah (a type of profit and loss 
sharing contracts). The focus is then turned to the liability models of Islamic dhimmah (legal 
capacity) developed by contemporary Muslim jurists. This substantive section deals with 
liability of modern Islamic finance institutions.  
 
                                                          
1 See Timur Kuran, ‘Why the Middle East is Economically Underdeveloped: Historical Mechanisms of Institutional 
Stagnation’ (2004) 18(3) Journal of Economic Perspectives 71-90.  
2 Ibid. 
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8.2 Corporation as a Legal Person  
To understand the meaning of corporation, it is imperative to understand the concept of 
a legal person or legal personality. Legal personality can be defined as “the capacity for legal 
relations” of a person.3 A person is “any being whom the law regards as capable of rights and 
duties”.4 Legal personality may be attributed to a person whether a natural person (human 
being) or an artificial person or juristic person (corporation, company, etc.).5 The law 
recognises and gives legal effect to a juristic person.6 This concept emerged in the English 
common law by the House of Lords in Salomon v. A Salomon & Co. Ltd.7 The decision 
confirmed that a company is a separate legal entity and separate from its shareholders, so the 
debts of the company are not the debts of Salomon, as one of its shareholders.8 Consequently, 
shareholders are not liable for company debts beyond their investment in shares.  
 
8.3 Limited Liability Company 
The underpinning concept of a company is that it has legal personality and is a separate 
legal entity. Thus, the liability of shareholders or other members of the company is limited to 
their shares only. Investors are not liable, directly or indirectly (or by way of indemnification, 
contribution, or otherwise) for any debts, obligations or liabilities of the company, or of third 
parties.9 This protects the personal wealth of investors or shareholders and management against 
                                                          
3 Bryant Smith, ‘Legal Personality’ 37(3) The Yale Law Journal 283-299, 299.  
4 John William Salmond, Jurisprudence (London: Sweet & Maxwell. 1924) 329.  
5 Discussion on whether or not the corporation is real or imaginary, natural or artificial, see Arthur W. Machen, Jr, ‘Corporate 
Personality’ (1911) 24(4) Harvard Law Review 253-267.  
6 Arthur W. Machen, Jr, ‘Corporate Personality’ (1911) 24(4) Harvard Law Review 253-267, 261.  
7 More discussion on a separate legal entity, see Leonard S. Sealy, Cases and Materials in Company Law (Cambridge 
University Press) 37-45.  
8 Ibid.  
9 Jonathan R. Macey, ‘The Limited Liability Company: Lessons for Corporate Law’ (1995) 73 (2) Washington University Law 
Journal 433, 433-434. 
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any possible risks in business undertakings including losses to bank customers of deposits or 
savings.10  
 
8.4 Anglo American Limited Partnership  
Unlike corporations where the company and shareholders have limited liability, in a 
limited liability partnership at least one of the partners must be a general partner who has 
unlimited liability for all of the debts and obligations of the partnership.11 A partner with 
limited liability does not participate in the management of the business. If the partnership fails 
or becomes insolvent or bankrupt, creditors sue only the general partner not the partners with 
limited liability.  
The limited liability partnership does not depend on the partnership having separate legal 
personality, which it does not, but from the separation of ownership and management.12 This 
is evident in the Old Regime French societe en commandite simple that formed the basis for 
the Anglo American limited partnership, first enacted by New York in 1882.13 It was derived 
from the commenda of the Medieval Italian city-states which viewed as a (morally necessary) 
consequence of the separation of ownership and management. This separation gave limited 
liability to sleeping partners, that is, partners who were not involved in hands-on management 
of the business.14 It is important to notice that the Anglo American limited partnership can trace 
                                                          
10 See for instance, Saul Levmore, ‘Partnerships, Limited Liability Companies, and Taxes: A Comment on the Survival of 
Organizational Forms’ (1992) 70 Washington University Law Quarter 489, 492.  
11 Peter C. Aslanides, et al, ‘Limited Partnership: What’s Next and What’s Left?’ (1978) 34(1) The Business Lawyer 257-305, 
259. 
12 Amalia D. Kessler, ‘Limited Liability in Context: Lessons from the French Origins of the American Limited Parnership’ 
(2003) 32(2) The Journal of Legal Studies 511-548, 513. 
13 Ibid 511.  
14 Ibid.  
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its origins to the commenda practice inspired by the qirad or mudharabah (profit and loss 
sharing contract) in the Muslim Medieval partnership practices.   
 
8.5 The Effect of Limited Liability Companies 
One of the adverse impacts of limited liability is that creditors bear the risks of corporate 
failure.15 This means that the risk is shifted from the company and its members to creditors, 
but may also, particularly in the case of bank failure, be shifted to the public more generally. 
This has the effect that the costs generated by corporation are externalized so that shareholders 
and directors gain benefits but do not suffer losses beyond their investment. Limited liability 
allows investors to engage in risky enterprises to generate higher profits, while the costs 
associated with failure are largely borne by creditors and “innocent” victims such as 
employees. This can result in over-investment in risky enterprises which may generate large 
profits and underinvestment in businesses offering only modest gains.16 But on the positive 
side, it allows innovation, new enterprises and development.  
Limited liability is the best vehicle to protect the shareholders from the risks. It enables 
the accumulation of large pools of capital under centralised management as is the case with the 
large modern, publicly held corporations.17 Limited liability also provides incentives for the 
public to be involved in economic activities without risk if the company fails. The modern 
corporation separates ownership (shareholders) and management. But it is no longer true to say 
that since shareholders bear minimum risks they may be uninterested in the management of the 
                                                          
15 Lawrence Mitchell, ‘Close Corporations Reconsidered’ (1989) 63 Tul. Law Review 1143, 1172-80, see also Paul Halpren, 
Michael Trebilcock & Stuart Turnbull, ‘An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law’ (1980) 30 University 
Toronto Law Journal 117, 148. 
16 Macey, above n 10, 448. 
17 Kessler, above n 13, 513. 
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corporation. Although shareholders have no say in the day to day running of a corporation, they 
have an important role in the annual general meeting, in electing Directors. At least in relation 
to large corporations, shareholders activism and institutional investors wield significant 
influence.18   
 
8.6 Islamic Partnership 
In Islamic law, the term business partnership is often referred to the Arabic word of 
shirkah. However, there is no a single standard understanding of what is the technical meaning 
of the word in Sunni traditions. Each Islamic legal school (madhab) has their own terminology. 
The word shirkah itself literally means participation of any type.19 The understanding of the 
concept of shirkah has been developed and transformed by different Islamic legal schools with 
different understandings of the concept.20  
The general features of shirkah can be described as follows. These include the sharing 
of cash money or wealth; the sharing of entrepreneurial skills, labours or management; and the 
sharing of credit worthiness or goodwill (al-wujuh). Each party’s contribution depends on the 
agreement between the contracting parties. Generally, participation is classified into unlimited 
(mufawadah) and limited contribution (inan). If it is unlimited, one particular party contributes 
                                                          
18 Ibid.  
19 See, eg, Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee, Islamic Law of Business Organization: Organisations (International Institute of 
Islamic Through, 2000) 27; and Nicholas H.D. Foster, ‘Islamic Perspective on the Law of Business Organisation I: An 
Overview of the Classical Sharia and a Brief Comparison of the Sharia Regimes with Western-Style Law’ (2010) 11 
European Business Organization Law Review 3-34, 14.  
20 Abraham L. Udovitch, ‘Labor Partnership in Early Islamic Law’ (1967) 10(1) Journal of the Economic and Social History of 
the Orient 64-80. See also Shelomo Dov Goitein, A Mediterranean Society: The Jewish Communities of the Arab World as 
Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza (University of California Press, 1983).  
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all work and capital. Where the contribution is limited, a party contributes either work or 
capital.21  
There are two common categories of Islamic partnership.22 The first is simply co-
ownership (shirkah al-milk) of a particular asset,23 often called as proprietary partnership.24 
Co-ownership is common in Muslim societies particularly where an asset cannot not be divided 
or distinguished, i.e. ships, or animals.25 Individual co-owners cannot sell their share without 
the permission of the other co-owners.26 This co-ownership is not for the purpose of profit.27 It 
has received little discussion by scholars.28 Typically, co-ownership takes two forms either an 
ascertained asset (‘ayn) or debt (dayn).29 In these types of co-ownership, assets are intermingled 
either through the act of the owners (i.e. voluntary by a joint purchase of an asset) or by the act 
of others (mandatory –without any action or approvals of the partners, i.e. inheritance).30 Co-
ownership of ‘ayn (co-owned asset) is accepted by a majority of Schools, but there is 
disagreement regarding co-ownership of a debt.31 
                                                          
21 Nyazee, above n 20, 30.  
22 This categorization is derived from Majallat al-Ahkam al-Adliyah, see Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee, Islamic Law of Business 
Organization: Partnerships (Islamic Book Trust, 2002) 35, see also Abraham L. Udovitch, Partnership and Profit in Medieval 
Islam (Princeton University Press, 1970) 17, Zuhaili also classifies partnership into these two categories, see Wahbah Al-
Zuhayli, Financial Transactions in Islamic Jurisprudence. Vol.1 (translated by Mahmoud A. El-Gamal, and revised by 
Muhammad S. Eissa) (Dar Al-Fikr, 2001) 448. 
23 Nyazee, above n 20, 35. 
24 Abraham L. Udovitch, Partnership and Profit in Medieval Islam (Princeton University Press, 1970) 17. 
25 Ibid 24. 
26  Regarding this principle, Nyazee argues whether or not the sale of share in a corporation is permissible, “a co-owner can 
sell his share without the permission of the other co-owners according to some schools. It is for this reason that the Islamic 
Fiqh Academy (OIC) attempts to validate the sale of the shares held in a corporation. The reasoning, however, is defective, 
because they treat a corporation like a sharikat al-aqd and a partner cannot sell his share in a partnership to an outsider 
without the specific permission of the other partners. This is true in fiqh as well as in law”, see Nyazee, above 20, 37. 
27 Wahbah Al Zuhayli, Financial Transactions in Islamic Jurisprudence. Vol. 1 (translated by Mahmoud A. El-Gamal, and 
revised by Muhammad S. Eissa) (Damascus: Dar Al-Fikr, 2001) 448. 
28 Udovitch, above n 25, 19. 
29 Nyazee, above n 20, 35. 
30 See, eg, Nyazee, above n 20, 36; Al Zuhayli, above n 28, 449; and Udovitch, above n 25, 16-17. 
31 Nyazee, above n 20, 36. 
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The second category of shirkah is a contractual partnership to conduct business 
undertakings (shirkah al-aqd). This kind of partnership is recognised in the Western law. In 
this chapter, the primary focus will be given to this form of contractual partnership.  
 
8.7 Islamic Contractual Partnership 
8.7.1 Hanafi School  
The Hanafi School, one of the earliest schools in Sunni traditions, recognised two 
important aspects of contractual partnership, mutual consultation (mufawadah) and mutual 
delegation of authority and powers (inan).32 Mufawadah consists of mutual agency (wakalah) 
and guarantee or suretyship (kafalah) of all partners. In this arrangement, the partnership 
extends to all things including capital, profit, and loss. Hanafi is the only school mazhab that 
recognises the validity of this type of mufawadah.33 When the communality does not 
comprehend all things, a partnership then becomes inan partnership whereby the communality 
is specified. In other words, inan partnership allows inequality of assets, profits, and loss that 
can vary according to agreement; there is no requirement that it be related to investment amount 
of the individual partner.34  Inan also allows having mutual agency (wakalah), without mutual 
suretyship (kafalah).35 Inan has been described as:  
                                                          
32 Udovitch, above n 25; and Nyazee, above n 20 35. Meanwhile according to Zuhaili, above n, 449, Hanafi School 
enumerates six types of shirkah al-aqd including the two types mentioned in Udovitch, above n 25, and Nyazee, above n 20.   
33 Udovitch, above n 25, 42.  
34 Ibid, 129-231, see also Abraham L. Udovitch, ‘Labor Partnership in Early Islamic Law’ (1967) 10(1) Journal of the 
Economic and Social History of the Orient 64-80, 65.  
35 Udovitch, above n 25, 65.  
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“a contract, based either on wakalah or on wakalah as well as kafalah, that permits 
participation from both sides with wealth (mal), work (‘amal), or credit-worthiness 
(wujuh) and the sharing of profits in an agreed upon ratio”.36  
According to the Hanafi school, the liability of partners is unlimited.37 The partners are 
liable in proportion to their share of the total investment. There is no limit on the amount of the 
partnership’s liability. Each partner is responsible for their share of the partnership’s 
indebtedness regardless of the amount, or by how much it exceeds the value of that partner’s 
own share of the company’s assets.38  
However, in term of the mutalaba (the way in which the creditors could identify from 
whom the demand for repayment can be made) the rights of creditors can be characterised as 
follows.  In mufawadah (mutual consultation), all partners are jointly and severally liable for 
debts since all partners are mutual agents (wakalah) and mutual guarantors (kafalah).39 Each 
partner can independently of other partners exceed the limit of capital (istiada), i.e. through 
credit purchase. Consequently, if a partner purchases on credit and exceeds the capital limit, 
the other partners are liable for such debts, the liability is equally shared by all parties.40 In 
inan, the liability for debts is several but not joint. It means that third parties could only look 
to the partner with whom they dealt with for the entire debt. If an obligation is jointly 
undertaken by both partners, the third parties can demand satisfaction from each of them 
proportional to the share of liability assigned to them in the partnership contract.41 
                                                          
36 Nyazee, above n 20, 102.  
37 Udovitch, above n 25, 41; and Nyazee classifies type of contractual partnership in Hanafi School by the way of mufawada 
or inan, Nyazee, above n 20, 87.  
38 Udovitch, above n 25, 41. 
39 Ibid 67-68. 
40 Nyazee classifies type of contractual partnership in Hanafi School by the way of mufawada or inan, see Nyazee, above n 
20, 87.  
41 Ibid 143-145. 
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8.7.2 Maliki School  
The Maliki School classifies Islamic partnership based on the form of investment (cash, 
labor, credit, and combination of cash and labor). It distinguishes between mufawadah (a 
general mandate), and inan (restricted mandate).42 Although, mufawadah and inan are identical 
with Hanafi’s terminologies, they have different meanings.43 Maliki’s mufawadah is quite 
similar with the Hanafi’s inan. For instance, unlike in Hanafi law whereby there is no restriction 
on partner buying an asset on a credit basis without the approval the other partner, the Maliki’s 
mufawadah requires the partner to get the other partner’s permission for credit purchases.44  
There are two important rules in Maliki’s partnership.  The first rule is tafwid, “the 
delegation of discretionary authority to conduct trade with each other’s capital”.45 In 
Mufawadah, each partner confers upon other partners full or unrestricted authority to dispose 
of their joint capital in any acceptable manner to earn benefits from any business undertakings. 
Meanwhile in inan, some limitations are imposed on each partners’ independent action with 
regard to their joint capital.46 Consequently, the action of partners is restricted to certain rules 
agreed upon at the inception of the partnership.  
The second rule is a strict equilibrium (takafu) between elements of input (capital, labor, 
equipment) and elements of output (profits and liabilities).47 This implies one-to-one ratio 
between the proportion share of the capital, labor, and equipment a partner contributes and their 
share of profits and losses. For instance, if a partner contributes one percent out of the 
accumulated capital, she or he is also entitled to one percent of the profits and liable for one 
                                                          
42 Ibid 143.  
43 Ibid 195-196.  
44 Ibid 196.  
45 Ibid 145.  
46 Ibid 147.  
47 Ibid.  
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percent of losses and other obligations.48  The liability of all partners in the Maliki’s school is 
both joint and several.  
 
8.7.3 Shafii School 
Unlike the Hanafi and Maliki School, the Shafii School views co-ownership of wealth 
as the underlying principle (asl) and a prerequisite of all partnership. The intermingling 
(ikhtilat) reflects the ownership of all parties that becomes the designation of all partnership.49 
Hence, the Shafii’s law only recognises the partnership of wealth. Shafii jurists consider that 
the mufawadah, shirkah al-abdan (labour-based partnership), as well as shirkah al-wujuh 
(creditworthiness-based partnership) are void as they only recognise “the shirkah al inan 
incorporating the contract of wakalah (agency) and having its subject matter as wealth.”50  
In Shafii law, the partnership capital is mingled making it undifferentiable and has has 
the same denomination and quality.51 These requirements (intermingling and same currency) 
become an impediment especially in a region that had different currencies, i.e. gold, silver, and 
copper, as well as in long-distance trade.52 The partnership model of Shafii School is best suited 
for local trade in a region that adopts a single currency.53 According to Nyazee, due to its 
rigidity the Shafii’s partnership has not been applied widely in the practice.54  
                                                          
48 Ibid. 
49 Udovitch, above n 25, 32. 
50 Nyazee, above n 20, 210.  
51 Udovitch, above n 25, 32. 
52 Ibid.  
53 Ibid.  
54 Nyazee, above n 20, 210.  
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 The right to profit and liability in Shafii partnerships is best explained by virtue of 
ownership of capital and the proportion of profit and loss based on that ownership.55 This 
means that there is no flexibility in distributing ratio of profit and liability for losses except the 
distribution is based on the portion of invested capital.56  
 
8.7.4 Hanbali School 
As with the Hanafi and Maliki, the Hanbali School recognises two types of partnership 
(shirkah), shirkah al-mal (co-ownership) and shirkah al-aqd (contractual partnership).57 The 
Hanbali School divides the contractual partnership into five types including mufawadah, inan, 
mudharaba, al-wujuh (creditworthiness), and al-abdan (work).58 According to Nyazee, the 
partnership-version of this school is more advanced than Maliki and Shafii, and is quite similar 
to the Hanafi.59 For example in defining shirkah al-inan, the Hanbali, like the Hanafi and unlike 
the Shafii, do not stipulate the mingling of capital (khalt, or ikhtilat), all that they require is that 
is to be ascertained and be present. For them, al-inan is simply a kind of partnership whereby 
two persons participate with their wealth and work for the purpose of the sharing the profits 
between them. 60 Each partner may sue and be sued for the debts of the partnership or those 
due to it. However, unlike the Hanafi school, the partner does not have the right to form another 
partnership or to invest the money by way of mudharaba (profit sharing partnership – see the 
following section).61  
                                                          
55 Udovitch, above n 25, 31, 
56 Ibid. 
57 Nyazee, above n 20, 215.  
58 Ibid.  
59 Ibid.  
60 Ibid.  
61 Ibid 220. 
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Like the other Schools, the liability of partners is unlimited in a specific circumstance. 
If the agent-manager raises credit beyond the limit of the capital, that partner is personally 
liable for the debts. In other words, the liability of investors is limited to their capital invested. 
However, if the purchase is approved by other partners, all partners are liable for the debts 
arising from such a purchase.62  
 
8.8 Unlimited Liability and the Profit/Risk Principle (Al-Kharaj Bi Al 
Dhaman) 
In Islamic legal maxims (qawa’idul fikhiyyah)63, there is an entitlement to profits from 
the possession of property only if one also bears the risks of its loss (al-kharaj bi al-dhaman).64 
Profits are linked to liability.65 One of the great classical Muslim scholars Al-Kasani argues as 
follows.  
“In the case of dhaman (liability for bearing loss), if the mudharib [entrepreneur, 
author’s translation] were made to bear the liability for loss, he would be entitled to the 
                                                          
62 Ibid 221. 
63 Islamic legal maxims commonly take the form of short phrases or sentences that express a general principle or objective 
of the Shariah. One of its definitions states that it is as “general rules that apply to all of their related particulars. They are 
abstract statements of the rules and principles of Islamic legal principles”. This understanding is inline the work of Taj al-Din 
al-Subki (d.771/1370) stating “the qa’idah [single form of qawa’id] is the generally valid rule with which many particular cases 
(juz’iyat) agree, whose legal determinations can be understood from it (i.e. the qa’idah)”. Wolfhart argues that qawa’id fiqhiya 
is a naturally madhab-specific legal principles, however, there are also qawa’id which are said to be acknowledged by all 
schools, i.e. al qawa’id al kubra (major principles) also called al qawa’id al-khams (five principles), see Wolfhart P. Heinrichs, 
‘Qawa’id as a Genre of Legal literatures’ in Bernard G. Lewis, Studies in Islamic Legal Theory (Brill, 2002) 365-384. 
64 Al-kharaj bi al-dhaman is a well-known legal maxim. It is considered as al-qawa’id al-kuliyyah (common legal maxims, 
author’s translation) in Majallat al-Ahkam al-‘Adliyyah, and and frequently used by those who wrote on the history of the 
discipline of al-qawaid al-fiqhiyyah as an example of legal maxims that originated from prophetic traditions in identical words. 
For example, Ibn Hajr al-Asqalani (d. 852/1449) in his Bulugh Al-Maram Min Adillat Al-Ahkam mentions that this maxim is 
derived from a saying of the Prophet: “Aishah (RAA) narrated that Allah’s Messenger [peace be upon him] said, “al-kharaj bi 
al-dhaman”. This hadith is found in the five major Sunni hadith collections (Sahih al-Muslim (d.261/875), Sunan Ibn Majah 
(d.273/887), Sunan Abu Dawud (d.275/889), Sunan al- Tirmidhi (d. 279/893) and Sunan al-Nas’i (d.303/916), see Imam Ibn 
Hajr Al-Asqalani, Bulugh Al-Maram Min Adillat Al-Ahkam  (Attainment of the Objective to According to Evidence of the Legal 
Judgments) [translated by Nancy Eweiss and edited by Selma Cook) (Dar Al-Manarah, 2003) 301. 
65 Vogel and Hayes, above n 368.  
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entire profit (of the mudharabah). This is due to his dhaman, and it is the revenue (al-
kharaj) of the dhaman. The Prophet (peace be upon him) said: “revenue is based upon 
the corresponding liability for bearing loss.” Thus, if the liability for bearing the loss 
falls on him, the kharaj belongs to him too”.66 
Thus, any investment activities based on the separation between profits and losses whereby the 
investors are qualified to receive profits without bearing liability for losses or risks is not 
accepted.67 
 From this perspective, all partners that receive benefits in Islamic partnership are liable 
for the losses. However, there are different views concerning joint and several liability 
discussed above. In general, any debts incurred in that partnership needs to be fully covered 
either by a particular party or all parties involved in that business undertaking.  
 
8.9 No Legal Personality in Islamic Contractual Partnership  
Most scholars take the view that an Islamic partnership has no legal personality as a 
company or as a legal person.68 This means that the partnership cannot sue or be sued in its 
own name. Therefore, if legal action is taken against this business partnership all partners 
                                                          
66 Al-Kasani, Bada’i  al-Sana’i. Vol.7, p. 3545, cited in Udovitch, above n 25, 41; and Nyazee classifies type of contractual 
partnership in Hanafi School by the way of mufawada or inan, see Nyazee, above n 20, 70. Ibn Qudamah, the Hanbali jurist, 
also shares the similar view of Al-Kasani, see Udovitch, above n 25, 41. In a nutshell, it is argued that the maxim (al-kharaj 
bi al dhaman) needs to be applied as a general rule in all contracts, see Umar F. Moghul, ‘No Pain, No Gain: The State of 
the Industry in Light of an American Islamic Private Equity Transaction’ (2007) 7(2) The Chicago Journal of International 
Law, 478 
67 See Asyraf Wajdi Dusuki and Nurdianawati Irwani Abdullah, Fundamentals of Islamic Banking (IBFIM, 2011) 280.  
68 See various arguments on this in Nicholas H.D. Foster, ‘Islamic Perspective on the Law of Business Organisation I: An 
Overview of the Classical Sharia and a Brief Comparison of the Sharia Regimes with Western-Style Law’ (2010) 11 
European Business Organization Law Review, 3-34, 14. 
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names would need to be listed in the writ, meaning they are being sued as individual not 
collectively under the partnership name.69  
 
8.10 Islamic Contractual Partnership: Liability for Debts   
In Islamic law, a contractual partnership does not apply to debts in the form of loans due 
to the prohibition of riba (interest). Al-Sarakhsi from the Hanafi school, takes the view that 
authorisation of interest or usury-based loan in this partnership is invalid.70 This is because 
partner cannot take out loans even though this partner was authorised to raise money through 
credit facilities. Second, any authority granted for raising interest-based loans is unwarranted 
under Islamic law.71  
A distinction can be drawn between debts arising from interest-based loans and debts 
arising from credit purchases. It is clear that the above statement refers the prohibition of 
interest-based loans in partnership transactions. However, it does not refer to the debts arising 
from credit purchases. In an Islamic partnership, partners are allowed to raise money beyond 
the initial investment. For instance, shirkah mufawadah an asset could be purchased on credit 
basis from seller-creditors beyond the limit of the initial capital. As a result, if the partner buys 
on credit and exceeds the capital limit, the other partners are liable for such debts as they 
provide a guarantee or surety (kafalah). Accordingly, the liability is unlimited and shared 
equally among the partners.72  
                                                          
69 Sayyid M. Hasanuzzaman, ‘Limited liabilities of Shareholders: An Islamic Perspective’ (1989) 28(4) Islamic Studies 353-
361. In some circumstance, one particular partner would be sued rather than all partners, since that partner is obliged to all 
business undertakings under a partnership. 
70 Nyazee, above n 20, 82.  
71 Ibid 83.  
72 Ibid 87. 
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There is a type of Islamic partnership, shirkah al-wujuh (credit partnership), where two 
parties form a partnership based on their skill or labour with the capital from a third party. The 
liability of all partners for the credit purchases arising from this type of partnership is unlimited 
only if the action is within the scope of the partner’s authority. The risk of loss and payment to 
creditors is distributed in accordance with the contract stipulation.73  
 
8.11 Limited and Unlimited Liability Under Mudharabah 
8.11.1 Mudharaba: Definition and Scope 
Mudharaba (qirad or muqarada)74 commonly refers to a type of partnership whereby 
one partner contributes capital while the other partner contributes labour or entrepreneurial 
skill.75 This type of contract has been referred to as commenda.  
“An arrangement in which an investor or group of investors entrusts capital or 
merchandise to an agent-manager, who is to trade with it and then return to the 
investor(s) the principal and a previously agreed-upon share of the profits. As a reward 
for his labor, the agent receives the remaining share of the profits. Any loss resulting 
from the exigencies of travel or from an unsuccessful business venture is borne 
exclusively by the investor(s); the agent is in no way liable for a loss of this nature, 
losing only his expended time and effort”.76 
                                                          
73 Ibid 86; and Al-Zuhayli, above n 28, 471.  
74 It is also called qirad, and muqarada. The different terminologies emerge due to different usage of this contract in different 
geographical area. The word qirad and muqarada was used by the jurists in Medina, while the word mudharaba was used in 
Iraq, see Nyazee, above n 20, 244.  
75 Ibid 246.  
76 He refers this definition to a unilateral commenda, see Udovitch, above n 25, 170. 
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This type of contract has been viewed as a prototype for a limited partnership.77 One of the 
greatest modern Syrian Muslim scholars Al Zuhaily argues that this contract provides a basis 
for the modern corporation.78 His view is that the modern corporation is not unlike a silent 
partnership in Islamic scholarship.  
“In a modern joint liability company the partners share in capital ownership, while some 
of them work as active partners working on behalf of the silent partners. In limited 
partnerships, the partners who have limited liability are considered the silent partners, 
and the company’s business is viewed as work on behalf of those silent partners. In 
particular partnerships, one partner is entrusted with the capital to invest on behalf of 
the others, who are considered silent partners in a mudharaba”. 79 
Other scholars disagree.80 Nyazee takes the view that under the general principles of Islamic 
partnership the liability of all partners is unlimited. This may result from the absence of legal 
personality in partnership that gives rise to unlimited liability.81  
In mudharaba, an agent’s activities may be restricted (muqayyadah, limited) or 
unrestricted (mutlaqo, unrestricted).82 It is argued that under an unlimited mandate, agent-
managers have unlimited authority in managing a business except for taking out loans.83 An 
unlimited mandate allows agent-managers to invest the investor’s capital with a second agent 
to share in the profits even though the first-agent is not involved in the business undertakings. 
The agent-manager simply invests the investor’s capital in another mudharaba with a second 
                                                          
77 See, eg, Udovitch, above n 25, 170; and Al-Zuhayli, above n 28, 492.  
78 Al-Zuhayli, above n 28, 492.  
79 Ibid.  
80 Nyazee, above n 20, 244.  
81 Ibid 53 and 81. 
82 Udovitch, above n 25, 204.  
83 The stipulation of unlimited mandate commonly may include: (1) buy and sell all types of merchandise as he sees fit; (2) 
buy and sell for cash and credit; (3) give goods as bid’a, leave them as a deposit or pledge; (4) hire helpers as needed; (5) 
rent or buy animals and equipment; (6) travel with the capital; (7) mingle it with his own resource; (8) give it as a commenda 
to a third party; and (9) invest it in a partnership with a third party. Ibid, 204 
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agent.84 This seems to be a functional equivalent of financial intermediary whereby the first 
agent acts as an intermediary between the robbul mal (capital provider) and the second-agent 
(entrepreneur). In the modern world of Islamic finance, this mechanism is called a two-tier 
mudharaba used as the theoretical base for an Islamic bank’s intermediary function – 
accumulating money from the surplus units to be allocated to the deficit units.  
 
8.11.2 Liability under Mudharaba: Limited/Unlimited  
In mudharaba, profits and risks are shared by all partners (capital provider and agent-
manager); the investor risks capital, while the agent risks their time and effort.85 In most cases, 
the investor is not liable with the agent for transactions with third parties. 86 In other words, the 
liability of investor for debts is limited. However, the limited liability of the investor in this 
context is different from limited liability of modern corporations. Due to absence of legal 
personality in Islamic partnership, the other partner or agent-manager is liable for those debts 
in some circumstances.  
Unlike modern limited liability that results from the theory of a separate legal entity of 
a juristic person (i.e. the company), the limited liability of the mudharaba investor arises out 
of the particular arrangement. The mudharaba was used in a long-distance trade whereby two 
parties (investor and agent-manager) had been separated geographically for most of the 
duration of the contract. Third parties who had commercial transactions with the agent-manager 
were not aware of the investor’s existence.87 Occasionally, the agent-manager might increase 
                                                          
84 Udovitch, above n 25, 205.  
85 See, eg, Ibid 171 and Nyazee, above n 20, 265-67. 
86 Udovitch, above n 25, 171.   
87 Ibid 239. 
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the investment over the original investment (istidana) by borrowing or purchasing goods from 
third parties without the approval of investors. In this case, the agent-manager is responsible 
for the debt if the project fails; investors are only liable to the extent of their invested capital.88 
Under this arrangement, the investor has limited liability.89  
This does not occur if other partners approve the transaction such as where the agent-
manager increases the investment capital (istidana) through loans or any another means from 
third parties with the approval of the original investors. If the project fails, all partners (investor 
and agent-manager) are liable to cover the debts proportionally or under the initial agreement 
between the parties.90 This is, however, not a universally held view.  
Nyazee takes the view that the liability principle in mudharaba contract is no different 
to any other kind of partnership that is unlimited. The agent-manager is also liable for any debts 
incurred by the partnership when the agent purchases an asset beyond the initial investment. If 
the agent-manager exceeds the investment with the approval of the partner or investors, all 
partners (agent manager and investors) are jointly liable for the loss arising from the credit 
purchase. If the agent-manager exceeds the investment without the approval of the partner, the 
agent is the only party liable for the debts.91  
 
                                                          
88 Ibid 242.  
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid 243. 
91 Nyazee, above n 20, 265-67. Taqi Usmani also shares this view, see Muhammad Taqi Usmani, An Introduction to Islamic 
Finance (Brill, 1998) 32. 
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8.11.3 Limited Liability Partnership and Mudharaba: A Liability 
Perspective 
There are some differences between a limited liability partnership and mudharaba in 
relation to the liability of partners. The liability of sleeping partners in mudharaba is limited to 
their invested capital where the agent-manager does not exceed the initial capital. When the 
agent-manager exceeds the initial capital through credit purchases with permission of sleeping 
partners, they become liable for the debts incurred, and thus the liability of partners is not 
limited to their shares but extends to the debts. This is also applied to the liability of the agent-
manager for such credit.92 In a limited liability partnership, the agent-manager is personally 
liable for all the debts and has no recourse to the non-working or limited partner beyond the 
capital contributed by them.93 In a limited liability partnership, a limited partner is entitled to 
profits from all the credit raised, even when this credit exceeds the capital of the initial 
investment or the capital of the firm; the limited partner enjoys limited liability, which is not 
accepted in mudharaba due to the violation of the principle of al-kharaj bi al-dhaman (profits 
come with risk of loss).94  
 
8.12 Liability and Legal Personality in Islamic Law 
As discussed above, the liability of investors is unlimited in most cases of Islamic 
partnership. Contemporary jurists look upon the concept of legal personality of a juristic person 
to give a theoretical basis for limited liability under Islamic law. When examining legal 
personality of a juristic person in Islamic law, the common view is that there is no equivalent 
                                                          
92 Nyazee, above n 20, 89-90.  
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
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term in traditional Islamic texts.95 However, this should not mean that Islamic law does not 
recognise the concept of legal personality. Dhimmah as ahliyah (legal capacity) is used as an 
approximate concept to define a legal personality under Islamic law.96 Ahliyah (legal capacity 
of natural person) consists of ahliyyat al-wujup (capacity to acquire rights) and ahliyyat al-
ada’ (capacity to execute).97  
The discussion of legal capacity (dhimmah) in Islamic law gives a theoretical 
background for the recognition of limited liability and a juristic person under Islamic law. 
  
8.12.1 Legal Capacity (Dhimmah) of a Natural Person  
Dhimma (legal capacity) has two distinctive meanings. Both meanings are based on a 
natural human being as its legal object. First, it denotes a person as being subject to a legal 
obligation (dayn) in relation to money or fungible goods, and occasionally also to a religious 
obligation toward God (prayer, fasting, pilgrimage).98 Dhimma (legal capacity) is the basis of 
personal obligation, and not identical with the obligation.99 The creditor has a claim against the 
dhimma of its debtors. Such a claim is limited to the present property of the debtor; debtors are 
not obliged to work for their creditor in order to pay off debts, but are entitled to retain enough 
to support themselves and their dependants. If the debtor dies, creditors can only seek 
                                                          
95 This also admitted by scholars who argue the existence of legal personality under Islamic law even tough there is no 
equivalent word of legal personality. Mahmood Mohamed Sanusi, ‘The Concept of Artificial Legal Entity (Saksiyyah 
I’Tibariyah) and Limited Liability in Islamic Law’ in Mahmood Mohamed Sanusi, Islamic Banking and Finance Shariah and 
Legal: Issues and Challenges (Aslita, 2012) 175, See also Mahdi Zahraa, ‘Legal Personality in Islamic Law’ (1995) 10(3) 
Arab Law Quarterly 193-206. 
96 Mahdi Zahraa, ‘Legal Personality in Islamic Law’ (1995) 10(3) Arab Law Quarterly 193-206, 202. 
97 Sanusi in Sanusi, above n 99, 175. 
98 See, eg, Stanley N. Katz (ed), The Oxford International Encyclopaedia of Legal History (Oxford University Press, 2009) in 
section ‘Legal Personality in Islamic Law’, see also B. Lewis, Pellat and Joseph Schacht (ed), The Encyclopaedia of Islam: 
New Edition. Volume II (Brill, 1991) 231. 
99 B. Lewis, Pellat and Joseph Schacht (ed), above n 102, 231. 
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satisfaction from the estate, not from the heirs.100 The concept of dhimma, in this sense, is 
equivalent what is termed in modern law, the debtor’s estate.101  
Secondly, dhimma refers to legal capacity (ahliyya) which provides a conceptual basis 
for legal personality under Islamic law. The Encyclopaedia of Islam defines dhimma as “legal 
quality that makes the individual a proper subject of law, that is, a proper addressee of the rule 
which provides him rights or charges him with obligations”.102 Other definitions are that 
dhimmah enables any human being to oblige and be obliged,103 or “a juristic container 
presumed in a person in order to encompass all its debts and obligations that are related to 
it”,104 or “a matter presumed to be a place for rights and duties”.105  
Jurists take a different view in relation to the recognition of legal capability (ahliyah) 
in a human being. Most Muslim scholars (jumhur) agree that dhimmah is endowed on every 
individual from the moment of birth and ends with the death of that individual.106 Some assume 
that only an adult qualifies based on his or her ability to be wise, thus they can have dhimmah.107 
Meanwhile, Al-Sanhuri states that dhimma is a “juristic description that is presumed by the 
legislator to exist in a human being and according with which (the person) becomes able to 
oblige and be obliged”.108 In other words, he suggests that dhimmah is not automatically 
embedded in a person, but rather it needs a legislative recognition to be endowed to a person.109  
                                                          
100 Stanley N. Katz (ed), The Oxford International Encyclopaedia of Legal History (Oxford University Press, 2009). 
101 See, eg, Ibid. in section “Legal Personality in Islamic Law”; Lewis, Pellat and Schacht (ed), above n 102, 231.  
102 Lewis, Pellat and Schacht (ed), above n 102, 231.  
103 Al Jarjani, Al-Ta’rifat in Walid Mohammed Almajid, ‘Can Electronic Agents Be Granted Legal Personality under Islamic 
Law? A Conceptual Rethink is Imperative’ (2010) 24 Arab Law Quarterly 393-416, 404. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid.  
106 See, eg, Almajid, above n 107, 404; and Lewis, Pellat and Schacht (ed), above n 102, 231.  
107 Al-Qarafi, Al-Furuq, Vol. 3 cited in Almajid, above n 107, 404.   
108 A. Al-Sanhuri, Masadir al-haqq fi I-fiqh al-Islami, Vol. 4, Almajid, above n 107, 405.  
109 This definition is interesting when compared to a modern legal personality. A company is given legislative recognition as 
legal personality from the date of incorporation a company to a specific legal rule.  
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The discussion on when a person acquires capacity (dhimmah) relies heavily on the 
conceptualisation of two capabilities (ahliyah): that is the capacity to acquire rights and bear 
obligations (ahliyat al-wujup); and capacity to perform or exercise those rights and obligations 
(ahliyat al-ada).  The first corresponds to a view that dhimmah is embedded equally in every 
human being. Some scholars do not differentiate between dhimmah (legal capacity) and ahliyat 
al wujup (capability to acquire rights and obligations).110  
The second capacity namely ahliyat al-ada’ (capability to perform or exercise rights 
and obligations) depends on the degree to which a person has full capacity for executing rights 
and duties having reached the age of maturity or a person that is endowed by the court or 
legislation to perform those rights and duties.111  
Dhimmah embraces all rights and obligations both religious or non-religious including 
financial matters.112 In the word of Al-Sanhuri, dhimmah is a description that allows all rights 
and duties whether non-financial such as prayer or even financial rights of (a) religious nature 
such as donation (zakat). This concept is broader than Western notions of capacity.113  
 
8.12.2 Dhimmah and Artificial Persons  
To develop the legal personality of a juristic person in Islamic law, the concept of 
dhimma can be extended to non-human forms. Most contemporary Islamic scholars, by analogy 
(qiyas), argue that capacity in artificial persons is recognised by early Islamic institutions such 
as waqf (endowment), and bait al mal (public treasury). This capacity is equivalent to a natural 
                                                          
110 Al-Qarafi, Al-Furuq, Vol. 3, Almajid, above n 107, 407.  
111 Ibid.  
112 Al-Zarqa, Al-Fatlawi, and Al-Sanhuri, Almajid, above n 107, 408-409.  
113 Al-Sanhuri, ibid 407. 
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person’s capacity to acquire rights and obligations as well as capacity to execute rights and 
obligations.114 This view is shared by contemporary Muslim scholars.115 
The basis of this view is that in waqf, the founder of waqf establishes an endowment on 
a perpetual basis for a specific purpose. The waqf then becomes autonomous (independent) 
from the founder to serve only the interests of the foundation and its beneficiaries. Like a real 
person, the waqf can own estates, receive donations and acquire privileges, such as tax 
exemptions. The supervisor, nazir or mutawalli, represents the waqf before the judge and the 
authorities in general. The supervisor purchases estates and invests funds on behalf of the 
foundation within the framework of the founder’s stipulations. The acts and functions of 
supervisor on behalf of the waqf in managing funds indicate that the waqf is a legal 
personality.116 This understanding is similar to the proposal of the Accounting Auditing 
Organization of Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) which takes the view that the risk fund 
in waqf-based insurance can be justified under a legal person concept (see paragraph 7.9 of 
Chapter 7).   
Some scholars argue that dhimmah is limited to human beings.117 Shariah law never 
envisaged that dhimmah could provide a shield against liability or as a corporate veil meant to 
protect shareholders from liability.118 If a waqf is required to pay damages owing to the 
commission of a tort involving that waqf, the beneficiaries, and not the waqf, have to bear 
responsibility for the payment of such damages.119  
                                                          
114 Sanusi, above n 99, 175. 
115 See, eg. Hasanuzzaman, above n 72, 357; Zahraa, above n 99, 202; Sanusi, above n 99, 175; and Usmani, above n 95, 
154.    
116 See, eg, Hasanuzzaman, above n 72; Zahraa, above n 99; and Sanusi, above n 99, 175; and Usmani, above n 95, 154.   
117 See, eg, Nabil A. Saleh, The General Principles of Saudi Arabian and Omani Company Laws (Namara Publications, 
1981) 79-80; and J. Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Clarendon Press, 1984) 125-126. 
118 Nabil A Saleh, ‘Arab International Corporations: The Impact of the Shariah’ (1993) 8(3) Arab Law Quarterly 179-183, 181.  
119 Cited from Ibn Qudama, al-Muhgni, ibid 636. 
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Nyazee rejects the argument that Islamic law permits legal personality to non-humans 
including its limited liability theory.120 He objects to the use of analogy (qiyas) as the basis of 
deriving the concept of legal personality rather than general principles, i.e. Islamic 
partnership.121 There is the added difficulty that it breaches the principle al-kharaja bi al 
dhaman (profits come with risks). Such reasoning suffers from an inherent problem in that it 
involves the examination of the Sharia regimes in terms of the concepts of modern Western 
law. This approach seems inappropriate and risky considering that two systems are so different 
in terms of their history, conceptual basis and commercial context. The Western limited 
liability corporation grew up out of various commercial and social phenomena such as Western 
trading empires, the Industrial Revolution, capital markets and an interest and speculation-
based financial system.122 Saleh123 without rejecting legal personality under Islamic law argues 
that a juristic person emerged in the contemporary Islamic law scholarships under the influence 
of the Western law.124 If the limited liability of a modern corporation is considered under 
Islamic law, this will add some consequences that will be discussed in the next section.   
8.13 Current Status of Limited Liability Companies in Islamic Law  
Once Islamic law permits legal personality of a juristic person, it should also accept 
that a modern corporation is a separate legal entity. A corporation is a juristic person that has 
legal capacity and the power of a natural person. Under the modern law, a company has the 
legal capacity to enter into contracts, own property or initiate legal action under its own name. 
The company is a distinct legal entity separate from its shareholders and directors.125 At the 
time of writing, no jurisdiction offering Islamic financial products and services has issued a 
                                                          
120 Nyazee, above n 20, 186. 
121 Ibid.  
122 Ibid.  
123 Saleh, above n 128, 179-183.  
124 See, eg. Saleh above n 128, 179-183; Saleh, above n 126, 79-80; and Schacht, above n 126, 125-126.  
125 See for instance the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 124 in Australia in Rhett Martin, Banking and Finance in Principle 
(Thomson and Law-book Co, 2008) 27.  
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fatwa on the permissibility of a corporation as a juristic person. It is notable that almost without 
exception IFIs use a limited liability corporation as their legal basis.   
In practice, it seems that the Sharia advisors do not object to the idea of a limited 
liability of a corporation. This is evident when considering the fact that most of contemporary 
IFIs are incorporated under a limited liability company structure. The governance structure of 
IFIs requires these IFIs to establish Sharia Supervisory Boards (SSBs) to ensure that their 
operations are Sharia compliant. The silence by SSBs on this issue either means they have no 
objection on the limited liability corporations or that they follow the fatwa of Fiqh Academy 
of Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) that allows the use of a limited liability company 
in the Islamic finance industry.126 The fatwa of the OIC that “there is no objection in Shariah 
to setting up a company whose liability is limited to its capital for that is known to the company 
clientele and such awareness on their part precludes deception”.127  
A further issue flowing from the recognition of limited liability companies in Islamic 
law is whether the reliance on waqf requires not for profit institutions. Waqf appears to be 
similar to modern foundations as acknowledged in European law which is also another type of 
legal personality.128 In practice, the waqf system has been used as profit oriented vehicles in 
the Islamic insurance industry (paragraph 7.6.4 of Chapter 7). In short, the recognition of a 
limited liability corporation does not limit the corporation to non-profit activities.  
 Limited liability corporations have become a standard legal form of incorporation for 
current global IFIs. As noted above there is an absence of fatwas on the question of Sharia 
compliance and SSBs have been silent on this issue. It is argued that it is implicit that limited 
                                                          
126 Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) Fiqh Academy, Resolution 63/1/7, para.12 of 1992 [25/10/2017] 
http://www.fiqhacademy.org.sa. 
127 Ibid.  
128 Doris Behrens-Abouseif, ‘The Waqf: A Legal Personality?’ (in English) in Astrid Meier, Johannes Pahlitzsch, Lucian 
Reinfandt (Hg.), Islamische Stiftungen Zwischen Juristischer Norm und Sozialer Praxis (Akademie Verlag, 2009) 55-60.  
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liability corporations are Sharia compliant. This recognises the need for Islamic institutions, 
business, and individuals to be part of a modern financial system. Without the limited liability 
corporation, Muslim institutions and business could not flourish or develop or participate in 
modern business and markets.  
 
8.14 Summary  
 This chapter argues that Islamic finance can accommodate the concept of the limited 
liability corporation. Islamic law recognises unlimited and limited liability. Unlimited liability 
is based on the concept of Islamic contractual partnership particularly musharakah and 
mudharabah. Limited liability is derived from the extension of the concept of dhimmah 
(capacity) to juristic persons under modern interpretations of Sharia rules. In most types of 
Islamic partnerships, the liability of investors is unlimited. However, in a mudharaba 
partnership, the liability of investors is limited to their capital. Any debts arising out of the 
initial investment without the approval of the investors will not be treated as investor 
obligations, unless the investors approve to the excess. The concept of dhimmah may legitimize 
the use of the limited liability corporation by IFIs. Under this concept, it is possible for the 
investors to shift and limit risk exposures.  
 This chapter is important as it demonstrates the capacity of the Islamic financial industry 
to adopt modern developments arguing by analogy with earlier models of financial institutions. 
This is particularly important for the viability of Islamic financial institutions and for the 
progress and competitiveness of Islamic businesses and their capacity to participate in modern 
markets. The next two chapters discuss Islamic finance practices in Indonesia and Australia.  
208 
 
CHAPTER 9: ISLAMIC FINANCE IN INDONESIA 
 
9.1 Introduction
Indonesia is one of the best examples of centralized Sharia regulatory regime in the 
Islamic financial industry. In this country, legitimacy of local Islamic financial products and 
services is derived from non-state agency Sharia Advisory Boards – Indonesian Ulama Council 
(DSN-MUI) rather than through formal regulatory mechanisms or courts.1 They set their own 
juristic rules. Fatwas produced by that body play an important role in harmonising Sharia 
opinions for local financial industries. The Indonesian Islamic Banking Law of 2008 directs 
Indonesian regulators to adopt DSN-MUI fatwas as a national benchmark.2  
The fatwas of the DSN-MUI are consistent with the global trend of financial fatwas, 
referred to in the previous chapters. These fatwas allow adoption of various juristic rules in 
defining local Islamic financial forms.3 In Indonesia the juristic rules from four Islamic legal 
schools are the predominant basis for following a selective Sharia rule (paragraph 2.4 of 
Chapter 2).   
                                                          
1There is no formal relationship between the MUI and Indonesian government. The Government has no authority to select 
its members and to guide the directions of this organization. However, they have been established and funded by the 
government through the Ministry of Religious Affairs, see Muhamad Ali, ‘Islam and Economic Development in New Order’s 
Indonesia (1967–1998)’ (2004) 12 East-West Centre Working Paper. Furthermore, MUI headed by a board of directors in 
the Jakarta’s headquarter. It has more than 150 regional branches at the provincial and district levels. Its members consist 
of different Islamic organizational backgrounds such as Nadhlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, Islamic United (Persis), and 
many others. The central headquarter does not have a clear relationship with all its branches including the complication of 
fatwas produced by the central and local branches. In the area of Islamic economics, the role of this organization is very 
central in influencing public perceptions about Islamic banking industry, for instance, in January 2004, MUI issued a fatwa 
(No. 1/2004) restating the prohibition of interest of conventional banks and confirming that interest is part of riba in the 
Qur’ān, and defining the term broadly to mean any ‘additional charges levied on the postponement of agreed payments’. 
See, Tim Lindsey, ‘Between Piety and Prudence: State Syariah and the Regulation of Islamic Banking in Indonesia’ (2012) 
34(1) Sydney Law Review 107.  
2 Islamic Banking Law No 21 of 2008 s 1(12). 
3 Indonesia is known as a Muslim majority country where most Muslims follow the Shafi’i school, see for instance, Michael B. 
Hooker, Indonesian Islam: Social Change Through Contemporary Fatawaa (Hawai University Press, 2003) 9. In practice, 
the largest Muslim organization in the country namely Nadhlatul Ulama (NU) was (and still is) devoted to the Shafi’i doctrine, 
see Akhmad Minhaji, Islamic Law and Local Tradition: A Socio-Historical Approach (Kurnia Salam Semesta, 2008) 259.  
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This chapter first discusses the Indonesian financial regulatory system particularly the 
position of Islamic financial institutions. It then discusses Sharia regulatory frameworks in 
Indonesia. This is followed by an examination of local Islamic financial instruments and most 
importantly Sharia compliant derivatives and its regulation. 
 
9.2 The Indonesian Financial Regulatory System 
 The two chief financial regulators in Indonesia are its central bank, Bank Indonesia, and 
Indonesian Financial Services Authority. Bank Indonesia as the central bank is responsible for 
macro prudential regulation, monetary, payment systems and foreign exchange. The Financial 
Services Authority, is responsible for an integrated regulatory and supervisory system for all 
financial activities in Indonesia.4 The Financial Authority Services is responsible for  
supervision, enforcement, and sanctions in relation to financial institutions. Prior to the 
establishment of this Financial Services Authority, Bank Indonesia and the Ministry of Finance 
separately regulated the banking and financial markets. The Financial Services Authority 
assumed the statutory powers from the Ministry of Finance.5 The next section discusses 
Indonesian Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) and the applicable regulations.  
 
                                                          
4 The establishment of OJK is based on Indonesian Financial Services Authority Law No 10 of 2011. 
5 Indonesian Financial Services Authority’s main roles include: (1) ensuring that the overall activities within the financial 
services sector are implemented in an organized, fair, transparent, and accountable manner; (2) promoting a financial 
system that grows in a suitable and stable manner; and (3) protect interest of consumer in the financial market. Thus, the 
working area of OJK includes capital markets, Non-Bank Financial Institutions (NBFI) such as pension, insurance, finance 
companies, venture capital, and guarantee companies, and banking regulation and supervision, see Eko Saputro, Indonesia 
and ASEAN Plus Three Financial Cooperation: Domestic Politics (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017) 182.  
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9.3  Regulation of Indonesian Islamic Financial Institutions  
Indonesia has a complex Islamic financial industry consisting of IFIs with a wide range 
of products and services. These local IFIs are summarised below:  
Table 9.1. Types of Islamic Financial Institutions in Indonesia in 2017 
ISLAMIC BANKING INSTITUTIONS 
A. Islamic banks 
B. Islamic Units (UUS) under Conventional Banks 
C. Islamic Rural Banks (BPRS) 
 
ISLAMIC CAPITAL MARKETS 
A. Islamic Shares (Saham Syariah) 
B. Islamic Bonds (Sovereign and Corporate Sukuk) 
C. Islamic Mutual Funds (Reksadana Syariah) 
D. Islamic Hedging Derivatives (Tahawwut) 
 
NON-BANK ISLAMIC FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS  
A. Islamic Insurance (Takaful) 
     1. Islamic Takaful Companies  
     2. Islamic Insurance Units under Conventional Insurance Companies 
B. Islamic Pension Funds (Dana Pensiun Syariah) 
C. Islamic Financing Institutions (Lembaga Pembiayaan Syariah) 
     1.   Islamic Leasing 
     2.   Islamic Venture Capital Funds  
    3.  Islamic Project Financing 
D. Islamic Special Financing (Pembiayaan Khusus) 
    1. Islamic Guarantee Institutions (Perusahaan Penjaminan Syariah) 
    2. Islamic Export Financing  
    3.  Islamic Pawnshop (Pegadaian Syariah) 
E. Islamic Microfinance (Lembaga Keuangan Mikro Syariah)  
Source: Financial Services Authority.6 
                                                          
6 Indonesian Financial Services Authority (OJK), ‘Roadmap Pengembangan Keuangan Syariah Indonesia 2017-2019’ (OJK, 
2017) [9/7/2018] https://www.ojk.go.id/id/kanal/syariah/berita-dan-kegiatan/publikasi/Documents/Pages/Roadmap-
Pengembangan-Keuangan-Syariah-Indonesia-2017-2019/Roadmap%202017-2019(1).pdf. 
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From the above figure, local IFIs are categorized under Islamic banking institutions, 
Islamic capital markets, and Non-Bank financial institutions. Rather than discuss all these 
financial institutions, this chapter focuses on some areas that have been discussed in the 
previous chapters particularly local Islamic hedging derivatives (hedging) and insurance 
(takaful) along with applicable regulations and Sharia compliance aspects.  
The term “Islamic” or “Syariah” attached to the local IFIs (Table 10.1) refers to the 
juristic opinions of the DSN-MUI.7 The Islamic Banking Law of 2008 defines local IFIs as 
financial institutions operated under the principles of Sharia derived from fatwas of an 
institution [the DNS-MUI] that has an authority to issue fatwa pertaining to banking and 
financial transactions in the Indonesian jurisdiction.8 This referral to the DSN-MUI also 
includes the insurance system based on Sharia principles (Takaful).9 It is clearly stated that the 
Sharia principles in Islamic insurance are derived from fatwas of an authorised body (referred 
to the DSN-MUI).10  This means that the DSN-MUI’s fatwas are the basis of defining  the term 
“Islamic” in relation to the modern Indonesian Islamic financial industry.  
 All IFIs are regulated and supervised by the Indonesian Financial Services Authority 
(OJK). Prior to this, Bank Indonesia regulated all banks including Islamic banks. The Ministry 
of Finance regulated non-banking financial institutions such as the capital market, insurance 
companies, cooperatives, venture capital, etc. Derivatives markets are regulated and supervised 
by Bank Indonesia and the Financial Services Authority as well as the Commodity Futures 
Trading Regulatory Authority (BAPPEBTI) under the Ministry of Trade. Bank Indonesia is 
                                                          
7 Indonesian Islamic Banking Law No 21 of 2008 s 2.   
8 Indonesian Banking Law No 21 of 2008 s 1(12).  
9 It is defined that Islamic insurance (takaful) as: “a collection of agreements consisting of an agreement between an Islamic 
insurance company and policy holders as well as an agreement between policy holders for the purposes of managing 
policyholder’s contributions based on the principles of Sharia to mutually help and protect one another”, Insurance Law No 
40 of 2014 s 1(2).   
10 Insurance Law No 40 of 2014 s 1(3).   
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responsible for derivatives transactions in the banking sectors particularly in relation to foreign 
exchange and interest rate. The Commodity Futures Trading Regulatory Authority regulates 
and supervises commodity derivatives traded in exchanges and off exchanges.11 The Financial 
Services Authority is responsible for ensuring market integrity through a series of regulations 
including customer protection for derivatives participants.12 
The Indonesian Islamic Banking Law of 2008 governs all Sharia banking institutions 
operated in Indonesia. Prior to this law, the legitimacy of IFIs was not clear. For instance, the 
Banking Law No. 7 of 1992 recognised the term profit sharing banks (bank bagi hasil) 
following the principles of Islamic commercial law (muamalat) without further clarification of 
the basis upon which Islamic juristic rules have been derived. 13 The Indonesian Banking Law 
of 2008 then clarifies the status of Islamic banks including the meaning of Sharia principles as 
derived from the fatwas of the DSN-MUI.14 In addition to the Sharia legitimacy of local IFIs, 
the law also provides measures to boost local IFIs, for instance, requiring Islamic banking units 
or windows under conventional banks to convert to full pledged Islamic banks within 15 years 
after the law or when these units exceed 50 per cent of its parent conventional bank’s assets.15 
                                                          
11 Definition of exchanged-traded derivatives and off exchange derivatives is provided in Chapter 4 on “Hedging and 
Derivatives”.  
12 OJK regulation covers all consumer protection for all manners of financial services and business players in Indonesia, see 
Indonesian Financial Services Authority (OJK) Regulation No. 1/PJOK.07/2013. 
13 Indonesian Principles of Banking Law No 7 of 1992 amended Law No 14/1967. 
14 There are several BI regulations were introduced following the enactment of the 1998 Bank Law including The Bank 
Indonesia Regulation (the PBI, Peraturan Bank Indonesia) No 6/24/PBI/2004 on Commercial Banks Conducting Business 
based on Shariah Principles which later on amended by PBI No 7/35/PBI/2005. Furthermore, Bank Indonesia introduced 
PBI No 8/3/PBI/2006 on the Conversion of Commercial Bank’s Business to Commercial Banks Conducting Business based 
on Shariah Principles and Establishment of Shariah Offices by Conventional Commercial Banks. 
15 Article 68 of Indonesian Islamic Banking Law No. 21 of 2008 states that “in a case that an Islamic banking unit under a 
conventional bank has reached at least 50 per cent from the total asset of its conventional bank or in 15 years after the 
commencement of this law, the conventional bank is compulsory to spin off its Islamic banking unit to become an Islamic 
full-pledge bank”. In addition, although the Indonesian Islamic Banking Law No 21 of 2008 gives more legal certainty for 
Islamic banks, the regulations of Islamic banking instruments issued by the Central bank of Indonesia are still relying, 
directly or indirectly, on MUI rulings. In 2008, for example, BI released a Code of Islamic Banking Products that aims to 
create consistency in the market by defining the commonly used forms of Islamic financial transactions. It identifies the MUI 
fatwa, BI regulation and accounting standard relevant to each transaction type, as well as the kind of Islamic banking 
institution authorised to offer each product. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (Dewan Standar Akuntansi 
Keuangan, DSAK) of the Indonesian Accountants Association (Ikatan Akuntan Indonesia), working with BI and Islamic 
financial institutions, has also prepared various Statements of Financial Accounting Standards (PSAKs) for Islamic banking. 
Again, all were approved by MUI’s DSN before issue. See, Hanim Hamzah, ‘Recent Legal and Regulatory Developments for 
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Following that law, there had been acquisitions of existing banks or the businesses of Islamic 
branches or spin-offs of Islamic windows/branches into separate Islamic banks. Examples 
include a conventional commercial bank that has Islamic Banking Unit/branches (Unit Usaha 
Syariah, UUS) which purchased a relatively small conventional bank to be converted into an 
Islamic commercial bank (Bank Umum Syariah, BUS) and merging of its Islamic 
units/branches into this new Islamic commercial bank.  Similarly, a conventional commercial 
bank that had no Islamic branches (UUS) purchased a relatively small conventional bank and 
converted it into an Islamic commercial bank (BUS). A further illustration is where a 
conventional commercial bank converted its Islamic branch into an Islamic commercial bank.16 
Meanwhile, in relation to financial products, sharia compliant derivatives or hedging 
(tahawwut) have been legally recognised under the Commodity Futures Trading Act 2011 as 
part of on-exchange derivatives.17 Bank Indonesia regulates and supervises derivatives 
transactions in the banking sectors.18 A detailed analysis of Sharia compliant derivatives 
regulation will be provided in the section of “Regulation of Sharia Compliant Derivatives” 
below.  
Takaful as part of the national insurance system is governed by the Insurance Law No. 
40 of 2014. Indonesian Financial Services Authority is the regulator for takaful companies 
under that law. The OJK supervises and enforces risk-based supervision and governance and 
risk management requirements.19 It also requires the insurance company to increase its fund to 
protect policyholders, for instance, by increasing capital adequacy requirements for insurance 
                                                          
Islamic Banking and Finance in Indonesia’ in Angelo M. Venardos (ed), Current Issues in Islamic Banking and Finance: 
Resilience and Stability in the Present (World Scientific Publishing, 2010) 99 and 104. 
16 Khatibul Umam, Trend Pembentukan Bank Umum Syariah Pasca Undang-Undang Nomor 21 Tahun 2008: Konsep, 
Regulasi, dan Implementasi (BPFE UGM, 2009) 3. 
17 Futures Commodities Trading Law No 10 of 2011 amended Law No 32 of 1997 s 1(7).  
18 Flow of Foreign Exchange and the Exchange Rate System Law No. 24 of 1999 s 4 states that “Bank Indonesia shall, in 
order to implement the prudential principle, prescribe provisions of various types of Foreign Exchange Transactions which is 
conducted by a bank”, see also Bank Indonesia Law No.23 of 1999 amended by Law No. 6 of 2009.  
19 International Monetary Fund (IMF), ‘Indonesia: Financial System Stability Assessment’ (Report, IMF, 2017) 42.  
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companies.20 The Indonesian insurance sector is dominated by conglomerates. About half the 
insurers belong to conglomerates, typically led by banks but with a number of other and non-
financial entities within the group.21 
In Indonesia, Islamic insurance providers are structured as stockholding companies 
with stockholders rather than policyholder as owners. A limited liabilities corporation is used 
in takaful markets, although the Insurance Law of 2014 also recognises other forms of 
insurance including co-operative-based insurance.22 The limited liability corporation model 
can be used by takaful companies to earn profits rather than for being limited to social benefits. 
The definition of takaful is closely related to the model of cooperative mutual guarantee 
(ta’awuni). 23 However, there is no clear statement in fatwa that Islamic insurance could be 
either a stockholder company (limited liability corporation) or a co-operative model.  
Although local IFIs are governed by local regulators, their Sharia legitimacy has been 
derived from non-state officials (the DSN-MUI). It thus allows the devolution of Sharia where 
the legitimacy is located within the fatwas of that governing body. The next section will 
examine the Sharia regulatory system in Indonesia.  
 
9.4 Sharia Regulatory System in Indonesia 
9.4.1 History of Indonesian Banking Sharia Standards  
From 1991 to 1998, local regulations did not require Islamic banks to adopt fatwas of 
a particular organization. When the first Indonesian Islamic bank (Bank Muamalat) was 
                                                          
20 Ibid 43.  
21 Ibid 43.  
22 Insurance Law No 40 of 2014 s 6.  
23 Fatwa on General Guidelines for Islamic Insurance of the DSN-MUI No. 21/DSN-MUI/X/2001. 
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established in 1991, the existing law and regulations were silent on the Sharia legitimacy of 
local IFIs.24 An article in the Banking Law of 1992 mentioned that the Islamic juristic rule 
related to financial transactions (muamalat) was the governing mechanism for Islamic banks 
(referred to a profit sharing bank).25 This article did not elaborate how the Islamic juristic rule 
was to be  implemented in Islamic banks. At that time, the Bank Muamalat set up its own 
private Sharia rules derived from their own Sharia boards on products offered to the markets.  
The Banking Law of 1999 gave Bank Indonesia the authority to create Sharia regulatory 
system for Indonesian financial markets.26 In 2000, Bank Indonesia created the Bureau of 
Islamic Banking (Biro Perbankan Syariah) which later on became the Directorate of Islamic 
Banking (Direktorat Perbankan Syariah) to collaborate with the DSN-MUI in formulating 
Sharia standards for the financial industry. Bank Indonesia also formally recognised the fatwas 
of the DSN-MUI as the only fatwas recognised in Indonesia.27 The next section examines how 
Islamic products are structured in Indonesia. 
 
9.4.2 A Centralised Model  
Indonesia has a centralised model of Sharia regulation. This model involves the 
presence of a single authority, the DSN-MUI, that makes substantive determinations as to 
whether a particular financial activity or instrument is Sharia complaint. This organization is 
responsible for determining Sharia compliance by different types of financial instruments 
                                                          
24 Banking Law No 7 of 1992. This law also did not recognise Islamic banks but rather profit-sharing banks. In addition, 
Peraturan Pemerintah No 72 Tahun 1992 tentang Bank Berdasarkan Prinsip Bagi Hasil [Government Regulation No 72 of 
1992 on Banks Applying Profit Sharing Principles] was also silent on this matter.  
25 Banking Law No 7 of 1992 s 2.  
26 Bank Indonesia Law No 23 of 1999. 
27 Surat Keputusan Direksi Bank Indonesia Nomor 32/34/1999 tentang Bank Berdasarkan Prinsip Syariah [Decree of Bank 
Indonesia Management No 32/34 of 1999 on Banks Applying Islamic principles] section 32.  
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offered by financial market participants such as Islamic banks, Islamic insurance companies, 
Islamic capital markets, Islamic derivatives markets, and other IFIs.  
IFIs in Indonesia must appoint Sharia Supervisory Boards (Dewan Pengawas Syariah 
in local terminology).28 This body ensures that the transactions of respective IFIs comply with 
Sharia juristic rules of the DSN-MUI. They do not make an independent determination of 
Sharia compliance as will be discussed in the case of Australia (Chapter 11). The DSN-MUI 
also recommends to local regulators for the appointments of Sharia Supervisory Boards 
members or the registration of a Sharia advisor. They also advise on any new financial 
products.  
Existing laws and regulations in Indonesia make the fatwas of the DSN-MUI binding 
rulings on matters of Islamic finance, which must be followed not only by the IFIs making a 
referral but by courts, arbitrators, and SSBs generally. This creates a uniform framework for 
the conduct of Islamic financial activities.29 The financial fatwas of the DSN-MUI set out not 
only the types of transactions which may be deemed Sharia compliant and therefore 
permissible, but may also contain substantive requirements or define the rights of parties for 
each type of transactions. In this way, the DSN-MUI operates as a central Sharia authority in 
the Indonesian jurisdiction.  
The Indonesian centralised model of Sharia regulation limits costs and provides some 
benefits for regulators, issuers, and investors. First, it can be argued that the centralised model 
reduces transaction and monitoring costs in relation to the Islamic financial transactions. IFIs 
do not need to pay financial, legal, and independent Muslim jurists to structure and draft 
documents for a transaction. There are monitoring costs for the ongoing oversight of activities 
                                                          
28 Islamic Banking Law No 21 of 2008 s 32.  
29 Islamic Banking Law No 21 of 2008 s 26(2), and Bank Indonesia Regulation (PBI) No 6/24/PBI/2004.  
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by Sharia Supervisory Boards or other compliance staff. Furthermore, in Indonesia, the DSN-
MUI conducts training or workshops for the markets in drafting documents and transactions 
approved by the DSN-MUI’s fatwas.30 The cost for attending those workshops is likely to the 
smallest for Islamic finance participant in a centralised model because the greater degree of 
standardisation achievable. In addition, a uniform understanding across the market on how 
Islamic finance activities must be conducted also drives down the costs. These cost reductions 
result from, inter alia, the ease of finding precedential documents, negotiation, and finding or 
training Sharia compliance staff as discussed earlier on. IFIs also face less risk that an activity 
will be deemed non-compliant, sometimes termed Sharia risks.31  
Second, a centralised determination of Sharia compliance can reduce opportunities and 
incentives for individual IFIs to innovate in structuring transactions. It also makes it more 
difficult for IFIs to customise transactions to the needs of a specific issuer or investor. If 
customization is required, the IFIs can forward the proposal of that product to the DSN-MUI 
for more consideration. This process will be discussed in the following section. 
 
9.5 Deriving National Financial Fatwas in Indonesia  
As discussed above, all existing Sharia guidelines and provisions on local Islamic 
products are required to adopt the DSN-MUI Sharia standards reflected in their financial 
fatwas. Until 2014, at least 58 fatwas on Islamic banking products and services have been 
issued by this body.32 This number may be increasing considering that various new Islamic 
                                                          
30 One of the leading actors in disseminating the fatwas of the DSN-MUI and how to draft a documentation based on those 
fatwas is “Iqtishod Consulting” in which its trainers are the members of the DSN-MUI, see their website on 
https://www.iqtishadconsulting.com. 
31 Islamic law is no longer perceived as “law” but as “risk” when the fatwas issued by Muslim scholars are only to serve 
financial actors through legalistic approach mimicking and replicating conventional financial forms, see K Balz, ‘Sharia Risk? 
How Islamic Finance Has Transformed Islamic Contract Law’ (2008) Islamic Legal Studies Program Harvard Law School.   
32 Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Himpunan Fatwa Keuangan Syariah: Dewan Syariah Nasional (Penerbit Erlangga, 2014). 
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structures coming into the markets including Sharia compliant derivatives. The fatwas vary 
from those which are pursuant to the application or request from IFIs when they submit a 
product proposal, and also other relevant fatwas relating to Islamic banking and finance which 
are independently initiated by the DSN-MUI.33 The following figure summarises the role of 
the DSN MUI within the Indonesian Sharia regulatory system.  
Figure 9.1. Sharia Regulatory System in Indonesia  
Source: modified from the DSN-MUI.34 
Local regulators have adopted the DSN-MUI’s financial fatwas. These fatwas became 
the raw material for the Bank Indonesia’s codification of Sharia rules for Indonesian banks.35 
                                                          
33 Ibid.  
34 Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), [2/07/2018] <http://www.mui.or.id>. 
35Bank Indonesia, Codification of Islamic Banking Products, [17/06/2018]  
<http://www.bi.go.id/en/perbankan/syariah/Documents/CODIFICATIONOFISLAMICBANKINGPRODUCTS.pdf>.  
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An Indonesian  accounting standard setting body, the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(Dewan Standar Akuntansi Keuangan, DSAK) of the Indonesian Accountants Association 
(Ikatan Akuntan Indonesia) also uses the DSN-MUI’s fatwas in formulating accounting 
treatment for Islamic financial transactions.  
Within the DSN-MUI, there is the organizing committee (Badan Pelaksana Harian) 
which has been pivotal in drafting Islamic financial fatwas when requested by the market 
participants. It consists of Muslim jurists, lawyers, bankers, regulators, and academics 
representing a broad range of interests within organization. Although a fatwa is approved by 
consensus among the DSN-MUI members (about 24 members) it may involve consideration 
of interests beyond merely the juristic view. Thus, a fatwa of the DSN-MUI is drafted with 
Sharia, financial, legal, and banking expertise and a sense of public interest and responsibility. 
The national Sharia standards are agreements between those interested parties that have 
interests in a particular outcome from the particular fatwa.  
 Independently of the DSN-MUI, the National Committee for Islamic Banking (KPS) 
under of Bank Indonesia was also set up by the government to translate the DSN-MUI’s fatwas 
into regulations.36 The diagram below sets out the relationship between the DSN-MUI and the 
committee in developing local Sharia standards. 
 
 
 
                                                          
36 Indonesian Islamic Banking Law No 21 of 2008 s 26(4)(5).  
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Figure 9.2. The Relationship between the DSN and the Islamic Banking Committee (KPS) 
Source: Modified from Al-Banna.37  
It is noted, however, that the KPS had been a passive participant in the process of Sharia 
certification. Its effectively operated only for two years, from 2008-2010. This was due to 
disputes concerning its position in the Indonesian Sharia regulatory system.38 This is due to the 
fact, as elaborated earlier, that Sharia standards in the form of fatwas are the responsibility of 
the DSN-MUI. Thus, effectively the committee no longer has a role to play.  
                                                          
37 Shofwan Al Banna Choiruzzad, ‘More Gain, More Pain: The Development of Indonesia’s Islamic Economy Movement 
(1980s-2012)” (April 2013) 95 Indonesia 125. 
38 Ibid, 164.  
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As noted previously, in Indonesia Sharia standards are by nature a private rule set up 
by a non-state agency representing discussion, negotiation, and compromise between bankers, 
academics, experts, representatives of financial regulators, and Sharia scholars.  
 
9.6 Structuring Islamic Products in Indonesia  
The DSN-MUI’s fatwas have been also used as providing a foundation for the national 
Codification of Islamic Banking Products and Services.39 This establishes specific measures 
and guidelines in ascertaining Sharia aspects of a product before its launch into the market 
place. For instance, according to that codification, a murabahah contract (see paragraph 2.4 of 
Chapter 2) is  
“a transaction to buy and sell of specified goods at value equivalent to the price of the 
goods with an added margin defined in advance by both parties. The seller provides 
information on the price of the goods in advance to the buyer”.40  
An Islamic bank then adopts such a definition in a way that enables customers to clearly 
understand the product. For instance, one of the largest Indonesian Islamic banks defines one 
of their financing products based on murabahah contracts as  
“financing based on transaction of buy and sell contracts between the bank and a 
customer. The bank first purchases a required product and then sells the product to a 
                                                          
39 The Bank of Indonesia Regulation (PBI) No 10/17/PBI/2008 Section 2 (1), Bank Indonesia Regulation (PBI) No 
7/46/PBI/2005 on Funding and Financing Contracts of Banks offering Business based on Shariah, and the Bank Indonesia 
Regulation (PBI) No 10/17/PBI/2008 on Codification of Islamic Banking Products have set out interest-free scheme 
guidelines.  
40 Bank Indonesia Regulation (PBI) No 10/17/PBI/2008 on the Codification of Islamic Banking Products. 
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customer at a selling price which comprises the actual cost of the product and the agreed 
profit margin.”41  
However, there is no uniformity in describing Islamic products and services despite the 
obligation to refer to the Bank Indonesia’s codification. Different terms may be used by the 
banks, to refer to a particular product although the products are substantially similar to each 
other.  
If there is no existing fatwa for a proposed product, the bank then needs to obtain  a 
DSN-MUI fatwa.42 The organising committee of the DSN then undertakes a detailed analysis 
on that proposal. This committee may invite the bank and their Sharia Advisers to advise them 
of the results. The committee usually also invites Sharia jurists to explore a legal basis from 
various sources of Islamic commercial law books. This may lead to a draft fatwa. The next step 
is the presentation of the fatwa draft in the DSN’s plenary meeting (rapat pleno) attended by 
the all members of DSN-MUI. The final result is the fatwa approval signed by the chairman of 
the DSN-MUI. This fatwa is then forwarded to regulators, the Indonesian Financial 
Authority.43 
Setting Sharia standards is a very complex process. There has been a trade-off between 
the Islamic legitimacy and the practicalities of a particular contract to be offered in the markets 
as examined in the Chapter 2 on the section of “Pragmatism in Islamic Finance”. On the one 
hand, regulators need to set up effective and competitive financial instruments to facilitate the 
growth of the Islamic financial industry. On the other side, regulators are required to adopt 
Sharia standards developed by the DSN-MUI. To balance out these competing considerations, 
                                                          
41 Bank Syariah Mandiri, ‘Laporan Manajemen’ [2/07/2018] http://www.syariahmandiri.co.id/wp-
content/uploads/2010/03/AR_BSM_2015_laporan_manajemen_final.pdf, 79. 
42 Bank Indonesia Regulation (PBI) No 10/17/PBI/2008 section 2(2). 
43 Before the establishment of Indonesian Financial Authority, all fatwas od the DSN-MUI related to banking and financial 
transactions are forwarded to Bank Indonesia. 
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the process of Sharia certification as illustrated in the previous sections of this chapter is not 
monopolised by Muslim scholars or jurists but also regulators, lawyers, academics, as well as 
bankers and practitioners. Their interests combine to establish Sharia standards. The next 
sections refer to continuing issues relating to local IFIs.  
 
9.7 IFIs as Limited Liability Corporations 
There are no fatwas on the permissibility of limited liability corporations in Indonesia. 
This is also the position in other jurisdictions such as in Malaysia and Australia. In Indonesia, 
all local IFIs are limited liability corporations and the Indonesian Islamic Banking Act 2008 
requires Islamic banks to become limited liability companies (Perseroan Terbatas).44 These 
include all foreign banks operating in the country. All takaful operators operate as joint-stock 
companies.45 As examined in Chapter 8 on “Liability of Investors in Islamic Law”, the DSN 
MUI may adopt some juristic rules that are present to allow limited liability corporation. The 
lack of fatwa indicates that modern financial institutions cannot operate otherwise than as 
limited liability corporations and that is amounts to an acceptance that this is inevitable if 
Islamic financial institutions are to survive at all.    
 
9.8 The DSN-MUI and Islamic Dispute Resolution 
The Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) has set up an independent arbitral body 
(Basyarnas national Sharia arbitration board) to settle disputes in relation to Indonesian Islamic 
                                                          
44 Indonesia Islamic Banking Law No 21 of 2008 s 7.   
45 OJK, ‘Directory of Non-Bank Islamic Financial Institutions (IKNB Syariah)’ (OJK, 2018).  
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financial and banking activities.46 The Indonesian Religious Courts Law No 3 of 2006 on the 
amending the Indonesian Religious Courts Law No 7 of 1989 granted authority to the DSN-
MUI to be involved in dispute resolutions by giving their Sharia opinions in relation to Sharia 
economic and financial activities in the country. 
The next section will examine regulations of particular products in particular Sharia 
compliant hedging derivatives known as tahawwut.   
 
9.9 Indonesian Regulation of Sharia Compliant Derivatives 
9.9.1 Derivatives Exchanges and Markets 
In Indonesia, there are exchanged traded and over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives. Local 
exchanges are fully owned by the government and allowed to organise system trading and 
procedures including margin requirements.47 OTC derivatives are locally known as the 
Alternative Trading System (“SPA”). The Commodities Futures Trading Act of 2011 defines 
the SPA as a trading system that deals with the sale and purchase of derivatives contracts other 
than futures contracts and Sharia compliant derivatives contracts that are conducted off 
exchanges and bilaterally between counterparties with the prerequisite of withdrawal margin 
rules from these counterparties to be registered in local clearing houses.48 Commodity Futures 
Trading Regulatory Authority (BAPPEBTI) then issues a series of rules for SPA trading for 
                                                          
46 Tim Lindsey, ‘Between Piety and Prudence: State Syariah and the Regulation of Islamic Banking in Indonesia’ (2012) 34 
Sydney Law Review 107, 120.  
47 Futures Trading Markets Law No 32 of 1997 s 6(c).  
48 Commodities Futures Trading Law No 10 of 2011 s 1(10).   
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supervisory purposes.49 The current definition of the SPA has incorporated OTC derivatives 
trading onto exchange platforms and reports OTC trades to a central repository.50  
Indonesian OTC financial derivatives are mostly foreign exchange derivatives 
transactions. These derivatives have increased following the development of legal 
infrastructure for these derivatives such as the introduction of regulations concerning foreign 
exchanges transactions against the rupiah and vice versa.51 Bank Indonesia (BI) also urged 
local banks to use money market derivatives between banks to support the country’s financial 
market.52 All market dealers for OTC foreign exchange derivatives must report transactions 
daily to BI.53 BI also facilitates the foreign exchange swap facility for Indonesian banks.54 This 
                                                          
49 Bappebti Regulation on Alternative Trading System, Peraturan Kepala Bappebti Nomor 88/BAPPEBTI/Per/01/2011 
tentang Sistem Pengawasan Tunggal (Supervisory System) dan Sistem Perdagangan dalam Transaksi Sistem 
Perdagangan Alternatif.  
50 Commodities Futures Trading Law No 10 of 2011 s 10, 11, 12.   
51 Particularly Bank Indonesia Regulation “PBI 18/18” [Bank Indonesia Regulation (PBI) No. 18/18/PBI/2016 on Foreign 
Exchange Transactions against Rupiah between Banks and Domestic Parties] and “PBI 18/19” [Bank Indonesia Regulation 
(PBI) No. 18/19/PBI/2016 on Foreign Exchange Transactions against Rupiah between Local and Foreign Banks]. “PBI 
18/18” regulates derivatives transactions based on foreign exchanges against Indonesian rupiahs between local banks and 
domestic parties. BI sets a minimum amount for each type of transactions (spot, plain vanilla derivatives, and call spread 
options). In transacting call spread options, parties are required to avoid structured foreign exchange products against 
rupiahs, except in the following circumstances: (1) they are supported by an underlying transaction; (2) the value of a foreign 
exchange structured product transaction against rupiahs is no more than the nominal value under the underlying 
transaction; (3) the term of the foreign exchange structure product transaction against rupiahs is no more than the term 
under the underlying transaction; and (4) the transaction is conducted based on dynamic hedging to ensure that the parties 
to call spread options are not exposed to foreign exchange risks as a result of market rates being above the estimated rates 
in the initial call spread options.  “PBI 19/18” regulates foreign exchange derivatives against rupiahs between local and 
foreign banks. BI also sets a series of rules on each derivative transaction including some restrictions in trading call spread 
options as stated previously. “PBI 18/19” also sets some restrictions for local banks with their foreign partners including: (1) 
providing credit or financing in rupiah and/or foreign exchange (subject to certain exemptions, i.e. financing or guarantees 
related to investment activities in Indonesia for which a counter guarantee from a prime bank has been obtained); (2) 
placements in rupiah; (3) purchasing commercial paper in rupiah issued by foreign parties; (4) intercompany invoicing in 
rupiah; (5) intercompany invoicing in foreign exchange in order to provide credit or financing overseas; and (6) capital 
participation in rupiah. Moreover, “PBI 18/19” disallows local banks to transfer rupiah overseas. However, banks may 
transfer rupiah to accounts held by foreign parties and or held jointly by foreign parties and Indonesian parties, in banks in 
Indonesia, subject to certain requirements.    
52 Reuters, “Indonesian Regulators Want Banks to Trade More Derivatives” April 8, 2016 [09/07/2018] 
http://www.reuters.com/article/indonesia-moneymarket/indonesian-regulators-want-banks-to-trade-more-derivatives-
idUSL3N17B2L5. 
53 Oxford Business Group, ‘The Report: Indonesia 2014’ (Oxford Business Group, 2015), 114. 
54 To enhance the practice of foreign exchange derivatives, BI issued PBI No. 16/19/PBI/2014 concerning Amendment to 
Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 15/17/PBI/2013 concerning Hedge Swap Transactions to Bank Indonesia to encourage 
the growth of derivative transactions in domestic foreign exchange market, see Bank Indonesia, “Press Release Bank 
Indonesian Regulation” [07/07/2018] http://www.bi.go.id/en/peraturan/moneter/Documents/faq_pbi_161914.pdf. 
226 
 
product is one of the money market instruments employed by BI.55 The BI’s swap facility 
operates as follows: (1) spot foreign exchange is sold to Bank Indonesia; (2) a forward contract 
made by Bank Indonesia with the initiator of the swap; and (3) rupiahs given to the initiator of 
the swap. This facility is mainly used for hedging purposes.56  
 Indonesia has yet to establish counterparty clearings (CCPs) for OTC financial 
derivatives although it was planned for at the end of 2018.57 Bank Indonesia proposes to 
establish CCPs to enable central clearing for OTC financial derivatives; to act as a guarantor 
of OTC derivatives transactions; and to provide risk management processes in money 
markets.58 At present, the OTC interest rate or foreign exchange derivatives are required to 
report to Bank Indonesia.59  
 Derivatives exchanges in Indonesia adopt the global benchmark of derivatives exchanges 
explained in Chapter 4. There are some outstanding matters for the establishment of CCPs for 
OTC financial derivatives transactions. These central counterparties are also important in the 
case that Sharia compliant hedging (tahawwut) if introduced into local markets. The next 
section examines the Sharia compliant derivatives in Indonesia.   
 
                                                          
55 This facility offers a party to borrow foreign currency abroad and to arrange a swap contract with an onshore bank, where 
the borrower receives rupiah rather than that foreign currency on spot rate and locks in the right to exchange the rupiahs for 
a foreign currency at a predetermined date in the future at the same rate. The borrower thus locks the rate of rupiahs at that 
specified date without influenced by movements of the foreign exchange rates. The bank in turn has the right to “re-swap” 
the contract with BI. This enables the bank to reduce the risks of their swap contract. Commonly, the initiator of the swap 
pays a premium to its bank partner. The BI also sets a premium for the banks that “re-swap” with BI. Through this facility, 
local banks tend to re-swap with BI if they are uncertain, and they tend to retain the swap when they have confidence in the 
rupiahs, see David C. Cole, Hal S. Scott, and Philip A. Wellons (ed.), Asian Money Markets (Oxford University Press, 1995) 
117-118.  
56 Ibid 118.  
57 The Jakarta Post, ‘Indonesia to Establish Clearing House for Derivatives in 2018’ [16/06/2018] 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/07/22/indonesia-to-establish-clearing-house-for-derivatives-in-2018.html. 
58 Bank Indonesia, ‘BI Siapkan Pembentukan Central Counterparty di Indonesia’ [11/07/2018] http://www.bi.go.id/id/ruang-
media/info-terbaru/Pages/BI-Siapkan-Pembentukan-Central-Counterparty-di-Indonesia.aspx. 
59 See IMF, ‘Indonesia: CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations for Securities Settlement Systems – the Equity and Corporate 
Bonds Securities Settlement Systems’ (2012) IMC Country Report No.12/186. 
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9.9.2 Sharia Compliant Derivatives  
In Indonesia, Sharia compliant derivatives have been recognised under the Commodity 
Futures Trading Act 2011 as part of on exchange-traded derivatives. 60 These derivatives are 
traded in the country’s futures markets.61 The law also authorises the DSN-MUI to define types 
of “commodities” as the underlying values of Sharia derivatives. 62  
The recognition of Sharia derivatives was preceded by a series of events held by Jakarta 
Future Exchanges (JFX) and DSN-MUI since 2010. In 2011, DSN-MUI issued a fatwa on 
commodity trading based on Sharia principles in future exchanges.63 Bank Indonesia adopted 
this fatwa to introduce Sharia commodity derivatives transactions into Indonesia.64 It adopted 
only one of the proposed contracts under the fatwa, namely murabahah (cost plus profit). 
However, Bank Indonesia did not adopt the MUI’s definition of murabahah in the fatwa of 
murabahah.65 The term murabahah according to Bank Indonesia is best described as referring 
to tawarruq (a reverse murabahah) as examined in Chapter 2 section 2.5. This product 
represents a legalistic approach towards Islamic financial instruments where modern financial 
theories such as risk management have been integrated into the structure of the product.  
After the issuance of fatwa on the permissibility of commodity futures under certain 
Sharia requirements, the Jakarta Future Exchanges (JFX) launched Sharia commodity markets 
(“JFX Sharia”) for the first time in Indonesia.66 This facility allows banks to manage their 
liquidity using commodity markets such as palm oil, rubber, tea, and chocolate. The fatwa 
                                                          
60 Indonesian Futures Commodities Trading Law No 10 of 2011 s 1(7).  
61 Indonesian Futures Commodities Trading Law No 10 of 2011 s 1(4).  
62 Bappebti Regulation No 94/BAPPEBTI/Per/04/2012 on the objects of futures trading in Indonesia (Komoditi yang Dapat 
Dijadikan Subyek Kontrak Berjangka, Kontrak Derivatif Syariah, dan/atau Kontrak Derivatif Lainnya yang Diperdagangkan di 
Bursa Berjangka). 
63 DSN-MUI’s fatwa on No. 82/MUI/VIII/2011 on Commodities Trading based on Islamic Principles.  
64 Circular Letter of Bank Indonesia No. 14/3/DPM/2012 on Commodity Trade Certificates based on Sharia Principles. 
65 DSN-MUI’s fatwa No. 04/DSN-MUI/IV/2000 on murabahah. 
66 Bulletin of Futures Exchanges, ‘JFX Gebrak Ekonomi Syariah’ (2011) October Edition.  (Bappebti/MJL/127;/X/2011/Edisi 
Oktober), 5.  
228 
 
requires the exchange to assure the availability of these commodities that will be transacted 
with multiple deals. In JFX Sharia, the buyer has legal ownership of the commodity represented 
by an electronic certificate. Thus, the buyer has a full control of the commodity as well as a 
right to receive the commodity within seven days. This Sharia trading facility was not designed 
for the purpose of speculation, see discussion at 5.8 of chapter 5. Thus, Bank Indonesia did not 
allow a commodity trader member to conduct transactions with a party that acts as both the 
commercial member and the commodity consumer. This transaction is also conducted on a 
random basis to avoid the same commodity returning to the same person via a netting 
arrangement. As with many other futures contracts, this JFX Sharia allows commodity users 
(customers) to transact online and deal directly with commodity brokers.67 
In 2015, to expand the application of Sharia derivatives, DSN-MUI issued a fatwa on 
hedging (Tahawwut).68 Bank Indonesia then adopted some part of this hedging fatwa.69 This 
fatwa was designed to overcome the difficulties of local Islamic banks in conventional foreign 
exchange derivatives.70 These foreign exchanges derivatives such as swaps and options were 
considered to be prohibited.71 This made it difficult for Islamic banks to hedge against adverse 
movements of their foreign currencies transactions and reserves. Prior to this fatwa, Sharia 
banks were allowed to exchange foreign currencies on a spot basis preventing them from using 
various alternatives to hedge their market risks particularly foreign exchange risks.72   
 
                                                          
67 See Asyraf Wajdi Dusuki, et al, ‘The Application of Commodity Murabahah in Bursa Suq Al-Sila’s Malaysia Vis-à-vis 
Jakarta Future Exchange Shariah Indonesia: A Comparative Analysis’ (2013) 5(1) ISRA International Journal of Islamic 
Finance. 
68 DSN-MUI’s Fatwa No. 96/MUI/III/2015 on Tahawwut (Hedging). 
69 Bank Indonesia Regulation (PBI) No. 18/2/PBI/2016 on Hedging based on Sharia Principles. 
70 This has been discussed in detail in the Chapter 5.  
71 See Fatwa on Foreign Exchanges issued by DSN-MUI No. 28/DSN-MUI/III/2002.  
72 Foreign Exchanges based on spot basis based on DSN-MUI’s Fatwa No.28/DSN-MUI/III/2002 on Foreign Exchanges (Al-
Sharf). 
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9.9.3 Issues for Sharia Compliant Derivatives 
Indonesia has not yet adopted any fatwa that legitimizes the trading mechanism in on-
exchange derivatives particularly margin rules. Fatwas on Islamic hedging in Indonesia has 
been dominated by the contractual arrangements creating derivative-like features in Islamic 
finance. These fatwas are imperative considering that margin rules may involve speculation 
and gambling as described in Chapter 4 paragraph 4.4.2. The trading mechanism of Sharia 
compliant futures might involve those prohibited elements.73 One view is that the margin 
payment is allowed as it represents a margin deposit, an equivalent to a deposit.74 Others argue 
that the focus on initial margins neglects other margins in futures trading.75 There is the view 
that there are some gambling elements in the margin system including the initial margin (a 
betting tool), and  the variation margin (game of chance) that allow one party to gain at the 
expense of another.76 All these concerns have not yet been addressed by the DSN-MUI.  
As discussed in Chapter 4 paragraph 4.4.3, internationally, OTC derivatives 
transactions are moving towards central counterparties (CCPs), allowing these entities to 
arrange multilateral OTC derivatives contracts. The implications of this needs close 
examination by the DSN MUI.  
The DSN-MUI has not yet discussed the master agreement for Sharia compliant 
derivatives transactions. So far, the global derivatives swap industry has used ISDA 
documentation to simplify documentation for swap transactions. Thus, the International 
                                                          
73 See for instance Noor Suhaida Kasri, “Maysir in the Crude Palm Oil Futures Contract:  A Critical Analysis of the 
Resolution of the Malaysian Securities Commission Sharia Advisory Council” (2013) International Sharia Research 
Academy for Islamic Finance (ISRA) Research Paper No. 63, see also Noor Suhaida Kasri, ‘A Critical Analysis of the 
Resolution of the Sharia Advisory Council of Securities Commission Malaysia: A Case Study of the Crude Palm Oil Futures 
Contract’ (2013) 5(2) ISRA International Journal of Islamic Finance.  
74 See for instance, Mohammad Hashim Kamali, ‘The Sharia Perspectives on Futures’ in Asma Siddiqi (ed), Anthology of 
Islamic Banking (Institute of Islamic Banking and Insurance, 2000) 176.   
75 Kasri, above n 73, 75. 
76 Ibid.  
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Islamic Financial Market (IIFM) in coordination with ISDA has developed documentation for 
OTC Sharia derivatives (Chapter 6). Indonesia is one of the founders of the IIFM. This close 
connection with the organization should be taken into consideration by the DSN-MUI in setting 
up observations towards the ISDA/IIFM Tahawwut Master Agreement. This master agreement 
would support the practice of the hedging fatwa issued by the DSN-MUI.   
The next section will explain how derivatives documentation takes place in Indonesia 
markets. This would also provide some pointers as to how ISDA/IIFM documentation could 
be utilised in local Sharia compliant OTC derivatives.  
 
9.9.4 Master Agreements for Sharia Compliant Derivatives  
 Indonesian has adopted two standard agreements for OTC derivatives transactions, the 
2002 ISDA Master Agreement and Indonesian Derivative Master Agreement (“PIDI”).  
 Bank Indonesia selectively adopted  provisions of the ISDA 2002 Master Agreement 
by a Bank Indonesia Circular Letter.77 ISDA did not participate in drafting this Indonesian 
version and takes no position as to its suitability in any form for use in any particular 
transaction. Accordingly, prospective users must independently ascertain such suitability.78  
The Indonesian equivalent to the ISDA agreement has been tailored to include certain 
local terms and laws. The netting procedure of the modified ISDA agreement must be based 
on Indonesian law. The difficulty is that Indonesia does not have netting legislation. Therefore, 
enforceability of the netting rule as prescribed in the 2002 ISDA Master Agreement is based 
                                                          
77 BI Circular Letter of Bank Indonesia No. 18/35/DPPK on Foreign Exchange Transactions against Rupiah between local 
banks and Foreign Parties.  
78 Indonesian Derivatives Master Agreement (PIDI)’s footnote, 1.   
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on general principles of law based on the Indonesian Civil Code (ICC). In local terminology, 
netting is often referred to as set off (perjumpaan utang).79 This concept is also explained in 
Indonesian Bankruptcy Law.80 However, there are disagreements on the application and 
enforceability of set-off in the netting system particularly in OTC derivatives transactions. 
Local law experts suggest that the Indonesian Civil Code rule could be directly applied, while 
others take a different view arguing that netting application needs to be requested by a receiver 
as suggested by Indonesian Bankruptcy Law.81 The Indonesian modified ISDA suggest that 
that counterparties should waive this rule.82 This implies that the application of set-off rule in 
the tahawwut may not need courts approvals.   
The Indonesian language is a formal language of the modified ISDA Master 
Agreement.83 Dispute resolution is undertaken by the Indonesian National Arbitration Board 
(BANI) in accordance with Indonesian Arbitration Law.84 PIDI also allows counterparties to 
select other arbitration institutions for dispute resolution.85  If this occurs, Indonesian cases 
indicate that Indonesian courts often act inconsistently in relation to the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards.86  
 
                                                          
79 Indonesian Civil Code, part 1425-1434. 
80 Bankruptcy and Suspension of Payments Law No 37 of 2004. 
81 Amy Rachmi Budiati, et al, “Standarisasi Perjanjian Transaksi Derivatif OTC Domestik Berdasarkan Prinsip Dalam ISDA 
Master Agreement Dihubungkan dengan Ketentuan Kepailitan di Indonesia” (2016) 13(2) Bulleting Hukum Kebanksentralan, 
23. 
82 Section 9(6) of the PIDI.  
83 Section 10 of the PIDI states that “this Agreement has been prepared in Indonesian and English. In the event of any 
conflict or inconsistency between the Indonesian language version and English language version of this Agreement, the 
Indonesian language version shall prevail”.  
84 Indonesian Arbitration Law No 30 of 1999. 
85 Section 13(b) of the PIDI.  
86 For more discusses on this issue, see Gatot Soemartono, “Interpretation and Application of the New York Convention in 
Indonesia” in George A. Bermann (ed), Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: The Interpretation and 
Application of the New York Convention by National Courts (Springer, 2017) 495. 
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9.9.5 The ISDA-IIFMTahawwut in Indonesia  
To apply the ISDA-IIFM Tahawwut Master Agreement in Indonesia, some adjustments 
are needed. Some amendments to the ISDA master agreement have been referred to above. 
This is in part because most the provisions of the tahawwut are derived from the ISDA Master 
Agreement. The first requirement is that the tahawwut should change some provisions in 
relation to the peculiarities of Indonesian law including among others the termination 
mechanism such as netting and the close out netting system. Second change relates to Sharia 
opinions which need adjustments in relations to each transaction under the tahawwut. As 
discussed in paragraph 6.6 of Chapter 6, each transaction that is attached to the document needs 
further Sharia approvals from respective Sharia scholars. Since Indonesia has some fatwas 
concerning Sharia compliant derivatives contracts, these juristic rules could be attached as an 
underlying contract to each transaction under the tahawwut. In addition, Sharia compliant 
derivatives in Indonesia are not contrary to the concept of wa’ad (unilateral promise) and 
murabahah as the chief concept underpinning the tahawwut (see discussion at 6.6). These two 
concepts have been widely used in Indonesia commodity derivatives markets.  In addition to 
those particular changes, the close out netting of the tahawwut should also be introduced in 
Indonesia. This would prompt issuance of additional fatwas by respective Sharia boards 
including Bank Indonesia and Financial Services Authority (OJK).  
 This section has examined regulatory frameworks of local Sharia compliant derivatives. 
It is suggested that the implementation of global regulatory standard for the Sharia derivatives 
known as the tahawwut needs to be adjusted to local laws.  
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9.10 Conclusion  
 This chapter discussed the regulation of Islamic finance in Indonesia. While the emphasis 
has been on the Sharia regulatory system in Indonesia, it also referred to the regulations of 
Islamic derivatives, Islamic insurance (takaful), and limited liability entities in Indonesian 
context. The DNS-MUI’s fatwas have been used as the core ingredients for local Sharia 
regulations. Their fatwas have been used in creating a centralised Sharia standard that governs 
local IFIs. This model involves the presence of a single authority that is the DSN-MUI that 
makes substantive determinations as to whether a particular financial activity or instrument is 
Sharia complaint. This organization is thus responsible for determining Sharia compliance with 
regards to different types of financial instruments offered by various market participants.  
 Devolution of Sharia also takes place in Indonesia. Sharia determinations are not made 
by state officials or institutions such courts but from the private actors in this case DSN-MUI.  
The next chapter will examine Islamic finance in Australia from a regulatory perspective. It 
provides a useful comparator to Indonesia. Australia is a jurisdiction where Islamic finance is 
a very small component of the financial industry and where Islamic finance has had to adapt to 
regulation dealing with conventional financial institutions and financial products.  
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CHAPTER 10:  ISLAMIC FINANCE IN AUSTRALIA 
 
10.1 Introduction  
Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) in Australia have not been the subject of regulatory 
concerns. They play a very small role in the Australian financial sector and this is likely to 
continue having regard the number of Australian Muslims. Most IFIs are local to Muslim 
populations such as in Melbourne, and Sydney. The Australian position provides a useful 
comparator to the Indonesian regulatory system. In contrast to Indonesia, Australian IFIs 
receive little or no special accommodation within the Australian regulatory system. Australian 
IFIs must adapt to a regulatory system established to deal with conventional banking and 
financial instruments. This advantages IFIs in Australia and is an inhibiting factor preventing 
expansion beyond a very small retail sector catering to local Muslim communities.  
In relation to Sharia regulation of Islamic finance, Australian IFIs practice a 
decentralised model in contrast to the Indonesian centralised model (Chapter 9). Australian 
IFIs develop Sharia rules for financial transactions derived from the juristic rulings of their 
respective Sharia Supervisory Boards (SSBs) or other overseas Sharia advisory agencies. These 
Sharia rulings are not the subject of local regulation. It means that IFIs can choose their Sharia 
opinions without following a Sharia standard recognised by local regulators. In this type of 
Sharia regulation, local markets seeking to practice Islamic finance face challenges including 
a legal recognition of various Sharia transactions under local regulations and a tax treatment of 
multiple steps involved in Islamic financial products and services.  
First, this chapter discusses the Australian regulatory model known as “Twin Peak 
Model” and examines how IFIs fit within this regulatory model. It then refers debates on Sharia 
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aspects and regulatory concerns particularly on taxation treatments of Islamic products as well 
as some of the obstacles in developing Islamic finance in Australia. It highlights various IFIs 
in Australia and their Sharia compliant aspects and products.  
 
10.2 Islamic Finance and the Twins Peaks Model
Australia adopts a functionally-based model – the ‘twin peaks’ model whereby the 
financial regulators operate on functional lines. The twin peaks, Australian Securities and 
Investment Commission (ASIC) and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) are 
independent statutory bodies. 1 ASIC is responsible for market conduct and consumer 
protection. APRA is responsible for prudential regulation. The Reserve Bank of Australia 
(RBA) is responsible for monetary policy and financial stability, including ensuring a safe and 
reliable payment system.2 The twin peaks model was introduced in 1998 based on 
recommendations of the Financial System Inquiry (the Wallis Inquiry).3 The model is aimed at 
combining market and government mechanisms to regulate the banking and finance industries.4 
Government involvement operates to prevent market failure and also to facilitate efficient 
running of the markets.5 This model is directed towards systemic stability, market conduct, and 
consumer protection.6 Under this model, it is necessary to ensure the objectives of each 
                                                          
1 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act (Cth), No 51 of 2001; Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Act 
(Cth), No 50 of 1998; Reserve Bank Act (Cth), No 4 of 1959. 
2 For instance, a securitisation based on Islamic law, the legal separation of securitized assets from the bankruptcy estate of 
the originator in a true sale securitization carries the possibility of bankruptcy courts or insolvency officials in Islamic 
jurisdictions to invalidate the substantive non-consolidation and “re-characterize” an asset sale as an unsecured loan, see 
Andrew Godwin, ‘Surveying the Twin Peaks of Australia’s Financial System’ in Sheelagh McCracken and Shelley Griffiths 
(ed), Making Banking and Finance Law: A Snapshot (Ross Parsons Centre of Commercial, 2015) 11-26, 12. 
3 Caner Bakir, ‘the Governance of Financial Regulatory Reform: The Australian Experience’ (2009) 87(4) Public 
Administration 910-922, 910. 
4 For more in-depth description and analysis of the current framework than is provided below, see Sheelagh McCracken and 
Anna Everett, Everett and McCracken’s Banking and Financial Institutions Law (Thomson Reuters, 7th Edition, 2009). 
5 Financial System Inquiry (Cth), Financial System Inquiry Final Report (1997) 14. 
6 See Andrew D Schmulow, ‘The Four Methods of Financial System Regulation: An International Comparative Survey’ 
(2015) 26 Journal of Banking and Finance Law and Practice 151, 165.  
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regulator and the boundaries between them.7 This is because a market participant may be 
regulated by both regulators. Further, to ensure that comprehensive supervision is achieved and 
that issues do not fall between the cracks, it is necessary to achieve effective collaboration 
between regulators. This requires consultation, information sharing and mutual cooperation in 
areas such supervision and enforcement action.8 Both APRA and ASIC have been the subject 
of scathing criticism in the 2019 report by the Royal Commission on Banking and Financial 
Services.  
 
10.2.1 Reserve Bank of Australia 
Since the establishment of twin peaks model, the Reserve Bank of Australia’s (RBA) 
main function is to set monetary policy, ensure systemic stability, and operate as a payment 
system regulator. Unlike many central banks, it is not involved with prudential regulation of 
banks or other deposit-taking institutions. 9 The RBA, which is formally independent of the 
Federal Government, has responsibilities covered by the Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth), and is 
also lender of last resort.10 
 
                                                          
7 Andrew Godwin, ‘Surveying the Twin Peaks of Australia’s Financial System’ in Sheelagh McCracken and Shelley Griffiths 
(ed), Making Banking and Finance Law: A Snapshot (Ross Parsons Centre of Commercial, 2015) 11-26, 12. 
8 Godwin in McCracken and Griffiths (ed), above n 1, 12-13.  
9 McCracken and Everett, above n 1, 69.   
10 Schmulow, above n 6, 169.  
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10.2.2 APRA (Australian Prudential Regulation Authority)  
APRA is responsible for the regulation of financial sectors, and developing 
administrative practices and procedures in performing regulatory roles.11 APRA regulates 
authorised deposit-taking institutions (ADIs) including Australian incorporated banks, 
Australian representative offices and branches of foreign banks, building societies, credit 
unions, specialised credit institutions and providers of purchased payment facilities as well as 
life and general insurance companies, and participants in the superannuation industry.12  
APRA has developed a regulatory framework for financial institutions in Australia 
under the Banking Act 1959 (Cth). Banking supervision principles include those published by 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The framework includes requirements 
concerning capital adequacy, credit risk, market risk, securitisation, liquidity, credit quality, 
etc.13 This function is designed to minimise the risks, and to protect the interests of depositors, 
insurance policy holders and superannuation fund members.14 
 
10.2.3 ASIC (Australian Securities and Investments Commission) 
ASIC acts under the Australian Securities and Investment Commission Act 2001 (Cth) 
and administers the Corporations Act 2000 (Cth) (Corporation Act), including the provisions 
governing the operation of companies in Australia (including foreign companies carrying on 
business in Australia), corporate fundraising, financial reporting, takeovers and compulsory 
                                                          
11 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Act 1998 (Cht), 6.  
12 Greg Hammond and Rowan Russel, ‘Australia’ in Rene Bosch, Homburger, Banking Regulation: Jurisprudential 
Comparisons (Thomson Reuters, 2012) 1-22, 1.  
13 Ibid 2.  
14 McCracken and Everett, above n 1, 19.  
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buyouts and external administration and insolvency.15 It has a broad regulatory role. It regulates 
Australian companies, corporate professionals (i.e. liquidators, auditors), financial markets, 
financial services and product providers, and consumer credit. In the finance sector, its chief 
role is to ensure market integrity and consumer protection.16  
 
10.2.4 IFIs within Australian Regulatory Frameworks  
Australia adopts three main types of financial institutions as follows: (1) Australian 
Deposit-taking Institutions (ADIs); (2) Non-IDI Financial institutions; and (3) Insurers and 
Fund Managers. The table below shows these institutions and their main regulators. 
Table 10.1. Australia’s Principal Financial Institutions  
Type of 
Institutions 
Characteristics Regulators 
Authorised Deposit Taking Institutions (ADIs) 
Banks, Building 
(BS) Societies, and 
Credit Unions (CU) 
Banks provide a wide range of financial services to all sectors of the 
economy, including (through subsidiaries) funds management and 
insurance services. Building societies and credit unions provide deposit, 
personal/housing loan and payment services to its members. 
APRA 
Non-Deposit Taking Institutions (Non-IDIs) 
Money market 
corporations 
(MMC), Finance 
companies 
(including general 
financiers and 
pastoral finance 
companies) (FC), 
and Securitisers 
(SC) 
 
MMCs operate primarily in wholesale markets, borrowing from, and 
lending to, large corporations and government agencies. Other services, 
including advisory, relate to corporate finance, capital markets, foreign 
exchange and investment management. FC provides loans to households 
and small- to medium-sized businesses. Finance companies raise funds 
from wholesale markets and, using debentures and unsecured notes, 
from retail investors. While Securitisers provide Special-purpose 
vehicles that issue securities backed by pools of assets (e.g. residential 
mortgage-backed securities). The securities are usually credit enhanced 
(e.g. through use of guarantees from third parties). 
 
ASIC 
Insurers and Funds Managers 
Life insurance 
companies 
 
Provide life, accident and disability insurance, annuities, investment and 
superannuation products. Assets are managed in statutory funds on a 
fiduciary basis, and are mostly invested in equities and debt securities. 
APRA 
                                                          
15 Hammond and Russel in Bosch, above n 12, 2.  
16 McCracken and Everett, above n 1, 25.  
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General insurance 
companies  
 
Provide insurance for property, motor vehicles, employers' liability, etc. 
Assets are invested mainly in deposits and loans, government securities 
and equities.  
 
APRA 
Health insurance 
companies 
 
Provide insurance for private health costs. Assets are invested mainly in 
deposits and loans, government securities and equities. 
 
APRA 
Superannuation 
and approved 
deposit funds 
 
Superannuation funds accept and manage contributions from employers 
(incl. self-employed) and/or employees to provide retirement income 
benefits. Funds are controlled by trustees, who often use professional 
funds managers/advisers. ADFs are generally managed by professional 
funds managers and, as with superannuation, may accept superannuation 
lump sums and eligible redundancy payments when a person resigns, 
retires or is retrenched. Superannuation funds and ADFs usually invest 
in a range of assets (equities, property, debt securities, deposits). 
 
APRA 
Public unit trusts 
 
Unit trusts pool investors' funds, usually into specific types of assets 
(e.g. cash, equities, property, money market investments, mortgages, 
overseas securities). Most unit trusts are managed by subsidiaries of 
banks, insurance companies or merchant banks. 
 
ASICs 
Cash management 
trusts 
 
Cash management trusts are unit trusts which are governed by a trust 
deed and open to the public and generally confine their investments (as 
authorised by the trust deed) to financial securities available through the 
short-term money market. 
 
ASIC 
Common funds 
 
Trustee companies pool into common funds money received from the 
general public, or held on behalf of estates or under powers of attorney. 
Funds are usually invested in specific types of assets (e.g. money market 
investments, equities, mortgages). 
 
State and 
Territory 
Authorities 
Friendly societies 
 
Mutually owned co-operative financial institutions offering benefits to 
members through a trust-like structure. Benefits include: investment 
products through insurance or education bonds; funeral; accident; 
sickness; or other benefits. 
 
APRA 
Source: Reserve Bank of Australia June 2016.17 
                                                          
17 Reserve Bank of Australia, ‘Main Type of Financial Institutions’ [22/03/2018] http://www.rba.gov.au/fin-stability/fin-
inst/main-types-of-financial-institutions.html#nonadi. 
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In Australia, IFIs such as banks and cooperatives, and insurance are regulated by 
APRA. Other IFIs such as Islamic fund managers, sukuk (are also commonly known as Islamic 
bonds or also referred to Islamic securitisation) issuers are subject to ASIC. ASIC exercises 
jurisdiction in matters that would fall outside jurisdiction of APRA, such as supervision of 
financial securities, financial instruments and stock exchanges. Like APRA, ASIC has 
considerable scope to supervise IFIs through the conditions it imposes on its licensees and the 
need for self-reporting of breaches. It has civil and criminal jurisdictions, has powers to 
investigate corporations, inspect books, call witnesses, require disclosure on the detail of 
financial products, and hold public hearings. ASIC, therefore, has considerably more powers 
than APRA and is the main policing body of the financial services industry. This includes 
cross-border surveillance activities, both in traditional overseas markets (UK, Europe and US) 
and more locally, such as in Indonesia.18  
Table 10.2. IFIs in Australia  
Name Type of Institutions Financial Services  Establishment and 
Headquarter 
 
MCCA (the Cooperative), 
and MCCA Asset 
Management 
 
The Cooperative holds a 
cooperative, the 
MCCAAM as Asset 
Management status  
 
Finance (house), 
Superannuation, and 
Investment  
The Cooperative Est. 
1989, the Asset 
Management Est. 
2009, Melbourne 
Crescent Wealth Asset Management 
including Superannuation  
 
Finance, Investment, 
Superannuation  
Est. 2011, Melbourne 
 
Islamic Cooperative Finance 
Australia Limited (IFCAL) 
 
Cooperative Finance (house, vehicle, 
small business finance), 
investment  
 
Est. 1998, Sydney 
                                                          
18 See Salim Farrar, ‘Accommodating Islamic Banking and Finance in Australia’ (2011) 34(1) UNSW Law Journal above 413, 
426.  
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Equitable Financial Solution  Asset Management Investment 
Finance 
 
Est. 2011, Sydney 
Salic Super Asset Management Superannuation  
 
Sydney 
Iskan Finance  Asset Management Finance (house)  
 
Est. 2001, Sydney 
Amanah Islamic Finance Mortgage Manager Finance (house)  
 
Est. 2014, Melbourne 
 
LM Investment 
Management Limited  
 
Asset Management Investment Liquidated  
Hyperion Fund 
Management  
Asset Management Investment   Islamic Fund est. 
2011, Brisbane 
 
Brisbane Islamic Investment 
Fund  
Asset Management  Investment  Brisbane 
Source: Various Sources 
Most local IFIs are registered under a fund manager regulated by the APRA. A large 
number of Islamic fund managers have been attracted by the country’s growing fund 
management industry.19 In Australia, Islamic based fund managers use their own preferred 
Sharia standards, independently of, and over and above regulatory requirements.  
There are also IFIs operated under a cooperative scheme. This type of IFIs were created 
by local Muslims to serve their community. These include MCCA Limited (Muslim 
Community Co-operative Australia) and Islamic Cooperative Finance Australia (IFCAL). To 
upgrade their business activities, some IFI based cooperatives changed their status to conduct 
wider financial services. The MCCA, for instance, changed its legal status from a cooperative 
                                                          
19 Michael T. Skully, ‘Australia: Islamic Finance Down Under’ in Sasikala Thiagaraja, Andrew Morgan, Andrew Tebbutt, and 
Geraldine Chan, (ed.), The Islamic Finance Handbook, (Wiley, 2014) 11-22, 13. 
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to a limited liability company. Since 2009, the MCCA has not admitted new members while 
existing members are encouraged to redeem their shares from the cooperative and invest in 
MCCA Asset Management.20  
At the time of writing, there are no Islamic banks, Islamic insurance companies 
(takaful), or Islamic bonds (sukuk). Although there are foreign banks operating in Australia 
which have Islamic subsidiaries overseas such as HSBC, the Arab Bank, and Kuwait Finance 
House, they do not offer these instruments in domestic markets. Long-established nonbank 
mortgage lender FirstMac has played a market funding role for some Islamic finance 
institutions, such as MCCA mortgage pool for many years.21 In addition, the Westpac Banking 
Corporation has also provided the Special Interbank Placements for financial institutions 
offering Islamic finance products.22 
Based on the previous discussion, Australian IFIs are subject to existing regulations. 
Although there are no Islamic banks in Australia, other Islamic financial institutions follow 
principal types of Australian financial institutions such as fund managers, superannuation 
funds, and cooperatives.  This is the most convenient way to practice Islamic finance within 
existing regulations.  
 
10.3 Accommodating IFIs in Australian Regulation  
There are some proposals to accommodate Islamic finance from a regulatory 
perspective. First, Islamic finance should have a separate legislative regime because of the 
                                                          
20 Muslim Community Co-operative (Australia) Limited, ‘2016 Annual Financial Report’ [1/03/2017] 
http://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/431648/Annual_Report_2016_-_MCCACOOP.docx.pdf?t=1488266283296, 4. 
21 Skully in Thiagaraja et al, above n 19, 19.  
22 Ibid.  
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unique characteristics of Islamic finance.23 Shariah compliance requires a different framework 
for its effective operation because of unique structure of products which are not taken into 
account in the current regulatory regime.24 There are several barriers to achieving a separate 
legislative regime. These include political and social difficulties, and the constitutionality of a 
separate regime.25 The current Australian political climate is unlikely to support a separate 
legislative regime for Islamic finance.26 There may also be constitutional questions on whether 
the Australian Constitution would allow religiously based law to be introduced.27 The other 
barrier is that the market for Islamic products in Australia is extremely small so that legislatures 
are unlikely to introduce costly measures to accommodate Sharia compliance.  
The alternative is that Islamic finance may be accommodated by a partial legislative 
reform, with parity potentially achieved by regulatory bodies such as the Australian Taxation 
Office (ATO) issuing administrative guidelines. This option is less controversial but less 
certain.28  
Islamic finance could also be accommodated by legislative amendments of some 
guidelines in relation to IFIs’ transactions to ensure equal treatment. This method is widely 
accepted and has been adopted by ATO in their discussion paper on these issues.29 Possible 
reforms include reforms to stamp duty, GST, limited or partial changes to the income tax 
                                                          
23 Abu Umar Faruq Ahmad, ‘Opportunities of Islamic Finance in the Australian Market in the Aftermath of the Global 
Financial Crisis’ (2011) 7(4) Journal of Islamic Economics, Banking and Finance 44-64, 60.  
24 Abu Umar Faruq Ahmad, Noor Mohammad Osmani and Mohd Fazlul Karim, ‘Islamic Finance in Australia: The Potential 
Problems and Prospects’ (2010) Paper of the Seventh International Conference – The Tawhidi Epistemology: Zahat and 
Waqf Economy, Bangi, Malaysia, 221. 
25 Kerrie Sadiq and Ann Black, ‘Embracing Sharia-Compliant Products Through Regulatory Amendment to Achieve Parity of 
Treatment’ (2012) 34 (1) Sydney Law Review 189, 200. 
26 See for further discussion on this issue, Sadiq and Black, above n 25, 200.  
27 Brett Freudenberg and Mahmood Nathie, ‘The Constitution and Islam: Are Tax Reforms Possible to Facilitate Islamic 
Finance?’ (2010) 20(1) Revenue Law Journal 1-36. 
28 Sadiq and Black, above n 25, 200.  
29 Ibid.  
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regime that affect payments and returns of Islamic products such as murabaha (cost plus profit 
financing).30  This is little prospect of significant reform on these issues in the near future.  
 
10.4 Decentralized Model of Islamic Financial Regulation in Australia 
Islamic finance in Australia necessarily operates on a decentralization approach to Sharia 
compliance. There is greater flexibility of local IFIs to adopt a particular fatwa in the process 
of their product Sharia certifications. Unlike the centralization of Sharia in Indonesia where 
IFIs are obliged to adopt Sharia standards or fatwas derived from their national Sharia Advisory 
Boards, Australian IFIs are free to choose their own preferable fatwas in offered products. 
Moreover, there is also no guidance or direction from the local regulators such as APRA in 
terms of a particular Sharia standard that should be adopted for their products and services.    
One particular issue is that courts will have difficulties in deciding legal disputes that 
may occur between local IFIs and their clients. In Indonesia Courts do not exercise independent 
judgment on what is, or is not, permissible in Islamic law as High Courts or judges defer their 
judgments to the determinations of the centralized Sharia boards. So long as the centralized 
board approved the transaction, it would be deemed Islamic and enforced on that basis. 
However, in Australia, such a mechanism is absent. The courts may have difficulties in judging 
disputes in Islamic financial industry. Unless it is clearly stated in the agreement between IFIs 
and its customers that the contract itself is governed by local law rather than Islamic law.  
                                                          
30 Justin Dabner, ‘Islamic Finance: Australia reacts belatedly. And impetuously?’ [12/01/2017], Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2701039, 20-21.  
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10.5 Defining “Sharia” or “Islamic” in Australian IFIs 
Contrary to the Indonesian centralised model where the term “Islamic” or “Sharia” refers 
to juristic rulings of the DSN-MUI, the term “Islamic” under Australian IFIs refers to a 
particular authority whereby its fatwas derived to legitimize their financial transactions. 
Moreover, the term “Islamic” is not affiliated to a particular Islamic legal school (madhab). 
This means that local Australian IFIs may adopt various fatwas derived from various Islamic 
legal schools (madhahib). By this understanding, it is possible in these circumstances to adopt 
selective Sharia rules in legitimizing Sharia compliant financial products in local markets. This 
approach has been advocated in earlier chapters as a modus operandi for modernising Islamic 
financial law.  
As a result, there have been various approaches to seeking Sharia legitimacy of the 
products offered to the markets. One institution gains its Sharia legitimacy from local Muslim 
scholars, some depend on the international Sharia standards body such as AAOIFI based in 
Bahrain or a fatwa institution of Al-Azhar in Egypt, and others hire a private Sharia consultant 
in the Middle East.31   
The lack of an authoritative source that determines the Sharia compliant aspects of local 
IFIs leads to some challenges for local regulators. There are debated on the legitimacy of 
Islamic financial transactions the subject of review by the Australian Board of Taxation. Some 
commentators argue that some products do not reflect “authentic” contracts under Islamic law. 
Thus, this modern form of murabahah product is said to lose its legitimacy and authenticity.32 
                                                          
31 For instance, The MCCA appointed local and overseas Sharia advisors based in Dubai. Meanwhile, Crescent Wealth 
entered an agreement with Dar Al Sharia Legal & Financial Consultancy (Dar Al Sharia), a subsidiary of Dubai Islamic Bank. 
The agreement includes Shariah advisory and certification across all investments products of the firm. Another Islamic 
finance institution Islamic Cooperative Finance Australia Limited (ICFAL) employs three local members of Shariah boards to 
assist that the products and services offered by the firm in line with the Shariah principles.  Iskan Finance also adopted 
fatwas from Al-Azhar University in Egypt. Various sources from the IFIs’ websites.  
32 Maria Bhatti, ‘Taxation Treatment of Islamic Finance Products in Australia’ (2015) 20(2) Deakin Law Review 263.   
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ATO has not adopted a particular view of the validity of Sharia products. The issue of the tax 
treatment of Islamic products continues to create difficulties.  
 
10.6 Tax Treatment for Islamic Products  
The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) adopts the view that the economic substance, 
rather than the form, of a transaction is the predominating principle relevant in viewing Islamic 
products for tax purposes. Although contractual forms of Islamic financial transactions might 
be different to their conventional counterparts, the substance might be similar. The Johnson 
Reports with the UN Committee’s Working Group suggested that the ‘legal approach’ (taxing 
according to legal ‘form’) would produce anomalies in relation to Islamic financial instruments 
when compared with conventional products, and that an ‘economic substance’ approach should 
be preferred.33 The Board of Taxation review paper also takes the view that in order for Islamic 
instruments to be treated equally to a conventional product under Australian regulatory 
frameworks, the profit market-up component such as in murabahah transactions is to be treated 
as if it is interest.34  
Although such an approach is convenient, it causes discomfort to Islamic scholars 
which should be recognised by local regulators. The difficulty for Australian regulators, 
including in this description the Australian Taxation Office, is that there may be a lack of 
expertise in relation to Sharia compliance requirements. APRA as the main banking regulator 
does not have a member status or even an observer status with the two main organizing bodies 
of Islamic finance – AAOIFI (Accounting Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
                                                          
33 Ibid.  
34 See more discussion on this, see Bhatti, above n 38.  
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Institutions) and IFSB (Islamic Financial Services Board). Thirty institutions from non-Islamic 
countries registered as either a member or an observer.35 This is no doubt because of the small 
number of Islamic financial institutions in Australia and their limited operations at the retail 
end of the market.  
The Australian Taxation Office Review considers that most Islamic products are 
equivalent to conventional products in terms of their economic substance. This followed the 
review of various Islamic financial products including murabahah (cost-plus-profit financing) 
and other products.36 For murabahah-based financing (discussed in paragraph 2.5 in Chapter 
2), the review accepted that mark-up in murabahah should be treated as interest for taxation 
law purposes, in order for murabahah to be treated equally with conventional products. A cost-
plus-profit sale is regarded as being similar to a conventional fixed interest mortgage — in 
terms of its structure and the deductibility of the profit mark-up. Consequently, the economic 
substance of an Islamic mortgage product using cost plus profit sale is treated the same as a 
conventional mortgage.37  
In relation to other products such as interbank financing based on tawarruq (reverse 
murabahah) (discussed in paragraph 2.5 in Chapter 2), the Board indicated that the economic 
substance of that product is equivalent to conventional debt instruments despite the form of the 
arrangement being different. Instead of the bank offering the debt instrument directly to 
financiers, an investment agent will facilitate the financing arrangement (using the capital 
contributed by the financiers) by making the initial commodity purchase and selling it to the 
bank at a profit on deferred payment terms. The bank then sells the commodity to access the 
                                                          
35 George Michail, ‘Is Islamic Finance Wanted in Australia’ (2015) 12(42) Islamic Finance News 20-21, 21.  
36 The Board of Taxation, ‘Review of the Taxation Treatment of Islamic Finance’ [07/05/2017] 
http://taxboard.gov.au/files/2015/07/Islamic_Finance_Discussion_Paper.pdf.  
37 Ibid 21.  
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cash and repays the cost plus profit to the Investment agent (Financiers) in accordance with the 
agreement.38  
For some Australian IFIs, the conventional terminology that has been applied to Islamic 
transactions may cause confusion. The Board of Taxation Review indicated that any legislative 
response should not use the word “interest”. Instead it was proposed that returns be identified 
as they are derived as profits, rentals or fees’ saying that this approach is consistent with the 
Sharia concept of finance.39 Despite this, the Muslim Community Cooperative Australia 
(MCCA) currently uses the term “interest” rather than “rent” in their contractual 
documentations for home financing due to the legislative requirement.40 This is based on the 
view that as long as the substance reflects Sharia compliance aspects, it is unimportant if in its  
legal form it is called “interest”. 41 Crescent Investments Australasia (CIA) takes the view that 
murabahah products are Sharia compliant, and agrees with the characterization which was 
proposed by the Review and how products were to be taxed.42 Other commentators also suggest 
that an economic substance approach is appropriate for Islamic financial products for income 
tax purposes.43 
The Board of Taxation Review accommodates Islamic financial contracts from the 
perspective of economic substance rather than from its contractual form. The Australian 
Taxation Office or Boards of Review have no function to determine the authenticity of Islamic 
                                                          
38 Ibid 32-33.  
39 MCCA, ‘MCCA Submission to Board of Taxation on the Review of the Taxation Treatment of Islamic Finance’ 
[07/05/2017] https://cdn.tspace.gov.au/uploads/sites/70/2015/07/MCCA.pdf, 4. 
40 MCCA, “Property Finance”, [15/03/2017] http://www.mcca.com.au/faq/mcca-property-finance#_Toc472073513.  
41 Ibid.  
42 Crescent Investments Australasia, submission to the Australian Government, Board of Taxation, Review of the Taxation 
Treatment of Islamic Finance (2010). [07/05/2017] 
https://cdn.tspace.gov.au/uploads/sites/70/2015/07/Crescent_Investments_Australasia.pdf. 
43 Brett Freudenberg and Dr Mahmood Nathie, Submission to the Australian Government, Board of Taxation, Review of the 
Taxation Treatment of Islamic Finance (2010) 17 December 2010, Certified Practising Accountants (CPA) Australia, 
Submission to the Australian Government, Board of Taxation, Review of the Taxation Treatment of Islamic Finance (2010) 
17 December 2010 [07/05/2017], https://cdn.tspace.gov.au/uploads/sites/70/2015/07/CPA_Australia6.pdf, 30. 
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financial contracts within Australia. It is also not the Board’s function to prefer one particular 
school (madhab) over another.  
 
10.7 Substance over Form  
As noted above the approach adopted in the taxation review is that economic substance 
should prevail over the form of the instrument or transaction. In theory, substance and form 
equally reflect juristic rules applied to financial contracts.44 But in practice it may be that there 
is “substance over form” or “form over substance”. Some commentators argue that Sharia 
places greater importance on the substance over form.45 However, in practice, form may prevail 
over substance. Many IFIs offer products that are in substance similar to their conventional 
interest-based products in terms of its economic outcomes.46 In western jurisdictions, Islamic 
contracts may be difficult to enforce. Western courts are unable to determine the Sharia 
legitimacy of a particular product. As a result, economic substance in evaluating Islamic 
products is often used for tax purposes, such as in the case of Australia.  
 The formulation of the substance and the form in Islamic transactions has several 
regulatory implications. First, in a country that adopts “the substance over form”, the 
documentation of Islamic transactions is not very different to their conventional equivalents. 
In Australia, for instance, the term “interest” is widely used in legal documentations of Islamic 
                                                          
44 International Sharia Research Academy (ISRA), ‘Application of “Substance over Form” Principle in Islamic Finance’ 
[06/05/2017] http://ifikr.isra.my/fatwa/-/fatwa/getFatwaDetail/4079. 
45 See, eg, Mahmud El-Gamal, Islamic Finance: Law, Economics, and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2006)106;  
A.H. Haider,”Jurisprudential schizophrenia: On form and function in islamic finance” (2007) 7(2) Chicago Journal of 
International Law  605-622; and Abdulazeem Abuzaid, “Towards Genuine Sharia Products with Lessons of the Financial 
Crisis” in Habib Ahmed, Mehmet Asutay and Rodney Wilson, Islamic Banking and Financial Crisis: Reputation, Stability and 
Risks (Edinburg University Press, 2014).  
46 In 2007, the Sharia board of the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) Taqi 
Usmani claimed that 85 per cent of the Gulf Islamic bonds (sukuk) do not really comply with Islamic law because the 
substance of these products are similar with conventional interest-based bonds, see Reuters, “Most Sukuk ‘Not Islamic’, 
body claims” [07/05/2017] http://www.arabianbusiness.com/most-sukuk-not-islamic-body-claims-197156.html. 
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transactions such as Islamic home financing. In addition, profits generated from the murabahah 
(cost plus profit financing) contracts are treated as if profits are conventional interest to avoid 
double taxation.47 Second, the formulation of “the substance” and “the form” also reflects the 
debates on which Sharia opinions should be adopted by a particular Islamic financial 
institution. This divergence of opinions (ikhtilaf) is inevitable in Islamic law traditions. This 
results an additional issue particularly on which pronouncements by Sharia scholars encroach 
upon the legal enforceability of a particular product.48 In addition, the terminology “the 
substance over form” (the substance more important that the form) is confusing. For instance, 
profits in murabahah are commonly treated as equivalent to interest in a commercial loan for 
tax purposes. These two notions – profits and interest – are semantically different, but not 
treated as substantially different in banking practice. In the case of that product, the form is 
Islamic, while the substance is similar to interest-based finance. In such a situation, it is the 
task of Islamic institutions to ensure that product offered is based on a particular Sharia opinion 
as a form of Islamic finance consumer protection. And third, the legalistic approach in 
developing Islamic finance have the result that the economic substance of this Sharia compliant 
finance is similar to its conventional counterparts. As discussed in chapter 2 the global Islamic 
finance industry generally adopts a legalistic approach in developing their Islamic markets. The 
consequence is the creation of various Islamic products that duplicate, mimic, and adopt 
conventional forms. This is the only way that various medieval Islamic contracts could be 
structured within the modern financial industry.  
                                                          
47 In United Kingdom, for instance, the legislators follow the approach of the economic substance of the transaction rather 
than its legal form. They treat the profit received from murabahah similarly to interest in a conventional loan transaction, see 
Tareq Moqbel, ‘the UK Islamic Finance Taxation Framework and the Substance v Form Debate in Islamic Finance’ (2015) 
18(1) Legal Ethics 84-86, 86.  
48 Heiko Hesse, Andreas A. Jobst, and Juan Sole, ‘Trends and Challenges in Islamic Finance’ (2008) 9(2) World Economics, 
184-185.   
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10.8 Major IFIs in Australia 
10.8.1 Muslim Community Cooperatives Australia (MCCA) 
The MCCA was initially established as a cooperative to fulfil the Islamic financial 
needs of their members.49 It was created in February 1989 with 10 members and initial capital 
of $22.300, operating in Burwood, a suburb of Melbourne, Victoria.50 Some local Muslims 
provided an initial capital for its establishment without the involvement of foreign investors 
such as Middle East wealthy Muslims.51 Currently, the MCCA has around 7500 shareholders 
and members.52 On 1997, the MCCA opened its Sydney branch,53 and has mobile offices in 
Perth.54 In addition, the firm holds an exemption to double stamp duty in Victoria.55 Their 
objective is to be “a leading provider of specialized financial and wealth management services 
catering to the needs of Muslim Australians”.56  
 In 2008, this cooperative changed its legal status to a regulated Managed Fund under 
the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) regulation.57 Under this new 
status, the firm manages their client funds through various investment schemes.58 However, 
this license does not authorise the firm to give personal financial advice to investors and cannot 
recommend the investors for a suitable investment based on their financial needs.59 Moreover, 
                                                          
49 MCCA, ‘History’ [22/12/2017] http://www.mcca.com.au/history. 
50 Algoud and Lewis, above n, 144. For detail on the MCCA, see Abdullah Saeed, ‘The Muslim Community Cooperative of 
Australia as an Islamic Financial Service Provider’ in Abdullah Saeed and Shahram Akbarzadeh, Muslim Communities in 
Australia (UNSW Press, 2001) 188-205, 189.  
51 Saeed in Saeed and Akbarzadeh, above n 58, 190.  
52 The MCCA Submission to Board of Taxation on the Review of the Taxation Treatment of Islamic Finance, [15/03/2017] 
http://taxboard.gov.au/files/2015/07/MCCA.pdf. 
53 Saeed in Saeed and Akbarzadeh, above n 58. 
54 The MCCA Submission to Board of Taxation on the Review of the Taxation Treatment of Islamic Finance, [15/03/2017] 
http://taxboard.gov.au/files/2015/07/MCCA.pdf. 
55 MCCA, ‘Islamic Financial Services: What Role for Australia’ [15/03/2017] 
http://www.melbournecentre.com.au/WebsiteUpdate_011208/MCFSSymposium211108_ChaabanOmran.pdf. 
56 MCCA, ‘Vision and Mission’ [22/12/2017] http://www.mcca.com.au/vision-mission. 
57 MCCA, ‘History’ [22/12/2017]  http://www.mcca.com.au/history. 
58 Ibid.  
59 Ibid.  
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the firm has also an Australian Credit License that allows them to provide financing facilities 
to their clients.60 In addition, local regulations are not concerned with Sharia compliance 
aspects. Despite this, the firm voluntarily discloses their Sharia aspects in the Product 
Disclosure Statement (PDS), a statement that is required by the Australian Corporations Act 
2001.  
The MCCA use traditional Islamic contracts that have been modified and widely used 
by modern Islamic finance institutions including murabahah (cost plus profit financing) and 
other products.61 The Sharia advisors of the MCCA issued a fatwa (an Islamic legal verdict) 
on the permissibility of the above product. The firm defines this contract as “a particular kind 
of sale where a seller agrees with a purchaser to provide a specific commodity to the purchaser 
for the deferred payment of the sale price that includes a certain profit added to his cost. The 
basic feature of murabahah is that the seller discloses the actual cost incurred in acquiring the 
commodity, and the added profit. This profit may be in lump sum or may be based on a 
percentage.”62 Commonly, the practice of IFIs is to modify this murabahah contract by adding 
additional arrangements such as wa’ad (unilateral promises), and wakalah (agency contract). 
This product has been claimed by the company to conform to both Shariah principles and 
Australian Laws, in particular the National Consumer Credit Protection (NCCP) law.63 The 
Board of Taxation Reviewed regarded this structure as equivalent to a conventional interest-
based mortgage. However, the form of the arrangements is quite different. In contrast to a 
                                                          
60 Ibid.  
61 Murabahah financing is only available in Victoria State, [[12/02/2017], 
http://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/431648/MCCA_Website_Rates_22122015.pdf?t=1450764340343. 
62 MCCA, ‘Property Finance’ [05/03/2018]  http://www.mcca.com.au/faq/mcca-property-finance. 
63 MCCA, ‘How It Works’ [05/03/2018] http://www.mcca.com.au/how-it-works, and http://cdn2.hubspot.net/hub/431648/file-
2482610729-pdf/pdf/Frequently_Asked_Questions.pdf?t=1450641216709. 
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conventional mortgage, the firm (financier) will purchase the property and then sell it at cost 
plus a profit to the client who will repay the cost plus profit on a deferred payment basis.64  
MCCA also utilises investment products whereby investors give a restricted mandate 
(muqayyadah) to the firm to invest funds.65 This investment product allows investors to invest 
in a specific asset class. The firm makes a sub-scheme (also referred sub-fund) that separates 
it with other sub-schemes. It means that the return and performance of each sub-scheme is not 
affected by other sub-scheme.66 In addition, since the interest has been removed in 
compensating the repayment of the clients’ funds, the firm has to deal with a return on 
investments to maintain positive expectations of their clients. Hence, the firm relies on its past 
performance and conventional rate of return benchmarks to attract more funds. For instance, 
on its Income Fund, the firm sets the average return of 12 months deposit in 4.33 per cent, that 
is relatively higher than the conventional Bloomberg AusBond Bank Bill Index.67  This past 
performance was then set to indicate current returns per annum of the MCCA’s income fund.68 
The above mentioned funds are managed in the same manner as conventional unit trusts but 
differ in their mode of financing and in the nature of their investment which must be Sharia 
compliant. The MCCA considers that the returns of the investments are to be distributed on a 
half yearly basis. This period could be changed if the fund is able to make monthly 
distributions; these distributions are credited to the investors’ funds balance.69  
                                                          
64 The Board of Taxation, “Review of the Taxation Treatment of Islamic Finance” (2010) [05/05/2017] 
http://taxboard.gov.au/files/2015/07/Islamic_Finance_Discussion_Paper.pdf. 
65 MCCA, ‘Property Funds’ [03/05/2018] 
http://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/431648/MCCA_Property_Fund_LR_OCT.pdf?t=1488266283296. 
66 Ibid.  
67 The MCCA Income Fund Report per September 2015.  
68 The institution gives note that these rates of returns are not guaranteed and are determined by future revenue of the Fund 
and may be owned than expected. Investors are taking risk of losing some or all of their principal investment. The 
investment is not a bank deposit.   
69 MCCA, ‘Product Disclosure Statements’ [05/03/2017] 
http://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/431648/Product_Disclosure_Statement_PDS.pdf?t=1488266283296. 
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MCCA is required under the regulation to use the term interest rather than rent in their 
home financing documentation.70 The National Consumer Credit Protection (NCCP) requires 
all financial institutions under its guidance to use the term interest in the paperwork of financial 
instruments including home finance contracts, regardless of whether these are intended to be 
Sharia compliant.71 This causes difficulties for MCCA because of client sensitivity to the use 
of the word “interest”. Hence, their Sharia Advisors issued an opinion that “the term "interest" 
in such documentation has the meaning of "rent" (for Ijarah Muntahia Bittamleek based 
products),72 that contract dictates the determinate principle of the meaning and purpose of the 
objective of the contract and not the words and expressions.73 MCCA has submitted to the 
Australian Taxation Board review requesting removal of the word “interest” in their contractual 
documentations.74 
 
10.8.2 Crescent Wealth  
Crescent Wealth is a fund manager that provides Sharia compliant investment funds 
including superannuation.75 The firm, which was established in February 201076, has launched 
an Islamic index the Thomson Reuters Crescent Wealth Islamic Australia Index.77 The firm 
                                                          
70 MCCA, ‘Property Finance’ [15/03/2018] http://www.mcca.com.au/faq/mcca-property-finance#_Toc472073513. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
74 The MCCA Submission to Board of Taxation on the Review of the Taxation Treatment of Islamic Finance, [15/03/2017] 
http://taxboard.gov.au/files/2015/07/MCCA.pdf, 4.  
75 Superannuation, or super, is Australia’s compulsory long-term savings plan that enables participants to save money for 
retirement period. Superannuation operating standards are in the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulation 1994. 
Trustees of registrable superannuation entities (RSEs) must hold a Registrable Superannuation Entity License (RSE 
license) issued by Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA). See Sheelagh McCracken, Joanna Bird, John 
Stumbles, and Gred Tolhurst, Everett and McCracken’s Banking and Financial Institutions Law, 8th edition (Thomson 
Reuters, 2013) 91-96.  
76 Crescent Investments Australasia: Shariah Compliant Wealth Management. The paper was submitted on Discussion 
paper on the review of the taxation treatment of Islamic finance, banking and insurance products released 13 October 2010 
[25/12/2016] http://taxboard.gov.au/files/2015/07/Crescent_Investments_Australasia.pdf. 
77 Crescent Wealth, ‘Our Story – Crescent Wealth’ [25/12/2017] http://www.crescentwealth.com.au/about-us/our-story-about-
us/. 
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has also opened a new office in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia to build its network across South East 
Asia and the Middle East.78 In 2014, the firm has 1920 members.79 
In Australia, superannuation is a privately managed occupational pension system, 
which provides a channel (both mandatory and voluntarily) for long-term savings and 
investment for retirement.80  It is part of the national economic strategy for funding the 
retirement where almost 90 per cent of all employees, including both full time and part time 
are covered in this privately funded pension system.81 A percentage of employee’s earnings are 
deducted for investment into this fund.82 Australia has become one of the world’s largest 
pension market. Superannuation is a major source for the growth of Australian Islamic wealth 
managers.83 
Crescent Wealth also set out procedures for Sharia compliant investment. This firm 
developed Sharia screening on their funds, see paragraph 5.8 in Chapter 5. This was a jointly 
effort between the firm and Thomson Reuters and the Accounting Auditing Organization of 
Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI).84 Particularly, the firm states that if they invest in a 
company that earns between 0-5 per cent profit from any non-compliance income, the firm 
donates that income to charity. The firm has set up a foundation to manage haram income by 
                                                          
78 Crescent Wealth, ‘Crescent Wealth Surpasses $100 Million Benchmark’ [25/12/2017] 
http://www.crescentwealth.com.au/crescent-wealth-surpasses-100-million-benchmark/. 
79 APRA, ‘2014 Superannaution Fund level Profiles and Financial performance’ [25/12/2017] 
http://www.apra.gov.au/Super/Publications/Documents/1505-SFL-profiles-performance-2014.xls. 
80 “Superannuation” is a British Commonwealth term used to describe saving for retirement within a legal framework of taxes 
and regulations intended to facilitate retirement financing. Meanwhile, in North America, the fund is called “pension plan”, 
see G. Kingston, ‘Superannuation: A Guide to the Field for Australian Economists’ (2005) Working Paper, School of 
Economics, University of New South Wales. 
81 Organisation for Economic-Cooperation and Development (OECD), ‘Pensions at a Glance in 2007: Public Policies across 
OECD Countries’ (OECD Paris, 2007). 
82 The Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 (The Act) requires employers to make the SG (Superannuation 
Guarantee) contribution on (at least) a quarterly basis or these workers may incur an SG charge. 
83 Talal Yassine, ‘Roadmap To Building Islamic Wealth: The Australian Example’ [25/12/2017] 
http://www.crescentwealth.com.au/roadmap-to-building-islamic-wealth/. 
84 See, eg, Crescent Wealth, ‘Our Investment Principles – Crescent Wealth’ [25/12/2017] 
http://www.crescentwealth.com.au/islamic-super/our-islamic-compliance-principles/; and Thomson Reuters, ‘Islamic Indices: 
Index Methodology’ http://thomsonreuters.com/content/dam/openweb/documents/pdf/tr-com-
financial/methodology/thomson-reuters-idealratings-islamic-indices-methodology.pdf, 3. 
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donating it to Australian registered charities. The firm also states that they would not invest in 
any company that earns above 5 per cent of their income from prohibited sources as defined by 
their above Sharia screening standards.85 These Sharia requirements have been developed by 
their Sharia scholars.  
Crescent Wealth also offers Sharia compliant superannuation, and investment schemes. 
The collected funds are then invested in various assets classes including Australia and 
international shares, property and infrastructure, and cash and fixed income. The structure in 
managing those funds is similar to other fund managers with some special characteristics 
related to Sharia compliance. The investors or clients hold units in a fund. These units are then 
pooled to purchase units in specific wholesale funds such as property funds listed in property 
and infrastructure securities. The Total Return Benchmark for these funds is the Reserve Bank 
of Australia Cash Rate plus 3 per cent. The firm expects to deliver a total return (income and 
capital growth) based on this benchmark.86  
 
10.8.3 Islamic Cooperative Finance Australia Limited (ICFAL) 
Islamic Co-operative Finance Australia Limited (ICFAL), located in New South Wales, 
was officially registered by the Registry of Co-operatives, Department of Fair Trading, the 
Government of the State of New South Wales, in May 1998 under the Co-operatives Act 1992  
(NSW) to function as co-operative within this State.87  
                                                          
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. 
87 ICFAL, ‘Profile’ [05/05/2017] http://www.icfal.com.au/about_us.html. 
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As a cooperative, ICFAL is different to common banking institutions. New members 
must be registered and pay a non-refundable amount. Members must purchase a minimum 
amount of shares within the cooperative. This amount is used to invest in the various businesses 
engaged in by the institution. The cooperative does not take out loans to fund their activities 
but instead use collected funds for specific purposes. These include the general membership 
fund, Hajj (pilgrimage), superannuation fund, and children’s education fund. 88 When the new 
members become active members, they may be eligible to apply for finance from the co-op. 
The minimum period for eligibility is one year. New members are then required to deposit a 
percentage, i.e. 10 per cent of the expected financing. For instance, if the purchase price of a 
property is $ 1 million, the member is required to deposit $100.000 with the co-op before 
commencement of the mortgage.89  
The above sections discussed Australian IFIs offering products and services to local 
markets. The Sharia legitimacy of these products is derived from their Sharia Supervisory 
Boards or other Sharia advisory agencies overseas. The operation of these institutions is based 
on existing Australian regulations. There are no Islamic banks, however, there exist co-
operatives offering Islamic financial instruments, Sharia compliant fund managers, and 
superannuation funds.  
 
10.9 Summary  
In Australia institutions have developed their own Sharia justifications for products and 
services offered to the markets. Local regulators do not concern themselves with issues related 
                                                          
88 ICFAL, ‘FAQ’ [25/12/2017] http://www.icfal.com.au/faq-2/.  
89 Ibid. 
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to Sharia compliance. The taxation office treats that the substance of Islamic products and 
services as being the same as interest-based products. The recognition of “substance over form” 
in some Islamic products such as murabahah financing would avoid double taxation for this 
product making it competitive with conventional interest-based loans. By allowing a regulation 
particularly in a secular jurisdiction to view Islamic instruments as no different economically 
with its conventional peers, the approach would be functional in the context where there is no 
specific regulation and no Sharia standardisation on Islamic financial products and services. 
This recognition is required as a prerequisite to ensuring equal tax treatment of Islamic finance 
transactions in Australia. 
Most of the products and services offered by those institutions have adopted the most 
common Islamic products such as murabahah-based financing to suit local market 
expectations. This product reflects the legalistic approach of Islamic finance in facing modern 
financial transactions as discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis. The next chapter is the conclusion 
for the thesis.  
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CHAPTER 11: CONCLUSION 
 
11.1 Overview 
The central theme of the thesis is the driving force of fatwa and the capacity of Sharia 
law to mould and adapt modern financial instruments and the operation of modern Islamic 
financial institutions.  Sharia provides the basis for innovation and change in Islam and Islamic 
finance.  It is not predicated on static views unrelated to the needs of society and business.  The 
practice of fatwa shopping reflects this legal pluralism with different views enriching 
opportunities for diversity and change.  The thesis demonstrates the importance of fatwa 
shopping as a means of establishing coherent Islamic finance law and creating a legitimate 
method for structuring modern Islamic finance.  
Islamic finance, as part of the global financial industry, is subject to national and 
international banking and financial regulation with some adaptation for unique Islamic 
characteristics. Islamic finance relies on fatwas of their Sharia Advisory Boards. These fatwas 
play a central role in developing products and services to offer in the market place. For 
example, in designing the halal certification for financial instruments, modern Muslim scholars 
consider not only normative aspects of contractual elements of those instruments, but also the 
importance of risk management. This demonstrates that contrary to popular Western 
perceptions, fatwas can be a dynamic modernising force for adapting Islamic law to changing 
modern conditions.  This thesis has used selective Sharia rules, various medieval juristic rules 
particularly from the Sunni tradition to show how they have been used as a force to modernise 
Islamic Law.  
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Giving effect to this approach through selective Sharia opinions and fatwa shopping does 
not jeopardise the legitimacy of Islamic finance nor undermine confidence in the financial 
industry and its financial products. Chapter 2 argues that selective Sharia opinions (fatwa 
shopping) reflect a continuation of the classical method, talfiq (amalgamation). Doctrinal 
selections are made by a Muslim jurist toward a particular interpretation that best fits the 
circumstances, regardless of whether or not this interpretation is from the scholar’s own legal 
school (madhab). The application of this approach finds expression in the views of Muslim 
scholars or Sharia Supervisory Boards (SSBs) in IFIs who review and select various Islamic 
juristic rulings from different schools to certify modern Islamic financial products and services. 
It also operates where IFIs review and select fatwas to legitimise their financial products and 
service proposals. This approach is used as a basis for adapting medieval Islamic commercial 
contracts which have significant problems in terms of feasibility and practicality in modern 
banking transactions. This approach takes a middle path between strict literal interpretation and 
practicality allowing for the development of Islamic financial instruments that obey Islamic 
juristic rulings but also take into account economic and modern financial considerations. The 
use of this mechanism allows Islamic finance to be sustainable, meet the needs of a modern 
financial industry and manage financial risk and prevent market failure. This thesis argues that 
the underlying proposition for accommodating various juristic rules in a particular product is 
based on the public interest safeguarding financial institutions, its depositors and the 
community.  
 
11.2 Sharia and Legal Pluralism 
 The thesis argues that the development of modern Islamic financial institutions and 
financial products cannot be separated from a pluralist approach which recognises the diversity 
of opinions and the need for legitimacy and practicality in modern Islamic finance. Crucial to 
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this process of modernisation is the proper appreciation of the impact and importance of 
selective Sharia opinions or fatwa shopping (Chapter 2). This method involves combining 
Islamic juristic rulings in the form of fatwas. The thesis argues that this methodology is a 
legitimate method of developing medieval Islamic contractual arrangements to meet the needs 
of a modern financial industry. It regards this process as inevitable. Different juristic rules are 
viewed as a rich resource rather than posing difficulties. Using this approach, medieval Islamic 
contracts are utilised on a functional basis and as a means of exploring modern functional 
equivalents. These approaches have enabled Islamic finance law to adopt a more 
comprehensive framework for conceptualising modern financial transactions. A broader 
interpretation of selected Sharia rules in the form of fatwas recognises the financial and 
economic realities of diverse circumstances, where Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) operate. 
Modern Islamic financial transactions are a paradigm illustration of the dynamism of Islamic 
law. These transactions reflect the plurality of juristic opinions that have been part and parcel 
of Muslim legal traditions for centuries. The modernisation of Islamic financial transactions 
has had to deal with contrasting ideas as part of a dynamic process. Whilst a range of sources 
may be used in structuring modern financial instruments the position of modern financial 
transactions represents a distinctive understanding and application of traditional Islamic 
contracts.  
It is also pivotal to the discussion of modern Islamic finance to consider the role of 
Sharia Supervisory Boards (SSBs). SSBs are fundamental to the modern Islamic financial 
interpretation. The capacity of the SSBs to interpret authoritatively governs how various Sharia 
opinions derived from various classical sources are understood. This capacity is important to 
access various Sharia opinions both from contemporary and classical scholars and to interpret 
these sources for modern application. Moreover, SSBs represent a unique and normatively 
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different basis for developing regulations for IFIs. The fatwas of SSBs define the character of 
Islamic finance within an Islamic financial system.  
11.3 Fatwa Shopping and Sharia Standardisation  
It is frequently said that fatwa shopping works against Sharia harmonisation in the 
market place. But as this thesis shows, fatwa shopping plays an important role in developing 
Sharia standards in the Islamic finance industry,90 and in the standardisation of Sharia in some 
jurisdictions. In Malaysia, the Sharia Advisory Council (SAC) of the Bank Negara Malaysia 
employed talfiq (described as fatwa shopping in a modern form in this thesis) in deriving a 
final resolution for Islamic products.91 The General Council for Islamic Banks and Financial 
Institutions (CIBAFI) found there is a consensus in 90% of fatwas in the fields of Islamic 
finance.92 The International Sharia Research Academy for Islamic Finance (ISRA) based in 
Malaysia found that fatwas relating to Islamic financial products and services in Malaysia and 
the Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) have more similarities than differences and that a clear 
difference is only evident in relation to certain Islamic principles.93  
The law governing Islamic finance should adopt a pluralistic methodology where 
different Sharia opinions from the same or different Islamic schools (madhahib) are seen as a 
rich resource for developing Islamic financial instruments. The abundance of various Sharia 
opinions prompted the practice of selecting the most favourable fatwas mirroring modern 
financial transactions. The classical debates in Sunni traditions also tend to signal that there is 
                                                          
90 Standardisation can be defined as setting up global Sharia standards by codifying the principles and precepts of Islamic 
commercial law, see Wafica Ali Ghoul, “The Standardization Debate in Islamic Finance: A Case Study” (2011) A Paper 
presented at the 8th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance, Doha 18 December, 2.  
91 Mohd Hafiz Jamaludin and Ahmad Hidayat Buang, “An Analysis of the Views of the Supporters and Opponents in the 
Usage of Talfiq in Islamic Law” (2017) 25(3) Jurnal Syariah 363-394.  
92 Wafik Grais and Matteo Pellegrini, ‘Corporate Governance and Shariah Compliance in Institutions offering Islamic 
Financial Services’ (2006) 4045 World Bank Policy Research Paper. 
93 Mohamad Akram Laldin, Mohamed Fairooz Abdul Khir, and Nusaibah Mohd Parid, “Fatwas in Islamic Banking: A 
Comparative Study Between Malaysia and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries” (2012) ISRA Research Paper No. 
31. 
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no obligation to follow a single restrictive fatwa. This leaves individuals free to seek guidance 
from various fatwas from different schools (madhahib). It is argued that fatwa shopping is as 
an unavoidable reflection of legal pluralism allowing the search for a Sharia opinion that will 
satisfy the unique requirements of the individual.  
Various juristic views within Sunni legal traditions have permitted product innovation 
and development necessary for modern financial transactions and the need for risk management 
and financial efficiency. It has allowed Islamic banking to increase its share in the global 
financial markets (see paragraph 1.2 of Chapter 1). Conversely, rigid Sharia harmonisation may 
limit innovation in the industry. Thus, divergence of opinions can be good for business in the 
sense that it allows financial institutions to introduce various products directed to specific 
consumers or markets.  
 
11.4 Managing Risk in Islamic Finance Law  
The mainstream theory of Islamic finance is the risk sharing principle, discussed in 
chapter 2. The dominance of the risk sharing theory is challenged by modern Islamic financial 
products. Through a legalistic approach, various conventional financial vehicles can be 
justified as alternative versions of Islamic instruments with similar economic outcomes. 
Conventional financial risk management typically involves risk transfer and risk shifting. For 
example, the creation of Sharia compliant derivative-like features also establishes the creation 
of risk transfer methods in Islamic finance. One of the most important risk shifting vehicles is 
the limited liability corporation. In practice, IFIs rely on the concept of the limited liability 
corporation as the most important risk shifting vehicle in a modern economy. But it is to be 
noted that at the time of writing, there is no single fatwa prohibiting the limited liability 
corporation. The explanation may be that a modern economy and financial institutions cannot 
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exist without limited liability corporations. Were it otherwise IFIs effectively could not operate 
or participate in a modern financial industry.  
 
11.5 Sharia law and Modern Hedging Instruments 
Currently, modern Islamic finance lacks financial instruments which hedge and manage 
financial risks.  Islamic financial institutions can only flourish and grow if appropriate financial 
debt and risk management instruments can be developed. Chapters 4 (hedging and derivatives), 
5 (Derivatives in Islamic Law), 6 (Legal Frameworks for Sharia Compliant Hedging 
Derivatives), 7 (Takaful Insurance), and 8 (Liability of Investors in Islamic Law) examine the 
various methods for managing risks within a modern financial system. The thesis argues that 
Sharia law can accommodate the range of financial instruments developed to manage financial 
risks in the global financial industry. It does so by recognising that Sharia law is pluralist in 
nature and allows a diversity of approaches to determining Sharia compliance. The thesis 
argues that the modern development of Islamic financial law can be achieved through the 
modern approach to deriving Sharia law which draws on multiple schools of Sunni thought 
using a process of selecting, reviewing, and combining Islamic juristic rulings.  
 One of the most important financial risk management tools are derivatives. These 
instruments are pivotal to managing and hedging risks that may jeopardise the business position 
of financial institutions including IFIs. The basic features of derivatives such as options, 
forwards, futures, and swaps respectively deliver economic benefits by mitigating risks from 
unknown future events. The key distinctions of importance in chapter 4 are between options, 
forwards, futures, and swaps. These distinctions are important in assessing those conventional 
derivatives from the point of view of Sharia compliance.  
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As derivatives deliver economic benefits to the economy, it is important to have these 
types of contracts in modern Islamic finance. Despite disagreements by Muslim scholars 
particularly whether derivatives are prohibited, because of gharar or uncertainty (see paragraph 
5.3 of Chapter 5), the development of processes to derive modern fatwa on Islamic finance 
provides the basis for arguing that there are Sharia compliant equivalents. This is examined in 
Chapter 5. This chapter argues that common objections on derivatives instruments do not have 
a strong foundation in Islamic law. Islamic juristic rules can be used to develop Islamic hedging 
through derivatives-like instruments.  The modern method of selective Sharia opinions is able 
to correct inefficiencies or inequitable IFIs practices and embed modern risk management. 
Chapter 5 argues that certain Islamic juristic rules may be adapted to accommodate derivative-
like features in Islamic finance. 
Sharia compliant hedging derivatives are a type of hedging following the requirements 
of Islamic law. The principal prohibitions against speculation, are avoided by ensuring that 
Sharia compliant hedging derivatives contracts are derived from Islamic contracts and that the 
underlying values are Sharia compliant. In addition, the economic activities of assets or values 
used for Sharia compliant derivatives must be Islamically permissible (halal). Thus, these 
assets are evaluated in qualitative and quantitative screenings developed by Sharia Supervisory 
Boards of respective IFIs. Sharia compliant derivatives can be used for risk management 
purposes and limit the use of speculation and gambling in its transactions. The development of 
Sharia compliant hedging derivatives allows Islamic banks and IFIs to engage in global 
finance.  
 Chapter 5 also takes the position that there are Sharia compliant derivatives including 
Islamic profit rate swaps. These contracts perform similar economic functions of interest rate 
swaps as the basic form of swaps in conventional derivatives that have been widely practiced 
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in derivatives markets. These Sharia derivatives have been developed based on the juristic rules 
of Islamic contracts namely murabahah (cost plus profits sale), tawarruq (reverse murabahah), 
and wa’ad (promise). However, to be accepted in global derivatives regulation, these Sharia 
compliant derivatives need to mirror global derivatives standardisation benchmarks. This is 
discussed in Chapter 6.  
 Chapter 6 continues the theme of how Islamic financial products can be adapted to 
manage risks arising in the Islamic finance industry.  It is argued that it is imperative to develop 
a standardised rule for Islamic derivatives. The introduction of the ISDA/IIFM Tahawwut 
Master Agreement provides standardization, as well as opening the door to largely untapped 
markets and opportunities for developing Sharia compliant derivatives. Chapter 6 argues that 
Islamic profit rate swaps need to be regulated in a fashion consistent with global risk regulatory 
schemes. In relation to Islamic profit rate swaps, the global benchmark of OTC derivatives 
trading mechanism, the ISDA Master Agreement should be applied. Although there are still 
some difficulties with the Sharia aspects of the Islamic master agreement (ISDA/IIFM 
Tahawwut Master Agreement), it provides a stepping stone towards modern Sharia compliant 
derivatives transactions.  
It may take some time until Islamic banks are able to integrate the Tahawwut into their 
own agreements and structures, the global standardization frameworks of the ISDA Master 
Agreement (as the main ingredients of the Tahawwut framework) will provide banks with 
incentives to make the transition. However, there are some continuing issues. These relate to 
close out netting mechanism for non-concluded transactions, whether the use of market 
quotations and loss method reduces the ability of the Tahawwut to mitigate counterparty risks 
in the event of market distress. The most important deficit is the lack of netting system in the 
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insolvency laws of Muslim jurisdictions. Until these difficulties are resolved, Islamic hedging 
(particularly derivatives) will struggle to exist in the global financial industry.  
Another important method of managing risk is insurance. This is examined in Chapter 
7. Islamic insurance, Takaful, is relatively modern. Despite the continuing debates on avoiding 
speculation and uncertainty, there is now acceptance of the general principles of insurance 
subject to varying qualifications in different jurisdictions. The difficulties have involved the 
issue whether Takaful must be based on a co-operative or mutual model where risk is shared 
or whether conventional style insurance involving risk transfer is permissible. Other difficulties 
have involved the issue of whether there can be a contract of insurance involving payment of 
premiums or a mere donation (tabaruu) and not a contractual arrangement. Further 
complications are encountered when insurance is offered through a joint stock company which 
provide challenges to the co-operative nature of insurance. Chapter 7 takes the view that 
insurance is a necessary part of any modern financial industry and Sharia rules must take into 
account practical considerations which include competitiveness, shareholder investment and 
risk management. Islamic insurance is imperative since modern Islamic financial markets 
cannot be separated from the insurance system. Furthermore, this formal takaful-based 
insurance complements traditional social security schemes that have flourished in Muslim 
traditions. Consistently with the themes of this thesis, the various models of takaful-based 
insurance reflect the modern processes of formulating Sharia rules for a modern financial 
industry.  
Chapter 8 discussed another pivotal risk management vehicle, namely the limited 
liability corporation. Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) are corporations. Traditionally, 
medieval Islamic juristic rules did not recognise that an ‘artificial person’ could have legal 
status. But as chapter 8 indicates an examination Islamic juristic rules provides a foundation 
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for not only recognising unlimited liability, but also limited liability. The former is derived 
from the concepts of musharakah and mudharabah, while the latter derived from the extension 
of the concept of dhimmah to a juristic person under modern interpretations of Sharia rules.   
 
11.6 Indonesian and Australian approaches 
  Indonesia and Australia provide a useful contrast between a centralised system 
governing Islamic finance such as in Indonesia and the Australian system which has no special 
provision for IFIs. Chapter 10 argues that in Indonesia, the legitimacy of local Islamic financial 
products and services have been derived from non-state agencies known as the Sharia Advisory 
Boards – Indonesian Ulama Council (DSN-MUI) rather than through state agencies and courts. 
DSN-MUI set their own juristic rules and perform the role of harmonising of Sharia opinions 
in the Indonesian financial industry. Islamic juristic rulings of the DSN-MUI are consistent 
with the global trend of financial fatwas allowing the adoption of various juristic rules in 
defining Indonesian Islamic financial forms. Although Indonesia is a Muslim majority country 
which follows the Shafi’i school, the reliance of this particular school has been absent in 
Islamic finance; juristic rules from the other three Islamic legal schools (Hanafi, Maliki, and 
Hanbali) have been dominant in following a selective Sharia rule method. 
 The position of the very few Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs) in Australia is very 
different. Chapter 10 indicates that Australian IFIs practice decentralized Sharia regulation. 
Local IFIs develop their own Sharia justifications for products and services offered to the 
markets. Australian regulators are not concerned with Sharia compliance aspects of Australian 
IFIs. Some adaptation has occurred in relation to taxation. For the purpose of applying taxation 
law, the taxation office examines the substance of local Islamic products and services with 
profit as being the same as interest-based products. The recognition of “substance over form” 
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in relation to some Islamic products such as murabahah-credit facilities avoids double taxation 
for this product making it competitive with conventional interest-based loans. This functional 
approach is effective where there is no specific regulation and no Sharia standardisation on 
Islamic financial products and services. Most products and services offered by Australian IFIs 
use the most common Islamic products such as murabahah-based financing.  
 Islamic finance in Australia is subject to the local legal system. Islamic financial contracts 
are governed by Australian law with Islamic law relevant only to the structure of the 
transactions.  The Australian legal system has not introduced different legal rules for Islamic 
financial transactions. The current Australian legal framework already facilitates Islamic 
financial transactions, especially retail products offered either by cooperative or fund 
managers, but within the existing framework of its private law. The effect is that Islamic 
finance can co-exist in a jurisdiction where there is no special provision for Sharia compliant 
products.  But Islamic finance is disadvantaged when it comes to taxation.  This has precluded 
the introduction of fully-pledged Islamic retail banking products in Australia. Sensitivity to 
legal diversity could be the gateway to success in this country. For example, legislative 
amendments to Australian tax law would enable the Islamic retail banking market to evolve in 
Australia. Although discussions on this subject were initiated almost a decade ago, the 
Australian Government has not yet been willing to facilitate such legislative amendments.  
 
11.7 Conclusion 
In summary, Sharia standardisation is not confined to a single interpretation of a 
particular legal school (madhab), but accommodates different views thus providing a plausible 
method of achieving modernisation of Islamic Law and finance. This method can be applied to 
particular Islamic banking products by allowing Sharia scholars in particular Islamic banks to 
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adopt different Islamic juristic rulings in developing modern Islamic financial products and 
services. 
Contemporary Islamic finance law reflects juristic pluralism in modern banking and the 
finance industry. This law is governed by the spirit of pre-modern contracts and arrangements 
and by the economic considerations of balancing risk and expected return.94 Banking and 
commercial laws are primarily tax driven and as such Islamic banking may lose out on the tax 
benefits available to conventional banking practice if Islamic finance law does not consider 
modern approaches in structuring financial contracts.95 In order to be viable, Sharia compliant 
instruments must be competitive in the financial market. If they are not Islamic banking will 
be limited to standard retail banking and play no role in the developing and financing of large 
infrastructure. Islamic products need to meet modern financial needs without losing the spirit 
of Sharia.  
 
  
                                                          
94 Compared to Kilian Balz, ‘Islamic Law as the Governing law under the Rome Convention: Universalist Lex Mercantoria vs. 
the Regional Unification of Law’ (2001) 8(1) Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law Online 73-85. 
95 Razeen Sappideen, ‘Islamic Banking in Australia: The Need for Meaningful Pluralism’, a paper presented in Sharia and 
Legal Pluralism in Western Sydney University, 7th July 2010. 
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